§ 8.36.1 Fragments of Book VIII
Be well assured that monstrous penalties in such cases not only destroy the culprits under sentence, who might have been made better, but at the same time fail to make others any more prudent. Human nature refuses to leave its regular course for any threats. 2 Some compelling fear or insolent audacity together with courage born of inexperience and rashness sprung from power, or some other combination of circumstances such as often occurs quite unexpectedly in the lives of many, leads men to do wrong. As for the punishments, some of these offenders do not even think of them, while others esteem them of no moment in comparison with the attainment of the ends for which they are striving.
§ 8.36.3 Wise forbearance, however, produces an effect quite the opposite of that just mentioned. For through the influence of a seasonable pardon the offenders themselves, in the first place, frequently change their ways, especially when they have acted from brave and not from evil motives, from ambition and not from baseness; for reasonable forbearance is a mighty force for subduing and correcting a noble spirit. Then, too, the rest are brought without resistance into a proper frame of mind by the sight of the rescue. Every one would rather obey than be forced, and prefers voluntary to compulsory observance of the law. That which a man chooses of his own accord he works for as if it were his own affair, but what is imposed upon him he rejects as unbecoming to a freeman.
§ 8.36.4 It is the part of the highest virtue and power alike not to kill a man (this is often done by the wickedest and weakest men), but to spare him and to preserve him; yet no one of us is at liberty to do that without your consent.
§ 8.36.5 It is my wish at length to cease from speaking. My poor spirit is weary, my voice is giving way, tears check my utterance, and fear closes my lips. But I am at a loss how to close. For my sorrow, which appears to me in no doubtful light, does not allow me to be silent, — unless you decide otherwise, — but compels me, as if the safety of my boy would depend upon whatever I say last, to speak even further, as it were in prayers.
§ 8.36.6 He shrank from changing the name and form of the office with which he was invested, and although he was intending to spare Rullus, — for he observed the zeal of the populace, — he wished, by resisting for some time, not only to make the favour the greater to him, but also to correct the young men more effectively as a result of the unexpectedness of the pardon.
§ 8.36.7 Therefore he knit his brows, and darting a frowning look at the populace, he raised his voice and spoke. The talking had ceased, but still they were not quiet; instead, as generally happens in such a case, what with groaning over the fate of the master of horse and muttering to one another, although they did not utter a single word, they gave the impression that they desired his preservation. Papirius, seeing this and fearing they might even become mutinous, relaxed the very domineering manner which he had assumed, for the purpose of their correction, to an excessive degree, and by showing moderation in his conduct generally brought them once more to friendship and enthusiasm for him, so that they acquitted themselves like men when they met their opponents.
§ 8.36.8 The Samnites, after their defeat at the hands of the Romans, made proposals for peace to the Romans in the city. They sent them all the Roman captives that they had; and they furthermore ravaged the property of a certain Papius, who was esteemed among the foremost of their race and bore the entire responsibility for the war, and likewise scattered abroad his bones, since he had anticipated their vengeance by committing suicide. Yet they did not obtain the desired peace; for they were regarded as untrustworthy and had the name of making truces in the face of disasters merely for the purpose of cheating any power that conquered them. Hence they not only failed to obtain any terms, but even brought a relentless war upon themselves; for the Romans, though they had received the prisoners, voted to wage implacable war upon them.
§ 8.36.10 Among the many events of human history that might give one cause for wonder must certainly be reckoned what occurred at this time. The Romans, who were so extremely arrogant as to vote that they would not again receive a herald from the Samnites in the matter of peace and moreover expected to capture them all at the first blow, succumbed to a terrible disaster and incurred disgrace as never before; while the enemy, who were badly frightened to begin with, and thought their failure to gain terms a great calamity, captured alive the entire Roman army, and sent them all under the yoke. So great a reversal of fortune did they experience.
One of these leaders was Lucius Papirius, also called Cursor from his physical prowess (he was a very fleet runner) and on account of his practising running. After this Papirius, as dictator, with Fabius Rullus, as master of the horse, was sent out against the Samnites and by defeating them compelled them to agree to such terms as he wished. But when he had resigned his command they again rose in arms.
They were attacked anew by the dictator Aulus Cornelius, and being defeated, made proposals for peace to the men at Rome. They sent them all the captives that they had, and ascribed the responsibility for the war to Rutulus [Papius Brutulus], a man of great influence among them; and since he had anticipated their vengeance by destroying himself, they scattered abroad his bones. Yet they did not obtain the desired peace, being accounted untrustworthy; instead, the victors, though they had received the prisoners, voted for relentless war against them. Thus the Romans, expecting in their extreme arrogance to capture them all at the first blow, succumbed to a terrible disaster. For the Samnites, who were badly frightened and thought their failure to gain terms a calamity, fought with desperation; and by planting an ambuscade in a rather narrow valley they both captured the camp and seized alive the whole force of the Romans, all of whom they sent under the yoke. The nature of the yoke has already been described by me above. They killed none of them, however, but took away their arms and horses and everything else they had save one garment, and released them, thus stripped of their possessions, under an agreement that they should leave Samnite territory and be their allies on an equal footing. And in order to make sure that the articles of the agreement were ratified also by the senate, they retained six hundred of the knights as hostages.
§ 8.36.11 Benefits lie rather within the actual choice of men and are not brought about by necessity, or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily by a willing and eager mind. For this reason it is proper to pity, admonish, and instruct those who commit any offence, but to admire, love, and reward those who do right. And whenever both kinds of treatment are received from the same individuals, it is decidedly more befitting our characters to remember their good rather than their disagreeable actions.
§ 8.36.12 Quarrels are ended by kindness. The greater the pitch of enmity to which a man has come when he unexpectedly meets with safety instead of vengeance, the more eagerly does he abandon quarrel and the more gladly does he yield to the influence of kindness. And just as among persons at variance for one reason or another those who have passed from friendship to enmity hate anyone with the more intense hatred, so among recipients of kindness those who have experienced this considerate treatment after a state of strife love their benefactors with the stronger affection. Now the Romans are very anxious to surpass in war, and at the same time they honour virtue; and so, impelled by their nobility of spirit, they gain success in both, since they take pains to return like treatment for like, with interest. 13 Now it is quite right to take pride in requiting those who have done us some injury, but we ought to give greater honour from rewarding those who have conferred some benefit.
§ 8.36.14 All men are by nature so constituted as to grieve more over insults offered them than they rejoice over benefits conferred upon them; therefore they attack those who have injured them more readily than they requite those who have shown them kindness. They take no account, when their own advantage is concerned, of the evil reputation they will get by not adopting a friendly attitude toward their preserver, but indulge their wrath even when such behaviour runs counter to their own interest.
Such was the advice he gave them out of his own inherent good sense and experience acquired in a long life; for he had regard, not to what might gratify them at the moment, but to what might cause them sorrow in the future. 15 The people of Capua, when the Romans after their defeat arrived in that city, were guilty of no bitter speech or outrageous act, but on the contrary gave them both food and horses and received them like victors. They pitied in their misfortune the men whom they would not have wished to see conquer on account of the treatment these same persons had formerly accorded them.
§ 8.36.16 When the Romans heard of the affair, they were thoroughly embarrassed, finding themselves unable either to feel pleased at the survival of their soldiers or yet to feel displeased. When they thought of the calamitous disgrace, their grief was extreme, for they regarded it as particularly shameful to have met with this defeat at the hands of the Samnites, and they could wish that all their men had perished; when they stopped to reflect, however, that if such a disaster had befallen them they would have been in danger of losing all the rest as well, they were not sorry to hear that the men had been saved.
The consuls Spurius Postumius and Tiberius Calvinus with their army immediately withdrew, and at night they and the other more prominent officers entered Rome, while the surviving soldiers scattered through the country districts. The men in the city on learning of the affair were unable either to feel pleased at the survival of their soldiers or yet to feel displeased. When they thought of the calamity, their grief was extreme, and the fact that they had suffered such a defeat at the hands of the Samnites increased their grief; when they stopped to consider, however, that if it had come to pass that all had perished, they would have been in danger of losing everything, they were really pleased at the survival of their men.
But concealing for a time their satisfaction, they went into mourning and carried on no business in the usual manner either then or later until they in their turn were victorious. The consuls they deposed forthwith, chose others in their stead, and took counsel about the situation. And they determined not to accept the arrangement; but since it was impossible to take this action without placing the responsibility upon the men who had conducted the negotiations, they hesitated, on the one hand, to condemn the consuls and the others associated with them, who, in their capacity as holders of certain offices, had made the truce, and they hesitated, on the other hand, to acquit them, since by so doing they would bring the breach of faith home to themselves. Accordingly they made these consuls themselves participate in their deliberations; and they asked Postumius first of all for his opinion, in order that he might pronounce judgment against himself, through shame at the thought of bringing reproach upon them all.
§ 8.36.17 It is requisite and blameless for all men to plan for their own safety, and if they get into any danger, to do anything whatsoever in order to be saved.
Pardon is granted both by gods and men to those who have committed any act involuntarily. 18 a Dio, Book VIII. "I both take upon myself the crime and admit the perjury."
§ 8.36.19 The Samnites, seeing that neither the terms were observed by the Romans nor gratitude manifested in any other way, and that few men instead of many were surrendered, in violation of the oaths, became terribly angry and conjured the Romans in the name of the gods; and reminding them of their pledges, they demanded back the captives and ordered them to pass naked under the same yoke from which through pity they had been released, in order that by experience they might learn to abide by terms which had once been agreed upon.
§ 8.36.20 They sent back those who had been surrendered, either because they did not think it right to destroy those guiltless men or because they wished to fasten the perjury upon the populace and not through the punishment of a few men to absolve the rest. This they did, hoping as a result to secure decent treatment.
§ 8.36.21 The Romans, so far from being grateful to the Samnites for the preservation of the surrendered soldiers, actually behaved as if they had in this affair suffered some outrage. In their anger they continued the war, and upon vanquishing the Samnites accorded them the same treatment in their turn. For the justice of the battle-field does not, as a rule, fit the ordinary definition of the word, and it is not inevitable that those wronged should conquer; instead, war, in its absolute sway, adjusts everything to the advantage of the victor, often causing something that is the reverse of justice to go under that name.
§ 8.36.22 The Romans after vanquishing the Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as satisfactory to their honour a repayment of similar disgrace. Thus did Fortune in the case of both peoples in the briefest time reverse her position, and, by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of these same outraged foes, show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme.
So he came forward and said that their acts ought not to be ratified by the senate and the people, since they themselves had not acted of their own free will, but under the compulsion of a necessity which the enemy had brought upon them, not through valour, but through treachery and ambuscade. Now men who had practised deception could not, if they had been deceived in turn, have any just complaint against those who turned the tables on them. When he had expressed these sentiments and many more of the same nature, the senate found itself at a loss how to act; but inasmuch as Postumius and Calvinus took the responsibility upon themselves, it was voted that the agreement should not be ratified and that these men should be delivered up.
Both the consuls, therefore, and the other officials who had been present when the oaths were taken were conducted back to Samnium. But the Samnites did not accept them; instead, they demanded back all the captives, and conjured the Romans in the name of all the gods, and finally they sent back the men who had been surrendered. The Romans were glad enough to get them back, but were angry at the Samnites, and attacked them in battle; and vanquishing them, they meted out to them treatment similar to that which they had received: they sent them under the yoke in their turn and released them without inflicting any other injury. They also received back unharmed their own knights, who had been held by the Samnites as hostages. 1 . After a number of years the Romans, under the leadership of Gaius Junius, were again warring with the Samnites, when they met with disaster. While Junius was pillaging their territory the Samnites conveyed their possessions into the Avernian woods, so called because on account of their denseness not even the birds fly into them. And having taken refuge there, they stationed some flocks in front of their position without shepherds or guards, and then secretly sent some pretended deserters who guided the Romans to the booty apparently lying at their disposal. But when the latter had entered the wood, the Samnites surrounded them and slaughtered them until completely exhausted.
And though the Samnites fought on many other occasions against the Romans and were defeated, they did not remain quiet; instead, they secured the Gauls and others as allies, and made preparations to march upon Rome itself.
§ 8.36.23 Papirius made a campaign against the Samnites, and after reducing them to a state of siege, was entrenched before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive use of wine, whereupon he replied: "That I am not a drunkard is clear to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I take the wine to lull me to rest."
§ 8.36.24 The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison became angry on not finding the general from Praeneste at his post. He summoned him and bade the lictor make ready his axe. When the general thereupon became alarmed and terrified, his fear sufficed for Papirius; he harmed him no further, but merely commanded the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they should not injure passes-by.
§ 8.36.25 Success is not at all constant in the case of most men, but leads many aside into carelessness and ruins them.
§ 8.36.26 The men of the city put forward Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they sent to him and begged him to place the common weal before his private grudge. Now he gave the envoys no response, but when night had come (according to ancient custom it was absolutely necessary that the dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius, and by this act gained the greatest renown.
§ 8.36.27 Appius the Blind and Volumnius became at variance with each other; and it was owing to this that Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the assembly with showing no gratitude for the progress he had made in wisdom through his [Appius'] instruction, replied that he had indeed grown wiser, as stated, and that he furthermore admitted the fact, but that Appius had not advanced at all in the science of war.
§ 8.36.28 In regard to the prophecy the multitude was not capable for the time being of either believing or disbelieving him [Manius]. It neither wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely painful position, distracted as it was between hope and fear. As each single event occurred the people applied the interpretation to it according to the actual result, and the man himself undertook to assume some reputation for skill with regard to foreknowledge of the unseen.
§ 8.36.29 The Samnites, enraged at what had occurred and feeling it disgraceful to be continually defeated, resorted to extreme daring and recklessness, with the intention of either conquering or being utterly destroyed. They assembled all their men that were of military age, threatening with death any one of their number who should remain at home, and they bound themselves with frightful oaths, each man swearing not to flee from the contest himself and to slay any one who should undertake to do so.
§ 8.36.30 The Romans, on hearing that their consul Fabius had been worsted in the war, became terribly angry, summoned him home, and proceeded to try him. He was vehemently denounced before the people, — though he was distressed by the injury to his father's reputation even more than by the charges, — and no opportunity was afforded him for reply. But the elder Fabius, although he did not make a set defence of his son, did enumerate his own services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that his son should do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people's wrath, especially since he urged his son's youth as an excuse for his error.
§ 8.36.31 And joining him at once in the campaign, he overthrew the Samnites in battle, elated as they were by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The Romans therefore both extolled him and ordered that his son should command also for the future, as pro-consul, and still employ his father as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him, sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily assisted the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. Yet he did not let it appear that he was doing things on his own responsibility, but he associated with his son as if actually in the capacity of counsellor and under-officer, while he acted with moderation and assigned to him the glory of the exploits.
§ Zon105.1 The Romans, when they learned of this, were in a state of alarm, particularly since many portents were causing them anxiety. On the Capitol blood is reported to have issued for three days from the altar of Jupiter, also honey on one day and milk on another — if anybody can believe it; and in the Forum a bronze statue of Victory set upon a stone pedestal was found standing on the ground below, without any one's having moved it; and, as it happened, it was facing in that direction from which the Gauls were already approaching. This of itself was enough to terrify the populace, who were even more dismayed by ill-omened interpretations of the seers. However, a certain Manius, by birth an Etruscan, encouraged them by declaring that Victory, even if she had descended, had at any rate gone forward, and being now established more firmly on the ground, indicated to them mastery in the war. Accordingly, many sacrifices, too, would be offered to the gods; for their altars, and particularly those on the Capitol, where they sacrifice thank-offerings for victory, were regularly stained with blood on the occasion of Roman successes and not in times of disaster. From these circumstances, then, he persuaded them to expect some fortunate outcome, but from the honey to expect disease, since invalids crave it, and from the milk, famine; for they should encounter so great a scarcity of provisions that they would seek for food of natural and spontaneous origin. Manius, then, interpreted the omens in this way, and as his prophecy turned out to be in accordance with subsequent events, he gained a reputation for skill and foreknowledge. Now Volumnius was ordered to make war upon the Samnites,
§ Zon106.1 while Fabius Maximus Rullus and Publius Decius were chosen consuls and were sent to withstand the Gauls and their fellow-warriors. And when the consuls had come with speed to Etruria, and had seen the camp of Appius, which was fortified by a double palisade, they pulled up the stakes and carried them off, instructing the soldiers to place their hope of safety in their weapons. So they joined battle with the enemy. Meanwhile a wolf in pursuit of a hind entered the space between the two armies, and darting toward the Romans, passed through their ranks. This encouraged them, for they looked upon him as belonging to themselves, since, according to tradition, a she-wolf had reared Romulus. But the hind ran to the other side and was struck down, thus leaving to the enemy fear and the issue of disaster. When the armies clashed, Maximus quite easily conquered the foes opposed to him, but Decius was defeated. And recalling the self-devotion of his father, undertaken on account of the dream, he likewise devoted himself, though without sharing his intention with anybody. Scarcely had he been slain when the man ranged at his side, partly out of respect for him (since they felt he had perished voluntarily for them) and partly in the hope of certain victory as a result of his act, checked their flight and nobly withstood their pursuers. At this juncture Maximus, too, assailed the latter in the rear and slaughtered vast numbers. The survivors took to flight and were annihilated. Fabius Maximus then burned the corpse of Decius together with the spoils and made a truce with the enemy, who sued for peace.
The following year Atilius Regulus again waged war upon the Samnites. And for a time they carried on an evenly-balanced struggle, but eventually, after the Samnites had won a victory, the Romans conquered them in turn, took them captive, led them beneath the yoke, and then released them. The Samnites, enraged at what had occurred, resorted to recklessness with the intention of either conquering or being utterly destroyed, threatening with death the man who should remain at home.
§ Zon107.1 So these invaded Campania; but the consuls ravaged Samnium, which was now destitute of soldiers, and captured a few cities. Therefore the Samnites, abandoning Campania, made haste to reach their own land; and joining battle with one of the consuls, they were defeated by a ruse and in their flight met with terrible reverses, even losing their camp and in addition the fortress to the assistance of which they were advancing. The consul called a triumph and turned over to the treasury the moneys realized from the spoils. The other consul made a campaign against the Etruscans and reduced them in a short time; he then levied upon them contributions of grain and money, of which he distributed a part to the soldiers and deposited the rest in the treasury.
§ Zon107.11 However, there befell a mighty pestilence, and the Samnites and Faliscans started an uprising; they felt contempt for the Romans both on account of the disease and because, since no war menaced, they had not chosen the consuls on grounds of excellence. The Romans, ascertaining the situation, sent out Carvilius along with Junius Brutus, and with Quintus Fabius his father Maximus Rullus, as lieutenants or envoys. Brutus, accordingly, worsted the Faliscans and plundered their possessions as well as those of the other Etruscans; and Fabius marched out of Rome before his father and pushed rapidly forward when he learned that the Samnites were plundering Campania. Falling in with some scouts of theirs and seeing them quickly retire, he got the impression that all the enemy were at that point and believed they were in flight. Accordingly, in his hurry to come to blows with them before his father should arrived, in order that the success might appear to be his own and not his elder's, he went ahead with a careless formation. But he encountered the enemy in a compact body, and would have lost his entire army, had not night come on. Many of his men, moreover, died afterwards, with no physician or medical appliances at hand, because they had hastened on far ahead of the baggage-carriers in the expectation of immediate victory. And they would certainly have perished on the following day but for the fact that the Samnites, believing Fabius' father was near at hand, felt afraid and withdrew.
§ Zon108.1 Those in the city on hearing this became terribly angry, summoned the consul, and wished to put him on trial. But the elder Fabius, his father, by enumerating his own and his ancestors' brave deeds, by promising that his son should do nothing unworthy of them, and by urging the latter's youth to account for the misfortune, immediately abated their wrath. And joining him in the campaign, he conquered the Samnites in battle, captured their camp, ravaged their country, and drove off great booty; a part of this he turned over to the treasury and a part he granted to the soldiers. For these reasons the Romans both extolled him and ordered that the son should command also for the future, as pro-consul, and still employ his father as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything himself, sparing his old age not a whit, yet he did not let it appear that he was doing things on his own responsibility, but made the glory of his exploit attach to his son.
§ 8.36.32 The soldiers . . . after setting out with Postumius, fell sick on the way, and it was thought their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. Postumius was recalled for these reasons, but showed contempt for them [the senators?] even at this juncture, declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of the senate.
§ 8.36.40 Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on that account not only was obnoxious to Rufinus, but was always at variance with him. Yet he appointed the latter, thinking that he was a most proper person to meet the requirements of the war, 2 and making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the commonwealth. From this action also he gained renown, in that he had shown himself superior even to jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a true patriot and did not practise virtue for a show, he thought it a matter of indifference whether the state were benefited by him or by some other man, even if that man were an opponent.
§ 8.36.33 Gaius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to his foe, praised the general excellence of Rufinus, and added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being sold by the enemy.
§ 8.37.1 Curius, in defending his conduct before the people, declared that he had acquired so much land that any smaller number of men could not have tilled it, and had captured so many men that any smaller territory would have been insufficient for them.
When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law prohibiting imprisonment for debt was often proposed without avail, since the lenders were desirous of recovering everything and the tribunes offered the rich the choice of either putting this law to the vote and recovering their principal only or . . . of receiving . . . in three annual payments.
§ 8.37.3 And for the time being the poorer class, fearing they might lose all, accepted both alternatives, and the wealthier class, encouraged to believe they would not be compelled to accept either alternative, displayed anger. But when . . ., the situation became reversed for both sides. The debtors were no longer satisfied with either plan, and the rich thought they should be lucky if they were not deprived of their principal also. Hence the dispute was not decided immediately, but for a long time after this they continued to clash in a spirit of contentiousness; and, in general, they did not act in their usual character. 4 Finally the people would not make peace even when the nobles were willing to concede much more than had originally been hoped for. On the contrary, the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more they became emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and consequently they would minimize the concessions made to them from time to time, feeling that these had been won by force; and they strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone thereto the fact that they had already obtained something.
§ 8.37.2 After this, when some of the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the people, since this was not granted by the lenders as well, began a sedition; and this was not quieted until foes came against the city.
§ 8.38.1 When the enemy saw that another general also had come, they ceased to heed the common interests of their expedition, and each cast about to secure his individual safety, as is the common practice of those who form a union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common grievances, or who have not a single commander; while good fortune attends them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one looks after his own interests only. 2 And they betook themselves to flight as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them to force their way out, or for their flight to pass unnoticed, but if they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone, they ought more easily to escape. And so, arranging their flight each in the way that seemed safest in his own judgment . . .
§ 9.39.1 Fragments of Book IX
The Romans had learned that the Tarentines and some others were making ready to war against them, and had despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent any revolt on their part; but these people arrested him, and by sending men to the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls caused a number of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later.
§ 9.39.3 The Tarentines, although they had themselves begun the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know it on account of their temporary embarrassments. Hereupon the Tarentines, thinking either that they would get off with impunity or that they were entirely unobserved, because they were receiving no complains, behaved still more insolently and forced the Romans even against their will to make war upon them. This confirms the saying that even success, when it comes to men in undue measure, proves a source of misfortune to them; for it leads them on into folly — since moderation will not dwell with vanity — and causes them the gravest disasters. Just so these Tarentines, after enjoying exceptional prosperity, met in turn with misfortune that was an equivalent return for their insolence.
§ 9.39.5 Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentines were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre one afternoon, they suspected that he was sailing against them. Immediately, in a passion and partly under the influence of intoxication, they set sail in turn; and thus, without any show force on his part or the slightest suspicion of any hostile act, they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. 6 When the Romans heard of this, they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys, in order not to appear to have passed over the affair in silence and in that way render them more arrogant. But the Tarentines, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance.
§ 9.39.7 It was the city garb, which was in use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of dignity or else by way of precaution, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revellers accordingly jeered at them — they were also celebrating a festival, which, though they were at no time noted for temperate behaviour, rendered them still more wanton — and finally a man planted himself in the way of Postumius, and stooping over, relieved his bowels and soiled the envoy's clothing. 8 At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous verses against the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood."
§ 9.39.9 Hearing this, they ceased their jests, but made no move toward obtaining pardon for their insult; indeed, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they had let the ambassadors withdraw unharmed. 10 Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentines not to engage in war with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revellers and a flute-girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the cordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as people are apt to do under such circumstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, said: "Now it is our privilege both to be drunk and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we should be slaves."
§ 9.40.5 King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by the aid of Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch [Pyrrhus, 14], was skilled in speaking — the only man, in fact, to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Now, as a sensible man, he recognized the folly of the expedition and endeavoured to dissuade Pyrrhus from it. For the latter intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the king's fondness for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles countless thousands of his own forces.
§ 9.40.3 King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by conferring benefits and partly by inspiring fear. The Aetolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip the Macedonian, and the chieftains in Illyricum paid court to him. In natural brilliancy, in power acquired by education, and in experience of affairs he far surpassed all men, so as to be rated even beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, great as these were.
§ 9.40.4 Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers because he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans; and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time so forestall the Romans with some plausible excuse before he should suffer injury at their hands. For so careful was he about his good reputation that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the power of the Romans, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities against them, when no wrong had been done him. 6 Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and inquired of the oracle about the expedition. And when the response came to him, "You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish — for desire is very apt to deceive one — and did not even await the coming of spring.
§ 9.40.7 The Rhegians had asked the Romans for a garrison, and Decius was the leader of it. But the majority of these guards, as a result of the abundance of supplies and the generally easy habits — for they were under far less rigid discipline than they had known at home — and at the instigation of Decius, formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as if they might be quite free to accomplish whatever they pleased, now that the Romans were busied with the Tarentines and with Pyrrhus.
§ 9.40.8 They were the more easily persuaded owing to the fact that they saw Messana in the possession of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison the place by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the inhabitants and occupied the city. The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. 9 Instead, Decius forged letters purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the Romans; he even assembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by addressing them in words appropriate to the occasion he exasperated them still further. The effect was enhanced by the announcement of a man, who had been assigned to the rôle, that a portion of Pyrrhus' fleet had anchored off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. 10 Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before they met with some harm, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed into their lodging-places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers; but a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there.
§ 9.40.11 Decius, the commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful association or the bonds of kinship.
§ 9.40.12 The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For while they were busied with concerns that were greater and or urgent, they gave the impression that they regarded this affair as of slight moment.
§ 9.40.13 The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was coming, were overcome with fear, since they had hear that he was a great warrior himself and had a large and irresistible army — just the sort of reports, of course, that always come to those inquiring about persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance.
§ 9.113.1 Those to begin the wars were the Tarentines, who had associated with themselves the Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites, and numerous other tribes. These allies the Romans engaged and defeated in various battles, with different consuls on different occasions; but the Tarentines, although they had themselves begun the war, nevertheless did not yet openly array themselves for battle. Now Lucius Valerius, the admiral, while proceeding with his triremes to a place whither he had been despatched with them, wished to anchor off Tarentum, supposing the country to be friendly. But the Tarentines, owing to a guilty sense of their own operations, suspected that Valerius was sailing against them, and in a rage set sail in turn, and attacking him when he was expecting no hostile act, sent to the bottom both him and many others. Of the captives they imprisoned some and put others to death. When the Romans heard of this they were indignant, but nevertheless despatched envoys, upbraiding them and demanding satisfaction. The offenders, however, not only failed to give them any decent answer, but actually jeered at them, going so far as to soil the clothing of Lucius Postumius, the head of the embassy. At this an uproar arose and the Tarentines indulged in loud guffaws. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood."
§ 9.116 Upon the return of the envoys the Romans, learning what had been done, were grieved, and voted that Lucius Aemilius, the consul, should make a campaign against the Tarentines. He advanced to Tarentum and sent them favourable propositions, thinking they would choose peace on some fair terms. But they were at variance among themselves in their opinions. The elderly and well-to-do were anxious for peace, but those who were youthful and who had little or nothing were for war; and the younger generation had its way. But feeling timid, nevertheless, they planned to invite Pyrrhus of Epirus to form and alliance, and sent to him envoys and gifts. Aemilius, learning of this, proceeded to pillage and devastate their country. They made sorties, but were routed, so that the Romans ravaged their country with impunity and got possession of some strongholds. Aemilius showed much consideration for those taken prisoners and liberated some of the more influential; and the Tarentines, accordingly, filled with admiration for his kindness, were led to hope for reconciliation, and so chose as general, with full powers, Agis, who was a good friend of the Romans. Scarcely had he been elected when Cineas, sent ahead by Pyrrhus, planted himself in the pathway of negotiations.
§ 9.117 Now Pyrrhus, king of the district called Epirus, surpassed all men in natural cleverness, in power acquired by education, and in experience; and he had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by conferring favours and partly by inspiring fear. Accordingly, when chance threw the envoys of the Tarentines in his way, he considered the alliance a piece of good luck. For a long time he had had his eye on Sicily and Carthage and Sardinia, but nevertheless he shrank from personally taking the initiative in hostilities against the Romans. So he promised to aid the Tarentines; but in order that he might not arouse suspicions (for the reasons stated) he announced that he would return home without delay, and insisted upon a clause being added to the agreement to the effect that he should not be detained by them in Italy further than actual need required. After making this agreement he detained the majority of the envoys as hostages, giving out that he wanted them to help him get the armies ready; a few of them, together with Cineas, he sent in advance with troops. As soon as they arrived, the Tarentines took courage, gave up their attempted reconciliation with the Romans, and deposing Agis from his command, elected one of the envoys general. Shortly afterward Milo, sent by Pyrrhus with a force, took possession of their acropolis to serve as headquarters for the king, and personally superintended the manning of their wall. The Tarentines rejoiced at this, since they did not have to do guard duty or undergo any other troublesome labour, and they sent regular supplies of food to the men and consignments of money to Pyrrhus.
§ 9.118 Aemilius for a time held his ground, but when he perceived that the soldiers of Pyrrhus had arrived, and also found himself unable on account of the winter to hold out any longer, he started for Apulia. The Tarentines laid an ambush at a narrow pass through which he was obliged to go, and by means of their arrows, javelins and slings rendered progress impossible for him. But he put at the head of his line the captives whom he was conveying; and the enemy, fearing they might destroy their own men instead of the Romans, desisted from their attack.
Now Pyrrhus set out, not even awaiting the coming of spring, taking along a large, picked army, and twenty elephants, beasts never previously beheld by the Italians; hence they were invariably filled with alarm and astonishment. While crossing the Ionian Gulf he encountered a storm and lost many soldiers from his army;
§ 9.119 the remainder were scattered by the violent seas. Only with difficulty, even, and by a land journey did he reach Tarentum. He at once impressed those of military age into service along with his own soldiers, lest, if formed into separate companies of their own, they might become mutinous; he closed the theatre, ostensibly on account of the war and to prevent the people from gathering there and setting on foot any uprising; also he forbade them to assemble for banquets and revels, and ordered the youth to practise in arms instead of spending the day in the market-place. When some, indignant at this, left the ranks, he stationed guards from his own contingent so that no one could leave the city. The inhabitants, oppressed by these measures and by supplying food, and compelled to receive the guardsmen into their houses, repented, since they found in Pyrrhus a master instead of an ally. He, fearing for these reasons that they might lean to the Roman cause, took note of all the men who had any ability as politicians or could dominate the populace, and sent them one after another to Epirus to his son on various excuses; occasionally, however, he would quietly assassinate them instead. A certain Aristarchus, who was among the noblest of the Tarentines and was a most persuasive speaker, he made his bosom friend, to the end that he should be suspected by the people of having the interests of Pyrrhus at heart. When, however, he saw that he still had the confidence of the multitude, he gave him an errand to Epirus. Aristarchus, not daring to dispute his behest, set sail, but went to Rome.
§ 9.121 Such was the behaviour of Pyrrhus toward the Tarentines. Those in Rome, learning that Pyrrhus had come to Tarentum, were overcome with fear, because the Italian states had been set at enmity with them, and because it was the common report that he was a great warrior and had an irresistible army. So they proceeded to enlist soldiers and to gather money and to distribute garrisons among the allied cities to prevent them from revolting likewise; and learning in time that some were on the point of changing their allegiance, they punished the principal men in them. A handful of those from Praeneste were brought to Rome late one afternoon and thrown into the treasury for safe-keeping. Thereby a certain oracle was fulfilled concerning them. For an oracle had told them once that they should occupy the Roman treasury. The oracle, even, turned out in this way; but the men lost their lives.
Valerius Laevinus was despatched against Pyrrhus, the Tarentines, and the rest of their associates, but a part of the army was retained in the city. Laevinus accordingly set out at once on his march, so that he might carry on the war as far as possible from the Roman territory. He hoped it would frighten Pyrrhus when the very men whom the king had thought to besiege should of their own accord advance against his troops. In the course of his journey he seized a strong strategic point in the land of the Lucanians, and he left behind a force in Lucania to hinder the people from giving aid to his opponents.
Pyrrhus, on learning of Laevinus' approach, set forth before the latter came in sight, established his camp, and was desirous of using up time while waiting for his allies. And he sent a haughty letter to Laevinus with the purpose of overawing him. The contents were as follows:
§ 9.122 "King Pyrrhus to Laevinus, Greeting. I learn that you are leading an army against Tarentum. Send it away, therefore, and come to me yourself with a few attendants. For I will judge between you, if you have any charge to bring against each other, and I will compel the party at fault, however unwilling, to deal justly." Laevinus wrote back thus in reply to Pyrrhus: "You seem to me, Pyrrhus, to be perfectly crazy when you set yourself up as judge between the Tarentines and us, before rendering us an account of your crossing over into Italy at all. I will come, therefore, with my whole army and will exact the proper recompense both from the Tarentines and from you. What use have I for nonsense and palaver, when I can stand trial in the court of Mars, our progenitor?" After sending this reply he hurried on and pitched camp in such wise that the river which flows through that district was between him and the enemy. Having captured some scouts, he showed them his troops, and after telling them he had more of them — many times that number — he sent them back. Pyrrhus, alarmed at this, was not desirous of fighting, since some of the allies had not joined him, and also since he kept hoping that provisions would fail the Romans while they delayed on hostile soil. Laevinus also took this possibility into account, and was eager to join battle. But as the soldiers had become terrified at the reputation of Pyrrhus and because of the elephants, he called them together and delivered a speech containing many exhortations to courage; then he busily prepared to join issue with Pyrrhus, willing or unwilling.
§ 9.40.15 Ambition and distrust are ever the associates of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that these should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friendships. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a fictitious appearance of comradeship, but find it to be without secure support.
§ 9.40.16 Generalship, if it be assisted by respectable forces, contributes greatly both to their preservation and to their victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that avails aught without persons to coöperate and to aid in its administration.
The latter had no heart to fight, but in order to avoid an appearance of fearing the Romans he also in person addressed his men, inciting them to battle. Laevinus tried to cross the river opposite the camp, but was prevented. Retiring, therefore, he himself remained in position with the infantry, but sent the cavalry off, ostensibly on a marauding expedition, with instructions to march along some distance and even to cross the stream. In this way the cavalry assailed the enemy unexpectedly in the rear, while Laevinus in the midst of the foe's confusion crossed the river and took part in the battle. Pyrrhus came to the aid of his own men, who were in flight, but lost his horse by a wound; and they believed him to be dead. Then, with the one side dejected and the other scornfully elated, the situation had become altered. Pyrrhus became aware of this and gave his raiment, which was more striking than that of the rest, to Megacles, bidding him put it on and ride about in all directions, so that in the belief that the king was safe his opponents might be inspired with fear and his followers with courage. As for himself, he put on the dress of a private soldier and encountered the Romans with his full army, except for the elephants; and by bringing assistance to his troops wherever they were in trouble he aided them greatly. At first, even, for a large part of the day, they fought evenly; but when a man killed Megacles, thinking he had killed Pyrrhus and creating this impression in the minds of the rest, the Romans gained strength and their opponents began to give way.
§ 9.40.18 When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap, the battle took an opposite turn. The one side was filled with much greater boldness as a result of his safety and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead; the other side, deceived a second time, had no longer any zeal left, but since they had been once more cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to the expectation of disaster, they had no hope that he might perish after that.
§ 9.40.19 When some men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is also told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans."
§ 9.40.21 Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who had been remaining neutral came over to his side and all the allies who had been watching the turn of events joined him. He did not openly display anger towards them nor did he entirely conceal his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their delay, but otherwise received them kindly.
§ 9.124 Pyrrhus, noting what was taking place, cast off his cap and went about with his head bare; and the battle took an opposite turn. Seeing this, Laevinus, who had horsemen in hiding somewhere outside the battle, ordered them to attack the enemy in the rear. As a counter-move to this Pyrrhus raised the signal for the elephants. Then, indeed, at the sight of the animals, which was out of all common experience, at their frightful trumpeting, and also at the clatter of arms which their riders made, seated in the towers, both the Romans themselves were panic-stricken and their horses became frenzied and bolted, either shaking off their riders or bearing them away. Disheartened at this, the Roman army was turned to flight, and in their rout some soldiers were slain by the men in the towers on the elephants' backs, and others by the beasts themselves, which destroyed many with their trunks and tusks (or teeth) and crushed and trampled under foot as many more. The cavalry, following after, slew many; and not one, indeed, would have been left, had not an elephant been wounded, and not only gone to struggling itself as a result of the wound but also by its trumpeting thrown the rest into confusion. This restrained Pyrrhus from pursuit and the Romans thus managed to cross the river and make their escape into an Apulian city.
§ 9.125 Many of Pyrrhus' soldiers and officers alike fell, so that when some men congratulated him on his victory, he said: "If we ever conquer again in like fashion, it will be our ruin." The Romans, however, he admired even in their defeat, declaring: "I should have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." Pyrrhus, accordingly, acquired a great reputation for his victory and many came over to his side; and the allies also espoused his cause. These he rebuked somewhat on account of their tardiness, but gave them a share of the spoils. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement,
§ 9.40.22 while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he should either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or should be suspected of harbouring secret wrath. And such feelings would breed in them either contempt or hatred, and would lead to a plot against him, due to their desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands. For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and gave them some of the spoils.
§ 9.40.23 Pyrrhus at first tried to persuade the Roman captives, who were many, to join with him in a campaign against Rome; but when they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put any of them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through them to win over the city without a battle.
§ 9.40.24 Although on account of the elephants, a kind of beast they had never before seen, the Romans had fallen into dismay, nevertheless, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no animal is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority, if not as regards strength, at least in respect of intelligence, they began to take heart.
§ 9.40.25 The soldiers of Pyrrhus, moreover, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for the plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger.
§ 9.40.26 The Epirots, displeased because they were getting nothing but trouble after entering upon the campaign in such high hopes, ravaged the territory of their friends. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans, inasmuch as the inhabitants of Italy who had been on the point of leaguing themselves with him, on seeing that his troops ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, drew back; for they considered his acts rather than his promises.
§ 9.126 The men of Rome were grieved at their defeat, but sent an army to Laevinus; and they summoned Tiberius from Etruria and put the city under guard when they learned that Pyrrhus was hastening against it. And Laevinus, as soon as he had cured his wounded soldiers and collected those scattered, and had also received the reinforcements from Rome, followed on the track of Pyrrhus and harassed him. Finding out that the king was eager to capture Capua, he occupied it in advance and guarded it. Disappointed there, Pyrrhus set out for Neapolis. But unable to accomplish anything at this place either, and being in haste to occupy Rome, he passed on through Etruria with the object of winning the people there also to his cause.
§ 9.40.27 Pyrrhus became afraid of being cut off on all sides by the Romans while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this, he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference there was between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kind of trees, vineyards, and tilled fields, and expensive farm fixtures; whereas the districts of his own friends had been pillaged to such an extent that it was impossible to tell whether they had ever been settled.
§ 9.40.28 The same man, when, upon his retreat, he beheld the army of Laevinus much larger than it had been before, declared that the Roman legions when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage, but he in turn arrayed his forces, though he did not join battle.
§ 9.40.29 Pyrrhus, when he learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching to treat on behalf of the captives, not only sent a guard for them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentines, but also went to meet them later, escorted them into the city, entertained them splendidly, and honoured them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as became those who had been defeated.
§ 9.40.30 Fabricius merely made this statement: "The Romans have sent us to get back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms for them of such size as shall be agreed upon by both of us." Thereupon Pyrrhus was quite dumbfounded because the envoy did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers, partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its conduct, whether energetically or in some other way it . . .
§ 9.40.31 ". . . to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. Do you therefore heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, and do not, either on the present occasion or any other, employ violence rather than skill, at least when the latter is possible; for Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail." By this speech of Cineas they were brought to a unanimous decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to involve both.
§ 9.40.32 And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors: "Not willingly, Romans, did I make war upon you earlier, and I will not war against you now; I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make peace." Privately, also, he showed these men favour, in order that they might, if possible, espouse his cause, or at any rate might obtain the desired friendship for him.
§ 9.40.33 Pyrrhus in addition to making friends of the rest conversed with Fabricius as follows: "Fabricius, I do not wish to be at war with you Romans any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentines in the first place and came thither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, be a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly upright and reputable man. Accordingly, I ask you to help me in securing peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I am desirous of making a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general."
§ 9.40.34 Fabricius replied: "I commend you both for repenting of your expedition and for desiring peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose, if it is to our advantage; for of course you will not ask me, an upright man as you say, to do anything against my country. But an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy; as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these presents, because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all.
§ 9.40.35 I ask, now, whether in very truth you regard me as a reputable man or not. For, if I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honour, how can you bid me accept them? Be well assured, then, that I have many possessions and am in no need of more; what I have satisfies me, and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more.
Upon learning, however, that they had made a treaty with the Romans and that Tiberius was moving to meet him, while Laevinus was dogging his footsteps, he became afraid of being cut off on all sides by them while he was in unfamiliar regions, and he advanced no farther.
§ 9.127 When, now, as he was retreating and had reached the vicinity of Campania, Laevinus confronted him with an army much larger than it had been before, he declared that the Roman legions when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. And he in turn arrayed his forces, though he did not join battle. In order to terrify the Romans he had ordered his own soldiers before joining battle to smite their shields with their spears and utter a shout while the trumpeters and the elephants raised a united blare; but when the other side raised a much greater shout, actually terrifying the followers of Pyrrhus, he no longer cared to come to close quarters, but retired, as if he found the omens bad. And he arrived at Tarentum. Thither came Roman envoys, including Fabricius, to treat on behalf of the captives.
§ 9.128 These he entertained lavishly and showed them honour, expecting that they would conclude a truce and make terms now they were defeated. But Fabricius asked that he might get back the men captured in battle for such ransom as should be satisfactory to both. Thereupon Pyrrhus, quite dumbfounded because the envoy did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace also, took counsel privately with his friends, as was his wont, about the return of the captives, but also about the war and how he should conduct it. Milo advised neither returning the captives nor making a truce, but overcoming all remaining resistance by war, since the Romans were already defeated; Cineas, however, gave advice just the opposite of his: he approved of surrendering the captives without price and sending envoys and money to Rome for the purpose of obtaining an armistice and peace. In his opinion the rest also concurred,
§ 9.129 and Pyrrhus, too, chanced to be of this mind. Having summoned the ambassadors, therefore, he said: "Not willingly, Romans, did I lately make war upon you, and I will not war against you now. It has been my desire to become your friend. Wherefore I release to you the captives without ransom, and am ready to make peace."
These words he addressed to the envoys as a body, and he gave them money, with the promise of more; but in conversation with Fabricius alone he said: "I would gladly become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are an upright man, and I ask you to help me in securing peace." With these words he offered to bestow upon him a number of gifts. But Fabricius said: "I commend you, Pyrrhus, for desiring peace, and I will secure it for you, if it shall prove to our advantage. For you will not ask me, an upright man, as you say, to do anything against my country. Nay, I would not even accept any of these things which you offer. I ask you, now, whether in very truth you regard me as a reputable man or not. For, if I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honour, how can you bid me accept them? Be then assured that I have very many possessions, that I am satisfied with what I now have, and feel no need of more. You, however, even if you are ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your possessions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more."
§ 9.40.36 Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. Why? Because he longs for everything not his own, as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he cannot live without it. Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you some of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it — neither populace nor tyrant; best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow.
§ 9.40.37 In what, then, does it consist? In using what one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in keeping one's hands off the possessions of others as if they contained some mighty curse, in wronging no man, in doing good to many, and a thousand other things which I could name if I had leisure. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former fate falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain.
§ 9.40.38 It is, therefore, preferable to be overthrown by the superior might of Heaven rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a man's body is brought low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well; . . . while in this case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased wealth."
§ 9.40.39 And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, each believing that his own failure to serve would mean the overthrow of the fatherland.
§ 9.131 After this conversation had taken place as recounted, the envoys took the captives and departed. Pyrrhus despatched Cineas to Rome with a large amount of gold and women's apparel of every description, so that even if some of the men should resist, their wives, at least, won by the appeal of the finery, might corrupt them along with themselves. Cineas on coming to the city did not seek an audience with the senate, but lingered about, alleging now one reason, now another. He was visiting the houses of leading men, and by his conversation and gifts was gradually extending his influence over them. When he had won over a large number, he entered the senate-chamber and spoke as follows: "King Pyrrhus offers as his defence the fact that he came not to make war upon you, but to reconcile the Tarentines, in answer to their entreaties.
§ 9.132 And what is more, he has released your prisoners, waiving ransom, and though he might have ravaged your country and assaulted your city, he asks to be enrolled among your friends and allies, hoping to gain much assistance from you and to render you still more and greater benefits in return."
Thereupon the greater part of the senators were pleased because of the gifts and because of the captives; however, they made no reply, but continued to deliberate for several days more as to the proper course to pursue. There was a great deal of talk, but they were inclined, nevertheless, to make a truce. On learning this, Appius the Blind was carried to the senate-house — for by reason of his age and his infirmity he was confined to his house — and declared that the truce with Pyrrhus was not advantageous to the state. He urged them to dismiss Cineas at once from the city, and through him to make known to Pyrrhus that the king must first withdraw to his own country and from there make propositions to them about peace or about anything else he might wish. This was the advice Appius gave; and the senate delayed no longer, but forthwith voted unanimously to send Cineas that very day across the border and to wage implacable war upon Pyrrhus, so long as he should remain in Italy. They imposed upon the captives certain degradations in the campaigns, employing them no longer against Pyrrhus or for any other object as a body, — out of apprehension that if they were together they might mutiny, — but sending them to do garrison duty, a few here and a few there.
§ 9.40.40 Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the change of heart his gifts had wrought.
§ 9.40.42 Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength.
§ 10.133 Fragments of Book X
During the winter both sides were making their preparations. And when spring was now at hand, Pyrrhus invaded Apulia and gained many places by force, many also by capitulation. Finally the Romans came upon him near a city called Asculum, and pitched camp opposite. For several days they delayed, rather avoiding each other. The Romans were not feeling confident against men who had once beaten them, and the others feared the Romans as men animated by desperation. Meanwhile some were talking to the effect that Decius was getting ready to devote himself after the fashion of his father and grandfather, and by so doing they terribly alarmed the followers of Pyrrhus, who believed that through his death they should certainly be ruined. Pyrrhus then assembled his soldiers and discussed this matter, advising them not to be disheartened or terrified by such talk. One human being, he said, could not by dying prevail over many, nor could any incantation or magic prove superior to arms and men. By talking to this effect and confirming his words by arguments Pyrrhus encouraged his army. He also inquired into the details of the costume which the Decii had used in devoting themselves, and gave orders to his men, if they should see anybody so arrayed, not to kill him, but to seize him alive.
§ 10.43 Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not meet with any success in case he had made up his mind to do this deed, and threatening besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of resorting to such a deed, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways.
And he sent to Decius and told him that he should not meet with success in case he had made up his mind to do this deed, and threatened that if he were taken alive, he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of resorting to such a deed, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways.
§ 10.134 There was a river not easy to ford flowing between the two camps; and they inquired whether he chose to cross unmolested himself, while they retired, or whether he would allow them to cross, in order that the forces might encounter each other intact and so from a battle with conditions equal the test of valour might be made an accurate one. The Romans delivered this speech to overawe him, but Pyrrhus granted them permission to cross the river, since he placed great reliance upon his elephants. The Romans, among other preparations, made ready, as a measure against the elephants, iron-pointed beams, mounted on waggons, and bristling in all directions. From these they intended to shoot fire and various missiles, in order to check the beasts. When the conflict began, the Romans forced the Greeks back, slowly but surely, until Pyrrhus, bringing his elephants to bear, not opposite their waggons, but at the other end of the line, routed their cavalry through fear of the beasts even before they had come close. Upon their infantry, however, he inflicted no great damage. Meanwhile some of the Apulians had set out against the camp of the Epirots, and by so doing brought about victory for the Romans. For when Pyrrhus sent some of his warriors against them, all the rest became disquieted, and, suspecting that their tents had been captured and that their companions were in flight, they gave way. Numbers of them fell, Pyrrhus and many officers besides were wounded, and later, because of the lack of food and of medical supplies, they incurred great loss. Hence he retreated to Tarentum before the Romans were aware of what he was doing. The consuls crossed the river for battle, but when they ascertained that all had scattered, they withdrew to their own cities, being unable to pursue after the foe on account of their wounded. Then the Romans went into winter quarters in Apulia, while Pyrrhus sent for soldiers and money from home and went on with his other preparations. But when he learned that Fabricius and Papus had been chosen consuls and had arrived in camp, he no longer adhered to the same purpose. The aforesaid consuls were now in the midst of their army, when a certain Nicias, one of those believed to be loyal to Pyrrhus, came to Fabricius and offered to assassinate the king. Fabricius, indignant at this, since he wished to overcome the enemy by valour and by main force,
§ 10.135 as Camillus had done, informed Pyrrhus of the plot. This action of his so amazed the king that he again released the Roman captives without price and sent envoys once more in regard to peace. But when the Romans made no reply about peace, but as before bade him depart from Italy, and only in that event make propositions to them, and when they kept overrunning and capturing the cities in alliance with him, he fell into perplexity; until at length some Syracusans called on him for aid — they had been quarrelling, as it chanced, ever since the death of Agathocles — and offered to surrender to him both themselves and their city. Hereupon he again breathed freely, hoping to subjugate all Sicily. Leaving Milo behind in Italy to keep guard over Tarentum and the other positions, he himself sailed away, after letting it be understood that he would soon return. The Syracusans welcomed him and laid everything at his feet, so that in a brief time he again became great, and the Carthaginians in fright secured additional mercenaries from Italy.
§ 10.45 He did not know how he was to repel either one of them [the consuls] first, nor how to repel them both, and was in perplexity. For he feared to divide his army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, and yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him a great calamity.
§ 10.46 However, he behaved in general toward them with great circumspection, attaching greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him than to the probability that no one would desire to do so.
For this reason he banished and put to death many who held office and many who had called him in to help in their disputes, partly because he was displeased with them, on account of remarks to the effect that he had become master of the state through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and believed that just as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else.
§ 10.47 But presently his fortunes met with a complete reversal by reason of the fact that he either expelled or slew many who held office and had incurred his suspicions.
§ 10.136 Then the Carthaginians, seeing that he was not strong in private forces and had not the goodwill of the natives, took up the war vigorously. They harboured the Syracusans who were exiled and harassed him so severely that he abandoned not only Syracuse but Sicily as well. 6 The Romans on learning of his absence recovered courage and turned their attention to punishing those who had summoned him. Postponing till another time the case of the Tarentines, they invaded Samnium with their consuls, Rufinus and Junius, devastated the country as they went along, and took several deserted forts. The Samnites had conveyed their dearest and most valuable treasures into the hills called Cranita, since they bear a large growth of cornel-wood krania. The Romans, feeling contempt for them, undertook to ascend these same hills; but since the region was overgrown with shrubbery and difficult of access many were killed and many, too, were taken prisoners.
The consuls now no longer carried on the war together, since each blamed the other for the disaster; but Junius went on ravaging a portion of Samnium, while Rufinus inflicted injuries upon the Lucanians and Bruttians. He then set out against Croton, which had revolted from Rome. His friends had sent for him, but the other party forestalled them by bringing in a garrison from Milo, of which Nicomachus was commander. Ignorant of this fact, he approached the walls carelessly, supposing that he was coming among friends, and suffered defeat when a sudden sortie was made against him. Then, bethinking himself of a ruse, he captured the city. He sent two captives as pretended deserters into Croton — one immediately, who declared that Rufinus had despaired of capturing the place and was about to depart for Locris, which was being betrayed to him, and the other later, corroborating this statement with the report that the consul was already on his way. For, in order that the story might gain credence, he actually packed up the baggage, and affected to be in haste. Nicomachus, accordingly, believed the story, inasmuch as scouts made the same report, and leaving Croton, he set out hastily for Locri by a shorter road. And when he had now arrived in Locris, Rufinus turned back to Croton, and escaping observation because he was not expected and because of a mist that then prevailed, he captured the city. Nicomachus, when he learned of this, went back to Tarentum, and encountering Eufinus on the way, lost many men. And the Locrians came over to the Roman side.
§ 10.48 When the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Proserpina, which were widely famed for their wealth, plundered them and sent the spoils by ship to Tarentum. And the men nearly all perished in a storm, while the money and offerings were cast up on shore.
§ 10.137 The next year the Romans made expeditions into Samnium and into Lucania, and fought with the Bruttians. Pyrrhus, who had been driven out of Sicily and had now returned, was troubling them grievously. He got back the Locrians, after they had killed the Roman garrison and changed their allegiance; but in a campaign against Rhegium he was repulsed, was himself wounded, and lost great numbers. He then retired into Locris, and after putting to death a few who had opposed his cause, secured food and money from the rest and made his way back to Tarentum. But the Samnites, being hard pressed by the Romans, caused him to set forth again; and on coming to their assistance he was put to flight. For a young elephant had been wounded, and shaking off its riders, wandered about in search of its mother, whereupon the latter became excited and the other elephants grew turbulent, so that everything was thrown into dire confusion. Finally the Romans won the day, killing many men and capturing eight elephants, and they occupied the enemy's entrenchments. Pyrrhus, accompanied by a few horsemen, made his escape to Tarentum, and from there sailed back to Epirus, leaving Milo behind with a garrison to take charge of Tarentum, inasmuch as he expected to come back again. He also gave them a chair fastened with straps made from the skin of Nicias, whom he had put to death for treachery. This, then, was the punishment that he meted out to Nicias.
Zonaras 47 All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to convict and punish them, but, afterward, when they declared, "We should have said many other things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us," he laughed and let them go.
But in the case of some youths whom he was intending to punish for having ridiculed him at a banquet, he first asked them why they were ridiculing him,
§ 10.138 and when they answered, "We should have said many other things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us," he laughed and let them go.
Now Pyrrhus, who had made a most distinguished record among generals, who had inspired the Romans with great fear, and had left Italy in the fifth year to make a campaign against Greece, not long afterward met his death in Argos. A woman, as the story runs, being eager to catch a glimpse of him from the roof as he passed by, made a misstep, and falling upon him, killed him. The same year Fabricius and Papus became censors; and among others whose names they erased from the lists of the knights and the senators was Rufinus, though he had served as dictator and had twice been consul. The reason was that he had in his possession silver plate of ten pounds' weight. Thus the Romans regarded poverty as consisting not in not having many things, but in wanting many things. Accordingly, their officials who went abroad and others who set out on any business of importance for the state received from the treasury a seal-ring in addition to their other necessary expenses.
Some of the Tarentines who had been injured by Milo attacked him, with Nico at their head. But, failing to accomplish anything, they occupied a fortress in their own land, and with that as headquarters kept making assaults upon Milo.
§ 10.33 The Argyllaeans [Caertes] when they learned that the Romans were disposed to make war on them, despatched envoys to Rome before any vote was taken, and obtained peace upon surrendering half of their territory.
§ 10.41 Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared badly and that the Romans were growing powerful, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to regard them highly, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. From him the envoys received magnificent gifts; but when they offered these to the treasury, they were not accepted.
When they learned that the Romans were disposed to make war upon them, they despatched envoys to Rome and obtained peace.
§ 10.139 And Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared badly and that the Romans were growing powerful, sent gifts to them and made a compact. And the Romans, pleased with this, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. The latter received magnificent gifts from him, which they desired to place in the treasury; the senate, however, would not accept them, but allowed the envoys to keep them.
After this, they subdued the Samnites through the activity of Carvilius and overcame the Lucanians and Bruttians at the hands of Papirius. This same Papirius subjugated the Tarentines also. The latter, angry at Milo and harassed by their own countrymen, who, as has been related, had made the attack on Milo, called in the Carthaginians to their aid when they learned that Pyrrhus was dead. Milo, finding himself in a tight place, since the Romans were besetting him on the land side and the Carthaginians on the water front, surrendered the citadel to Papirius on condition of being permitted to depart unharmed with his followers and his money. Then the Carthaginians, inasmuch as they were at peace with the Romans, sailed away, and the city surrendered to Papirius. They delivered to him their arms and their ships, demolished their walls, and agreed to pay tribute.
When the Romans had thus secured control of Tarentum, they turned their attention to Rhegium, whose inhabitants, after taking Croton by treachery, had razed the city to the ground and had slain the Romans who were there.
§ 10.140 They averted the danger that threatened them from the side of the Mamertines in possession of Messana, whom the people of Rhegium were expecting to secure as allies, by coming to an agreement with them; but in the siege of Rhegium they suffered hardships because of the scarcity of food, among other reasons, until Hiero by sending them grain and soldiers from Sicily strengthened their hands and aided them in capturing the city. The place was restored to the survivors among the original inhabitants, while those who had plotted against it were punished.
Now Hiero, who was not of distinguished family even on his father's side, and on his mother's side actually belonged to the slave class, ruled almost the whole of Sicily, and was considered a friend and ally of the Romans. After the flight of Pyrrhus he had become master of Syracuse, and being on his guard against the Carthaginians, who were encroaching upon Sicily, he was inclined to favour the Romans; and the first mark of favour that he showed them was the alliance and the sending of grain already related.
After this came a winter so severe that the Tiber was frozen to a great depth and trees were killed. The people of Rome suffered hardships, and the cattle perished for want of grass. 7 The next year a Samnite named Lollius, living in Rome as a hostage, made his escape, gathered a band and seized a strong position in his native country, from which he carried on brigandage. Quintus Gallus and Gaius Fabius made a campaign against him, and captured him all with his rabble, most of whom were unarmed; on proceeding, however, against the Caraceni, in whose keeping the robbers had deposited their booty, they encountered difficulties. Finally one night, led by deserters, they scaled the wall at a certain point and came dangerously near perishing on account of the darkness — not that it was a moonless night but because it was snowing fiercely. But the moon shone out, and they at once captured the position.
A great deal of money fell to the share of Rome in those days, so that they even used silver denarii.
Next they made an expedition into the district now called Calabria. Their excuse was that the people had received Pyrrhus and were overrunning their allied territory, but in reality they wished to get possession of Brundisium; for the place had a fine harbour,
§ 10.141 and for the traffic with Illyricum and Greece there was an approach and landing-place of such a character that vessels would sometimes come to land and put out to sea wafted by the same wind. They captured it, and sent colonists both to this point and to others as well.
§ 10.42 Though the Romans were achieving such results as these and were ever rising to greater power, they showed no haughtiness as yet; on the contrary, they surrendered to the people of Apollonia (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their envoys. The people there, however, did him no injury, but actually sent him home.
§ 10.141.5 Yet while accomplishing these exploits and rising to greater power, they showed no haughtiness; on the contrary, they surrendered to the people of Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, Quintus Fabius a senator, because he had insulted their envoys. But they, on receiving him, sent him back home unharmed. In the consulship of Quintus Fabius and Aemilius they made an expedition to Volsinii to secure the freedom of its citizens; for they were under treaty obligations to them. These people were the most ancient of the Etruscans; they had acquired power and had erected an extremely strong citadel, and they had a well-governed state. Hence, on a certain occasion, when they were involved in war with the Romans, they resisted for a very long time. Upon being subdued, however, they drifted into indolent ease, left the management of the city to their servants, and used those servants also, as a rule, to carry on their campaigns. Finally they encouraged them to such an extent that the servants gained both power and spirit, and felt that they had a right to freedom;
§ 10.142 and, indeed, in the course of time they actually obtained this through their own efforts. After that they were accustomed to wed their mistresses, to succeed their masters, to be enrolled in the senate, to secure the offices, and to the entire authority themselves. Furthermore, they were not at all slow to requite their masters for any insults and the like that were offered them. Hence the old-time citizens, not being able to endure them, and yet possessing no power of their own to punish them, despatched envoys by stealth to Rome. The envoys urged the senate to convene secretly by night in a private house, so that no report might get abroad, and they obtained their request. The senators, accordingly, deliberated under the impression that no one was listening; but a certain Samnite, who was being entertained by the master of the house and was sick, kept his bed unnoticed, and learning what was voted, gave information to those against whom charges were preferred. These seized and tortured the envoys on their return; and when they found out what was afoot, they put to death the envoys and the other more prominent men as well. This, then, was the occasion which led the Romans to send Fabius against them. He routed those who came to meet him, destroyed many in their flight, shut up the remainder within the wall, and made an assault upon the city. In that action he was wounded and killed, whereupon the enemy gained confidence and made a sortie. Upon being again defeated, they retired and underwent a siege; and when they were reduced to famine, they surrendered. The consul scourged to death the men who had seized upon the honours of the ruling class, and he razed the city to the ground; the native-born citizens, however, and any servants who had been loyal to their masters were settled by him on another site.
§ 11.8 Fragments of Book XI
At this time the Romans began their struggles oversea; previously they had had no experience at all in naval matters. They now became seamen and crossed over to the islands and to other divisions of the mainland. The first people with whom they warred were the Carthaginians. These were in no whit inferior to them in wealth or in the excellence of their land; they were trained in naval science to a high degree of efficiency, were equipped with cavalry forces, infantry, and elephants, ruled the Africans, and held possession both of Sardinia and the greater part of Sicily; as a result they had conceived hopes of subjugating Italy. Various factors contributed to increase their self-confidence, but they were especially proud by reason of their position of independence, since they elected their king under the title of a yearly office and not for permanent rule; and feeling that their efforts were expended in their own behalf, they were brimful of enthusiasm.
§ 11.43.1 The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were — on the side of the Romans, that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentines, on the side of the Carthaginians, that Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forth as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are seeking their own advantage but are ashamed to be thought to be doing so. The truth is otherwise. 2 As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly stronger, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were led into war partly by the desire of continually acquiring more — in accordance with the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful — and partly also by fear. Both sides alike thought that one sure salvation for their own possessions lay in obtaining also those of the others.
§ 11.43.3 If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two peoples who were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other by a very short distance, so to speak, considering the quickness of the voyage, to rule alien tribes and yet be willing to keep their hands off each other. But a chance incident of the following nature broke their truce and plunged them into war. 4 The conflict nominally concerned Messana and Sicily, but in reality both sides perceived that from this beginning the struggle would involve their own country as well; and they thought that the island, lying, as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a safe base for operations against the other party.
§ 11.43.5 Gaius Claudius came to the meeting, and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he had set their affairs in order. Next he commanded the Carthaginians also either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit to arbitration. 6 Now when not one of the Mamertines, by reason of fear, opened his lips, and the Carthaginians, since they were occupying the city by force, paid little heed to him, he stated that in the silence of both sides he had sufficient evidence. On the part of the invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, since they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest; and on the part of the Mamertines, that they desired freedom, since they would have been quite free to speak, had they chosen the side of the Carthaginians, especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin and on account of the request for assistance which they had made.
§ 11.8.7 Gaius Claudius lost some of his triremes and with difficulty got back to safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, relaxed their attempts to master the sea because they had been worsted when first making trial of it, although this is the ordinary course that people pursue who fail in their first undertaking and think that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the sea with even greater zeal, chiefly because they were ambitious and did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the disaster. 8 Hanno was in no wise disposed to make light of the war, and wished, in case it were bound to occur, to throw the responsibility at least for breaking the truce upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and the captives, and urged him to agree to peace; moreover he advised him not to meddle with the sea.
§ 11.8.9 When Claudius would listen to nothing, he uttered an arrogant and outrageous threat. For he declared that he would never allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea; yet he lost not only the sea but also Messana not much later. 10 Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbour, called an assembly of their number and made the announcement: "I have no need of arms, but leave it with yourselves to decide everything." By this means he persuaded them to send for Hanno; and when Hanno was unwilling to come down, he denounced him vigorously, inveighing against him and declaring that if the other had even the slightest right on his side, he would certainly have come to a conference with him, and would not persist in occupying the city by force. 32 c "You attack even your friends who have been guilty of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies."
§ 11.8.11 The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers moreover to be of good cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He showed them that victories fall to the lot of the better-equipped, but that their own valour was far better than the skill of their opponents. They would soon acquire the science of seafaring, whereas the Carthaginians would never have bravery equal to theirs. For skill was something that could be obtained in a short time by men who gave their minds to it, and could be mastered by practice; but bravery, in case it were lacking in a man's nature, could never be furnished by instruction. 12 The Africans, taking courage as if they had conquered not through the nature of their position, but by their own valour, sallied forth. But Claudius made them so fearful that they did not even peep out of the camp.
The reasons alleged for the war were — on the side of the Romans, that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentines, on the side of the Carthaginians, that Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. The truth was, however, that they were viewing each other with jealousy and thought that the only salvation for their own possessions lay in the possibility of obtaining also those of the others. While they were thus disposed, a certain incident broke the truce and provoked them to war. It was of the following nature.
The Mamertines, who had once conducted a colony from Campania to Messana, were now being besieged by Hiero, and they called upon the Romans as a nation of kindred blood. The latter readily voted to aid them, knowing that in case the Mamertines should not secure an alliance with them, they would have recourse to the Carthaginians; and then the Carthaginians would master all Sicily, and from there cross over into Italy. For this island is such a short distance away from the mainland that the story goes that it was itself once a part of the mainland. So the island, thus lying off Italy, seemed to invite the Carthaginians to lay claim also to the land over opposite, could they but occupy Sicily first; and the possession of Messana assured to its masters the control of the strait also.
Though the Romans voted to assist the Mamertines, they did not promptly come to their aid because of various hindrances that occurred. Hence the Mamertines, under the spur of necessity, called upon the Carthaginians. These effected peace with Hiero both for themselves and for those who had invoked their aid, so as to prevent the Romans from crossing into the island; and under the leadership of Hanno they kept guard over the strait and the city. Meantime Gaius Claudius, a military tribune, sent ahead with a few ships by Appius Claudius, had arrived at Rhegium. But to sail across was more than he dared, for he saw that the Carthaginian fleet was far larger. So he embarked in a skiff and landed at Messana, where he talked to the Mamertines as long as the time permitted. When the Carthaginians spoke in opposition, he returned without accomplishing anything at the time; but later, ascertaining that the Mamertines were at odds, — they did not wish to submit to the Romans, and yet were weary of the Carthaginians, — he sailed over again. Among other remarks which he made to tempt them he declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, and that as soon as their affairs could be set in order, he would sail away. He also commanded the Carthaginians either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea, to offer it. Now when not one of the Mamertines, by reason of fear, opened his lips, and the Carthaginians, who were occupying the city by force, paid no heed to him, he said: "The silence on both sides affords sufficient evidence. On the part of the invaders it shows that they are in the wrong, since they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest; and on the part of the Mamertines, that they covet freedom, since they would have spoken freely if they had espoused the cause of the Carthaginians." And he promised to aid them. At this a tumult of applause arose from the Mamertines. He then sailed back to Rhegium, and a little later forced a passage across with his entire fleet. However, partly because of the numbers and skill of the Carthaginians, but chiefly owing to the violence of the current and to a storm that suddenly came up, he lost some of his triremes and barely succeeded in getting back safely to Rhegium with the remainder.
§ 11.9 However, the Romans did not avoid the sea because of their defeat. Claudius proceeded to repair his ships, while Hanno, wishing to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce upon the Romans, sent to Claudius the captured triremes and was restoring the captives; and he urged him to agree to peace. When the other would listen to nothing, he threatened that he would never permit the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea. But Claudius, now that he had become acquainted with the strait, watched for a time when the current and the wind both bore from Italy toward Sicily, and then sailed to the island, encountering no opposition. So, discovering the Mamertines at the harbour, he convened an assembly and talked to them, finally persuading them to send for Hanno; for the latter had already become suspicious of their movements and had established himself on the citadel, which he was guarding. Now Hanno was unwilling to come down, but fearing that the Mamertines might allege injustice on his part and revolt, he finally entered the assembly. After many words had been spoken to no purpose by both sides, one of the Romans seized him and, with the approval of the Mamertines, threw him into prison.
Thus, under compulsion, Hanno left Messana entirely. The Carthaginians punished him, and sent a herald to the Romans bidding them leave Messana and depart from all of Sicily by a given day; they also set an army in motion. And when the Romans paid no heed, they put to death the mercenaries serving with them who were from Italy, and made an assault upon Messana, accompanied by Hiero. They besieged the city and kept guard over the strait, to prevent any troops or provisions from being conveyed to the foe. The consul learned of this when he was already close at hand; and finding numerous Carthaginians disposed at various points about the harbour under pretence of carrying on trade, he resorted to deception in order to get safely across the strait, and thus succeeded in anchoring off Sicily by night. His place of landing was not far from the camp of Hiero, and he joined battle without delay, thinking that his sudden appearance would be most likely to inspire the enemy with fear. When they came out to withstand the attack, the Roman cavalry was worsted but the heavy-armed infantry prevailed. Hiero retired temporarily to the mountains and later to Syracuse.
When Hiero had retired, the Mamertines recovered courage because of the presence of Claudius. Claudius therefore assailed the Carthaginians, who were now isolated, and attacked their rampart, which was situated on a kind of peninsula. For on the one side the sea enclosed it, and on the other some marshes, difficult to traverse. At the neck of this peninsula, the only entrance and a very narrow one, a cross wall had been built. In an attempt to carry this point by force the Romans fared badly and withdrew under a shower of missiles. The Africans then took courage and sallied out, pursuing the fugitives, as they thought them, beyond the narrow strip of land. Thereupon the Romans wheeled about, routed them, and killed many, so that they did not issue from the camp again, at least so long as Claudius was in Messana. 13 For it usually happens that those who are in dread of something as a result of calculation are successful because of their precaution against it, whereas those who are bold through lack of foresight are ruined because of their unguarded state. 14 Moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after they are won, whereas license can prevail against nothing, and if it ever should be fortunate in any matter, very easily destroys it. And even if it perchance preserves some conquest, it grows worse by the very fact of undeserved further fortune, and so far from being benefited by its success, is itself actually ruined. 15 Moreover, all boldness that is not in accord with reason is prone to unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it resolution strengthened by forethought and hope rendered reliable by its own trustworthiness, does not allow one to be either dejected or presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, on the other hand, often elates men in the midst of good fortune and brings them low in disasters, possessing, as it does, no support, but always accommodating itself to the chance event.
But since he hesitated to force the entrance, he left a garrison behind in Messana, and turned his attention to Syracuse and Hiero. He made assaults upon the city, and the inhabitants would now and then come out to battle. Each side was sometimes victorious and sometimes defeated. One day the consul got into a confined position and would have been captured, had he not, before being surrounded, sent to Hiero an invitation to agree to certain terms. When the man came with whom he was to conclude the terms, he kept falling back unobtrusively, while conversing with him, until he had retired to safety. But the city could not easily be taken, and a siege was impracticable, because of the scarcity of provisions and because of disease in the army. Claudius accordingly withdrew; but the Syracusans followed and held communication with his scattered troops, and they would have made a truce, if Hiero also had been willing to agree to terms. The consul left behind a garrison in Messana and sailed back to Rhegium.
Now that Etruscan unrest had come to a standstill and affairs in Italy were perfectly peaceful, whereas the Carthaginian power was becoming ever greater, the Romans ordered both the consuls to make an expedition into Sicily. Valerius Maximus and Otacilius Crassus consequently crossed over, and in their progress through the island together and separately they won many towns by voluntary submission. When they had gained the majority of the places, they set out for Syracuse. Hiero, in terror, sent a herald to them with offers: he was ready to restore the cities of which they had been deprived, to promise money, and to liberate the prisoners. On these terms he obtained peace, for the consuls thought they could subjugate the Carthaginians more easily with his help. After reaching an agreement with him they turned their attention to the remaining cities garrisoned by the Carthaginians. Now from all the others they were repulsed, but Segesta they took without resistance; for its inhabitants because of their relationship with the Romans — they declare they are descended from Aeneas — slew the Carthaginians and joined the Roman alliance.
§ 11.10 Now the consuls on account of the winter departed for Rhegium, while the Carthaginians conveyed most of their army to Sardinia with the intention of attacking Rome from that quarter. They would thus either drive them out of Sicily altogether or would render them weaker after they had crossed over there. Yet they achieved neither the one object nor the other. The Romans both kept guard over their own land and sent a respectable force to Sicily with Postumius Albinus and Quintus Aemilius. On arriving in Sicily the consuls set out for Agrigentum, and there besieged Hannibal, the son of Gisgo. The people of Carthage, when apprised of it, sent Hanno with a powerful force to aid him in the warfare. So this leader came to Heraclea, not far from Agrigentum, and engaged in the war. A number of battles followed, though not important ones. At first Hanno challenged the consuls to fight, then later on the Romans challenged him. For as long as the Romans had an abundance of food they did not venture to contend against a superior force, and were hoping to get possession of the city by famine; but when they began to encounter a shortage of grain, they became eager to run risks, while Hanno now showed hesitation, since their eagerness led him to suspect that he might be ambushed. Everybody, therefore, saw fit to court the Romans as easy victors, and Hiero, too, who thus far had co-operated with them reluctantly, now sent them grain, so that even the consuls took heart again.
Hanno now undertook to bring on a battle, in the expectation that Hannibal would fall upon the Romans in the rear, assailing them from the wall. The consuls learned his plan, but remained inactive, and Hanno in scorn approached their intrenchments; and they sent some men to lie in ambush behind him. When now, toward evening, he fearlessly and contemptuously led a charge, the Romans joined battle with him both from ambush and palisade, and wrought a great slaughter of the enemy and of the elephants besides. Hannibal had in the meantime assailed the Roman tents, but was repulsed by the men guarding them. As for Hanno, he abandoned his camp and escaped to Heraclea. Hannibal then formed a plan to steal away from Agrigentum by night, and did in his own case elude observation; the rest, however, were recognised and were killed, some by the Romans, and many by the Agrigentines. For all that, the people of Agrigentum did not obtain pardon, but their wealth was plundered and they themselves were all sold.
On account of the winter the consuls retired to Messana. The Carthaginians were angry with Hanno and sent out in his stead Hamilcar, the son of Barca, a man superior in generalship to all his countrymen with the exception of Hannibal, his son. Hamilcar himself guarded Sicily and sent Hannibal as admiral to ravage the coast regions of Italy and so draw the consuls to his vicinity. Yet he did not accomplish his object, for they posted guards all along the coast, and then proceeded to Sicily. They effected nothing worthy of record, however. Now Hamilcar, becoming afraid that his Gallic mercenaries, who were offended because he had not given them full pay, might go over to the Romans, brought about their destruction. He sent them to take charge of one of the cities under Roman sway, assuring them that it was in course of being betrayed, and giving them permission to plunder it; he then sent to the consuls pretended deserters to give them advance information of the coming of the Gauls. Hence all the Gauls were ambushed and destroyed; many of the Romans also perished.
After the consuls had departed home, Hamilcar sailed to Italy and ravaged the land and also won over some cities in Sicily. On learning of this the Romans gathered a fleet and put one of the consuls, Gaius Duilius, in command of it, while they sent his colleague, Gaius [Gnaeus] Cornelius, to Sicily. The latter, neglecting the war on land, which had fallen to his lot, sailed with the ships which he had to Lipara, on the understanding that it was to be betrayed to him; but this was a ruse on the part of the Carthaginians. When, therefore, he put in to Lipara, Bodes, the lieutenant of Hannibal, closed in on him. But as Gaius made preparations to defend himself, Bodes, fearing the Romans' desperation, invited them to discuss terms; and having persuaded them to do so, he took the consul and military tribunes, who supposed they were to meet the admiral, on board his own trireme. Now these men he sent to Carthage; and he captured the rest without their so much as lifting a weapon.
§ 11.11 Then Hannibal continued the ravaging of Italy, while Hamilcar made a campaign against Segesta, where the Romans had most of their infantry. Gaius Caecilius, a military tribune, was endeavouring to assist them, but Hamilcar waylaid him and slaughtered many of his followers. The people of Rome, learning of this, at once sent out the praetor urbanus and incited Duilius to haste.
Zonaras 16 The Romans and Carthaginians, when they joined in naval combat, were well matched in the number of ships and in their own enthusiasm. For both sides were then for the first time entering a naval engagement with equal equipment, and they hoped that it would decide the whole war. Sicily lay before their eyes as the prize, and they were contending in a matter of servitude or dominion, resolved not to be beaten, lest they experience the former, but to conquer and obtain the latter. 17 One side, however, surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea; and the other was superior in the strength of its marines and in their daring, since the recklessness and audacity of their fighting were in direct ratio to their inexperience in naval affairs. For in matters of experience practically all men make exact calculations and feel some reluctance, even when their judgment approves a particular course; but in the case of the untried they are unreasonably bold, and are drawn into the conflict through lack of due consideration. 18 The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a natural tendency of practically all people who send out armies on any mission to claim credit for the advantages gained, but to charge the defeats upon their leaders; and the Carthaginians were very ready to punish those who failed in any enterprise. Hannibal, however, was afraid, and immediately after the defeat inquired of them, just as if the business were still untouched, whether they bade him risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he had of course expected, because they prided themselves on having such a superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power, but not the fortune of the battle."
Duilius, on coming to Sicily, learned that the ships of the Carthaginians were inferior to his own in stoutness and size, but excelled in the speed of their rowing and in the variety of their manoeuvres. Therefore he fitted out his triremes with mechanical devices, — anchors, grappling-irons attached to long poles, and other such contrivances, — in order that by hurling these upon the hostile ships they might bind them fast to their own vessels, and then by crossing over into them might come to blows with the Carthaginians and engage them just as in an infantry battle. When the Carthaginians began the fight with the Roman ships, they sailed round and round them, plying the oars rapidly, and would make sudden attacks. So for a time the conflict was evenly matched; later the Romans got the upper hand and not only sent many of the enemy to the bottom, but also captured many. Hannibal conducted the fight from a boat of seven banks of oars, but when this became entangled with a trireme, fearing capture, he hastily left the seven-banked boat, and boarding another ship, effected his escape.
This was the outcome, then, of the naval battle, and much spoil was taken. The Carthaginians would have put Hannibal to death on account of the defeat, if he had not immediately inquired of them, just as if the business were still untouched, whether they bade him risk a sea-fight or not. When they agreed that he ought to fight, since they prided themselves upon having a superior navy, he added: "I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power, but not the fortune of the battle." So he saved his life, but was deprived of his command.
Duilius, taking the infantry along with him also, rescued the people of Segesta — Hamilcar would not even venture to come to blows with him — and strengthened the loyalty of the other friendly settlements; and he returned to Rome at the close of the summer season. Upon his departure Hamilcar fortified the place called Drepanum (it is a convenient harbour), deposited there the objects of greatest value, and transferred to it all the people of Eryx. The latter city, because it was a strong position, he razed to the ground, to prevent the Romans from seizing it and making it a base of operations for the war. He captured several cities, too, some by force and some by betrayal; and if Gaius Florus, who was wintering there, had not restrained him, he would have subjugated the whole of Sicily.
Lucius Scipio, his colleague, made a campaign against Sardinia and against Corsica. These islands are situated in the Tyrrhenian Sea and lie so near together that from a distance they seem to be one. His first landing place was Corsica. There he captured by force Aleria, its chief city, and subdued the other places without difficulty. While sailing toward Sardinia he descried a Carthaginian fleet and directed his course toward it. The enemy fled before a battle could be joined, and he came to the city of Olbia. There the Carthaginians put in an appearance with their ships, and Scipio, becoming frightened, since his infantry was insufficient for battle, set sail for home.
At this time various captives serving in the city, together with the Samnites, who had come in considerable numbers to man the fleet, agreed to form a conspiracy against Rome. Herius Potilius, the leader of the auxiliary force, found it out and pretended to be of like mind with them, in order that he might fully inform himself in regard to what they had determined upon. But being unable to reveal their plans, since all the Samnites were around him, he persuaded them to gather in the Forum at a time when the senate was meeting and denounce him on the ground that they were being wronged in the matter of the grain which they were receiving. This they did; and when he was sent for as being the cause of the tumult, he revealed the plot to the senators. For the moment they merely dismissed the conspirators, after they had become quiet; but at night all of those who owned slaves arrested some of them. And in this way the entire conspiracy was overthrown.
The following summer the Romans and the Carthaginians fought in Sicily and Sardinia at the same time. Somewhat later Atilius Latinus [Calatinus] went to Sicily, and finding the city of Mutistratus besieged by Florus, he made use of the other's troops. When he made assaults upon the circuit of the wall, the natives, with the help of Carthaginians, defended themselves vigorously at first, but when the women and children were moved to tears and laments, they abandoned resistance. The Carthaginians passed out secretly at night and at daybreak the natives voluntarily swung the gates open. The Romans went in and proceeded to slaughter them all, till Atilius made proclamation that the remainder of the booty and the inhabitants would belong to whoever captured them. Thereafter they spared the lives of the remaining captives, and after pillaging the city burned it to the ground.
§ 11.12 Thence they proceeded heedlessly against Camarina and came into a region where an ambuscade had already been set; and they would have been utterly destroyed, had not Marcus Calpurnius, a military tribune, retrieved the disaster by his cleverness. He saw that just one of the surrounding hills had been left unoccupied, by reason of its steepness, and he asked the consul for three hundred heavy-armed men, with whom he hastened to that point. His purpose was to make the enemy turn their attention to his detachment, so that the rest of the Romans might then make their escape. And so it turned out; for when their foes witnessed the charge of these men, they were thunderstruck and leaving the consul and his force, whom they considered as good as captured, they made a united rush upon Calpurnius. A fierce battle ensued, in which many of the enemy as well as all the three hundred fell. Calpurnius alone survived. He had been wounded and lay unnoticed among the slain, being as good as dead by reason of his wounds; afterward he was found alive and his life was spared. While the three hundred were fighting, the consul got away; and after thus escaping he gained Camarina and other cities, some by force and some by capitulation. Next Atilius set out against Lipara. But Hamilcar forestalled him by occupying it stealthily during the night; and making a sudden sortie, he killed many of the Romans.
Gaius Sulpicius overran the greater part of Sardinia, and filled with arrogance as a result, set out for Africa. The Carthaginians also, alarmed for the safety of their countrymen at home, set sail with Hannibal, but when a contrary wind was encountered, both leaders turned back.
Zonaras 32 b Dio, Book XI. "When the storm continued and a mist arose besides, he compassed Hannibal's defeat by means of some pretended deserters."
Subsequently Atilius compassed Hannibal's defeat by means of some false deserters who represented that Atilius was going to sail to Africa again. Hannibal put out hastily, whereupon Sulpicius sailed against him and sank the majority of his vessels, whose crews, because of a mist, did not know for a long time what was taking place and were thrown into confusion.
All the ships that made their escape to land he seized, though without the crews; for Hannibal, who saw that the harbour was unsafe, abandoned the vessels and retired to the city of Sulci. There the Carthaginians mutinied against him, and when he came forth before them alone, he was slain. The Romans in consequence overran the country with greater boldness, but were defeated by Hanno. These were the events of that year. Also stones in great quantities at a time, and in appearance something like hail, fell from heaven upon Rome continually. It likewise came to pass that stones descended upon the Alban Mount and elsewhere.
The consuls on coming to Sicily made a campaign against Lipara. And discovering that the Carthaginians were lying in wait beneath the height called Tyndaris, they divided their expedition. One of the consuls with half the fleet doubled the promontory, and Hamilcar thinking them to be an isolated force, sailed out against them; but when the rest came up, he turned to flight and lost most of his fleet. The Romans were elated, and feeling that Sicily was already theirs, they left it and ventured to make an attempt on Africa and Carthage.
Zonaras 19 But holding the non-surrender of their native land and the acquirement of foreign territory to be of equal importance, they [the Carthaginians] contended with spirit and might. For, whereas most men defend their own possessions even beyond their strength, but are unwilling to struggle for those of others when it involves danger, these antagonists regarded in the same light what they possessed and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at a distance from Carthage, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. Then, if they failed, they would lose nothing; and if they conquered, they would be in excellent hopes. Therefore, making their preparation commensurate with their resolve, they took the field against Carthage. 20 Their leaders were Regulus and Lucius, selected for merit. Regulus, indeed, was in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that account, to undertake the command; and it was voted that his wife and children should be furnished their support from the public treasury. 21 Hamilcar sent Hanno to the Romans, ostensibly in behalf of peace, but in reality to gain time. And he, when some clamoured for his arrest on the ground that the Carthaginians had arrested Cornelius treacherously . . .
Their leaders were Marcus Regulus and Lucius Manlius, selected for merit. These two sailed to Sicily, settled affairs there, and made ready for the voyage to Africa. The Carthaginians, however, did not wait for them to sail thither, but after due preparation hastened toward Sicily; and thus the opposing forces met near Heraclea. The contest was for a long time evenly balanced, but in the end the Romans got the best of it. Hamilcar did not dare to withstand them longer, but sent Hanno to them, professedly in behalf of peace, whereas he really wished to use up time; for he was hoping that an army would be sent to him from home. When some clamoured for Hanno's arrest, because the Carthaginians had treacherously arrested Cornelius, the envoy said: "If you do this, you will no longer be any better than the Africans."
He, therefore, by flattering them most opportunely escaped all molestation; but the Romans once more resumed the war. And the consuls sailed from Messana, while Hamilcar and Hanno separated and studied how to enclose them on both sides. Yet Hanno would not await them when they approached, but sailed away promptly to Carthage and kept guard over the city. Hamilcar, however, when apprised of this, stayed where he was. The Romans landed and marched against the city of Aspis, whose inhabitants, seeing them approaching, slipped away in good season. The Romans thus occupied it without striking a blow, and made it a base for the war. Setting out from it, they ravaged the country and acquired cities, some of their own free will and others by intimidation; they also secured great booty, received vast numbers of deserters, and got back many of their own men who had been captured in the previous wars.
When winter came on, Manlius sailed back to Rome with the booty, while Regulus remained behind in Africa. The Carthaginians found themselves in the depths of woe, since their country was being pillaged and their neighbours alienated; and cooped up in their fortifications, they remained inactive.
Ioannes Damascenus, De Draconibus I.,
§ 11.13 Now while Regulus was encamped beside the Bagradas river, there appeared a serpent of huge bulk, the length of which is said to have been one hundred and twenty feet (for its slough was carried to Rome for exhibition), and the rest of its body corresponded in size. It destroyed many of the soldiers who approached it and some also who were drinking from the river. Regulus overcame it with a crowd of soldiers and with catapults.
Dio the Roman . . . says that when Regulus, the Roman consul, was warring against Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile, and having flayed it, sent its skin, a great wonder, to the senate at Rome. And when measured by this same senate, as Dio himself goes on to report, it was found to have a length of one hundred and twenty feet; its thickness, moreover, was proportionate to its length.
After thus destroying it, he gave battle by night to Hamilcar, who was encamped upon a high, wooded spot; and he slew many in their beds as well as many who had been aroused. Any who escaped fell in with the Romans guarding the roads and perished. In this way a large part of the Carthaginians was destroyed and many of their cities were going over to the Romans.
Zonaras 22 The Carthaginians, fearing capture, first made overtures to the consul, in the hope that they might by some satisfactory arrangement secure his withdrawal and so escape the danger of the moment. But since they refused to retire from all Sicily and from Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by the Romans for the war and also to pay more as tribute each year, they accomplished nothing. 23 Indeed, in addition to those just mentioned, there were the following demands which displeased them: they were to make neither war nor peace without the consent of the Romans, were to keep for their own use not more than one warship, yet come to the aid of the Romans with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them, and were not to be on an equal footing in some other respects. In view, then, of these demands, they decided that the truce would mean their utter subjugation, and they chose rather to fight with the Romans.
Those in the city, fearing capture, made overtures to the consul, in the hope that they might by some satisfactory arrangement secure his withdrawal and so escape the immediate danger. But when many oppressive demands were made of them, they decided that the truce would mean their utter subjugation, and they chose rather to fight.
Regulus, however, who up to that time had been fortunate, became filled with boastfulness and conceit, so much so that he even wrote to Rome that he had sealed up the gates of Carthage with fear. His followers and the people of Rome were of the same opinion, and this caused their undoing. For various allies came to the Carthaginians, among them Xanthippus from Sparta. This man assumed absolute authority over the Carthaginians, since the populace was eager to entrust matters to his charge and Hamilcar together with the other officials stepped aside voluntarily. He managed their affairs excellently in every way, and in particular he brought the Carthaginians down the heights, where they were staying through fear, into the level country, where their horses and elephants would be of most avail. For some time he remained inactive, until at length he found the Romans encamped in a manner that betokened their contempt. They were very haughty over their success and looked down upon Xanthippus as a Graecus (for thus they call the Hellenes, and they use the epithet as a reproach to them for their mean birth); and consequently they had constructed their camp in a heedless fashion. While the Romans were in this state of mind Xanthippus assailed them, routed their cavalry with his elephants, cut down many, and captured many alive, among them Regulus himself. This put the Carthaginians in high spirits. They saved the lives of those captured, in order that their own citizens previously taken captive by the Romans might not be killed. Thus they treated all the Roman prisoners with consideration except Regulus, whom they kept in a state of utter misery; they offered him just enough food to keep him alive, and they would repeatedly lead an elephant close up to him to frighten him, so that he might have peace in neither body nor mind. After afflicting him in this way for a good while, they placed him in prison.
With their allies the Carthaginians dealt in a most ruthless manner. Not being supplied with sufficient wealth to pay them what they had originally promised, they dismissed them with the understanding that they would pay them their wages before very long. To the men who escorted the allies, however, they issued orders to put them ashore on a desert island and quietly sail away. As regards Xanthippus, one story is that they pursued after him, when he had sailed away, and sank his ship; the other is that they gave him an old ship which was in no wise seaworthy but had been newly covered over with pitch outside, that it might sink quite of itself, and that he, being aware of this, went aboard a different ship, and so was saved. Their reason for doing this was to avoid seeming to have been saved by his ability; for they thought that when once he had perished, the renown of his deeds would also perish.
§ 11.14 The people of Rome were grieved at what had occurred, more especially because they expected that the Carthaginians would sail against Rome itself. For this reason they carefully guarded Italy, and hastily sent to the Romans in Sicily and Africa the consuls Marcus Aemilius and Fulvius Plaetinus [Paetinus]. These men sailed to Sicily, and after garrisoning the positions there, set out for Africa, but were overtaken by a storm and carried to Cossura. They ravaged the island and put it in charge of a garrison, then sailed onward again. Thereupon a fierce naval battle with the Carthaginians took place. The latter were struggling to eject the Romans entirely from their country, and the Romans were striving to save the remnants of their soldiers who had been left in hostile territory. In the midst of a close battle the Romans in Aspis suddenly sailed against the Carthaginians from the rear, and by thus getting them between two forces overcame them. Later the Romans also won an infantry engagement and took many prisoners, whose lives they saved because of Regulus and those captured with him. They made several raids, and then sailed to Sicily. But encountering a storm and losing many of their number, they sailed for home with the ships that were saved.
The Carthaginians took Cossura and crossed over to Sicily; and they would have subjugated the whole of it, had they not learned that Collatinus [Calatinus] and Gnaeus Cornelius were approaching with a large fleet. For the Romans had quickly fitted out a first-class fleet, had made levies of their best men, and had become so strong that in the third month they returned to Sicily. It was the five-hundredth year from the founding of Rome. The lower city of Panormus they took without trouble, but in the siege of the citadel they fared badly until food failed those inside: then the besieged came to terms with the consuls.
Zonaras 29 a Dio, Book XI. "The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money."
Afterwards Servilius Pio [Caepio] and Gaius Sempronius, consuls, made an attempt upon Lilybaeum, where they were repulsed; and crossing over to Africa, they ravaged the coast. But while returning homeward they encountered a storm and incurred disaster. Hence the people, thinking that their misfortunes were due to their inexperience in naval affairs, voted to keep them away from the sea with the exception of guarding Italy with a few ships.
In the succeeding year Publius Gaius and Aurelius Servilius came to Sicily and among other places subdued Himera; but they did not get possession of any of its inhabitants, for the Carthaginians conveyed them away by night. After this Aurelius secured some ships from Hiero, and adding to his contingent all the Romans who were there, he sailed to Lipara. Here he left the tribune Quintus Cassius to carry on a siege, while avoiding battle, and set sail for home. Quintus, disregarding orders, made an attack upon the city and lost many men. Aurelius, however, subsequently took the place, killed all the inhabitants, and deposed Cassius from his command.
The Carthaginians, learning what the Romans had determined regarding the fleet, sent an expedition to Sicily, hoping now to bring it entirely under their control. Now as long as both the consuls, Caecilius Metellus and Gaius Furius, were on the ground, they remained quiet; but when Furius set out for Rome, they conceived a contempt for Metellus and proceeded to Panormus. Metellus learned that spies had come from the enemy, and assembling all the people of the city, he addressed them, and then bade them lay hold of one another; thus he was enabled to investigate who each other was and what his business was, and so detected the enemies. The Carthaginians now set themselves in battle array, and Metellus pretended to be afraid. When he continued this pretence for several days, the Carthaginians were filled with presumption, and became quite bold in making attacks. Then Metellus raised the signal for the Romans. Forthwith they made an unexpected rush through all the gates, easily overcame resistance, and enclosed their foes in a narrow place through which they could now no longer retreat; for, by reason of their own numbers and the large number of elephants with them, they were crowded together and thrown into confusion. Meanwhile the Carthaginian fleet approached the coast and became the chief cause of their destruction. For the fugitives, seeing the ships, rushed toward them and tried to force their way on board; some fell into the sea and perished, others were killed by the elephants, which crowded against one another and against the men, and still others were slain by the Romans; many also were captured alive, men and elephants as well. For when the beasts, bereft of the men to whom they were used, became infuriated, Metellus made a proclamation to the prisoners, offering safety and pardon to such as would hold them in check; accordingly, some of the keepers approached the gentlest of the animals, which they subdued by the influence of their accustomed presence, and then won over the remainder. These, one hundred and twenty in number, were conveyed to Rome, being ferried across the strait in the following way. A number of huge jars, separated by wooden stays, were fastened together in such a way that they could neither break apart nor yet strike together; then this framework was spanned by beams, and on top of all earth and brush were placed, and the surface was fenced in round about, so that it presented somewhat the appearance of a farmyard. The beasts were then put on board this raft and were ferried across without knowing that they were moving on the water. Such was the victory of Metellus; but Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian leader, though he got safely away on this occasion, was later summoned by the Carthaginians at home and impaled.
§ 11.26 They say that the Carthaginians made overtures to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives, among other causes; they wished most of all to see if they could make peace on some moderate terms, and if they could not do this, at least to get back the captives. It is said that Regulus, too, was sent among the envoys because of his reputation and valour. They assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever for the sake of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives. 27 Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return without fail, in case he should accomplish neither of their objects; and they despatched him as an envoy along with others. Now he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, and not a Roman. He did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him, nor did he enter the city, although invited inside; instead, when the senate assembled outside the walls, as was their custom in treating with the enemy's envoys, he not only asked permission to approach with the others — at least so the story goes — . . . .
§ 11.15 The Carthaginians now made overtures to the Romans, on account of the great number of the captives, among other causes; and with the envoys they sent also Regulus himself, thinking that through him their whole object was as good as gained, because of the reputation and valour of the man; and they bound him by oaths to return without fail. Now he acted in all respects like one of the Carthaginians. He did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him, nor did he enter the city, although repeatedly invited to do so; instead, when the senate assembled outside the walls, as was the custom in treating with the envoys of the enemy, and he was brought into the assembly he said: "We, Fathers, have been sent to you by the Carthaginians. It is they who despatched me on this journey, since by the law of war I have become their slave. Now they ask, in the first place, to conclude the war upon terms pleasing to both parties, or, if that is not possible, to effect an exchange of prisoners." After speaking these words, he withdrew with the envoys, so that the Romans might deliberate in private. When the consuls urged him to take part in their discussion, he paid no heed, until permission was granted by the Carthaginians. And for a time he was silent; then, when the senators bade him state his opinion, he said: "I am one of you, Fathers, though I be captured times without number. My body is a Carthaginian chattel, but my spirit is yours. The former has been alienated from you, but the latter nobody has the power to make anything else than Roman. As captive I belong to the Carthaginians; yet, inasmuch as I met with misfortune not from cowardice, but from zeal, I am not only a Roman, but I also have your cause at heart. Not in a single respect, now, do I think reconciliation advantageous to you."
After these remarks Regulus stated also the reasons because of which he favoured rejecting the proposals, and added: "I know, to be sure, that manifest destruction awaits me, for it is impossible to keep them from learning the advice I have given; but even so, I esteem the public advantage above my own safety. If any one shall say, 'Why, then, do you not run away, or stay here?' he shall be told that I have sworn to them to return, and I will not transgress my oaths, not even when they have been given to enemies. My reasons for this attitude are various, but the principal one is that if I abide by my oath, I alone shall suffer disaster, but if I break it, the whole city will be involved."
But the senate, out of consideration for his safety, showed a disposition to make peace and to restore the captives. When he became aware of this, he pretended, in order that he might not be the cause of their letting their advantage slip, that he had swallowed deadly poison and was sure to die in any case from its effects. Hence no agreement and no exchange of prisoners was made. As he was departing in company with the envoys, his wife and children and others clung to him, and the consuls declared they would not surrender him, if he chose to stay, nor yet would they detain him if he was for departing. Consequently, since he preferred not to violate the oaths, he was carried back. And he was tortured to death, as the report goes, by his captors. They cut off his eyelids and for a time shut him up in darkness, then they cast him into some kind of specially constructed receptacle bristling with spikes, and made him face the sun; thus through suffering and sleeplessness — for the spikes kept him from reclining in any fashion — he perished. When the Romans found it out, they delivered the foremost captives in their hands to his children to torture and put to death in revenge.
§ 12.15 Fragments of Book XII
They voted that the consuls, Gaius Atilius, brother of Regulus, and Lucius Manlius, should make an expedition into Africa. These, on coming to Sicily, attacked Lilybaeum and undertook to fill up a portion of the moat to help in bringing up the engines. The Carthaginians tried to dig beneath the mound and undermine it; but when they found this to be a losing game, because of the numbers of the opposing workmen, they built another wall, crescent-shaped, inside. The Romans ran tunnels under this circular wall, in order that when it settled into the mine they might rush inside. The Carthaginians then built counter-tunnels and came upon many workers who were unaware of what the other side was doing; these they killed, and they also destroyed many by hurling blazing fire-wood into the excavations. Some of the allies now, burdened by the protraction of the siege and displeased because their wages were not paid them in full, made propositions to the Romans to betray the place. Hamilcar discovered their plan, but did not disclose it, for fear of driving them into open hostility; instead, he supplied their officials with money, and also promised some to the multitude. In this way he won their favour to such an extent that they did not even deny their treachery, but drove away the last envoys when they returned. p5The latter then deserted to the consuls, and received from them land in Sicily and other gifts.
The Carthaginians at home, hearing of this, sent Adherbal with a very large number of ships carrying grain and money to Lilybaeum. And he, after waiting for a storm, sailed in. Thereupon many others likewise attempted a landing, and some succeeded, while others were destroyed.
As long as both consuls were present the conflicts were evenly matched. Pestilence and famine, however, came to harass them, and these caused one of them to return home with the soldiers of his division. Hamilcar then took courage and made sorties, in which he would set fire to the engines and slay the men defending them; and his cavalry, setting out from Drepanum, prevented the Romans from getting provisions and overran the territory of their allies. Adherbal also ravaged the shores now of Sicily, now of Italy, so that the Romans did not know what to do. In the meantime, however, Lucius Junius was preparing a fleet, and Claudius Pulcher hastened to Lilybaeum, where he manned triremes and with them captured Hanno, the Carthaginian, as he was leaving the harbour on a five-banked ship. The prize craft served the Romans as a model in ship-building.
The fleet was so frequently endangered that the Romans were disheartened by the constant destruction of their ships; for in these they lost a good many men and vast sums of money. Yet they would not give up; nay, they even slew a man who uttered a word in the senate about reconciliation with the Carthaginians, and they voted that a dictator should be named. Collatinus [Calatinus] was therefore named dictator, and Metellus became master of the horse; but they accomplished nothing worthy of remembrance. While Collatinus was being chosen dictator, Junius had won over Eryx, and Carthalo had occupied Aegithallus and taken Junius alive.
§ 12.16 The next year Gaius Aurelius and Publius Servilius took office and spent their time in harrying Lilybaeum and Drepanum, in keeping the Carthaginians off the land, and in devastating the territory of their allies. Carthalo undertook many different kinds of enterprises against them, but, as he accomplished nothing, he set out for Italy, with the object of drawing the consuls back there after him, or of injuring the country meanwhile and capturing cities. Yet he made no headway even there, and on learning that the praetor urbanus was approaching, sailed back to Sicily. His mercenaries now rebelled p9on account of their pay, whereupon he put a large number ashore on desert islands and left them there, and sent many off to Carthage. When the rest learned of this, they became indignant, and were ready to mutiny. Hamilcar, Carthalo's successor, cut down many of them one night and had many others thrown into the sea. In the meantime the Romans had concluded a perpetual friendship with Hiero, and they furthermore remitted all the tribute which they were accustomed to receive from him annually.
The next year the Romans refrained officially from naval warfare, because of their misfortunes and expenses, but some private individuals asked for ships on condition of restoring the vessels but appropriating any booty gained; and among other injuries that they inflicted upon the enemy, they sailed to Hippo, an African city, and there burned up all the boats and many of the buildings. The natives put chains across the mouth of the harbour, and the invaders found themselves in an awkward situation, but escaped by cleverness and good fortune. They made a quick dash at the chains, and just as the beaks of the ships were about to catch in them, the members of the crews moved back to the stern, and so the prows were lightened and cleared the chains; and again, when all rushed into the prows, the sterns of the vessels were lifted high into the air. Thus they effected their escape, and later near Panormus they conquered the Carthaginians on the sea.
As for the consuls, Metellus Caecilius was in the vicinity of Lilybaeum, and Numerius Fabius was investing Drepanum, where he formed a plan to capture the little isle of Pelias. As this had been seized earlier by the Carthaginians, he sent soldiers by night, who killed the garrison and took possession of the island. Learning this, Hamilcar at dawn attacked the troops who had crossed to it. Fabius, unable to defend them, led an assault upon Drepanum in order either to capture the city while deserted or to draw Hamilcar away from the island. One of these objects was accomplished, for Hamilcar in fear retired within the fortifications. So Fabius occupied Pelias, and by filling in the strait, which was a shallow one, between it and the mainland he made a stretch of solid ground, and thus conducted more easily his operations against the wall, which was rather weak at this point. The Carthaginians caused the Romans much annoyance also by sailing over to Sicily and making trips across into Italy. They exchanged each other's captives man for man; and those left over — since the numbers were not equal — the Carthaginians got back for money.
In the period that followed various persons became consuls, but effected nothing worthy of record. The Romans owed the majority of their reverses to the fact that they kept sending out from year to year different and ever different leaders, and took away their office from them when they were just learning the art of generalship. It looked as if they were choosing them for practice and not for service.
The Gauls, who were acting in alliance with the Carthaginians, and hated them because they were ill-treated by them, abandoned to the Romans for money a position with whose defence they had been entrusted. These Gauls and other allies of the Carthaginians who had revolted from their service the Romans secured as mercenaries; up to this time they had never supported a foreign contingent. Elated at this accession, and furthermore by the ravaging of Africa on the part of the private citizens who were managing the ships, they were no longer willing to neglect the sea, but again got together a fleet.
§ 12.17 Lutatius Catulus was chosen consul, and with him was sent out Quintus Valerius Flaccus, who was praetor urbanus. On coming to Sicily they assailed Drepanum both by land and sea, and demolished a section of the wall. Indeed, they would have captured the town but for the fact that the consul was wounded and the soldiers were occupied in caring for him. In the meantime they learned that a body of the enemy had come from home with an immense fleet commanded by Hanno, and they turned their attention to these new arrivals. When the forces had been marshalled in hostile array, a star resembling a torch appeared above the Romans and after rising high to the left of the Carthaginians plunged into their ranks. The naval combat was a vigorous one on the part of both nations, for several reasons; but in particular, the Carthaginians were anxious to drive the Romans into utter despair of naval success, and the Romans were eager to retrieve their former disasters. Nevertheless, the Romans gained the victory, for the Carthaginian vessels were impeded by the fact that they also carried freight, grain, and money.
Hanno escaped and hastened at once to Carthage. But the Carthaginians, seized with wrath and fear, crucified him and sent envoys to Catulus regarding peace. Now he was disposed to end the war, since his office was soon to expire; for he could not hope to destroy Carthage in a short time, and he did not care to leave to his successors the glory of his own labours. Hence, after they had given him money, grain, and hostages, they were granted an armistice, so that they might send envoys to Rome to sue for peace. The conditions were, that they should retire from the whole of Sicily, yielding it to the Romans, as well as abandon all the surrounding islands, that they should carry on no war with Hiero, and should pay an indemnity, a part at the time of making the treaty and a part later, and should return the Roman deserters and captives free of cost, while ransoming their own.
Such were the terms agreed upon; for Hamilcar succeeded merely in having the disgrace of passing under the yoke omitted. After settling these conditions he led his soldiers out of the fortifications and sailed for home before the oaths were administered. The people of Rome soon learned of the victory and were greatly elated, feeling that they had triumphed completely. And when the envoys arrived, they could no longer restrain themselves, and hoped to possess all of Africa. Therefore they would not abide by the terms of the consul; instead, they exacted from their foes a much larger sum of money than had been promised, and also forbade them to sail past Italy or their allied territory abroad in ships of war, or to employ any mercenaries from such districts.
The first war between the Carthaginians and the Romans ended in this way, then, in the twenty-fourth year; and Catulus celebrated a triumph over its conclusion. Quintus Lutatius became consul and departed for Sicily, where with his brother Catulus he established order throughout the island; he also deprived the inhabitants of their arms. Thus Sicily, with the exception of Hiero's domain, was enslaved by the Romans; and thenceforth they were on friendly terms with the Carthaginians.
Both were soon again involved in other wars of their own. At Carthage the remnant of the mercenary force and the slave population in the city and many of their neighbours, taking advantage of the misfortunes of the state, joined in an attack upon it. The Romans did not heed the request of the rebels for aid, but sent envoys in return; and when they found themselves unable to reconcile the combatants, they released free of cost all the Carthaginian captives they were holding, sent grain to the city, and permitted it to gather mercenaries from among their own allies. By this action they were rather seeking to gain a reputation for fairness than displaying a real interest in their own advantage, and this later caused them trouble. For after conquering his adversaries, Hamilcar Barca, while he did not dare to make a campaign against the Romans, much as he hated them, nevertheless departed for Spain, contrary to the wishes of the magistrates at home.
§ 12.18 This, however, took place later. At the time under discussion the Romans made war upon the Faliscans and Manlius Torquatus ravaged their country. In a battle with them his heavy infantry was worsted, but his cavalry conquered. In a second engagement with them he was victorious and took possession of their arms, their cavalry, their goods, their slaves, and half their country. Later on the original city, which was set upon a steep mountain, was torn down and another one was built, easy of access. After this the Romans again waged war upon the Boii and upon the Gauls who were neighbours of the latter, and upon some of the Ligurians. So the Ligurians were conquered in battle and harried by Sempronius Gracchus; in a conflict with the Gauls, however, Publius Valerius was at first defeated, but later, learning that troops had come from Rome to his assistance, he renewed the struggle with the enemy, determined either to conquer by his own exertions or to die — for he preferred death to living in disgrace — and by some good fortune or other he gained the victory.
Such were the events, then, that befell the Romans at this time. They also secured Sardinia from the Carthaginians, without a battle, as well as a fresh supply of money, by charging them with injuring Roman shipping. For the Carthaginians had not yet recovered strength, and feared their threats. The next year Lucius Lentulus and Quintus Flaccus made a campaign against the Gauls; and as long as they remained together, they were invincible, but when they began to pillage districts separately, with the purpose of securing greater booty, the army of Flaccus became imperilled, being surrounded by night. For the time the barbarians were beaten back, but after gaining accessions of allies they proceeded anew with a huge force against the Romans. When confronted by Publius Lentulus and Licinius Varus, they hoped to terrify them by their numbers and prevail without a battle. So they sent and demanded back the land surrounding Ariminum and commanded the Romans to vacate the city, since it belonged to them. The consuls, because of their small numbers, did not dare to risk a battle, nor would they undertake to abandon any territory; accordingly they arranged an armistice, to enable the Gauls to send envoys to Rome. These came before the senate with the same demands, but obtained no satisfaction, and returned to camp. There they found their cause was lost. For some of their allies repented, and regarding the Romans with fear, turned upon the Boii, and many were killed on both sides. Thereupon the remainder went home and the Boii obtained peace at the price of a large portion of their land.
When the Gallic wars had now been ended, Lentulus conducted a campaign against the Ligurians; he repulsed those who attacked him and gained possession of several fortresses. Varus set out for Corsica, but inasmuch as he lacked the necessary ships to carry him over, he sent a certain Claudius Clineas ahead with a force. The latter terrified the Corsicans, held a conference with them, and made peace as though he had full authority to do so. Varus, however, ignored this agreement and fought the Corsicans until he had subjugated them. The Romans, to divert from themselves the blame for breaking the compact, sent Claudius to them, offering to surrender him; and when he was not received, they drove him into exile. They were on the point of making an expedition against the Carthaginians, alleging that these were committing outrages upon their merchants; but instead of doing so, they exacted more money and renewed the truce. Yet the treaty was not destined even thus to be of long standing. The case of the Carthaginians was accordingly postponed; but the Romans made an expedition against the Sardinians, who would not yield obedience, and conquered them. Later the Carthaginians secretly persuaded the Sardinians to rise against the Romans. In addition to this the Corsicans also revolted and the Ligurians did not remain quiet.
The following year the Romans divided their forces into three parts in order that the rebels, finding war waged upon all of them at once, might not render assistance to one another; so they sent Postumius Albinus into Liguria, Spurius Carvilius against the Corsicans, and Publius Cornelius, the praetor urbanus, to Sardinia. And the consuls accomplished their missions with some speed, though not without trouble. The Sardinians, who were animated by no little spirit, were vanquished in a fierce battle by Carvilius; for Cornelius and many of his soldiers had perished of disease. When the Romans left their country, the Sardinians and the Ligurians revolted again. Quintus Fabius Maximus was accordingly sent against the Ligurians and Pomponius Manius to Sardinia. The Romans declared the Carthaginians, as the instigators of these wars, to be enemies, and they sent to them demanding money and bidding them remove their ships from all these islands, since these ports belonged to them. And to make their mind perfectly clear, they sent a spear and a herald's staff, bidding them choose one, whichever they pleased. The Carthaginians, quite undismayed, returned a sufficiently curt answer, in which they stated that they chose neither of the articles sent them, but were ready to accept either that the Romans might leave with them. Henceforth the two nations hated each other but hesitated to begin war.
When the Sardinians once more rose against the Romans, both the consuls, Marcus Malleolus and Marcus Aemilius, took the field. And they secured many spoils, which were taken away from them, however, by the Corsicans when they touched at their island. Hence the Romans now turned their attention to both these peoples. Marcus Pomponius proceeded to harry Sardinia, but could not find many of the inhabitants, who as he learned, had slipped into caves of the forest, difficult to locate; therefore he sent for keen-scented dogs from Italy, and with their aid discovered the trail of both men and cattle and cut off many such parties. Gaius Papirius drove the Corsicans from the plains, but in attempting to force his way to the mountains he lost numerous men through ambush and would have suffered the loss of still more owing to the scarcity of water, had not water at length been found; then the Corsicans were induced to come to terms.
§ 12.19 About this time also Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, was defeated by the Spaniards and lost his life. For, as he was arrayed in battle against them, they led out in front of the Carthaginian army waggons full of pine wood and pitch and when they drew near they set fire to these vehicles, then hurried on the animals drawing them by goading them to madness. Forthwith their opponents were thrown into confusion, became disorganized, and turned to flight, and the Spaniards, pursuing, killed Hamilcar and a great many besides. Thus, after a remarkably successful career, Hamilcar met his end; and at his death his son-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him. The latter acquired many new districts of Spain and founded there a city, called Carthage after his native place.
In view of the fact that the Boii and rest of the Gauls were offering for sale various articles and an especially large number of captives, the Romans became afraid that they might some day use the money against them, and accordingly forbade anybody to give to a Gaul either silver or gold. Soon afterward the Carthaginians, learning that the consuls, Marcus Aemilius and Marcus Junius, had started for Liguria, made preparations to march upon Rome. But when the consuls became aware of this and proceeded suddenly against them, they became frightened and went to meet them as if they were friends. The consuls likewise feigned that they had not set out against these people, but were going through their country into the Ligurian territory.
And the Romans crossed the Ionian Gulf and laid hands upon the Greek mainland. They found an excuse for the voyage in the following circumstances. Issa is an island situated in the Ionian Gulf. Its inhabitants, known as Issaeans, had of their own free will surrendered themselves to the Romans because they were angry with their ruler Agron, who was king of the Ardiaeans and of Illyrian stock. To him the consuls sent envoys. But he had died, leaving as his successor a son who was still a mere child; and his wife, the boy's stepmother, was governing the realm of the Ardiaeans. She was not at all reasonable in her dealings with the ambassadors, and when they expressed themselves freely, she cast some of them into prison and killed others. As soon, however, as the Romans had voted for war against her, she became panic-strickened, promised to restore the ambassadors who were left alive, and declared that those dead had been slain by robbers. But when the Romans demanded the surrender of the murderers, she declared she would not give up anybody, and dispatched an army against Issa. Then she again grew fearful and sent a certain Demetrius to the consuls, assuring them of her readiness to heed them in everything. And a truce was made with this emissary, upon his agreeing to give them Corcyra. Yet woman-like, such was her vain and fickle disposition that when the consuls had crossed over to the island, she became emboldened again, and sent out an army to Epidamnus and Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued these cities, seized ships of hers which were sailing home from the Peloponnesus laden with treasure, and devastated the coast regions, and after Demetrius as a result of her caprice had transferred his allegiance to the Romans and also persuaded some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and abdicated her power. This Demetrius received in trust for the boy. The Romans were thanked by the Corinthians for their action, and took part in the Isthmian games, in which Plautus won the stadium race. Moreover they formed a friendship with the Athenians and were admitted by them to citizenship and to the Mysteries.
The name Illyricum was anciently applied to different regions, but later it was transferred to the interior of the mainland and to the region above Macedonia and the part of Thrace lying this side of Haemus and next to Rhodope. It lies between these mountains and the Alps, also between the river Aenus and the Ister, extending as far as the Euxine Sea; indeed, at some points it extends even beyond the Ister.
Inasmuch as an oracle had once come to the Romans that Greeks and Gauls should occupy the city, two Gauls and likewise two Greeks, male and female, were buried alive in the Forum, in order that in this way destiny might seem to have fulfilled itself, and these foreigners, thus buried there, might be regarded as possessing a part of the city.
After this the Sardinians, indignant because a Roman praetor was continually set over them, began an uprising; but they were again enslaved.
§ 12.20 The Insubres, a Gallic tribe, after securing allies from among their kinsmen beyond the Alps, turned their arms against the Romans, and the latter were accordingly making preparations themselves. The barbarians plundered some towns, but at last a great storm occurred in the night, and they suspected that Heaven was against them. Consequently they lost heart, and falling into a panic, attempted to find safety in flight. Regulus pursued them and brought on an engagement with the rearguard in which he was defeated and lost his life. Aemilius occupied a hill and remained quiet. The Gauls in turn occupied another hill, and for several days both sides were inactive; then the Romans, through anger at what had taken place, and the barbarians, from arrogance born of their victory, charged down from the heights and came to blows. For a long time the battle was evenly fought, but finally the Romans surrounded the others with their cavalry, cut them down, seized their camp, and recovered the spoils. After this Aemilius wrought havoc among the possessions of the Boii and celebrated a triumph, in which he conveyed the foremost captives clad in armour up to the Capitol, making jests at their expense for having sworn not to remove their breastplates until they had ascended to the Capitol. The Romans now not only gained the entire territory of the Boii, but also crossed the Po for the first time against the Insubres, whose country they proceeded to ravage.
Meanwhile portents had occurred which threw the people of Rome into great fear. A river in Picenum ran the colour of blood, in Etruria a good part of the heavens seemed to be on fire, at Ariminum a light like the day blazed out at night, in many portions of Italy three moons became visible in the night time, and in the Forum a vulture perched for several days. On account of these portents and also because some declared that the consuls had been illegally chosen, they summoned them home. The consuls received the letter, but did not open it immediately, since they were just on the point of beginning the war; instead, they joined battle first and came out victorious. After the battle the letter was read, and Furius was for obeying promptly; but Flaminius was elated over the victory and kept pointing out that it showed their election to have been proper, and he insisted that in their jealousy of him the nobles were even misrepresenting the will of the gods. Consequently he refused to depart until he had settled the whole business in hand, and he said he would teach the people at home, too, not to be deceived by relying on birds or any thing of the sort. So he was anxious to remain where he was, and strove to detain his colleague, but Furius would not heed him. However, since the men who were going to be left behind with Flaminius feared that if left by themselves they might suffer some disaster at the hands of their opponents and begged him to remain for a few days longer, he yielded to their entreaties, but did not take any active part. Flaminius travelled about laying waste the country, reduced a few forts, and bestowed all the spoils upon the soldiers as a means of winning their favour. At length the leaders returned home and were charged by the senate with disobedience; for Furius also incurred disgrace because of the anger felt against Flaminius. But the populace, in its zeal for Flaminius, opposed the senate and voted them a triumph. After celebrating this the consuls laid down their office.
Other consuls, Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus Scipio, chosen in their stead, made an expedition against the Insubres; for the Romans had not granted this people's request for peace. At first the consuls carried on the war together, and were in most case victorious; but soon, learning that the allied territory was being plundered, they separated their forces. Marcellus made a quick march against those plundering the land of the allies, but found them no longer there; he then pursued them as they fled, and when they made a stand, overcame them. Scipio remained where he was and proceeded to besiege Acerrae; upon taking it he made it a base for the war, since it was favourably placed and well walled. And setting out from that point, they subdued Mediolanum and another town. After these had been captured the rest of the Insubres also made terms with them, giving them money and a portion of the land.
Later Publius Cornelius and Marcus Minucius made an expedition in the direction of the Ister and subdued many of the nations there, some by war some by capitulation. Lucius Veturius and Gaius Lutatius went as far as the Alps, and without any fighting won over many people. But the ruler of the Ardiaeans, Demetrius, as has been stated above, was not only proving oppressive to the natives, but was also ravaging the territory of the neighbouring tribes; and it appeared that it was by abusing the friendship of the Romans that he was able to wrong them. As soon as the consuls, Aemilius Paulus and Marcus Livius, heard of this, they summoned him before them. When he paid no heed, but actually proceeded to assail their allies, they made a campaign against him in Issa. And having learned in advance that he was lying secretly at anchor somewhere in the vicinity of the landing-places, they sent a part of their ships to the other side of the island to bring on an engagement. When the Illyrians, accordingly, turned against these, thinking them to be alone, the main force sailed in at leisure, and after pitching camp in a suitable place, repulsed the natives, who, in their anger at the deception, had promptly attacked them. Demetrius made his escape to Pharos, another island, but they sailed to that, overcame resistance, and captured the city by betrayal, though only after Demetrius had fled. This time he reached Macedonia with large sums of money, and went to Philip, the king of the country. He was not surrendered by him, but on returning to Illyria was arrested by the Romans and put to death.
§ 13.21.1 Fragments of Book XIII
In the following year the Romans became openly hostile to the Carthaginians, and this war, though of far shorter duration than the previous one, proved to be both greater and severer in its exploits and its disasters. It was brought on chiefly by Hannibal, the general of the Carthaginians. This Hannibal was a son of Hamilcar Barca, and from his earliest boyhood had been trained to fight against the Romans. For Hamilcar said he was rearing all his sons like so many whelps to fight against them, and when he saw that this one had by far the best nature, he made him take an oath that he would wage war upon them; accordingly he was engaged in giving him a careful training, particularly in warfare, at the time of his own death, when the boy was fifteen years of age. Because of his youth Hannibal was unable to succeed then to the generalship; upon the death of Hasdrubal, however, he delayed no longer, being now twenty-six years of age, but at once took possession of the army in Spain, and after being acclaimed general by the soldiers, brought it about that the command was confirmed to him also by those in authority at home. After accomplishing this he required a plausible excuse for his enterprise against the Romans, and this he found in the Saguntines of Spain. These people, dwelling not far from the river Iberus, and a short distance from the sea, were dependents of the Romans, who held them in honour, and in the treaty with the Carthaginians had made a special exception of them. Hence, for this reason Hannibal began war with them, knowing that the Romans would either assist the Saguntines or avenge them if they suffered injury. From this motive, then, as well as because he knew that they possessed great wealth, which he particularly needed, and from various other considerations that promised him advantages against the Romans, he made an attack upon the Saguntines.
Tzetzes in Lycophr. Alex. 516
Spain, in which the Saguntines dwell, and all the adjoining land is in the western part of Europe. It extends for a great distance along the inner sea, past the Pillars of Hercules, and along the Ocean itself; furthermore, it includes the regions inland for a very great distance, even to the Pyrenees. This range, beginning at the sea called anciently the sea of the Bebryces, but later the sea of the Narbonenses, reaches to the great outer sea, and contains many diverse nationalities; it also separates the whole of Spain from the neighbouring land of Gaul. The tribes were neither of one speech, nor did they have a common government. As a result, they were not known by one name: the Romans called them Spaniards, but the Greeks Iberians, from the river Iberus.
Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses Bebryces, writing thus: "To those who were of old Bebryces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul."
These Saguntines, then, upon being besieged, sent to their neighbours and to the Romans, asking for aid. But Hannibal checked any local movement, while the Romans sent ambassadors to him commanding him not to come near the Saguntines, and threatening, in case he should not obey, to sail to Carthage at once and lay accusation against him. When the envoys were now close at hand, Hannibal sent some of the natives who were to pretend that they were kindly disposed to them and who were instructed to say that the general was not there, but had gone some distance away into parts unknown; and they advised the Romans to depart as quickly as possible, before their presence should be reported, lest in the disorder prevailing because of the absence of the general they should lose their lives. The envoys, accordingly, believed them and set out for Carthage. And when an assembly had been called, some of the Carthaginians counselled maintaining peace with the Romans, but the party attached to Hannibal affirmed that the Saguntines were guilty of wrongdoing, and that the Romans were meddling with what did not concern them. Finally those who urged them to make war won the day.
Meanwhile Hannibal in the course of the siege was conducting vigorous assaults, in which many of his men fell and many more were wounded. One day the Carthaginians succeeded in battering down a portion of the wall, and had been daring enough to enter through the breach, when the Saguntines made a sortie and drove them away. As a result the besieged were strengthened, and the Carthaginians gave way to discouragement. Yet they did not leave the city till they had captured it, though the siege dragged on to the eighth month. Many untoward incidents happened during that time, one of which was the dangerous wounding of Hannibal. The place was taken in the following manner. They brought to bear against the wall an engine much higher than the fortifications, and carrying heavy-armed soldiers, some visible, some concealed. While the Saguntines, therefore, were vigorously fighting against the men they saw, believing them to be the only ones, those concealed from view dug through the wall from below and found their way inside. The Saguntines, overwhelmed by the unexpectedness of the event, ran up to the citadela and held a conference, to see whether by any reasonable concessions they might be saved. But as Hannibal held out no moderate terms and no assistance came to them from the Romans, they begged for a cessation of the assaults, on the plea that they wished to deliberate a little about their present situation. During this respite they gathered together the most highly prized of their treasures and cast them into the flames; then such as were incapable of fighting took their own lives, and those who were in the prime advanced in a body against their opponents, and fighting zealously, were cut down.
§ 13.52.1 The Romans were at the height of their military power and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Thus, unlike most people, who are led by unalloyed good fortune to audacity, but by strong fear to forbearance, they at this time had a very different experience in these matters. For the greater their successes, the more were they sobered; against their enemies they displayed that daring which is a part of bravery, but toward one another they showed the forbearance which goes hand in hand with good order. 2 They used their power for the exercise of safe moderation and their orderliness for the acquirement of true bravery; and they did not allow either their good fortune to develop into arrogance or their forbearance into cowardice. They believed that in the latter case sobriety was ruined by bravery and boldness by fear; whereas with them moderation was rendered more secure by bravery and good fortune surer by good order. It was due to this in particular that they carried through so successfully the wars that came upon them and administered both their own affairs and those of the allies so well.
§ 13.54.1 All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the Romans as leaders, but because they hated the power that ruled them and welcomed the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but all of them taken together were scarcely Hannibal's equal. He could comprehend matters most clearly and plan out most promptly every project that he concerned, notwithstanding the fact that, as a rule, sureness is the result of deliberation and instability the result of a hasty disposition. 2 He was most resourceful in the suddenest emergency, and most steadfast to the point of utter trustworthiness. Not only did he safely handle the affair of the moment, but he accurately read the future beforehand; he proved himself a most capable counsellor in ordinary events and a most accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he not only handled the situation immediately confronting him most readily and in the briefest time, but also by calculation anticipated the future afar off and considered it as though it were actually present.
§ 13.54.3 Consequently he, above all other men, met each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he viewed the expected and the actual in the same light. He was able to manage matters thus for the reason that in addition to his natural capacity he was versed in much Phoenician learning common to his country, and likewise in much Greek learning, and furthermore he understood divination by the inspection of entrails.
In addition to such mental qualities he was also equipped with a physique that had been brought to a state of equal perfection, partly by nature and partly by his manner of life, so that he could carry out easily everything that he undertook. He kept his body agile and at the same time as compact as possible; and he could with safety, therefore, run, or stand his ground, or ride at furious speed. He never burdened himself with overmuch food, nor suffered through lack of it, but took more or less with equal readiness, feeling that either was satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew strong.
§ 13.55.5 Possessing these advantages of mind and body, he managed affairs in general as follows. Since he saw that most men were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself dealt with them on this principle and expected the same treatment of them, so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom failed by being the object of a plot. 6 He regarded as enemies all who could gain an advantage, whether foreigners or his own countrymen, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but treated them very harshly, assuming that they were desirous of doing whatever injury they could; he thought it better to be the first to act than the first to suffer, and resolved that others should be in his power rather than he in theirs.
§ 13.55.7 In short, he paid attention to the real nature of things, rather than to the good things said of them, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. However, he showed excessive honour to any of whom he stood in need; for he considered that most men are slaves to such distinction, and saw that they were willing to encounter danger for the sake of it, even contrary to their own interest. 8 For these reasons he often refrained himself from opportunities for gain and other most delightful pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get them to be zealous partners in hard work also. Furthermore, he subjected himself not only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same dangers, and was the first to perform every task that he demanded of them. For he believed that thus they in their turn would give him unhesitating and eager support in all his projects, since they saw on his part something more than empty words. Towards the rest he always behaved very haughtily;
§ 13.55.9 and the whole multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him because of their similar conditions of life in the one case, and because of his haughtiness in the other. Consequently, he was fully able to bring low the lofty, to exalt the humble, and in the briefest time to inspire any whom he pleased, now with hesitation, now with boldness, with hope also and despair, regarding the most important matters.
§ 13.54.10 Now that this is not idle report about him, but truthful tradition, his deeds are proof. He won over many new districts of Spain in a short time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by force and others by persuasion. 11 This, however, he achieved by himself without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any great assistance from them. For although they were to enjoy no slight glory and benefit from his efforts, they wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to coöperate effectively in any enterprise.
§ 13.55.1 Zonaras 8, 22: Peace not only creates wealth but also preserves it, whereas war both expends it and destroys it.
All mankind is so constituted as to desire to lord it over such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against those who are willing to be enslaved. 2 But do you, who have knowledge of this fact and who have had experience with these men, believe that forbearance and mildness are sufficient for our safety? And can you regard with indifference all the wrongs they may do us by stealth or deceit, or even by violence? Will you not rather bestir yourselves, be on your guard in season, and defend yourselves? And, indeed, you have never reflected that such behaviour is in place for you toward one another, while toward the Carthaginians it is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must treat in a manner both gentle and worthy of citizens; for if one be saved unexpectedly, it is our gain. But the enemy we must treat unsparingly; for we shall save ourselves, not by the defeats we incur as a result of sparing them, but by the victories we win as a result of humbling them.
§ 13.55.3 War both preserves men's own possessions and wins those of others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war, but itself in addition.
a Thus it is disgraceful to seem either to have taken the wrong course in the beginning or to have repented later when there was no necessity; for serious as it is to make a mistake in one's haste at the outset, it is yet more serious to give up in dismay the plan once approved. 3 b Those whose lives are upright and noble and who are concerned with affairs must consider ahead of time what needs to be done, and then adopt the course which has met their approval; 4 for it is base to proceed to action before there has been discussion of the matter. In such a case, if successful, you will appear to have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have used good judgment, and if defeated, to be making your investigation at a time when there is no longer any profit in it. And yet who does not know that to heap up reproaches and to accuse people who have once warred against us is very easy — any man can do it — whereas, to state what is advantageous for the state, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to the benefit of the state, is the duty of the advising class?
§ 13.55.5 Do not arouse us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to go to war, until you show us that it will be really to our advantage. Reflect particularly — though there are other considerations — that speaking here about deeds of war is not the same thing as actually doing them. 6 Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who make a wise use of them far better than those who are altogether fortunate and for that reason arrogant. Somehow adversity seems to contain no inconsiderable portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses or to indulge in extreme arrogance. It is most desirable, of course, to have a natural inclination toward all the best things, and to make not possibility, but reason, the measure of desire. But if a man be unable to admire the more excellent way, it will still pay him to learn moderation, even against his will, so as to regard occasional ill success as good fortune.
§ 13.57.12 Now is it not absurd for us to be zealous for success in foreign and remote enterprises before we set the city itself upon a firm foundation? And is it not rash to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order?
§ 13.55.7 It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience again; this is the only benefit that one can receive from disasters. Successes occasionally ruin those who unthinkingly base their hopes upon them, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas failures compel every one as a result of his past experiences to provide securely for the future. 8 For securing either the favour of the gods or a good reputation among men it is no small thing to avoid the appearance of beginning war, and to seem forced rather to defend oneself against aggression.
§ 13.55.9 After speeches of this character on both sides they decided to prepare for war; they would not vote for this, however, but decided to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal. Then, if the Carthaginians did not approve his deeds, they would arbitrate the matter, or if the responsibility were put upon him, they would present a demand for his surrender; and if he were given up, well and good; otherwise they would declare war upon them. 10 When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and actually showed contempt for them, Marcus Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga, and holding them with palms upward, exclaimed: "I bring you here, Carthaginians, both war and peace; choose once for all whichever of them you wish." Upon their replying then and there to this challenge that they chose neither, but would readily accept whichever the Romans left with them, he declared war upon them.
§ 13.56.1 The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But these people declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians nor received any favour from the Romans that they should war against the one or defend the other, and were quite angry with them; for they accused them of having done their kinsmen many wrongs.
The Romans, ascertaining this, assembled in the senate-house, and many speeches were delivered. Lucius Cornelius Lentulus in his address declared they must not delay, but must vote for war against the Carthaginians, and must separate the consuls and armies into two detachments, sending one to Spain and the other to Africa, in order that at one and this time the enemy's land might be desolated and their allies injured; thus their foes would be unable either to assist Spain or to receive assistance from there themselves. To this Quintus Fabius Maximus replied that is was not so absolutely necessary to vote for war, but that they ought first to send an embassy, and then, if the Carthaginians persuaded them that they were guilty of wrong, they should remain quiet, but if they were convicted of wrongdoing, they should then wage war upon them — "in order," he added, "that we may also cast the responsibility for the war upon them." The opinions of the two men were substantially these. The senate decided to prepare, indeed, for the struggle, but to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; and if the Carthaginians did not approve his deeds, they would arbitrate the matter, or if the responsibility were put upon him, they would demand his surrender, and if he were not given up, they would declare war upon the nation.
The envoys accordingly set out, and the Carthaginians considered what must be done. Now a certain Hasdrubal, one of those who had been primed by Hannibal, counselled them that they ought to win back their ancient freedom and shake off, by means of money and troops and allies combined, the slavery imposed by peace, adding: "If you will but permit Hannibal to act by himself as he wishes, the proper thing will be done, and you will have no trouble yourselves." After such words on Hasdrubal's part the great Hanno, in opposing this argument, expressed the opinion that they ought not to draw war upon themselves lightly nor for small complaints concerning foreigners, when it was in their power to settle some of the complaints and divert the rest upon the heads of those who were responsible. With these remarks he ceased, and the elder Carthaginians, who remembered the former war, sided with him; but the younger men, and especially all the partisans of Hannibal, violently opposed him. When, then, they made no definite answer and showed contempt for the envoys, Marcus Fabius, thrusting his hands beneath his toga, and holding them with palms upward, exclaimed: "I bring you here, Carthaginians, both war and peace: choose whichever of them you wish." Upon their replying that they chose neither, but would readily accept whichever the Romans should leave, he immediately declared war upon them.
In this way, then, and for these reasons the Romans and the Carthaginians went to war for the second time. Now Heaven had indicated beforehand what was to come to pass. For in Rome an ox talked with a human voice, and another at the Ludi Romani hurled himself out of a house into the Tiber and perished, many thunderbolts fell, and blood in one case was seen issuing from sacred statues, whereas in another it dripped from the shield of a soldier, and the sword of another soldier was carried off by a wolf from the very midst of the camp. And in the case of Hannibal, many unknown wild beasts went before him leading the way, as he was crossing the Iberus, and a vision appeared to him in a dream. He thought once that the gods, sitting in assembly, sent for him and bade him march with all speed into Italy and that by this guide he was commanded to follow without turning around. He did turn, however, and saw a great tempest moving along and an immense serpent following in its wake. In surprise he asked his conductor what these were; and the guide said: "Hannibal, these are on their way to help you in the sack of Italy."
§ 18.15.1 As long as the struggle with the Carthaginians was at its height, they treated Philip with consideration, even though his attitude toward them was not one of friendliness; for they wished to prevent him from combining with the Carthaginians or making an expedition into Italy. But as soon as they were at peace with Carthage, they no longer hesitated, but embarked upon open warfare with him, charging him with many injuries. Accordingly, they sent envoys to him, and when he complied with none of their demands, declared war. They took as a pretext his attack upon the Greeks, but their real reason was irritation at his general behaviour and a determination to forestall him, so that he should not be able to enslave Greece and make an expedition against Italy after the manner of Pyrrhus. And having declared war, they not only made thorough preparations in other respects, but also associated with Sulpicius Galba Lucius Apustius as admiral of the fleet. Now Galba after crossing the Ionian Sea was sick for some time; and accordingly the admiral just mentioned and the lieutenant, Claudius Cento, took charge of the whole force. Cento with the aid of the fleet rescued Athens, which was being besieged by the Macedonians, and sacked Chalcis, which was occupied by the same enemy. Meanwhile Philip marched against Athens, but Cento, returning, drove him back for the time being, and also repulsed him again on the occasion of a subsequent assault. Apustius, while Philip was busy with Greece, had invaded Macedonia, and was plundering the country as well as subduing garrisons and cities. For these reasons Philip was at his wit's end, and for a time rushed about hither and thither, defending now one place and now another. This he did until his own country came to be severely harried by Apustius, and the Dardanians, who dwell above the Illyrians and the Macedonians, were injuring the part of Macedonia close to their borders, and some Illyrians, together with Amynander, king of the Athamanians, a Thessalian tribe, though they had previously been his allies, now transferred themselves to the Roman side. In view of all this he became suspicious of the loyalty of the Aetolians and feared for his interests at home, and he hastened thither with the larger part of his army. Apustius, apprised of his approach, retired; for by this time it was winter.
§ 18.15.2 Galba, on recovering from his illness, made ready a still larger force and at the beginning of spring hastened into Macedonia. When the two leaders drew near each other they pitched camp opposite each other and engaged in skirmishes with the cavalry and light-armed troops. But when the Romans transferred their camp to a certain place from which they could get food more easily, Philip thought they had shifted their position out of fear of him; therefore he attacked them unexpectedly while they were engaged in plundering and killed a few of them. Galba, on perceiving this, made a sortie from the camp, attacked him and slew many more in his turn. Philip, then, defeated and wounded, withdrew at nightfall. Galba, however, did not follow him up, but retired to Apollonia. Apustius with the Rhodians and with Attalus cruised about and subjugated many of the islands.
§ 18.15.3 About the same time Hamilcar, a Carthaginian who had served with Mago in Italy and had remained there unnoticed, keeping quiet for the time being, caused the Gauls, as soon as the Macedonian war broke out, to revolt from the Romans; then with the rebels he made an expedition against the Ligurians and won over some of them also. They fought with Lucius Furius the praetor, were defeated, and sent envoys regarding peace. The Ligurians obtained this, but it was not granted to the others. Instead, Aurelius the consul, who was jealous of the praetor's victory, conducted a retaliatory campaign against them. The following year a great deal of havoc was caused by Hamilcar and the Gauls. They conquered the praetor Gnaeus Baebius, overran the territory which was in alliance with the Romans, besieged Placentia, and after capturing it razed it to the ground.
§ 18.16.1 To return to the campaign in Greece and Macedonia — Publius Villius the consul was encamped opposite Philip, who had previously occupied the passes of Epirus, through which are the approaches to Macedonia. Philip had extended a wall across the entire space between the mountains and held a formidable position, but the consul Titus Flamininus at the end of winter got around the wall with a few followers by a narrow path. And appearing suddenly on higher ground, he terrified Philip, who thought that the whole army of Titus had got inside the pass. Hence he fell back into Macedonia at once. The consul did not pursue him, but won over the cities in Epirus. He also went into Thessaly and detached a good part of it from Philip, and then retired into Phocis and Boeotia. While he was besieging Elatea his brother Lucius Flamininus in company with Attalus and the Rhodians was subjugating the islands. Finally, after the capture of Cenchreae, they learned that envoys had been sent to the Achaeans to see about an alliance, and they despatched some themselves in turn, the Athenians also joining the embassy. And at first the opinions of the Achaeans were divided, some wishing to vote an alliance with Philip and some with the Romans; eventually, however, they voted assistance to the latter. And they joined in an expedition against Corinth, where they succeeded in demolishing portions of the wall, but retired after losses suffered through sorties on the part of the citizens.
§ 18.16.2 Then Philip, fearing that many cities might be taken, made overtures to the consul regarding peace. The latter accepted his proposals and they and their allies met together; but nothing was accomplished except that permission was granted Philip to send envoys to Rome. Nor was anything effected there either. For when the Greeks insisted that he depart from Corinth and Chalcis and from Demetrias in Thessaly, the envoys of Philip said they had received no instructions on this point; and they departed without accomplishing anything.
§ 18.16.3 The people of Rome voted to Flamininus the command in Greece for another year and also committed to his charge the campaign against Philip. Accordingly, since he was to remain at his post, he set about preparing for war, the more readily because the Lacedemonian tyrant, Nabis, although a friend of Philip, from whom he had received Argos, had made peace with him. It was because Philip was unable to look after so many districts at once and because he feared the city might be seized by the Romans that he had entrusted Argos to Nabis, to be restored again.
§ 18.16.4 In a campaign of the consul Aelius Paetus against the Gauls many perished on both sides in the conflicts, and no advantage was gained. Furthermore, the Carthaginian hostages, together with the slaves accompanying them and the captives who had been sold to various persons, had the hardihood to take possession of the several cities in which they were living; but after slaughtering many of the native population they were overthrown by the praetor Cornelius Lentulus before they had done any more mischief. The Gauls, however, elated by their successes, and aware of the fact that the Romans were paying only slight heed to the war against them, prepared to march upon Rome itself. The Romans consequently became afraid and sent both the consuls, Cornelius Cethegus and Minucius Rufus, against the Gauls. The consuls parted company and each ravaged a different district; accordingly the enemy also divided forces to meet them. One band under Hamilcar encountered Cethegus and was defeated; the rest upon learning of this became faint-hearted and would no longer face Rufus, and he consequently overran the country at will. Those who had fought against Cethegus then made peace, while the remainder still continued under arms.
§ 18.16.5 At this time Flamininus in company with Attalus reduced the whole of Boeotia. Attalus, however, expired of old age in the midst of a speech which he was making to the people there; and Flamininus went into Thessaly, where he came into collision with Philip. It was only a cavalry skirmish in which they engaged, for the ground was not suitable for a battle on a larger scale; hence both withdrew. And having reached a certain hill, the top ridge of which is called Dog's Head [Cynoscephale], they encamped, one on one side, the other on the other. Here they fought with their entire armies, and would have separated with the contest undecided, had not the Aetolians caused the Romans to prevail.
§ 18.16.6 So Philip was defeated and fled, and afterward, learning that Larissa and the neighbouring cities had chosen the side of the victors, he made overtures to Flamininus. And the latter made a truce after Philip had given money and hostages, among them his own son Demetrius, and had sent out envoys to Rome in regard to peace.
§ 18.16.7 During the period of these campaigns Androsthenes also had been vanquished by the Achaeans and had lost Corinth. And Lucius Flamininus, who was in charge of the fleet, when he could not persuade the Acarnanians to refrain from allying themselves with Philip, besieged and captured Leucas; later they learned of Philip's defeat, and he secured their submission with greater ease.
§ 18.16.8 Thus was the Macedonian war terminated, and the people of Rome very readily became reconciled with Philip upon the following terms. He must restore the captives and deserters; give up all his elephants and triremes except five (including the flag-ship, a vessel of sixteen banks); pay an indemnity, part at once, the rest in definite instalments; be king of Macedonia alone; keep not more than five thousand soldiers, and not make war with anybody outside his own country. The rest of the cities situated in Asia and Europe which had previously been subject to him they set free.
§ 18.16.9 The consuls waged once more with the Gauls a war not unfraught with difficulties, yet in spite of all they subdued this people too.
§ 18.58.1 . . . And they delayed for several days, not meeting in battle array, but engaging in skirmishes and encounters with the light-armed troops and the cavalry. The Romans, for their part, were eager to join battle with all speed; for their force was a strong one and they had few provisions, and consequently they would often advance even to the foe's palisade. 2 Philip, on the other hand, was weaker in point of armed followers, but his supply of provisions was better than theirs because his own country was close by; so he waited, expecting to wear them out without a conflict, and if he had possessed self-control, he certainly would have accomplished something. As it was, he became contemptuous of the Romans, thinking that they feared him, because they had transferred their camp to a certain place from which they could get food more readily; he thereupon attacked them unexpectedly while they were engaged in plundering and managed to kill a few.
§ 18.58.3 On perceiving this, Galba made a sortie from the camp, attacked him while off his guard and slew many more in his turn. Philip, defeated and also wounded, no longer held his ground, but after arranging a truce of some days, ostensibly for the taking up and burial of the dead, he withdrew on the very first night. 4 Galba, however, did not follow him up; for being short of provisions, ignorant of the country, and in particular not knowing his adversary's strength, he feared that if he advanced incautiously anywhere he might come to grief. For these reasons he was unwilling to proceed farther, but retired with his men to Apollonia. During this time Apustius with the Rhodians and with Attalus cruised about and subjugated many of the islands . . .
§ 18.58.5 . . . the Insubres were stirred up. Hamilcar, a Carthaginian, who had served with Mago and had remained unnoticed in those regions, had been keeping quiet for the time being, satisfied if only he might elude discovery; but as soon as the Macedonian war broke out, he caused the Gauls to revolt from the Romans. Then with the rebels he made an expedition against the Ligurians and won over some of them also; 6 later they had a battle with the praetor Lucius Furius, were defeated, and sent envoys asking for peace. The Ligurians obtained this . . . . 57 81 he thought he ought to be granted a triumph, and many arguments were presented on both sides. Some, especially in view of the animosity shown by Aurelius, eagerly furthered his cause, magnifying his victory, and citing many precedents. Others declared he had contended with the consul's troops and had no independent authority of his own; and furthermore they even demanded an explanation from him for his failure to carry out his instructions. However, he won his triumph, which he celebrated before Aurelius returned (?).
§ 18.60.1 Philip after his defeat made overtures to Flamininus. And the latter, however eagerly he coveted Macedonia also and desired to follow up his present good fortune to the utmost, nevertheless made a truce. This was due to his fear that if Philip were out of the way, the Greeks might recover their ancient spirit and no longer pay court to the Romans, that the Aetolians, already filled with great boastfulness because they had contributed the largest share to the victory, might become more troublesome to them, and that Antiochus might, as was reported, come to Europe and form an alliance with Philip.
§ 19.18.1 At this time also Flamininus made a campaign against Argos, for the Romans, seeing that Nabis was not loyal to them and was a source of terror to the Greeks, regarded him as an enemy. With an accession of allies from Philip Flamininus marched upon Sparta, crossed Taygetus without difficulty, and advanced toward the city, meeting with no opposition. For Nabis, being afraid of the Romans and suspicious of the natives, did not rouse himself to the point of advancing to meet Flamininus; but when the latter drew near, he made a sortie, feeling contemptuous of his opponent while the latter was fatigued from the march and was busied, moreover, with the work of pitching camp; and he caused some confusion among them. The next day he came out to face the Romans when they assaulted, but as he lost large numbers, he did not try it again. So Flamininus left a portion of his army there to prevent Nabis from stirring anywhere, and with the rest turned his attention to the country, which he ravaged with the aid of his brother and the Rhodians and Eumenes, the son Attalus. Nabis was consequently in despair and despatched a herald to Flamininus in regard to peace. The latter listened to his proposals, but did not immediately conclude peace. For the terms which Nabis was asked to make were such that he neither dared to refuse them, nor yet would he consent to make them; but the populace prevented him from coming to an agreement. So at this time Nabis did not make peace, but when the Romans attacked again and captured nearly the whole of Sparta (for it was without a wall in places), he held out no longer, but made a truce with Flamininus, and by sending an embassy to Rome effected a settlement.
§ 19.18.2 Flamininus at this time set all the Greeks free, and later he summoned them together and after reminding them of the benefits they had received urged them to maintain friendship with Rome; he then withdrew all the garrisons and departed with his entire army.
§ 19.18.3 Upon the arrival of Flamininus at Rome Nabis rebelled. Thereupon practically the whole Greek world became aroused, being encouraged by the Aetolians; and they were making ready for war and were sending embassies to Philip and Antiochus. The latter they succeeded in persuading to become an enemy of the Romans, promising him that he should be king of both Greece and Italy. With affairs in this disturbed state, the Romans had no hope of overcoming Antiochus, but were content if only they could preserve their former conquests. For he was regarded as a mighty ruler even by virtue of his own power, by which he had subjugated Media among other exploits; but he became far mightier still through having gained as sons-in-law Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia.
§ 19.18.4 In view of this estimate of Antiochus, the Romans, so long as they were at war with Philip, were careful to court his favour, keeping up friendly relations with him through envoys and sending him gifts. But when they had vanquished their other enemy, they despised also this king whom they had formerly feared. Antiochus crossed over into Thrace and gained control of many districts. He also helped to colonize Lysimachia, which had been depopulated, intending to use it as a base; for Philip and Nabis had invited his assistance. Hannibal, too, had been with him, and had caused him to hope that he might sail to Carthage, and from there to Italy, and further that he might subjugate the races along the Ionian Sea, and with them set out against Rome. Antiochus did, at any rate, succeed in crossing into Europe twice, and in reaching Greece. But learning now that Ptolemy was dead, and deeming it all-important to get possession of Egypt, he left his son Seleucus with a force at Lysimachia, and himself set out on the march. He found out, however, that Ptolemy was alive, and so kept away from Egypt, but made an attempt to sail to Cyprus; however, he was baffled by a storm and returned home. The Romans and he both now sent envoys to each other submitting mutual complaints, in order that they might find an excuse for war and also that they might observe conditions on the other side before the conflict began.
§ 19.18.5 Hannibal had obtained the most important office at Carthage and in his tenure of it had offended the most powerful nobles and incurred their hatred. Malicious reports about him were also conveyed to the Romans, to the effect that he was rousing the Carthaginians to revolt and was taking counsel with Antiochus. Learning now that some men from Rome were present, and fearing arrest, he fled from Carthage by night. And coming to Antiochus, he undertook to pave the way for his own restoration to his native country and for war against the Romans by promising the king that he would secure for him the rule of both Greece and Italy. This was before Scipio Africanus joined them. Scipio had been sent to Africa as an arbitrator between Masinissa not Carthaginians, who were at variance over some boundaries, and he had left their dispute still unsettled, in order that they might continue to quarrel and that neither of them might be angry at the Romans on account of their decision. From there he crossed into Asia, nominally as an envoy to Antiochus, but in reality to frighten both him and Hannibal by his coming and to accomplish what was for the advantage of the Romans. After his arrival Antiochus no longer paid the same deference to Hannibal. He suspected him because of his secret conversations with Scipio, and found him burdensome in any case, since everybody ascribed every plan to Hannibal, and all placed in him their hope for success in the war. For these reasons, then, he became both jealous and afraid of Hannibal, lest he might change his demeanour, in case he should get control of any power. So he neither supplied him with an army nor sent him to Carthage; furthermore, he did not favour him with any great intimacy, but even endeavoured to avoid all appearance of acting on his advice.
§ 19.19.1 The fame of Antiochus occupied a large share of Rome's attention and caused the Romans no small degree of uneasiness. Many rumours were rife regarding him: some reported that he already held the whole of Greece, others that he was hastening toward Italy. The Romans accordingly sent envoys to Greece, among them Flamininus, who was on intimate terms with the people there, in order that he might prevent both Philip and them from beginning a revolt; and of the praetors they sent Marcus Baebius to Apollonia, in case Antiochus should undertake to cross over into Italy by that route, and Aulus Atilius against Nabis. Now Aulus accomplished nothing, for Nabis had already perished, the victim of a plot on the part of the Aetolians, and Sparta had been captured by the Achaeans; but Baebius and Philip strengthened the loyalty of many portions of Thessaly. For the Macedonian king had remained true to his agreement with the Romans, principally for the reason that Antiochus had annexed some settlements belonging to him in Thrace.
§ 19.19.2 Flamininus went about Greece, persuading some not to revolt, and winning back others who had already revolted, with the exception of the Aetolians and a few others. The Aetolians had gone over to Antiochus and were forming a union out of various states with or without their consent. Antiochus, even though it was winter, hastened forward to fulfil the hopes of the Aetolians; and this is the reason why he did not bring a respectable force. With the troops he had, however, he took Chalcis and gained control of the rest of Euboea; and finding some Romans among the captives he released them all.
§ 19.19.3 Then he took up his winter-quarters at Chalcis, with the result that he himself and his generals and his soldiers had their moral energy ruined at the outset; for by his general indolence and by his passion for a certain girl he drifted into a life of luxury and rendered the rest unfit for warfare.
§ 19.19.4 The people at Rome, learning that he was in Greece and that he had captured Chalcis, took up the war openly. Of the consuls they retained Scipio Nasica to guard Italy and sent Manius Glabrio with a large army into Greece. Nasica conducted a war against the Boii, and Glabrio drove Antiochus out of Greece. He also went to Thessaly, and with the help of Baebius and Philip gained control of many of the towns there. He captured Philip of Megalopolis and sent him to Rome, and drove Amynander out of his domain, which he then gave to the Macedonian ruler.
§ 19.19.5 Antiochus meanwhile was remaining at Chalcis and keeping quiet. Afterward he went into Boeotia and awaited the advance of the Romans at Thermopylae; for he believed, in view of his small numbers, that the natural advantages of the place would be of assistance to him. But in order to avoid repeating the experience of the Greeks who had been arrayed there against the Persian he sent a division of the Aetolians up to the summit of the mountains to keep guard there. Glabrio was little concerned about the nature of the region, and did not postpone battle; but he sent the lieutenants Porcius Cato and Valerius Flaccus by night against the Aetolians on the summit, and himself engaged in conflict with Antiochus at dawn. Now as long as he fought on level ground he had the best of it, but when Antiochus withdrew to a higher position, he found himself at a disadvantage, until Cato arrived in the enemy's rear. Cato had come upon the Aetolians while they were asleep and had killed most of them and scattered the rest; then he hurried down and participated also in the battle going on below. So they routed Antiochus and captured his camp. The king forthwith retired to Chalcis, but learning that the consul was approaching, he retired secretly to Asia.
§ 19.19.6 Glabrio at once occupied Boeotia and Euboea, and proceeded to deliver assault upon Heraclea, since the Aetolians were unwilling to yield to him. The lower city he captured by siege, and later he received the capitulation of those who had fled to the acropolis. Among the prisoners taken at this time was Democritus, the Aetolian general, who had once refused alliance with Flamininus, and when the latter had asked for a decree that he might send it to Rome, had said: "Never fear. I will carry it there with my army and read it to you all on the banks of the Tiber." Philip was engaged in besieging Lamia when Glabrio came against it and appropriated both the victory and the booty. Although the remainder of the Aetolians were desirous of peace, still they made no truce, since Antiochus sent them envoys and money, but set themselves in readiness for war. Philip affected friendliness toward the Romans, but his heart was with Antiochus.
§ 19.19.8 So they, as well as the Epirots, despatched envoys to Rome. Philip sent a crown of victory to Capitoline Jupiter and received in return, among other presents, his son Demetrius, who had been living at Rome as a hostage. But with the Aetolians no truce was made, for they would not submit to any curtailment of privileges.
§ 19.20.1 The Romans opposed to Antiochus the Scipios, Africanus and his brother Lucius. These generals granted the Aetolians an armistice for the purpose of once more sending an embassy to Rome regarding peace, and hurried on against Antiochus. On reaching Macedonia they secured allies from Philip, and marched on to the Hellespont. Then crossing into Asia, they found most of the coast districts already occupied by the Romans who had gone there first, as well as by Eumenes and the Rhodians; the latter had also conquered Hannibal near Pamphylia, as he was taking some ships up from Phoenicia. Eumenes and his brother Attalus were injuring the country of Antiochus, and cities kept coming over to the Romans, some under compulsion, some voluntarily, with the result that Antiochus was obliged to abandon Europe entirely and to recall his son Seleucus from Lysimachia. When this son had returned, he sent him with troops against Pergamum.
§ 19.20.2 Inasmuch, however, as he accomplished nothing by his siege and the Scipios presently approached, Antiochus promptly made overtures to them; for he expected to obtain peace, since he had got possession of the son of Africanus and was according him the kindest treatment. In the end, though he failed of securing a truce, he released him without ransom.
§ 19.20.3 Now the reason why peace was not concluded was that Antiochus would not agree to the Roman demands.
§ 19.20.4 For some time after this, however, the antagonists remained quiet; but finally they fell to fighting again. The nature of the struggle was as follows. Antiochus placed the chariots in front, with the elephants next, and behind these the slingers and the archers. Now the Romans anticipated the charge of the chariots by a charge of their own, and with a mighty shout they rushed straight at them and repulsed them, so that most of the chariots turned back toward the elephants, and thus threw their own army into confusion; for in their wild flight they terrified and scattered the men marshalled beside them. Moreover, a heavy rain which now came up rendered the efforts of the archers and slingers of little effect. There followed a dense and heavy mist, which in no wise hindered the Romans, since they had the upper hand and were fighting at close range; but in the case of their opponents, who were terrified and who employed cavalry and archers for the most part, it made it impossible for them to see which way to shoot their arrows and caused them to stumble over one another as if they were wandering about in the dark. Nevertheless Antiochus was able with his mail-clad cavalry to rout those confronting him, and to advance in pursuit as far as their camp. Indeed, he would have taken it, had not Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who was charged with guarding it, killed the first Romans who came up, after he had failed to persuade them to check their flight. Thereupon the rest of the fugitives faced about, and Lepidus himself also made a sortie with the garrison, which was fresh; and by their united efforts they repulsed Antiochus. While this action was taking place, Zeuxis had assailed the ramparts in another quarter, had succeeded in getting within them, and continued to pillage until Lepidus became aware of it and came to the rescue of his own camp. At the same time Scipio captured the camp of Antiochus, where he found many people, many horses, baggage animals, silver and gold and ivory, and many other precious objects besides. Antiochus after this defeat at once retired into Syria, and the Asiatic Greeks attached themselves to the Roman cause.
§ 19.20.5 After this, upon overtures made by Antiochus, an armistice was arranged. Africanus was well disposed toward him for his son's sake, and the consul, moreover, did not wish to have the victory left to his successor, who was now drawing near; consequently they laid upon Antiochus conditions no more severe than those they had originally made before the battle. Hence Gnaeus Manlius, who succeeded them in office, was not pleased with the terms agreed upon, and he made additional demands upon the king, besides requiring him to give hostages, one of whom should be his son Antiochus, and to deliver up all the deserters, among them Hannibal. Antiochus reluctantly yielded obedience on all the other points; to give up Hannibal, however, was out of his power, since the latter had already fled to Prusias, king of Bithynia. On these conditions Antiochus sent envoys to Rome and secured peace. Lucius Scipio was praised for his victory, and received the title of Asiaticus because of it, just as his brother had been called Africanus for conquering Carthage, the most powerful city in Africa.
§ 19.20.6 These brothers, who had proved themselves men of such valour, and as a result of their excellence had attained such a great reputation were not long afterward brought to trial before the assembly.
§ 19.20.7 Lucius was condemned nominally for having appropriated a large share of the spoil, and Africanus for having made the terms of peace milder on account of his son; but the true cause of their conviction was jealousy. That they were guilty of no wrong-doing is made plain both by other evidence and in particular by the fact that when the properties of Asiaticus was confiscated it was found to consist merely of his original inheritance, and that though Africanus retired to Liternum before a vote was taken and lived there to end, no one ever again voted to condemn him.
§ 19.20.8 Manlius at this time won over Pisidia, Lycaonia, and Pamphylia, and a large part of Asiatic Gaul [Galatia]. For there exists in that region too a race of Gauls, which broke off from the European stock. With their king, Brennus, at their head they once overran Greece and Thrace, and crossing hence to Bithynia, they detached certain portions of Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Mysia adjacent to Olympus, and Cappadocia, and took up their residence in them; and they constitute today a separate nation bearing the name of Gauls [ Galatians]. This people caused Manlius trouble, but he managed to overcome them also, capturing their city Ancyra by assault and gaining control of the rest of the towns by capitulation. After he had accomplished this and had received a large price for peace from Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, he set sail for home.
§ 19.21.1 The Aetolians, after sending ambassadors to Rome the second time in regard to peace, were themselves once more beginning a rebellion. Hence the Romans immediately dismissed their envoys and assigned Greece to Marcus Fulvius. He set out first for the large city of Ambracia, once the royal residence of Pyrrhus and now occupied by the Aetolians, and proceeded to besiege it. The Aetolians, accordingly, held a conference with him in regard to peace, but since he was unwilling to make terms, they sent a part of their army into Ambracia. The Romans now undertook to capture the town by an underground passage, beginning their mine at a remote point, and so for a time eluding the notice of the besieged; but the latter suspected the true state of affairs when the excavated earth began to accumulate. Since, however, they were not aware in what direction the tunnel was being dug, they proceeded to apply a bronze shield to the surface of the ground along the circuit of the wall. And discovering the place by means of the resonance they went to work in their turn to dig a tunnel from inside, and so approached the Romans, with whom they battled in the darkness. Finally they devised the following sort of defence. Filling a huge jar with feathers, they put fire in it and attached a bronze cover perforated with numerous holes. Then, after carrying the jar into the mine and turning the mouth of it toward the enemy, they inserted a bellows in the bottom, and by blowing this bellows vigorously they caused a tremendous amount of disagreeable smoke, such as feathers would naturally create, to pour forth, so that none of the Romans could endure it. Hence the Romans, in despair of success, made a truce and raised the siege. When these had reached an agreement, the Aetolians also changed their course. They secured an armistice and subsequently obtained peace from the people at Rome by the gift of considerable money and many hostages. Fulvius gained Cephallenia by capitulation and established order in the Peloponnesus, which was torn by dissension.
§ 19.21.2 Afterwards, in the consulship of Gaius Flaminius and Aemilius Lepidus, Antiochus died and his son Seleucus succeeded him. Much later, at the demise of Seleucus, the Antiochus who was living as a hostage in Rome became king. And Philip undertook to revolt because he had been deprived of some towns in Thessaly and of Aenus and Maronea besides; but he was unable to do so because of his age and of what had happened to his sons. And some Gauls crossed the Alps and desired to found a city to the south of the mountains. Marcus Marcellus took away their arms and everything that they had brought along; but the people at Rome, upon receiving an embassy from them, restored everything on condition that they should at once retire.
§ 19.21.3 At this time also occurred the death of Hannibal. Envoys had been sent from Rome to Prusias, monarch of Bithynia, a part of whose errand was to get him to give up Hannibal, who was at his court. But Hannibal learned of this beforehand, and being unable to escape, committed suicide. An oracle had once announced to him that he should die in the Libyssan [or Libyan] land, and he was expecting to die in Libya, his native country; but, as it happened, his death occurred while he was staying in a certain place called Libyssa. Scipio Africanus also died at this time.
§ 19.60.2 Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, had captured the son of Africanus, who was sailing across from Greece, and had given him the kindest treatment. Although his father many times requested the privilege of ransoming him, his captor refused, yet did him no harm; on the contrary, he showed him every honour, and finally, though he failed of securing a truce, released him without ransom.
§ 19.61.1 Some youths who had insulted envoys of the Carthaginians when they came to Rome were sent to Carthage and delivered up to the people there; however, they received no injury at their hands, but were released.
§ 19.64.1 The Romans, when they had had a taste of Asiatic luxury and had spent some time among the possessions of the vanquished amid the abundance of spoils and the licence granted by success in arms, rapidly came to emulate the prodigality of these peoples and ere long to trample under foot their own ancestral traditions. Thus the terrible influence, starting in that quarter, invaded the city as well.
§ 19.65.1 Gracchus was thoroughly a man of the people and a very eloquent public speaker, yet his disposition was very different from Cato's. For, although he had an enmity of long standing against the Scipios, he did not acquiesce in what was taking place, but spoke in defence of Africanus, who was accused while absent, and he exerted himself to prevent any stain from attaching to his name; he also prevented the imprisonment of Asiaticus. Consequently the Scipios gave up their enmity toward him and arranged a family alliance, Africanus bestowing upon him his own daughter.
§ 20.22.1 Philip, king of Macedon, had put to death his son Demetrius and was about to slay his other son Perseus, when death overtook him. For because Demetrius had gained the affection of the Roman people through his sojourn as hostage and hoped, along with the rest of the Macedonian people, that he should secure the kingdom after Philip's death, Perseus, who was his elder had become jealous of him and falsely reported him to be plotting against his father. Thus Demetrius was forced to drink poison and died. Philip not long afterward ascertained the truth, and desired to take vengeance upon Perseus; but he did not possess sufficient strength, and not only did he die himself, but Perseus succeeded to the kingdom. The Romans confirmed his claims to it and renewed the compact of friendship made with his father.
§ 20.22.2 In the period following this some events took place, to be sure, yet they were not of such great importance as to seem worthy of record. Still later Perseus became hostile to the Romans, and in order to delay actual warfare until he should have made his preparations, he sent envoys to Rome nominally to present his answer to the charges which were being brought against him. These messengers the Romans would not receive within the wall; and although they gave them a hearing in the space before the city, they returned no other answer than that they would send a consul with whom he might confer on whatever topics he pleased. They also caused them to depart the same day, after giving them guides to prevent their associating with anybody. And Perseus was forbidden for the future to set foot on the soil of Italy.
§ 20.22.3 The Romans later sent out Gnaeus Sicinius, a praetor, with a small force, as they had not yet made ready their greater armament; and Perseus made an invasion of Thessaly, in which he won over the greater part of that country. When spring opened, they sent Licinius Crassus against him, as well as a praetor, Gaius Lucretius, in charge of the fleet. Crassus first encountered Perseus near Larissa and was worsted in a cavalry skirmish; later, however, he got the best of him, and Perseus accordingly retreated into Macedonia. Crassus meanwhile assailed the Greek cities which were held in subjection by Philip and was repulsed from the majority of them, although he got possession of a few and razed some of them to the ground, selling the captives. When the people in Rome learned of this, they became indignant, and later they imposed a fine on Crassus, liberated the captured cities, and bought back from the purchasers such of their inhabitants as had been sold and were then found in Italy.
§ 20.22.4 Thus the Romans fared in these undertakings; but in the war against Perseus they suffered many severe reverses and their fortunes at many points were at a low ebb. Perseus occupied the greater part of Epirus and Thessaly, having gathered a large body of troops. As a special measure of defence against the Romans' elephants he had a trained phalanx of heavy-armed warriors whose shields and helmets he had had studded with sharp iron nails. Also, in order to make sure that the beasts should not prove a source of terror to the horses, he constructed images of elephants and smeared them with some kind of ointment to give them a dreadful odour. They were terrible both to see and to hear, since they were skilfully arranged to emit a roar resembling thunder; and he would repeatedly lead the horses up to these figures until they gained courage. Perseus, then, as a result of all this had acquired great confidence and even hoped to surpass Alexander in glory and in the size of his domain; and the people of Rome, when they learned this, speedily sent out Marcius Philippus, who was consul. He, on reaching the camp in Thessaly, went to drilling the Romans and the allies, so that Perseus became afraid, and remained quiet at Dium in Macedonia, near Tempe, and kept watch of the pass. Philippus, encouraged by this behaviour of his, crossed over the middle of the mountain range and occupied some possessions of Perseus. But as he was advancing toward Pydna he fell short of provisions and turned back to Thessaly. Perseus now gained courage anew, recovered the places that Philippus had occupied, and with his fleet caused the Romans numerous injuries.
§ 20.22.5 He also secured allies and hoped to eject the Romans from Greece altogether, but through his excessive and inopportune parsimony and the consequent contempt of his allies he became weak once more. For as soon as the Roman influence was declining and his own was increasing, he became filled with scorn and thought he had no further need of his allies, and would not give them the money which he had offered. The zeal of some, accordingly, became damped and others abandoned him entirely, whereupon he was so overwhelmed by despair that he even sued for peace. And he would have obtained it through Eumenes but for the presence of Rhodians also in the embassy. These, by adopting an arrogant tone with the Romans, prevented him from obtaining peace.
§ 20.22.6 At this point the war against him was entrusted to Aemilius Paulus, now for the second time consul. He quickly reached Thessaly, and having first restored discipline among the soldiers, forced his way through Tempe, which was being guarded by only a few men, and marched against Perseus. The latter had erected breastworks along the river Elpeus, which lay between the armies, had occupied and rendered impassable by means of stone walls and palisades and buildings all the ground between Olympus and the sea, and was encouraged by the lack of water in the place. Yet even so the consul attempted to effect a passage, and he found a means of remedying the lack of water; for by piercing the sand bed at the foot of Olympus he found an abundant supply suitable for drinking. Meanwhile envoys of the Rhodians came to him, animated by the same boldness which they had displayed on their former embassy to Rome. But he made no statement to them beyond saying that he would return an answer in a few days, and dismissed them. Now when he could accomplish nothing by direct assault, but learned that the mountains were passable in places, he sent a portion of his army toward that pass across them which was the most difficult of approach, to seize opportune points along the route, — for on account of the difficulty of access it had an extremely small guard, — while he himself with the remainder of his army attacked Perseus, so that the latter might not become suspicious and guard the mountains with greater care. Afterwards, when the heights had been occupied, he set out by night for the mountains, and by passing unnoticed at some points and employing force at others he got across. Perseus on learning of this became afraid that the enemy might assail him from the rear, or even seize Pydna, since the Roman fleet was at the same time sailing along the coast; and he accordingly abandoned his fortification near the river, and hastening to Pydna, encamped in front of the town. Paulus, too, came there, but instead of beginning an engagement immediately they delayed for a good many days. Paulus had learned beforehand that the moon was going to be eclipsed, and so, assembling his army on the evening when the eclipse was due to occur, he gave the men notice of what would happen and warned them not to let it disturb them at all. Accordingly the Romans on beholding the eclipse looked for no evil to come from it; but the Macedonians were in fear because of it and thought that the prodigy referred to Perseus. While each side was in this frame of mind an accidental occurrence the next day forced them into an unpremeditated battle and put an end to the war. One of the Romans' pack-animals fell into the water from which they were getting their supply, whereupon the Macedonians laid hold of him and the water-carriers offered resistance. At first they fought by themselves; then the other troops also gradually issued from their respective camps to the assistance of their own men, and everybody on both sides became engaged. A disordered but sharp conflict ensued, in which the Romans were victorious; and pursuing the Macedonians as far as the sea, they slaughtered numbers of them themselves and allowed the fleet, which was drawing inshore, to slay many more. Indeed, not one of them would have been left alive had not night come to their aid; for the battle occurred during the late afternoon.
§ 20.22.7 Perseus consequently made his escape to Amphipolis, where he intended to rally the survivors and reorganize the campaign; but as nobody came to him but Cretan mercenaries and he learned that Pydna and other cities had chosen the Roman side, he moved on from there also, and after putting aboard some vessels all the money that he was carrying he sailed away by night to Samothrace. Before long he ascertained that Octavius was approaching at the head of his fleet and that Paulus had arrived at Amphipolis; so he sent him a letter expressing a desire to come to terms. But since he styled himself king in the letter, he did not even get an answer. Subsequently he sent a letter without any such title in it; and Paulus entertained his plea for peace, but declared that he would make terms only on condition that Perseus entrusted himself and all his possessions to the Romans' keeping. Hence they failed to come to an agreement.
§ 20.22.8 After this a demand was made upon Perseus by the Romans for the surrender of one Evander, a Cretan, who had assisted him in many schemes against them and was most faithful to him. Perseus, fearing that he might declare all the intrigues to which he had been privy, did not deliver him up, but secretly slew him and spread the report that he had perished by his own hand. Then the associates of Perseus, fearing his treachery, since they were not ignorant of what had occurred, began to desert him. Perseus, in dread of being delivered up to the Romans, tried to escape at night by flight, and would have gotten away unobserved to Cotys, a Thracian prince, but for the fact that the Cretans abandoned him; for after placing the money in boats they sailed off home. So he remained there for some days in concealment with Philip, one of his sons, but on ascertaining that the rest of his children and his retinue had fallen into the hands of Octavius, he allowed himself to be discovered. When he was brought to Amphipolis, Paulus did him no injury, but welcomed him and let him sit at his table; he kept him in honourable confinement and treated him with consideration. After this Paulus returned through Epirus to Italy.
§ 20.24.1 At this same time Lucius Anicius, a praetor, sent to conduct operations against Gentius, not only conquered those who withstood him but also pursued Gentius, when he fled to Scodra, where his palace was, and shut him up there. The city was built on the summit of a mountain and had deep ravines with rushing torrents winding about it, besides being surrounded by a strong wall; and the siege would have come to naught, had not Gentius, presuming greatly upon his own power, voluntarily advanced to battle. In consequence Anicius gained control of his entire domain; he then proceeded to Epirus, before Paulus arrived, and quieted that disturbed district also.
§ 20.24.2 The people of Rome by some rumour or other heard of the victory of Paulus on the fourth day after the battle, but they placed no sure confidence in it. Then letters were brought from Paulus regarding his success, and they were greatly pleased and plumed themselves not merely upon having vanquished Perseus and acquired Macedonia but upon having beaten the renowned Philip of old and Alexander himself, together with all that empire which he had held. When Paulus reached Rome, many decrees were passed in his honour and his triumphal procession was a most brilliant one. For in addition to all the booty which he had taken he also had in his procession Bithys, the son of Cotys, besides Perseus with his wife and three children in the garb of captives. But fearing that Heaven might become displeased with the Romans because of their excessive good fortune, he prayed, as Camillus had once done, that no ill to the state might result from it all, but rather to him, if it must come; and, indeed, he lost two sons, one a little before the celebration and the other during the triumphal festival itself.
§ 20.24.3 He was not only good at generalship, but he scorned money. Of this the following is a proof. Though he had at that time entered upon the consulship for a second term and had gained possession of untold spoils, he continued to live in such great poverty that when he died the dowry was with difficulty paid back to his wife.
§ 20.24.4 Of the captives Bithys was returned to his father without ransom, but Perseus with his children and attendants was settled in Alba. There he held out as long as he still hoped to recover his kingdom, but when he despaired of this, he made away with himself. His son Philip and his daughter also died a little later; only the youngest son survived for a time and served as under-secretary to the magistrates of Alba. Thus Perseus, who boasted of tracing his descent through twenty kings and often had on his lips the name of Philip and still oftener that of Alexander, lost his kingdom, became a captive, and marched in the triumphal procession wearing chains as well as his diadem.
§ 20.24.5 The Rhodians, who in their earlier dealing with the Romans had shown a haughty spirit, now begged the latter not to bear ill-will toward them; and whereas they had previously refused to be called their allies, they were now especially anxious to secure this privilege. They obtained the object of their striving, but only after long delay. The Romans harboured resentment against the Cretans, too, but in response to frequent entreaties on the part of this nation they eventually relaxed their anger. Their behaviour was similar in the case of Prusias and Eumenes. The former came personally to the city, and entering the senate-house, kissed the threshold and did obeisance to the senators, whereupon he obtained mercy and pardon; Eumenes, however, owed to his brother Attalus his security against further ill-will on their part.
§ 20.24.6 At this time, too, the affairs of Cappadocia were settled in the following manner. The monarch of that country, Ariarathes, had a legitimate son Ariarathes. But since for a long time before she had this son his wife had failed to conceive, she had adopted a child whom she called Orophernes. When the true son was later born, the position of the other was detected and he was banished. But after the death of Ariarathes he headed an uprising against his alleged brother. Eumenes allies himself with Ariarathes, and Demetrius, the king of Syria, with Orophernes. Ariarathes, after sustaining a defeat, fled to the Romans and was appointed by them to share the kingdom with Orophernes. But the fact that Ariarathes had been termed a friend and ally by the Romans enabled him subsequently to make the entire domain his own. Then Attalus, who succeeded Eumenes upon the death of the latter, drove both Orophernes and Demetrius out of Cappadocia altogether.
§ 20.25.1 Ptolemy, the ruler of Egypt, passed away leaving two sons and one daughter. When the brothers began to quarrel with each other about the sovereignty, Antiochus, the son of Antiochus the Great, sheltered the younger, who had been driven out, in order that under the pretext of defending him he might get his hands on Egyptian affairs. In a campaign directed against Egypt he conquered the greater part of the country and spent some time in besieging Alexandria. When the rest sought refuge with the Romans, Popilius was sent to Antiochus and bade him keep his hands off Egypt; for the brothers, comprehending the designs of Antiochus, had become reconciled. When the latter was for putting off his reply, Popilius drew a circle about him with his staff and demanded that he deliberate and answer standing where he was. Antiochus then in fear raised the siege. The Ptolemies (this was the name of both princes) on being relieved of their dread of danger from outside, quarrelled again. Then they were reconciled once more by the Romans, on the condition that the elder should have Egypt and Cyprus, and the other the country about Cyrene, which also belonged to Egypt at that time. But the younger brother, angry at receiving the inferior portion, came to Rome, where he secured from the people a grant of Cyprus in addition. Then his brother once more effected an arrangement with him by giving him some cities in exchange for Cyprus and agreeing to make fixed payments of money and grain.
§ 20.25.2 Antiochus subsequently died, leaving the kingdom to a child of the same name, whom the Romans confirmed in possession of it and to whom they sent three men ostensibly to act as his guardians, as he was very young. The commissioners, on finding elephants and triremes contrary to the compact, ordered the elephants all to be slain and administered everything else in the interest of Rome. Therefore Lysias, who had been entrusted with the guardianship of the king, incited the populace to expel the Romans and also to kill Gaius Octavius. When these plans had been carried out, Lysias straightway despatched envoys to Rome to offer a defence for what had been done. Now Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, and grandson of Antiochus, who was staying in Rome as a hostage at the time of his father's death and had been deprived of the kingdom by his uncle Antiochus, had asked for the domain of his father when he learned of the death of Antiochus, but the Romans would neither help him to get it nor permit him to depart from Rome; and he, in spite of his dissatisfaction, had remained quiet. But when this affair of Lysias occurred, he no longer delayed, but escaped by flight and sent a message to the senate from Lycia stating that it was not his cousin Antiochus, but Lysias that he was attacking, with the purpose of avenging Octavius. And hastening to Tripolis in Syria, he won over the town, representing that he had been sent out by the Romans to take charge of the kingdom; for no one had any idea of his flight. Then after conquering Apamea and gathering a body of troops he marched on Antioch; and when the boy and Lysias offered no opposition through fear of the Romans, but came to meet him as friends, he put them to death and recovered the kingdom. He then forwarded to Rome a crown and the assassin of Octavius; but the citizens were angry with him and would accept neither.
§ 20.25.3 Later the Romans made a campaign again the Dalmatians. This race is a branch of the Illyrians who dwell along the Ionian Sea, some of whom the Greeks used to call Taulantii, and part of whom are close to Dyrrachium. The cause of the war was that they had been abusing some of their neighbours who enjoyed the friendship of the Romans, and when the Romans joined an embassy in their behalf, the Dalmatians returned no respectful answer, and even arrested and killed the envoys of the other nations. Scipio Nasica made a campaign against this race and brought them to submission; for he captured their towns and proceeded to sell the captives. Other events, too, took place in those days, yet not of a kind to deserve mention or record.
§ 20.66.1 Perseus hoped to eject the Romans from Greece completely, but through his excessive and inopportune parsimony and the consequent contempt of his allies he became weak once more. For when the Roman influence was declining and his own was increasing, he became filled with scorn and thought he had no further need of his allies, but believed that either they would assist him free of cost or he could prevail by himself. Hence he paid neither Eumenes nor Gentius the money that he had promised, thinking that they had reasons of their own for enmity toward the Romans. These princes, therefore, and the Thracians, who also were not receiving their full pay, became indifferent; and Perseus fell into such depths of despair again that he even sued for peace.
§ 20.66.2 Perseus sued for peace at the hands of the Romans, and would have obtained it but for the presence in his embassy of the Rhodians, who joined it through fear that the Romans' rival might be destroyed. Their language had none of the moderation which it was fitting for petitioners to employ, and they talked as if they were not so much asking peace for Perseus as bestowing it, and adopted a very arrogant tone generally; finally they threatened those who should be responsible for their failing to come to an agreement, declaring that they would fight with the others against them. Even before this time they had not been free from suspicion on the part of the Romans, and by their present conduct they made themselves more hated than ever; thus they prevented Perseus from obtaining peace.
§ 20.66.3 When Perseus was in the temple at Samothrace, a demand was made of him for the surrender of one Evander, of Cretan stock, a most faithful follower who had assisted him in many other schemes against the Romans and had helped to concoct the plot carried out at Delphi against Eumenes. Perseus, fearing that he might declare all the intrigues to which he had been privy, did not deliver him up, but secretly slew him and spread the report that he had made away with himself before he could be apprehended. The associates of Perseus, fearing his treachery and blood-guiltiness, then began to desert him.
§ 20.66.4 Perseus allowed himself to be discovered, and he was brought to Amphipolis. Paulus accorded him no harsh treatment in deed or word, but on the contrary rose at his approach, welcomed him in other ways, and let him sit at his table; he kept him in honourable confinement and treated him with great consideration.
§ 21.28.1 It was at this time, too, that the episode occurred in which Prusias figured. This monarch, being old and of an irritable disposition, became possessed by a fear that the Bithynians would expel him from his kingdom, choosing in his stead his son Nicomedes. So he sent him to Rome on some pretext, with orders to make that his home. But since he plotted against his son even during his sojourn in Rome and strove to kill him, some Bithynians visited Rome, took Nicomedes away secretly, and conveyed him to Bithynia; and after slaying his father they appointed him king. This act irritated the Romans, but not to the point of war.
§ 21.28.2 A certain Andriscus, who was a native of Adramyttium and resembled Perseus in appearance, caused a large part of Macedonia to revolt by pretending to be his son and calling himself Philip. First he went to Macedonia and tried to stir up that country, but as no one would yield him allegiance, he betook himself to Demetrius in Syria to obtain from him the aid which relationship might afford. But Demetrius arrested him and sent him to Rome, where he met with general contempt, both because he stood convicted of not being the son of Perseus and because he had no other qualities worthy of mention. On being released he gathered a band of revolutionists, drew after him a number of cities, and finally, assuming the kingly garb and mustering an army, he reached Thrace. There he added to his army several of the independent states as well as several of the princes who disliked the Romans, invaded and occupied Macedonia, and setting out for Thessaly won over no small part of that country.
§ 21.28.3 The Romans at first scorned Andriscus, and then they sent Scipio Nasica to settle matters there in some peaceable manner. On reaching Greece and ascertaining what had occurred, he sent a letter to the Romans explaining the situation; then after collecting troops from the allies there he devoted himself to the business in hand and advanced as far as Macedonia. The people of Rome, when informed of the doings of Andriscus, sent an army along with Publius Juventius, a praetor. Juventius had just reached the vicinity of Macedonia when Andriscus gave battle, killed the praetor, and would have annihilated his entire force had they not withdrawn by night. Next he invaded Thessaly, harried a great many parts of it, and was ranging Thracian interests on his side. Consequently the people of Rome once more dispatched a praetor, Quintus Caecilius Metellus, with a strong body of troops. He proceeded to Macedonia and received the assistance of the fleet of Attalus. Andriscus in consequence became anxious about the coast districts, and so did not venture to advance farther, but moved up to a point slightly beyond Pydna. There he had the best of it in a cavalry encounter, but out of fear of the infantry turned back. He was so elated that he divided his army into two sections, with one of which he remained on the watch where he was, while he sent the other to ravage Thessaly, Metellus, contemptuous of the forces confronting him, joined battle, and after overpowering those with whom he first came into conflict he very easily won over the others also; for they readily admitted to him the error of their ways. Andriscus fled to Thrace and after assembling a force gave battle to Metellus as the latter was advancing on his way. His vanguard, however, was routed, whereupon his allied force was scattered; and Andriscus himself was betrayed by Byzes, a Thracian prince, and punished.
§ 21.28.4 One Alexander also had declared himself to be a son of Perseus, and collecting a band of warriors, had occupied the country round about the river which is called the Mestus: but now he took to flight, and Metellus pursued him as far as Dardania.
§ 21.29.1 The Romans sent out Piso, the consul, against the Carthaginians. Piso did not try conclusions with Carthage and Hasdrubal, but devoted himself to the coast cities. He was repulsed from Aspis, but captured and razed Neapolis; and in his expedition against the town of Hippo he merely used up time without accomplishing anything. So the Carthaginians took heart both on his account and because some allies had joined them. Learning this, the Romans in the army and city alike had recourse to Scipio and created him consul, notwithstanding his age did not entitle him to hold the office.
§ 21.29.2 But his own deeds and the prowess of his father, Paulus, and of his grandfather, Africanus, inspired them all with the firm hope that through him they might vanquish their enemies and utterly destroy Carthage.
§ 21.29.2 While Scipio was proceeding to Africa, Mancinus in sailing past Carthage noticed a place called Megalia which was inside the city wall on an abrupt cliff and extended down to the sea; the place was a long distance away from the rest of the town and had but few guards because of the natural strength of its position. So Mancinus suddenly applied ladders to it from the ships and ascended. When he had already got up there, some of the Carthaginians hastily gathered, but they were unable to repulse him. He then sent to Piso an account of his exploit and a request for assistance. Piso, however, being far in the interior, was of no aid to Mancinus; but Scipio chanced to come along at night just after the receipt of the news and rendered prompt aid. For the Carthaginians would have either captured or destroyed Mancinus, if they had not seen Scipio's vessels sailing past; then they grew discouraged, but would not fall back. So Scipio sent them some captives to tell them that he was at hand; and upon learning this they no longer stood their ground, but retired and fortified with trenches and palisades the cross-wall in front of the houses, meanwhile sending for Hasdrubal. Scipio now left Mancinus to guard Megalia and set out himself to join Piso and the troops, so as to have their support in his operations. He quickly returned with the lightest-armed troops and found that Hasdrubal had entered Carthage and was attacking Mancinus fiercely. The arrival of Scipio put an end to the attack. When Piso too had now arrived, Scipio commanded him to encamp outside the wall opposite certain gates, and he sent other soldiers round to a little gate a long distance away from the main force, with orders as to what they must do. Then he himself about midnight took the strongest part of the army, got inside the wall, under the guidance of deserters, and hurrying round to a point inside the little gate, he hacked the bar in two, let in the men who were on the watch outside, and destroyed the guards. He then hastened to the gate opposite which Piso had his station, routing the intervening guards, who were only a few in each place, so that Hasdrubal by the time he found out what had happened saw that nearly the whole force of the Romans was inside. For a time, indeed, the Carthaginians withstood them; then they abandoned the remainder of the city and fled for refuge to Cotho and the Byrsa. Next Hasdrubal killed all the Roman captives, in order that the Carthaginians, in despair of pardon, might resist with greater zeal. He also made way with many of the natives on the charge that they were betraying their own cause. Scipio surrounded them with a palisade and walled them in, yet it was some time before he captured them. For their walls were strong, and the men inside, being many in number and confined in a small space, made a vigorous resistance. They were well off for food, too; for Bithias, taking advantage of wind and tide, whenever a heavy gale blew, would send merchantmen into the harbour to them from the mainland opposite the city. To overcome this opposition Scipio conceived and executed a remarkable undertaking, namely, the filling up of the narrow entrance to the harbour. The work was difficult and toilsome, but was nevertheless brought to completion, thanks to the great number of men employed. The Carthaginians, to be sure, undertook to check them, and many battles took place during the course of the work, but they were unable to prevent the filling of the channel.
§ 21.30.1 So, when the mouth of the harbour had been filled, the Carthaginians were terribly oppressed by the scarcity of food; and some of them deserted, while others held out and died, and still others ate the dead bodies. Hence Hasdrubal, in discouragement, sent envoys to Scipio with regard to a truce, and would have obtained immunity, had he not desired to secure both safety and freedom for all the rest as well. After he had failed for this reason to accomplish his purpose, he confined his wife in the citadel because she had made overtures to Scipio looking to the safety of herself and her children; and in other respects he grew bolder in his conduct of affairs as a result of despair. He, therefore, and some others, mastered by frenzy, fought both night and day, sometimes losing and sometimes winning; and they devised engines to oppose the Roman engines. Moreover, Bithias, who held a strong fortress and scoured wide stretches of the mainland, was helping the Carthaginians and injuring the Romans. Hence Scipio also divided his army, assigning one half of it to invest Carthage, while he sent the other half against Bithias, placing at the head of it his lieutenant, Gaius Laelius. He himself went back and forth from one division to the other on visits of inspection. Finally the fortress was taken, and the siege of Carthage was once more conducted by the whole army.
§ 21.30.2 The Carthaginians, despairing, consequently, of being any longer able to save both walls, betook themselves to the enclosure of the Byrsa, since it was better fortified, at the same time transferring thither all the objects that they could. Then at night they burned the dockyard and most of the other structures, in order to deprive the enemy of any benefit from them. When the Romans became aware of their action, they occupied the harbour and hastened against the Byrsa. After occupying the houses on each side of it, some of the besiegers walked along on top of the roofs by successively stepping to those adjacent, and others by digging through the walls pushed onward below until they reached the very citadel. When they had got thus far, the Carthaginians offered no further opposition, but sued for peace — all except Hasdrubal. He, together with the deserters, to whom Scipio would grant no truce, crowded into the temple of Aesculapius along with his wife and children; and there he defended himself against the assailants until the deserters set fire to the temple and climbed to the roof to await the last extremity of the flames. Then, vanquished, he came to Scipio holding the suppliant branch. His wife witnessed his entreaties, and after calling him by name and reproaching him for securing safety for himself, when he had not allowed her to obtain terms, threw her children into the fire and then cast herself in.
§ 21.30.2 Thus Scipio took Carthage; and he sent to the senate the following message: "Carthage is taken. What are our orders now?" When these words had been read, they took counsel as to what should be done. Cato expressed the opinion that they ought to raze the city and blot out the Carthaginians, whereas Scipio Nasica still advised sparing the Carthaginians. And thereupon the senate became involved in a great dispute and contention, until some one declared that for the Romans' own sake, if for no other reason, it must be considered necessary to spare them. With this nation for antagonists they would be sure to practise valour instead of turning aside to pleasures and luxury; whereas, if those who were able to compel them to practise warlike pursuits should be removed from the scene, they might deteriorate from want of practice, through a lack of worthy competitors. As a result of the discussion all became unanimous in favour of destroying Carthage, since they felt sure that its inhabitants would never remain entirely at peace. The whole city was therefore utterly blotted out of existence, and it was decreed that for any person to settle upon its site should be an accursed act. The majority of the men captured were thrown into prison and there perished, and some few were sold. But the very foremost men together with the hostages and Hasdrubal and Bithias spent their lives in different parts of Italy in honourable confinement. Scipio secured both glory and honour and was called Africanus, not after his grandfather, but because of his own achievements.
§ 21.31.1 At this time also Corinth was destroyed. The chief men of the Greeks had been deported to Italy by Aemilius Paulus, whereupon their countrymen at first through embassies kept asking for the return of the men, and when their request was not granted, some of the exiles, in despair of ever returning to their homes, made away with themselves. The Greeks were greatly distressed at this and made it a matter of public lamentation, besides showing anger toward any persons dwelling among them who favoured the Roman cause; yet they displayed no open signs of hostility until they got back the survivors among their hostages. Then those who had been wronged and those who had obtained a hold upon the goods of others fell into strife with one another and went to war.
§ 21.72.1 The Achaeans began the quarrel, accusing the Lacedemonians, with whom they were at variance, of having been the cause of their misfortunes; in this they were especially encouraged by Diaeus, the general. And although the Romans repeatedly sent mediators to them, they paid no heed; in fact they came very near slaying the envoys whom the Romans next sent to them. The ostensible mission of these envoys was to insist that the cities which had belonged to Philip, including Corinth, — in other respects a flourishing city and in addition the leader in the congress, — should not take part in that body; yet in reality it was their desire to disrupt the Greek alliance in some manner, so that the members might be weaker. 2 When the envoys had made their escape by flight from Acrocorinth, where they had been, the Greeks sent an embassy to Rome to offer explanations for what had occurred. It was not against Rome's representatives, they claimed, but against the Lacedemonians who were with them that the attack had been made. The Romans, still occupied as they were the war against the Carthaginians, and not as yet in firm control of the Macedonian situation, did not refute their plea, but sent out men, and promised them pardon in case they would refrain from further disturbances. Yet these men were not given a hearing by the congress, but were put off until the next meeting, which was to occur six months later.
§ 21.72.2 And although the Romans sent mediators to them, they paid no heed, but rather set their faces toward war, appointing Critolaus as their leader. Metellus was consequently afraid that they might lay hands also on Macedonia, since they had already appeared in Thessaly; and so he went to meet them and routed them.
§ 21.72.3 At the fall of Critolaus the Greek world was split asunder. Some of them inclined to peace and laid down their weapons, whereas others committed their interests to Diaeus and continued their strife. On learning this the people at Rome sent against them Mummius, who relieved Metellus and himself took charge of the war. When part of his army sustained a slight reverse through an ambuscade and Diaeus pursued the fugitives up to their own camp, Mummius sallied forth against him, routed him, and followed to the Achaean entrenchments. Diaeus now gathered a larger force and undertook to give battle to them, but, as the Romans did not come out against them, he conceived a contempt for them and advanced into the valley lying between the camps. Mummius, seeing this, secretly sent horsemen to assail them on the flank. After these had attacked and thrown the enemy into confusion, he brought up the phalanx in front and caused considerable slaughter. Thereupon Diaeus killed himself in despair, and of the survivors of the battle the Corinthians were scattered over the country, while the rest fled to their homes. Hence the Corinthians within the wall, believing that all their citizens had been lost, abandoned the city, and it was empty of men when Mummius took it. After that he won over without trouble both the people and the rest of the Greeks. He now took possession of their arms, all the offerings that were consecrated in their temples, the statues, paintings, and whatever other ornaments they had; and as soon as his father and some other men were sent out to arrange terms for the vanquished, he caused the walls of some of the cities to be torn down and declared them all to be free and independent except the Corinthians. As for Corinth, he sold the inhabitants, confiscated the land, and demolished the walls and all the buildings, out of fear that some states might again unite with it as the largest city. To prevent any of them from remaining concealed and any of the other Greeks from being sold as Corinthians he assembled all those present before disclosing his purpose, and after causing his soldiers to surround them in such a way as not to attract notice, he proclaimed the freedom of all except the Corinthians and the enslavement of these; then, instructing them all to lay hold of those standing beside them he was able to make an accurate distinction between them.
§ 21.72.4 Thus was Corinth overthrown. The rest of the Greek world suffered momentarily from massacres and levies of money, but afterward came to enjoy such immunity and prosperity that they used to say that if they had not been captured promptly, they could not have been saved.
§ 21.72.5 So this end simultaneously befell Carthage and Corinth, those ancient cities; but at a much later date they received colonies of Romans, became again flourishing, and regained their original position.
§ 22.73.1 Book XXII fragments
Viriathus was a Lusitanian, of very obscure origin, as some think, who gained great renown through his deeds, since from a shepherd he became a robber and later on also a general. He was naturally adapted and had also trained himself to be very swift both in pursuit and in flight, and of powerful endurance in a hand-to-hand conflict. 2 He was glad enough to get any food that came to hand and whatever drink fell to his lot; most of his life he lived under the open sky and was satisfied with nature's bedding. Consequently he was superior to any heat or cold, and was never either troubled by hunger nor annoyed by any other privation; for he found full satisfaction for all his needs in whatever he had at hand, as if it were the very best.
§ 22.73.3 And yet, possessed of such a physique, as the result both of nature and training, he excelled still more in his mental powers. He was swift to plan and accomplish whatever was needful, for he not only knew what must be done, but also understood the proper occasion for it; and he was equally clever at feigning ignorance of the most obvious facts and knowledge of the most hidden secrets. 4 Furthermore, he was not only general but his own assistant as well in every undertaking, and was seen to be neither humble nor overbearing; indeed, in him obscurity of family and reputation for strength were so combined that he seemed to be neither inferior nor superior to any one. And, in fine, he carried on the war not for the sake of personal gain or power nor through anger, but for the sake of warlike deeds in themselves; hence he was accounted at once a lover of war and a master of war.
§ 22.74 Claudius, the colleague of Metellus, impelled by pride of birth and jealousy of Metellus, since he had chanced to draw Italy as his province, where no enemy was assigned to him, was eager to secure by any means some pretext for a triumph; hence he set the Salassi, a Gallic tribe, at war with the Romans, although no complaints were being made against them. For he had been sent to reconcile them with their neighbours who were quarrelling with them about the water necessary for the gold mines, and he overran their entire country . . . the Romans sent him two of the ten priests. 2 Claudius, even though he realised perfectly well that he had won no victory, nevertheless even then displayed such arrogance as not to say a word in either the senate or the assembly about the triumph; but acting as if it belonged to him in any case, even if no one should vote to that effect, he asked for the necessary funds.
§ 22.76 As regards their characters, Mummius and Africanus were utterly different from each other in every respect. The latter performed his official duties as censor with the strictest integrity and with impartiality, not esteeming one person above another; indeed, he called to account many of the senators and many of the knights, as well as other individuals. Mummius, on the other hand, was more popular in his sympathies and more charitable; he not only attached no stigma himself to any one, but he even undid many of the acts of Africanus, whenever it was possible. 2 In fact, he was of such an amiable nature that he even lent some statues to Lucullus for the consecration of the temple of Felicitas (which he had built from the booty gained in the Spanish war), and then, when that general was unwilling to return them on the ground that they had become sacred as a result of the dedication, he showed no anger, but permitted his own spoils to lie there offered up in the other's name.
§ 22.77 Pompeius also received many setbacks and incurred great disgrace. There was a river flowing through the country of the Numantines that he wished to turn aside from its ancient channel and let in upon their fields, and after tremendous exertions he accomplished this; but he lost many soldiers, and no advantage from turning it aside came to the Romans, nor yet any harm to enemy . . .
§ 22.78.1 Caepio accomplished nothing worthy of mention against the foe, but visited many injuries upon his own men, so that he even came near being killed by them. For he treated them all, and especially the cavalry, with such harshness and cruelty that a great number of unseemly jokes and stories were told about him during the nights; and the more he grew vexed at it, the more they jested in the endeavour to infuriate him. 2 When it became known what was going on and no one could be found guilty, — though he suspected it was the doing of the cavalry, — since he could not fix the responsibility upon anybody, he turned his anger against them all, and he commanded them, six hundred in number, to cross the river beside which they were encamped, accompanied only by their grooms, and to bring wood from the mountain on which Viriathus was bivouacking. The danger was manifest to all, and the tribunes and lieutenants begged him not to destroy them.
§ 22.78.3 The cavalry waited for a little while, thinking he might listen to the others, and when he would not yield, they scorned to entreat him, as he was most eager for them to do, but choosing rather to perish utterly than to speak a respectful word to him, they set out on the appointed mission. And the horsemen of the allies and other volunteers accompanied them. They crossed the river, cut the wood, and piled it in all around the general's quarters, intending to burn him to death. And he would have perished in the flames, if he had fled away in time.
§ 22.75 Popilius so terrified Viriathus that the latter immediately sent to him in regard to peace before they had made any trial of battle at all, killed some of the leaders of the rebels whose surrender had been demanded by the Romans (among these his son-in-law, though commanding his own force, was slain) and delivered up the rest, all of whom had their hands cut off by the consul's order. And he would have agreed to a complete truce, if their weapons had not also been demanded; with this condition neither he nor the rest of the soldiers would comply.
§ 23.79.1 Book XXIII fragments
The Romans received the Numantine ambassadors, on their arrival, outside the walls, in order that their reception might not seem to imply a ratification of the truce. However, they sent gifts of friendship notwithstanding, since they did not wish to deprive them as yet of the hope of coming to terms. The associates of Mancinus told of the necessity of the compact made and the number of the saved, and stated that they still held all their former possessions in Spain; and they besought their countrymen to look at the matter not in the light of their present immunity, but with reference to the danger that had at the time encompassed the soldiers, and to consider what ought to have been done, but what had been possible.
§ 23.79.3 The Numantines, for their part, had much to say about their previous good-will toward the Romans and much also about the subsequent injustice of the latter, by reason of which they had been forced into war, and about the perjury of Pompeius; and they asked for kindly treatment in return for the preservation of Mancinus and the rest. But the Romans terminated the truce and also decided that Mancinus should be given up to the Numantines.
§ 23.81 Claudius by reason of his harshness would have done many outrageous deeds, had he not been restrained by his colleague Quintus. For the latter, who was amiable and possessed exactly the opposite temperament, did not oppose him with anger in any matter, but in fact occasionally yielded to him, and by gentle behaviour so managed him that he found very few opportunities for irritation.
§ 23.82 Furtius took out among his lieutenant both Pompeius and Metellus, though they were hostile both to him and to each other; for, expecting to achieve some great success, he wished to have in them sure witnesses to his deeds and to receive the evidence of his prowess from their unwilling lips.
§ 24.83.1 Book XXIV fragments
Tiberius Gracchus caused an upheaval of the Roman state notwithstanding the fact that he belonged to one of the foremost families through his grandfather, Africanus, that he possessed a natural endowment worthy of the latter, had received a most thorough course of education, and had a proud spirit. For in direct proportion to the number and magnitude of the advantages he possessed was the allurement they offered him to follow his ambition; and when once he had turned aside from what was best, he drifted, quite in spite of himself, into what was worst. 2 It began with his being refused a triumph over the Numantines; he had previously been hoping to be honoured inasmuch as he had conducted the negotiations, but so far from obtaining any such reward, he actually came near being delivered up. Then he decided that deeds were estimated not on the basis of worth or genuineness, but according to mere chance.
§ 24.83.3 So he abandoned this road to fame as unsafe, and since he desired by all means to become a leader in some way, and believed that he could accomplish this better with the aid of the populace than with that of the senate, he attached himself to the former.
§ 24.83.4 Marcus Octavius, because of a family feud with Gracchus, willingly became his opponent. Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation; but zealously vying, as they did, each to prevail over the other rather than to benefit the state, they committed many acts of violence more appropriate in a despotism than in a democracy, and suffered many unusual calamities appropriate to war rather than to peace.
§ 24.83.5 For in addition to their individual conflicts there were many who banded together and indulged in bitter abuse and conflicts, not only throughout the city generally, but even in the very senate-house and the popular assembly. They made the proposed law their pretext, but were in reality putting forth every effort in all directions not to be surpassed by each. 6 The result was that none of the usual business was carried on in an orderly way: the magistrates could not perform their accustomed duties, courts came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name of city, but was no whit different from a camp.
§ 24.83.7 Gracchus was proposing certain laws for the benefit of those of the populace serving in the army, and was transferring the courts from the senate to the knights, disturbing and overturning all established customs in order that he might be enabled to lay hold on safety in some wise. 8 And when not even this proved of advantage to him, but his term of office was drawing to a close, when he would be immediately exposed to the attacks of his enemies, he attempted to secure the tribuneship for the following year also, in company with his brother, and to appoint his father-in-law consul; and to obtain this end he did not hesitate to make any statement or promise anything whatsoever to people. Often, too, he put on mourning and brought his mother and children into the presence of the populace to join their entreaties to his.
§ 24.84.1 Scipio Africanus indulged his ambition more than was fitting or compatible with his general excellence. Consequently none of his rivals took pleasure in his death, but, although they thought him a great obstacle in this way, even they felt his loss. For they saw that he was valuable to the state and they never expected that he would cause any serious trouble even to them. 2 But after he was out of the way the whole power of the nobles was again diminished, so that the land commissioners ravaged at will practically all of Italy. And this in particular seems to me to have been the meaning of the mass of stones that had poured down from heaven, falling upon some of the temples and killing men, and of the tears of Apollo. For the god had wept for three days, so that the Romans on the advice of the soothsayers voted to hew the statue in pieces and to sink it in the sea.
§ 25.85.1 Book XXV fragments
Gracchus had the same principles as his brother; only the latter had drifted from excellence into ambition and thence into baseness, whereas this man was naturally turbulent and played the rogue voluntarily; and he far surpassed the other in his gift of language. For these reasons his designs were more mischievous, his daring more spontaneous, and his arrogance greater toward all alike. 2 He was the first to walk up and down in the assemblies while delivering a speech and the first to bare his arm; hence neither of these practices has been thought improper since his time. And because his speaking was generally characterised by great condensation of thought and vigour of language and he consequently was unable to restrain himself easily, but was often led to say more than he wished, he used to bring in a flute-player, and from him, as he played an accompaniment, he would gain moderation and self-control; or, if even then he managed to get out of bounds, he would stop.
§ 25.85.3 This was the sort of man who attacked the constitution, and, by assuming no speech or act to be forbidden, in very brief time gained the greatest influence with the populace and the knights. All the nobility and the senatorial party, if he had lived longer, would have been overthrown, but, as it was, his great power caused him to be hated even by his followers, and he was overthrown by his own methods.
§ 26.87.1 Book XXVI fragments
The priestesses bore the chief punishment and shame themselves, but they proved the source of great evils to various others as well, while the entire city was agitated on their account. For the people, considering that what was immaculate by law and sacred by religion and decent through fear of punishment had been polluted, were ready to believe that anything most shameful and unholy might be done. 2 For this reason they visited punishment, not only on the convicted, but also on all the rest who had been accused, to show their hatred of what had occurred. Hence the whole affair in which the women were concerned seemed now to have been due not so much to feminine incontinence as to the wrath of some god.
§ 26.87.3 Three had known men at the same time. Of these Marcia had acted by herself, granting her favours to one single knight, and would never have been discovered, had not the investigation into the cases of the others extended and involved her also; Aemilia and Licinia, on the other hand, had a multitude of lovers and carried on their wanton behaviour with each other's help. At first they surrendered themselves to some few privately and secretly, telling each man that he was the only one favoured. 4 Later they themselves bound every one who could suspect and inform against them to certain silence in advance by the price of intercourse with them, and those who had previously enjoyed their favours, though they saw this, yet had to put up with it in order not to be detected through a display of their vexation. So besides holding commerce with various others, now singly, now in groups, sometimes privately, sometimes all together, Licinia enjoyed the society of the brother of Aemilia, and Aemilia that of Licinia's brother.
§ 26.87.5 These doings were hidden for a very long time, and though many men and many women, both freemen and slaves, were in the secret, it was kept concealed for a very long period, until one Manius, who seems to have been the first to assist and coöperate in the whole evil, gave information of the matter, because he had not obtained freedom nor any of the other objects of his hope. And since he was very skilful not only at leading women into prostitution, but also in sowing slander and discord among them, . . .
§ 26.88.1 This was calculated to bring him [Marcus Drusus] glory, first of itself, and secondly in the light of Cato's disaster; and because he also had shown great leniency toward the soldiers and seemed to have made success of more importance than the truth, he likewise secured a renown greater than his deeds deserved.
§ 26.89.1 When Jugurtha sent to Metellus in regard to peace, the latter made many demands upon him, one by one, as if each were to be the last, and in this way got from him hostages, arms, the elephants, the captives, and the deserters. All of these last he killed; but he did not conclude peace, since Jugurtha, fearing to be arrested, refused to come to him and since Marius and Gnaeus stood in the way.
§ 26.89.2 For he [Marius] was in general seditious and turbulent, friendly to all the rabble, from which he had sprung, and ready to overthrow all the nobility. He ventured with perfect readiness any statement, promise, lie, or false oath wherever he hoped to profit by it. Blackmailing one of the best citizens or commending the veriest rascal he thought mere child's play. And let no one be surprised that such a man could conceal his villainies for so long a time; for, as a result of his exceeding cleverness and the good fortune which he uniformly enjoyed in the fullest measure, he actually acquired a reputation for virtue.
§ 26.89.3 Marius was the more easily able to calumniate Metellus for the reason that the latter belonged to the patricians and was conducting the war in excellent fashion, whereas he himself was just beginning to come forward from a very obscure and humble origin into public notice. The multitude was of course readily inclined to overthrow Metellus through envy, and to advance Marius for his promises; but they were particularly influenced by the report that Metellus had said to Marius, when the latter was asking for his discharge on account of the elections: "You ought to be satisfied if you get to be consul along with my son." Now this son was a mere lad.
§ 26.89.4 Gauda was angry at Metellus because in spite of his requests he had received from him neither the deserters nor a garrison of Roman soldiers, or else because he could not sit near him — a privilege ordinarily accorded by the consuls to kings and potentates.
§ 26.89.5 After Cirta had capitulated, Bocchus made overtures to Marius; and first he demanded the empire of Jugurtha as the price of his defection, but later, failing to obtain this, simply asked for a truce. So he sent envoys to Rome; but Jugurtha, while this was taking place, retired to the most desolate portions of his own territory.
§ 26.90.1 Book XXVII fragments
Tolosa, which had formerly been in alliance with the Romans, but had revolted, as a result of the hopes placed in the Cimbri, even to the point of keeping the garrison in chains, was suddenly occupied at night by the Romans, after they had been admitted by their friends. They plundered the temples and obtained much money besides; for the place was wealthy from of old, containing among other things the offering of which the Gauls under the leadership of Brennus had once despoiled Delphi. No treasure of importance, however, reached the Romans at home, but the soldiers themselves appropriated the most of it; and for this a number were called to account.
§ 26.91.1 Servilius became the cause of many evils to the army by reason of his jealousy of his colleague; for, though he had in general equal authority, his rank was naturally diminished by the fact that the other was consul. After the death of Scaurus, Mallius had sent for Servilius; but the latter replied that each of them ought to guard his own province. 2 Then, suspecting that Mallius might gain some success by himself, he grew jealous of him, fearing that he might secure the glory alone, and went to him; yet he neither encamped in the same place nor entered into any common plan, but took up a position between Mallius and the Cimbri, with the evident intention of being the first to join battle and so of winning all the glory of the war.
§ 26.91.3 Even thus they inspired their enemies with dread at the outset, as long as their quarrel was concealed, to such an extent that they were brought to desire peace; but when the Cimbri made overtures to Mallius, as consul, Servilius became indignant that they had not directed their embassy to him, gave them no conciliatory reply, and actually came near slaying the envoys. 4 The soldiers forced Servilius to go to Mallius and consult with him about the situation. But far from reaching an accord, they became as a result of the meeting even more hostile than before; for they fell into strife and abuse, and parted in a disgraceful fashion.
§ 26.92.1 After Gnaeus Domitius had brought suit against Scaurus, one of the latter's slaves approached him and offered to give much damaging evidence against his master; but Domitius did not investigate the matter, and moreover arrested the fellow and handed him over to Scaurus.
§ 26.93.1 Publius Licinius Nerva, who was praetor in the island, on learning that the slaves were not being justly treated in some respects, or else because he sought an occasion for profit, — for he was not inaccessible to bribes, — sent round a notice that all who had any charges to bring against their masters should come to him and he would assist them. 2 Accordingly, many of them banded together, and some declared they were being wronged and others made known other grievances against their masters, thinking they had secured an opportunity for accomplishing all that they wished against them without bloodshed. The freemen, after consultation, resisted them and would not make any concessions.
§ 26.93.3 Therefore Licinius, inspired with fear by the united front of both sides and dreading that some great mischief might be done by the defeated party, would not receive any of the slaves, but sent them away, thinking that they would suffer no harm or that at any rate they would be scattered and so could cause no further disturbance. But the slaves, fearing their masters because they had dared to raise their voices at all against them, organized a band and by common consent turned to robbery.
§ 26.94.1 After the defeat of the barbarians, though many had fallen in battle, some few were saved. Whereupon Marius, by way of encouraging and rewarding these [the soldiers], sold all the plunder to them at a nominal price, to prevent its being thought that he had bestowed favours outright upon any one. By this act Marius, who previously had enjoyed the favour of the populace alone, because sprung from that class and raised to power by it, now won over even the nobles by whom he had been hated, so that he was praised by all alike. He received from a willing and harmonious people a reelection for the following year, to enable him to complete his conquests.
§ 26.94.2 The Cimbri, when once they had halted, lost much of their spirit and consequently became enfeebled and sluggish in both mind and body. The reason was that in place of their former outdoor life they lodged in houses, and instead of their former cold plunges they used warm baths; whereas they had been wont to eat raw meat, they now gorged themselves with richly spiced dishes and relishes of the country, and they steeped themselves, contrary to their custom, in wine and strong drink. These practices extinguished all their fiery spirit and enervated their bodies, so that they could no longer bear toils or hardships, whether heat or cold or loss of sleep.
§ 26.93.4 The people of Messana, not expecting to meet with any harm, had deposited in that place for safe-keeping all their most valuable and precious possessions. Athenio, a Cilician who held the chief command of the robbers, on learning this, attacked them while they were celebrating a public festival in the suburbs, killed many of them as they were scattering about, and almost took the city by storm. After building a wall to fortify Macella, a strong position, he proceeded to do great injury to the country.
§ 28.95.1 Book XXVIII fragments
The son of Metellus besought everybody to such an extent both in private and in public to let his father return from exile that he received the cognomen Pius, i.e. Dutiful. 2 Furius cherished such enmity against Metellus because the latter when censor had taken his horse away.
§ 28.95.3 Publius Furius, under indictment for the acts he had performed while tribune, was slain by the Romans in the very assembly. He richly deserved to die, to be sure, for he was a seditious person, who after first joining Saturninus and Glaucia had veered about, deserted to the opposing faction, and joined them in attacking his former associates; yet it was not proper for him to perish in just this way. This deed, then, seemed to have a certain justification . . . .
§ 28.97.1 Rutilius, an upright man, they most unjustly condemned; for he was brought into court by a preconcerted plan of the knights on the charge of having received bribes while serving in Asia as lieutenant under Quintus Mucius, and was fined by them. They did this in their anger because he had ended many of their irregularities in connection with the collecting of taxes. 2 Rutilius made a very noble defence, saying everything which an upright man would natural say who was being blackmailed and who grieved far more for the condition of the state than for his own fortunes; he was convicted, however, and immediately stripped of his property. This process more than anything else revealed the fact that he had in no wise deserved the sentence passed upon him. For he was found to possess much less than his accusers had charged him with having appropriated from Asia, and he could trace all that he had back to just and lawful sources of acquisition.
§ 28.97.3 Such was his unworthy treatment, and Marius was not without a hand in his conviction; for a man so excellent and of such good repute had been an annoyance to him. Therefore Rutilius, indignant at the conduct of affairs in the city, and disdaining to live longer in the company of such a creature, withdrew, though under no compulsion, and actually went back to Asia. There for a time he dwelt in Mytilene; 4 then, after that place had suffered injury in the Mithridatic war, he removed to Smyrna and there lived to the end of his life without any desire to return home. And yet in all this he suffered not a whit either in reputation or wealth. For he received many gifts from Mucius and a vast number from all the peoples and kings as well who had ever had dealings with him, until he possessed far more than his original wealth.
§ 28.96.1 There were other factional leaders, but the greatest influence was possessed by Marcus in the one group, and by Quintus in the other; these men were eager for power, insatiate in their ambition, and consequently very prone to strife. 2 These qualities they possessed in common; but Drusus had the advantage of birth, and also of wealth, which he lavishly expended upon those who at any time made demands upon him, while the other greatly surpassed him in audacity and daring, and by the timeliness of his plots, as well as his malignity in carrying them out. It was not strange, therefore, since they balanced each other in a way, partly by their likenesses and partly by their differences, that they brought the discord to such a high pitch that it continued even after the death of both.
§ 29.98.1 Book XXIX fragments
Lupus, suspecting that the patricians making the campaign with him were revealing his plans to the enemy, sent word about them to the senate before he had any definite information, and in consequence, inasmuch as they were not well disposed toward each other to begin with, because of their strife, he set them still more at variance. And the disturbance would have been even more serious, had not some of the Marsians been detected mingling with the foraging parties of the Romans and entering the ramparts under the guise of allies, where they took note of what was said and done in the camp and reported it to their own men. Accordingly they ceased to be angry with the patricians.
§ 29.98.2 Marius suspected Lupus, although a relative, and through jealousy and the hope of being appointed consul for even the seventh time, as the only man who could bring success out of the existing situation, bade him delay; their men, he said, would have provisions even though they delayed, whereas the other side would not be able to hold out for any considerable time, since the war was in their country.
§ 29.98.3 The Picentes overcame those who had not joined their rebellion and abused them in the sight of their friends, while from the heads of their wives they tore out the hair along with the skin.
§ 30.99.1 Fragments of Books XXX thru XXXV
Mithridates, when the Roman envoys arrived, did not create any disturbance, but after bringing some counter-charges and also exhibiting to the envoys the amount of the wealth which he had lavished on the state and on private individuals, he remained quiet. Nicomedes, however, elated by the Romans' alliance and being in need of money, invaded his territory.
§ 30.99.2 Mithridates dispatched envoys to Rome requesting the people, if they deemed Nicomedes a friend, to persuade or else compel him to act justly toward him, or if not, to allow him [Mithridates] to take measures against his foe. But they, so far from doing anything he wished, even threatened him with punishment if he should not give back Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes and remain at peace with Nicomedes. They sent away his envoys the same day and furthermore ordered him never to send anyone else, unless he should render them obedience.
§ 30.100 Cato, the greater part of whose army was from the city and rather too old for service, had little authority at best; and once, when he ventured to rebuke them because they were unwilling to work hard or obey orders readily, he came near being buried under the shower of missiles which they hurled at him. And he would certainly have been killed, if they had had plenty of stones; but since the site where they were assembled was under cultivation and happened to be very wet, he received no hurt from the clods of earth. The man who began the mutiny, Gaius Titius, was arrested; he had been a lounger about the Forum, making his living in the courts, and was excessively and shamelessly outspoken. He was now sent to the city to the tribunes, but escaped punishment.
§ 30.101.1 All the Asiatics, at the bidding of Mithridates, massacred the Romans; only the people of Tralles did not personally kill anyone, but hired for the purpose a certain Theophilus, a Paphlagonian, — just as if they themselves were more likely thus to escape destruction, or as if it made any difference to the victims by whom they were to be slaughtered.
§ 30.102.1 Cinna, as soon as he took possession of the office, was anxious about no one thing so much as driving Sulla out of Italy. He made Mithridates his excuse, but in reality wanted Sulla to get out of his way so that he might not, by keeping watch close at hand, prove a hindrance to the objects he himself was trying to carry out. And yet he owed his election to the other's support and had promised to do everything according to his pleasure. 2 For Sulla, who saw the necessity of the war and was eager for its glory, had before starting arranged everything at home for his own best interests. Among other things he appointed Cinna and one Gnaeus Octavius to be his successors, hoping in this way to retain the most power even while absent. For he understood that Octavius was commended for his amiability, and he thought he would cause no trouble;
§ 30.102.3 the other he well knew to be a base fellow, but he did not wish to make an enemy of him, because the man already had some influence of his own and was prepared, as he had repeatedly said and declared on oath, to assist him in every way whatsoever. 4 Thus Sulla himself, adept as he was at seeing through the minds of men and reasoning out the nature of things, made a grave mistake in the present instance and bequeathed a great war to the state.
§ 30.102.7 The Romans, having become at odds with one another, sent for Metellus, bidding him come to terms with the Samnites as best he might; for at this time they alone were still ravaging Campania and the district beyond it. Nevertheless, he did not conclude a truce with them, since they demanded that citizenship be given not alone to themselves but also to those who had deserted to their side, refused to give up any of the booty which they had, and demanded back all the captives and deserters from their own ranks. As a result even the senators no longer chose to make peace with them on these terms.
§ 30.102.8 When Cinna again brought forward the law regarding the return of the exiles, Marius and those who had been expelled with him rushed into the city with the rest of the army by all the gates at once; these they shut, so that no one could make his escape, and then slew every man they met, making no distinctions, but treating them all alike as enemies. 9 They took especial pains to destroy those who possessed any property, because they coveted wealth; and they abused the children and wives of the victims as if they had enslaved some foreign city. The heads of the most eminent citizens they fastened to the Rostra, and that sight was no less cruel than had been their destruction; for, aside from other considerations, the thought might occur to the spectators that what their ancestors had graced with the ships' beaks of the enemy was now being disgraced by the heads of citizens.
§ 30.102.10 For, in short, so great a desire and insatiable passion for slaughter possessed Marius that when he had killed most of his enemies and could no longer, because of the great confusion prevailing, think of anyone whom he wished to destroy, he gave the word to the soldiers to slay everyone in turn of the passers-by to whom he should not extend his hand. For Roman affairs had come to this, that a man had to die not only without trial and without having incurred enmity, but even for the mere reason that Marius did not stretch out his hand. 11 Now naturally amid so great a throng and such confusion it was not only no object to Marius to make the gesture, but it was not even possible, however much he wished it, to use his hand as he pleased. Hence many died needlessly — men whose death he did not in the least desire. The total number of those who perished at this time is beyond finding out; for the slaughter continued through five days and an equal number of nights.
§ 30.102.12 While the Romans were offering the usual sacrifice at the beginning of the new year and making their vows for their magistrates according to ancestral rites, the son of Marius slew a tribune with his own hands and sent his head to the consuls, hurled another from the Capitol — a fate which had never befallen such an official — and forbade two praetors the use of fire and water.
§ 30.104.1 Fimbria, the lieutenant of Flaccus, revolted against his superior when the latter reached Byzantium. For he was in all matters very bold and headstrong, passionately fond of any notoriety whatsoever and contemptuous of all his superiors. This led him at that time, after his departure from Rome, to feign an incorruptibility in respect to money and a zeal for the soldiers, which bound them to him and set them at variance with Flaccus. 2 He was able to accomplish this for the reason that Flaccus was insatiable in regard to money, not being content to appropriate what was left over, but enriching himself even from the soldiers' allowance for food and from the booty, which he invariably considered as belonging to him.
§ 30.104.3 When Flaccus and Fimbria had arrived at Byzantium and Flaccus, after commanding them to encamp outside the wall, had gone into the city, Fimbria seized the occasion to accuse him of having taken money, and denounced him, declaring that he was living in luxury within, whereas they were enduring hardships under the shelter of tents, in storm and cold. The soldiers then angrily rushed into the city, killed some of those that fell upon them, and scattered to the various houses.
§ 30.104.4 On the occasion of some dispute between Fimbria and the quaestor, Flaccus threatened to send him back to Rome, willing or not, and when the other consequently made some abusive reply, he deprived him of his command. Fimbria set out ostensibly upon his return to Rome with the worst possible will and upon reaching the soldiers at Byzantium greeted them as if he were on the point of departure, asked for letters, and lamented his fate, claiming to have suffered undeservedly.
§ 30.104.5 He urged them to remember the services he had done them and to be on their guard; this was a hidden reference to Flaccus, implying that he had designs upon them. And finding that they accepted his story and were well disposed toward him and suspicious of the general, he mounted an eminence and went on to arouse their anger by accusing Flaccus of various other faults, and finally charging that he was going to betray them for money; hence the soldiers drove away Thermus, who had been assigned to take charge of them.
§ 30.104.6 Fimbria destroyed many men, not to serve the best ends of justice nor to secure the greatest benefit to Rome, but out of anger and lust of slaughter. Here is a proof. On one occasion he had ordered a large number of stakes to be prepared, to which he would then bind the condemned and flog them to death; and when these were found to be far in excess of the number who were to be put to death, he commanded some of the bystanders to be seized and bound to the extra stakes, that they might not seem to have been prepared in vain.
§ 30.104.7 The same man on capturing Ilium slaughtered as many persons as he could, sparing none, and all but burned the whole city to the ground. And yet he had taken the place not by storm, but by guile. For after bestowing some praise on them for the embassy sent to Sulla and stating that it made no difference with which one of the two they came to terms, since he and Sulla were both Romans, he thereupon went in among them as among friends and did these deeds.
§ 30.106 Metellus after being defeated by Cinna came to Sulla, and was of the greatest assistance to him. For in view of his reputation for justice and filial devotion not a few of those even who were opposed to Sulla's policy decided that it was not without reason that Metellus was associating with him but that he was choosing what was really juster and more advantageous for the country, and hence they went over to that side.
§ 30.107.1 Pompey was the son of Strabo, and has been compared by Plutarch with Agesilaus, the Lacedaemonian. Being angry with those who held the city, he proceeded on his own account to Picenum before he had quite yet come to man's estate, and thanks to his father's former rule there he gathered from the inhabitants a small band and set up a sovereignty of his own, thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then he joined Sulla. And from this beginning he became no less a man than his chief, but, even as his title indicates, grew to be Great.
§ 30.107.2 "For it is ridiculous when he [Scipio?] is in Campania and able quickly to give his answer to the charges brought against him, for me to plead in his behalf." 3 Dio, Book XXXIII. "But how could anyone believe him [Sulla?]."6b
§ 30.108 Sulla handed over the army to a man [Ofella] commended neither for his generalship nor otherwise, in spite of the fact that he had many who had been with him from the beginning, superior in skill and experience, whom up to that time he had employed in all emergencies as being thoroughly reliable. Before his victory he had been accustomed to make requests of them and to avail himself freely of their services; but as he drew nearer to his dream of absolute power, he no longer took any account of them, but reposed his trust rather in the basest men, and in those who were neither conspicuous for their family nor possessed of a reputation for uprightness. 2 The reason was that he saw that such persons were ready to assist him in all his projects, even the basest; and he thought they would be most grateful to him if they should obtain even the smallest favours, and moreover would never feel themselves his superiors nor lay claim to either his deeds or his plans. The virtuous element, on the other hand, would not be willing to help him in his evil-doing but would even rebuke him; they would demand rewards for benefits conferred, according to merit, would feel no gratitude for them but accept them as their due, and would claim his deeds and plans as their own.
§ 30.109.1 Sulla up to the day that he conquered the Samnites had been a conspicuous figure, possessing the greatest renown for his generalship and his plans, and was believed to be a very superior man both in humaneness and piety, so that all believed he had Fortune as an ally because of his excellence. 2 But after this event he changed so much that one would not say his earlier and his later deeds were those of the same person. Thus it would appear that he could not endure good fortune. For he now committed acts which he had censured in other persons while he was still weak, and a great many others still more outrageous. He had doubtless always desired to act thus, but revealed himself only in the day of his power. This fact produced a strong conviction in the minds of some that adversity has not a little to do with virtue.
§ 30.109.3 Thus Sulla, as soon as he had conquered the Samnites and thought he had put an end to the war, — for he considered the rest as of no account, — changed his course, and leaving behind his former self, as it were, outside the wall on the field of battle, proceeded to outdo Cinna and Marius and all their successors combined. Treatment that he had accorded to none of the foreign peoples who had opposed him he bestowed upon his native land, as if he had actually subdued that also. 4 In the first place, he promptly sent the heads of Damasippus and his followers to Praeneste and had them stuck on poles; and many of those who voluntarily surrendered he killed as if he had captured them without their consent.
§ 30.109.5 The next day he ordered the senators to assemble at the temple of Bellona, as if he were going to make some defence of his conduct, and ordered the captives to meet at the so-called "public field," as if he would enroll them in the lists; and while these were slain by others at his command (and there perished along with them many persons from the city who were mixed in among them), he himself addressed a very bitter speech to the senators.
§ 30.109.6 The massacre of the prisoners was going on just the same even then under Sulla's direction, and as they were being killed near the temple, the great uproar and lamentation that they made, their cries and wails, invaded the senate-house. Thus the senators were doubly alarmed;
§ 30.109.7 for they had now about come to the point of expecting that they themselves, too, would suffer some unholy fate, so unholy were both his words and his deeds. Therefore many, tortured by this twofold anguish, were wishing that they themselves belonged to the number of men already perishing outside, in order that they might gain respite at last from fear. 8 Their fate, however, was postponed, while the rest were slaughtered and thrown into the river, so that the deed of Mithridates, deemed so terrible, in slaughtering all the Romans in Asia in one day, was regarded as of slight importance in comparison with the number now massacred and their manner of death.
§ 30.109.9 Nor did the horror stop here, but the massacres which began at this point, as if by a kind of signal, occurred in the country and in all the cities of Italy, as well as in the capital. Many, of course, were objects of Sulla's hatred, many also that of his followers; but, while with some this hatred was genuine, with others it was a mere pretence. They wished to show that they were like him by doing like deeds, and so strengthen their place in his friendship; thus they would not, by reason of any dissimilarity, be suspected of disapproving some of his deeds, and so incur danger. 10 They proceeded to murder all whom they saw to surpass them either in wealth or in any other respect, some out of envy and others on account of their possessions. For under such conditions many neutral persons even, though they may take neither side, become the objects of some private complaint, as surpassing someone in excellence or wealth and family, and so perish. No safety was to be found for any one against those possessing any power who wished to commit injustice.
§ 30.109.11 Such calamities encompassed Rome. But why narrate the outrages offered to the living, in many cases to women, and in many to the noblest and most distinguished boys, as if they were captives taken in war? Nevertheless, these deeds, though most distressing, still by reason of their similarity to others previously experienced seemed endurable to such persons at least as were not involved in them. 12 But Sulla was not satisfied, nor was he content to do the same as others; a certain longinga came over him to go far beyond all others in the variety also of his murders, as if there were some virtue in being excelled by none even in blood-guiltiness. Accordingly he brought forward a new device, a whitened tablet, on which he inscribed the names. 13 Nevertheless everything went on as before, and not even those whose names were not inscribed on the targets were safe. For the names of many, some living and others actually dead, were added to the lists so that the slayers might gain immunity; thus in this respect the procedure marked no new departure, yet equally by its terror and by its strangeness it angered absolutely every one. 14 The tablets were exposed like some register of senators or list of approved soldiers, and all those passing by from time to time would rush up eagerly to it in crowds, just as if it contained some favourable announcement; then many would find relatives' names inscribed, and some, indeed, their own, whereupon their fate, because of the suddenness of the calamity, became the more terrible, and many of them, making themselves known by their very behaviour, perished. 15 There was no safety at all for any one outside of Sulla's circle. For if a man approached the tablets, he incurred censure as a busybody, whereas, if he failed to approach, he was regarded as a malcontent. The man who read the list or asked any one a question about what was written there became suspected of enquiring about himself or his companions, and the one who did not read or enquire was suspected of being displeased at it and for that reason incurred hatred. 16 Tears or laughter proved fatal on the spot; hence many were destroyed, not because they had said or done anything forbidden, but because they either frowned or smiled. So carefully were their attitudes observed; and it was permitted to no one either to mourn over a friend or to exult over an enemy, but even these were slain on the ground that they were jeering at somebody. 17 Furthermore many found trouble in their very names: for some who were unacquainted with the proscribed applied their names to whomsoever they pleased, and thus many perished in the place of others. This resulted in great confusion, since some would apply to any they met whatever names they pleased, and the others would deny that these were their names. 18 Some were murdered while still ignorant of the fact that they were to die, and others, who knew it in advance, were slain anywhere that they happened to be; no place, either profane or sacred, was safe or inviolate for them. Some, to be sure, by perishing suddenly before learning of the catastrophe hanging over them, or indeed at the very moment of receiving the news, were fortunate in being relieved of the terror preceding death; 19 but those who learned of their danger in advance and hid themselves were in a wretched plight. They neither dared to withdraw, for fear of being detected, nor could they endure to remain where they were for fear of betrayal. Very many of them were actually betrayed by their associates and those dearest to them, and so perished. 20 Consequently, as a result of this state of constant expectation of death, not only those whose names were inscribed suffered, but the rest also in equal measure.
§ 30.109.21 The heads of all those slaughtered in whatever place were brought to the Roman Forum and exposed on the Rostra, so that the same scenes were being enacted around them as around the proscription lists.
§ 30.111.1 The Cretans sent an embassy to the Romans, hoping to renew the old treaty and furthermore to obtain some kindness in return for saving the quaestor and his soldiers. But the Romans, possessed rather with anger at their failure to subdue the Cretans than with gratitude to them for not destroying their men, returned no mild answer, but among other things demanded back from them all the captives and deserters. 2 They also demanded hostages and large sums of money, required the larger ships and the chief men to be given up, and would not wait for an answer from the envoys' country, but sent out one of the consuls immediately to take over the things surrendered and to make war upon them if they failed to give them up — as proved to be the case.
§ 30.111.3 For why should these men, who had refused to make terms in the beginning, before any such demand had been made and before they had conquered, now submit, after their victory, to demands of such a nature? The Romans, clearly realizing this fact and suspecting, furthermore, that envoys would try to corrupt some persons with money, so as to hinder the expedition, voted in the senate that no one should lend them anything.
§ unk Fragments of Uncertain Reference
"A few of the lightest boats were moored inshore; but most of them being larger, rode at anchor in the open sea because of the shoals."
The name Ausonia, according to Dio Cocceianus, is properly applied only to the land of the Aurunci, situated on the coast between the Campanians and Volsci. Yet many have supposed that Ausonia extended up to Latium, so that from it all Italy was called Ausonia.
The name Ausonians, as I wrote near the beginning, is properly applied to the Aurunci situated between the Campanians and Volsci. Yet some have supposed that Ausonia extended up to Latium, so that from this circumstance some say that it was the whole of Italy.
§ 36.1.1 When the consuls drew lots, Hortensius obtained the war against the Cretans. But on account of his fondness for residence in the capital and on account of the courts, in which he had greater influence than any of his contemporaries with the exception of Cicero, he voluntarily relinquished the campaign in favour of his colleague and remained at home himself. Metellus accordingly set out for Crete . . . 1b Lucius Lucullus at this time had defeated in battle the lords of Asia, Mithridates and Tigranes the Armenian, and after forcing them to avoid battle was besieging Tigranocerta. But the barbarians did him serious injury by means of their archery as well as by the naphtha which they poured over his engines; 2 this chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that it is sure to burn up whatever it touches, and it cannot easily be extinguished by any liquid. In consequence Tigranes recovered courage and marched forth with an army of such strength that he even scoffed at the Romans present there. He is said, indeed, to have remarked that when they came on a campaign there were only a few of them, but when on an embassy there were a great many.
§ 36.1.3 His amusement, however, was of short duration, for he forthwith discovered how far courage and skill surpass any mere numbers. After his flight the soldiers found and gave to Lucullus his tiara and the band that went around it; for in his fear that these ornaments might lead to his recognition and capture he had torn them off and thrown them away. . . . and since Mithridates had experienced both extremes of fortune, Tigranes entrusted the supreme command to him (?). For after his many defeats and victories no fewer, he was believed to have become in consequence better versed in generalship. These two rulers, accordingly, not only set about making preparations themselves, as if they were then for the first time beginning the war, but also sent embassies to their various neighbours, including Arsaces the Parthian, although he was hostile to Tigranes on account of some disputed territory. 2 This they offered to yield to him, and they also went maligning the Romans, declaring that the latter, in case they conquered their present antagonists while these were left to fight single-handed, would immediately make a campaign against him. For every victorious force was inherently insatiate of success and set no bound to its greed; and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave him alone.
§ 36.2.1 While they were thus engaged, Lucullus did not follow up Tigranes, but allowed him to reach safety quite at his leisure. Because of this he was charged by the citizens, as well as others, with refusing to end the war, in order that he might retain his command a longer time. 2 Therefore they at this time restored the province of Asia to the praetors, and later, when he was believed to have acted in this same way again, they sent to him the consul of that year to relieve him.
§ 36.2.3 Nevertheless he did seize Tigranocerta when the foreigners living in the city revolted against the Armenians; for the most of them were Cilicians who had once been carried off from their own land, and these let in the Romans during the night. 4 Thereupon everything was plundered, except what belonged to the Cilicians; but Lucullus saved from outrage many of the wives of the principal men, when they had been captured, and by this action won over their husbands also.
§ 36.3.1 Learning now from them of the embassy sent by Tigranes and Mithridates to Arsaces, he in his turn sent to him some of the allies with threats, in case he should aid the foe, and promises, if he should choose the Roman side instead. 2 Arsaces at that time, since he was still angry with Tigranes and felt no suspicion toward the Romans, sent back envoys to Lucullus, and established friendship and alliance. Later, when he saw Secilius [Sextilius], who had come to him, he began to suspect that he was there to spy out the country and his power;
§ 36.3.3 it was for this cause, he thought, and not on account of the compact which had already been made that a man distinguished in warfare had been sent. Hence he no longer gave him any aid. On the other hand, he offered no opposition, but stood aloof from both parties, naturally wishing to make neither side strong; for he thought that an evenly-balanced struggle between them would insure him the greatest safety. Besides these achievements, Lucullus this year subdued many parts of Armenia;
§ 36.4.1 and in the year of Quintus Marcius — this man held office alone, although not the only consul appointed, since Lucius Metellus, elected with him, died in the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead died before entering upon office, in consequence of which no one else was appointed — 2 in this year, I say, Lucullus entered upon his campaign when summer was already at its height, since in the spring it had been impossible to invade the enemy's country because of the cold. He devastated a part of their land, purposing to draw the barbarians imperceptibly into battle while defending it; but when even then they made no move, he marched against them.
§ 36.5.1 In this engagement the opposing cavalry gave the Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe approached the infantry; indeed, whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus assisted the horse, the enemy would turn to flight. Far from suffering any injury, however, they kept shooting back at those pursuing them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. 2 Now these wounds were dangerous and hard to heal; for they used double arrow-points and moreover poisoned them, so that the missiles, whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or even if they were drawn out, would very quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, not being firmly attached, would be left in the wound.
§ 36.6.1 Since many, then, were getting wounded, of whom some died, and the others were in any case maimed, and since provisions at the same time were failing them, Lucullus retired from that place and marched against Nisibis. 2 This city is built in the region called Mesopotamia (the name given to all the country between the Tigris and Euphrates) and now belongs to us, being considered a colony of ours. But at that time Tigranes, who had seized it from the Parthians, had deposited in it his treasures and most of his other possessions, and had stationed his brother as guard over it.
§ 36.6.3 Lucullus reached this city in the summer time, and although he directed his attacks upon it in no half-hearted fashion, he effected nothing. For the walls, being of brick, double, and of great thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither battered down anywhere, nor undermined, and even Tigranes, therefore, was not assisting the besieged.
§ 36.6.7 But when winter set in, and the barbarians were behaving rather carelessly, inasmuch as they had the upper hand and were all but expecting the Romans to withdraw, Lucullus waited for a moonless night, when there was a violent storm of rain and thunder, 2 so that the foe, not being able to see anything ahead or to hear any sound, left the outer circuit — all but a few of them — and the intervening moat. Then he approached the wall at many points, ascending it without difficulty from the mounds, and easily slew the guards who had been left behind upon it, since they were few in number. 3 In this way he filled up a part of the moat, since the barbarians had broken down the bridges in advance, and got across, since in the downpour neither archery nor fire could harm him. Immediately he captured nearly everything, for the inner circuit was not very strong by reason of the confidence felt in the outer works beyond it. 4 Some, however, fled to the citadel, among them the brother of Tigranes; but he later caused them to surrender. He also obtained much treasure, and passed the winter there.
§ 36.8.1 Nisibis, then, he captured as described, but he lost many districts of Armenia and of the other countries around Pontus. For Tigranes had not aided Nisibis, believing that it could not be captured, but had hurried to the places just mentioned to see if he could secure them ahead of Lucullus, while the latter was occupied around Nisibis. 2 Then sending Mithridates back home, Tigranes himself entered his own district of Armenia. There he was opposed by Lucius Fannius, whom he surrounded, however, and besieged, until Lucullus learned of it and sent assistance.
§ 36.9.1 Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded the other Armenia and the neighbouring districts. Here he fell upon and destroyed many of the Romans, to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they were wandering about the country, while others he killed in battle; and thereupon he promptly recovered most of the districts. 2 For the people were well-disposed toward him because of kinship and because of his being hereditary monarch; and they likewise hated the Romans because these were foreigners and because they had been ill-treated by those set over them. Consequently they sided with Mithridates and later conquered Marcus Fabius, who was leader of the Romans there.
§ 36.9.3 For the Thracians, who had formerly served as mercenaries under Mithridates but were then with Fabius, and the slaves present in the Roman camp gave them valiant assistance. For the Thracians, when sent ahead by Fabius to reconnoitre, did not bring back to him any reliable report, 4 and later, when he was proceeding in rather careless fashion and Mithridates suddenly fell upon him, they joined in the attack on the Romans; and at the same time the slaves, to whom the barbarian king had proclaimed freedom, took a hand in the affair.
§ 36.9.5 They would have destroyed the Romans utterly had not Mithridates, who, although over seventy years old, was in the battle, been struck by a stone while taking a valiant? part against the enemy. This caused the barbarians to fear that he might die; and while they halted battle on that account Fabius and others were able to escape to safety.
§ 36.10.1 Fabius was subsequently shut up and besieged in Cabira, but was rescued by Triarius. The latter was in that vicinity on his way from Asia to Lucullus; and upon learning what had happened he collected as large a force as was possible in the circumstances 2 and so alarmed Mithridates, who supposed he was advancing with the full strength of the Roman army, as to make him withdraw before ever he came in sight. At this Triarius took courage, and pursuing the king as far as Comana, whither he had retired, won a victory over him there.
§ 36.10.3 Mithridates was encamped on the opposite side of the river from the point which the Romans were approaching, and was anxious to join battle with them while they were worn out from the march. Accordingly, he advanced to meet them himself, and also directed that at the crisis of the battle others should cross by another bridge and attack them. But although he held his own in the struggle for a long time, he was not only deprived of the reinforcements but seriously embarrassed besides by the collapse of the bridge across which many were hastening and crowding all at once.
§ 36.11.1 Later they both retreated to their own fortifications and rested, for it was now winter. Comana belongs to the present district of Cappadocia and was supposed to have possessed clear up to that time the Tauric statue of Artemis and the descendants of Agamemnon. As to how these reached them or how they remained there I cannot discover the truth, since there are various stories; 2 but what I understand clearly I will state. There are two cities of this same name in Cappadocia, not very far apart, and they covet the same honours; for the stories they tell, and likewise the relics they exhibit, are the same in every case, including the sword, which each possesses, supposed to be that which belonged to Iphigenia. So much for this matter.
§ 36.12.1 The following year, in the consulship of Manius Acilius and Gaius Piso, Mithridates encamped opposite Triarius near Gaziura, with the purpose of challenging and provoking him to battle; 2 in particular, he not only took his own exercise but also drilled the army in plain sight of the Romans. His hope was to engage and vanquish Triarius before Lucullus should come up, and thus recover the rest of his realm. But when the other did not stir, he sent some men to Dadasa, a stronghold where the Romans' baggage was deposited, in order that his opponent might at least go to its defence and so be drawn into conflict.
§ 36.12.3 And thus it came about. Triarius, who feared the numbers of Mithridates and was awaiting Lucullus, whom he had sent for, was remaining quiet for the time; but when news came of the siege of Dadasa, and the soldiers in their fear for the place were becoming excited and were threatening that if no one would lead them forth they would go to the rescue at their own bidding, he reluctantly left his position. 4 As he was now moving forward, the barbarians fell upon him, surrounded and overwhelmed by their numbers those near at hand, and then riding around, killed those who had fled into the plain not knowing that the river had been directed into it.
§ 36.13.1 They would have destroyed them utterly, had not one of the Romans, pretending to belong to the allied force of Mithridates (for, as I have related, he had many of his troops equipped in the same manner as the Romans), approached the king, as if wishing to communicate something, and wounded him. To be sure, the fellow was immediately seized and put to death; but the barbarians were so excited over the occurrence that many of the Romans escaped. 2 Mithridates, accordingly, was having his wound cured; and suspecting that there were others also of the enemy in the camp, he held a review of the soldiers, as if for a different purpose, and then ordered them to retire hastily every man to his own tent. In this way he detected the Romans and cut them down while they were left there by themselves.
§ 36.14.1 At this juncture Lucullus arrived, and gave some the impression that he would conquer Mithridates easily and soon recover all that had been let slip; nevertheless, he accomplished nothing. 2 For Mithridates, entrenched on the high ground near Talaura, would not come out against him, and the other Mithridates from Media, the son-in-law of Tigranes, fell suddenly upon the Romans while they were scattered, and killed many of them; also the approach of Tigranes himself was announced, and there was mutiny in the army.
§ 36.14.3 The Valerians, who, after being discharged, had later entered the service again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of their victory and ensuing idleness, and also because they had had provisions in abundance and had been left to themselves much of the time, while Lucullus was absent on numerous errands. 4 But it was largely a certain Publius Clodius (called Claudius by some) who through innate love of revolution brought the mutiny to a head, although his sister was married to Lucullus. At this time, however, they became turbulent again largely because they heard that Acilius, the consul, who had been sent out to relieve Lucullus for the reasons mentioned, was drawing near, and they accordingly regarded Lucullus with contempt, as being already a mere private citizen.
§ 36.15.1 Lucullus, then, was in perplexity, both for these reasons and because Marcius Rex, Acilius' predecessor, who was on his way to Cilicia, his destined province, had refused a request of his for aid. 2 He hesitated, on the one hand, to strike camp with no purpose in view, and he feared, on the other hand, to stand his ground; hence he set out against Tigranes, to see if he could repulse him while off his guard and tired from the march, and at the same time put a stop somehow to the mutiny of the soldiers. However, he attained neither object.
§ 36.15.3 The army accompanied him to a certain spot from which it was possible to turn aside into Cappadocia, when all with one consent without a word turned off in that direction. The Valerians, indeed, learning that they had been discharged by the authorities at home, withdrew altogether.
§ 36.16.1 Let no one wonder that Lucullus, who had proved himself most skilful of all men in generalship, who was the first Roman to cross the Taurus with an army for warfare, and who had vanquished two powerful kings and would have captured them if he had chosen to end the war quickly, was unable to control his men, and that they were always revolting and finally deserted him. 2 For he required a great deal of them, was difficult of access, strict in his demands for work, and inexorable in his punishments; he did not understand how to win over a man by persuasion, or to attach him by mildness, or to make a friend of him by conferring honours or bestowing wealth — all of which means are necessary, especially with a large crowd, and most of all with a crowd on a campaign.
§ 36.16.3 Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty that was a fair return for their dangers, obeyed him; but when they encountered trouble and fear took the place of their hopes, they no longer heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men — for he enrolled the Valerians again — and kept them without the slightest show of revolt. So much does one man differ from another.
§ 36.17.1 After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all his domain and caused great havoc in Cappadocia, since neither Lucullus defended it, on the ground that Acilius was near, nor yet Acilius himself. For the latter had been hurrying in the first place to rob Lucullus of the victory, and now, when he learned what had taken place, he did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. 2 As for Marcius, the pretext which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. Instead, he went to Cilicia, where he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and also Clodius, who had left Lucullus out of fear because of the occurrence at Nisibis; the latter he put in command of the fleet, for he, too, had married one of Clodius' sisters.
§ 36.17.3 Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians, with whom they were then at variance. There, likewise, he stirred up a sedition and all but lost his life.
§ 36.17a. And Metellus later subjugated the entire island, although he was hindered and restrained by Pompey the Great, who was now in command of the whole sea and of the mainland for a three-days' march from the coast; for Pompey asserted that the islands also belonged to him. Nevertheless in spite of Pompey's opposition Metellus put an end to the Cretan war, celebrated a triumph in honour thereof, and was given the title of Creticus.
§ 36.18.1 . . . Metellus spared. In his eagerness for power he attacked even the Cretans who had come to terms with the other Pompey, and heedless of their claim that there was a truce, hastened to do them injury before Pompey should come up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so kept quiet; in fact he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take over the cities. Cornelius Sisena, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the towns, but on failing to persuade him offered no active opposition. 2 Metellus in addition to many other injuries captured the city of Eleuthera by treachery and extorted money from it; for those who had betrayed it had by night repeatedly saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took Lappa by storm, in spite of Octavius' occupancy of the place, and while he did the latter no harm, he put to death the Cilicians who were with him.
§ 36.19.1 Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there the victims of oppression, and then, when these troops had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hierapydna and aided him in fighting. Aristion had just withdrawn from Cydonia, and after conquering one Lucius Bassus who sailed out to oppose him, had gained possession of Hierapydna. 2 They held out for a time, but at the approach of Metellus left the stronghold and put to sea; they encountered a storm, however, and were driven ashore, losing many men. After this Metellus conquered the entire island.
§ 36.19.3 In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages and had never had a foreign master, became enslaved; and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his title. He was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes, whom he had also captured, march in his triumph; for Pompey got them away beforehand by persuading one of the tribunes that it was to him that they had submitted in the settlement and not to Metellus.
§ 36.20.1 I will now relate the progress of Pompey's career. Pirates always used to harass those who sailed the sea, even as brigands did those who dwelt on land. There was never a time when these practices were unknown, nor will they ever cease probably so long as human nature remains the same. 2 But formerly freebooting was limited to certain localities and small bands operating only during the summer on sea and on land; whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places at once, and many cities had been overthrown, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives, and there was no freedom from fear for anyone anywhere, large numbers had turned to plundering.
§ 36.20.3 Now the operations of the bandits on land, being in better view of the towns, which could thus perceive the injury close at hand and capture the perpetrators with no great difficulty, would be broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. 4 For while the Romans were busy with their antagonists, the pirates had gained great headway, sailing about to many quarters, and adding to their band all of like condition, to such an extent that some of them, after the manner of allies, assisted many others.
§ 36.21.1 Indeed, I have already related how much they accomplished in connection with others. When those wars had been ended, the pirates, instead of desisting, did much serious injury alone by themselves both to the Romans and to their allies. They no longer sailed in small force, but in great fleets; and they had generals, so that they had acquired a great reputation. 2 First and foremost they robbed and pillaged those sailing the sea, no longer permitting them any safety even during the winter season, since as the result of their daring, practice, and success they made voyages in security even then; and next they despoiled even those in the harbours. For if any one ventured to put out against them, he would usually be defeated and perish;
§ 36.21.3 but even if he conquered, he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason of the speed of their ships. Accordingly, they would return after a little, as if victors, and would ravage and set in flames not only farms and fields, but also whole cities; some places, however, they conciliated, so as to gain naval stations and winter quarters in a friendly land as it were.
§ 36.22.1 As these operations of theirs met with success it became customary for them to go into the interior, and they inflicted many injuries on those even who had nothing to do with the sea. This is the way they treated not only the distant allies of Rome, but even Italy itself. 2 For, believing that they would obtain greater gains in that quarter and also that they would terrify all the others still more if they did not keep their hands off that country, they sailed into the very harbour of Ostia as well as other cities in Italy, burning the ships and pillaging everything.
§ 36.22.3 Finally, as no attention was paid to them, they took up their abode on the land, disposing fearlessly of whatever men they did not kill, and of whatever spoils they took, just as if they were in their own land. 4 And though some plundered here and some there, since of course it was not possible for the same persons to do harm throughout the whole length of the sea at once, they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another as to send money and assistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to their nearest of kin.
§ 36.22.5 In fact, this was one of the chief sources of their strength, that those who paid court to any of them were honoured by all, and those who came into collision with any of them were despoiled by all.
§ 36.23.1 To such an extent did the power of the pirates grow that their hostility became a grave and constant menace, admitting of no precaution and knowing of no truce. The Romans, of course, heard of these deeds from time to time, and even saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; 2 but they paid no serious attention to it at the proper time. Instead, they would send out fleets and generals only as they were stirred by individual reports, but accomplished nothing; on the contrary, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were finally reduced to the last extremity. Then at length they came together and deliberated for many days as to what really should be done.
§ 36.23.3 Wearied by the continued dangers and perceiving that the war against the pirates would be a great and expensive one, and believing, too, that it was impossible to assail them all at once or yet individually, inasmuch as they helped one another and there was no way of driving them back everywhere at once, the people fell into great perplexity and despair of making any successful move. 4 In the end, however, one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set forth his plan. He had either been prompted by Pompey or wished in any case to do him a favour; certainly he was not prompted by any love of the common welfare, for he was a most base fellow. His plan, then, was that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full power against all the pirates, who should command for three years and have the use of a huge force, with many lieutenants.
§ 36.23.5 He did not directly utter Pompey's name, but it was easy to see that if once the populace should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him.
§ 36.24.1 And so it came about. They adopted his motion and immediately all except the senate turned to Pompey. But that body preferred to suffer anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than put so great command into Pompey's hands; in fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very senate-house, but he eluded them somehow. 2 When the people learned the feeling of the senators, they raised an uproar, even going so far as to rush upon them as they sat assembled; and if the senators had not gotten out of the way, they would certainly have killed them.
§ 36.24.3 So they all scattered and secreted themselves, except Gaius Piso the consul — for it was in the year of Piso and Acilius that these events took place; he was arrested and was about to perish for the others when Gabinius begged him off. After this the optimates themselves held their peace, happy if only they might be allowed to live, but tried to persuade the nine tribunes to oppose Gabinius. 4 None of these, however, except one Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, would say a word in opposition, through fear of the multitude; and those two men, who had the courage, were unable to fulfil any of their promises by either word or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the measure was to be ratified, things went as follows.
§ 36.24.5 Pompey, who was very eager to command, and because of his own ambition and the zeal of the populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the failure to win it a disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the optimates, desired to appear forced to accept. 6 He was always in the habit of pretending as far as possible not to desire the things he really wished, and on this occasion did so more than ever, because of the jealousy that would follow, should he of his own accord lay claim to the leadership, and because of the glory, if he should be appointed against his will as the one most worthy to command.
§ 36.25.1 He now came forward and said: "I rejoice, Quirites, in being honoured by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred upon them by their fellow-citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honours at your hands, scarcely know how to be properly pleased on the present occasion. Nevertheless, I do not think it fitting either that you should be so insatiable to my services or that I myself should continually be in some position of command. For I have toiled since boyhood, and, as for you, you ought to be favouring others as well. 2 Do you not recall how many hardships I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest youth, and how many labours in Sicily and in Africa before I had as yet come fully of age, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain before I was even a senator? I will not say that you have shown yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labours.
§ 36.25.3 How could I? On the contrary, in addition to the many other important favours of which you have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was entrusted with the command against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able to undertake it, and that I celebrated a triumph, contrary to custom, upon resigning it, brought me the greatest honour. 4 But inasmuch as I have undergone many anxieties and many dangers, I am worn out in body and wearied in soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, and do not calculate that I am so and so many years old.
§ 36.25.5 For if you will count up the campaigns that I have made as well as the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in number than my years, and in this way you will more readily believe that I can no longer endure either the hardships or the anxieties.
§ 36.26.1 "If any of you, now, should persist in your demand, in spite of all this, just observe that all such positions are causes of jealousy and hatred. This consideration you hold of no account — indeed, it is not fitting that you should pretend to regard it — but to me it would prove most grievous. 2 And I confess that I am not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the midst of wars as by such a position. For what person in his right mind could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him? And who would be eager to carry out any public business if destined in case of failure to stand trial, and in case of success to incur jealousy?
§ 36.26.3 In view, then, of these and other considerations allow me to remain undisturbed and to attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and may not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many who are at once willing and able to serve as admirals, both young men and old, so that your choice from so many becomes easy. 4 Surely I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in warfare; so also is this man, and the next man — not to seem to favour anybody by mentioning names."
§ 36.27.1 When he had delivered this speech, Gabinius answered him, saying: "Pompey's behaviour in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character: he does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it off-hand when offered to him. 2 For a good man has no business, in any case, to desire to hold office and to manage public affairs; and in the present instance it is fitting that one should undertake all the tasks imposed only after due consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding safety. Rashness in making promises, which leads to inopportune haste also in carrying them out, causes the downfall of many; but sureness at the outset remains the same in action, and is to the advantage of all.
§ 36.27.3 You, however, must choose not what is pleasing to Pompey, but what is of benefit to the state. Not the office-seekers, but those who are capable should be put in charge of affairs; the former are very numerous, but you will not find any other such man as Pompey. 4 Recall, furthermore, how many reverses and how serious we experienced in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that we found no one else equal to the task, either among the young or the old, except this man, and that we actually sent him out in place of both consuls, although at that time he neither had reached the proper age as yet nor was a member of the senate.
§ 36.27.5 I should be glad, of course, if you had a great many able men, and if I ought to pray for such, I would so pray; but since this ability is not a matter of prayer and does not come of its own accord to any one, but a man must be born with a natural bent for it, must learn what is pertinent and practise what is fitting and above everything must enjoy good fortune throughout, — all which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man, — 6 you must all with one accord, whenever such an one is found, both support him and make the fullest use of him, even if he does not wish it. Such compulsion proves most noble both in him who exerts it and in him who suffers it: to the former because he may be saved by it, and to the latter because he may thus save the citizens, in whose behalf the excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and life.
§ 36.28.1 "Or do you think that this Pompey who in his boyhood could make campaigns, lead armies, increase your possessions, preserve those of your allies, and acquire those of your adversaries, could not now, in the prime of life, when every man is at his best, and with a great fund of added experience gained from wars, prove most useful to you? 2 Will you reject, now that he has reached man's estate, him whom as a youth you chose as leader? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you committed those wars?
§ 36.28.3 Will you not, now that you have most amply tested him, entrust the present emergency, no less pressing than the former ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent dangers, even before you had carefully tested him? Will you not send out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, whom, before he could yet properly hold office, you chose against Sertorius? 4 Nay, do not think of adopting any other course; and as for you, Pompey, do you heed me and your country. For her you were born, for her you were reared. You must serve her interests, shrinking from no hardship or danger to secure them; and should it become necessary for you to lose your life, you must in that case not await your appointed day but meet whatever death comes to you.
§ 36.29.1 But truly it is absurd for me to offer this advice to you who have in so many and so great conflicts exhibited both your bravery and your love for your country. 2 Heed me, therefore, as well as these citizens here, and do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on all the more for this very reason, and in comparison with the friendship of the majority and the common advantage of us all, scorn your traducers.
§ 36.29.3 And, if you are willing even to grieve them a little, take command for this very reason, that you may vex them by conducting the war and winning applause contrary to their expectations, and that you may yourself set a crown worthy of yourself upon your former achievements, by ridding us of many great evils."
§ 36.30.1 When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius attempted to speak in opposition; but failing to receive leave to speak, he proceeded to oppose the taking of a vote. 2 Gabinius was naturally incensed, and postponed the vote regarding Pompey, while he introduced a new motion concerning Trebellius himself. The first seventeen tribes to give their decision voted that Trebellius was at fault and ought no longer to be tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the same way was he with difficulty induced to maintain silence.
§ 36.30.3 Roscius, seeing this, did not dare to utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a little of Pompey's power. At this gesture of his the crowd gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads was so startled that it fell as if struck by lightning. 4 After that Roscius kept quiet not only with his tongue but with his hand as well. Catulus would have remained silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch as he was the foremost man in the senate and it seemed likely that through him the rest might be brought to the same way of thinking;
§ 36.30.5 for it was Gabinius' expectation that he would join in approving the proposal as a result of the plight in which he saw the tribunes. Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honoured him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and he addressed them somewhat as follows:
§ 36.31.1 "That I have been exceedingly jealous, Quirites, in behalf of you, the people, you all, no doubt, clearly understand. This being so, it is incumbent upon me to set forth in simple fashion and with frankness what I know to be for the good of the state; and it is only fair for you to listen calmly and then deliberate afterwards. 2 For, if you raise an uproar, you will perhaps fail to receive some useful suggestion which you might have heard; but if you pay attention to what is said, you will be sure to discover something definitely to your advantage.
§ 36.31.3 I, for my part, assert first and foremost that it is not proper to entrust to any one man so many positions of command one after another. This has not only been forbidden by the laws, but has also been found by experience to be most perilous. What made Marius what he became was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the shortest space of time and being made consul six times in the briefest period; 4 and similarly Sulla became what he was because he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. For it does not lie in human nature for a person — I speak not alone of the young but of the mature as well — after holding positions of authority for a long period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.
§ 36.32.1 Now I do not say this in any disparagement of Pompey, but because it does not appear ever to have been of advantage to you in any way, and in particular because it is not permitted by the laws. Indeed, if the command brings honour to those deemed worthy of it, all whom it concerns ought to obtain that honour, — this is democracy, — and if it brings labour, all ought to share that labour proportionately — this is equality. "Now in such a course there is the further advantage that many individuals gain practical experience, so that your choice of those who can be entrusted with any needful business becomes easy as a result of your trial of them; but if you take the other course, it is quite inevitable that there should be a great scarcity of those who will give themselves the needful training and who will be entrusted with affairs.
§ 36.32.3 This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; for previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it is anything but fitting for either you or him that this be done.
§ 36.33.1 "This is the first and most important point I have to mention. Second, there is the consideration that so long as consuls and praetors and those serving in their places are receiving their offices and commands conformably to the laws it is in no wise fitting, nor yet advantageous, for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. 2 To what end, indeed, do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such occasions? Surely not that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that, clothed with the name alone of the office, they may be deprived of its duties.
§ 36.33.3 How can you fail to arouse the enmity of these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter public life at all, if you overthrow the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but assign some strange and hitherto unheard-of command to a private individual?
§ 36.34.1 Yet if there should be any necessity of choosing another in addition to the annual officials, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent — I refer to the dictator. However, because this official held such power, our fathers did not appoint one on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. 2 Accordingly, if you require any such official, you may, without either transgressing the laws or forming plans in disregard of the common welfare, elect Pompey himself or anyone else as dictator — on condition that he shall not hold office longer than the appointed time nor outside of Italy. For surely you are not unaware that this second limitation, too, was scrupulously observed by our forefathers, and no instance can be found of a dictator chosen for another country, except one who was sent to Sicily and who, moreover, accomplished nothing.
§ 36.34.3 But if Italy requires no such person, and you would no longer tolerate, I will not say the functions of the dictator, but even the name, — as is clear from your anger against Sulla, — how could it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and outside? 4 For you all alike understand what disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of their lawless lust for rule have often disturbed our populace and brought upon themselves countless evils.
§ 36.35.1 "About this, then, I shall say no more. For who does not realize that it is in no wise fitting, nor yet advantageous, to entrust affairs to any one man, or for any one man to be put in control of all the blessings we have, however excellent he may be? Great honours and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. 2 And what is more, I ask you to consider this fact also, that it is not really possible for one man to hold sway over the whole sea and to manage the whole war properly. For you must, if you are going to accomplish any of the needful results, make war on them everywhere at once, so that they may not, either by uniting or by finding a refuge among those not involved in war, become hard to capture. But no one man in command could by any manner of means accomplish this. For how could he fight on the same days in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands? Consequently it is necessary for many soldiers and generals also to be in command of affairs, if they are going to be of any use to you. 36 1 And in case any one urges that, even if you confide the entire war to some one man, he will in any case have many admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be: Is it not much more just and advantageous that these men destined to serve under him be chosen by you beforehand for this very purpose and receive independent authority from you? What prevents such a course? 2 By this plan they will pay better heed to the war, since each of them will be entrusted with his own particular part in it and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they achieve. But by the other plan what man, do you think, subordinate to some one else, will show the same zeal, what man will perform any duty readily, when he is going to win victories not for himself but for another?
§ 36.35.3 "That one man, now, could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself; at any rate he asks for many assistants to be given to the one who shall be elected. The question remains, then, whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, whether generals or lieutenants, and whether they should be commissioned by the entire populace with full authority, or by the commander alone for his assistance. Surely every one of you will admit that my proposal is more in accordance with law and more advantageous with reference to the freebooters themselves as well as in all other respects. And apart from this, observe how it looks for all your offices to be overthrown on the pretext of the pirates, and for none of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time . . ."
§ 36.36.1 Catulus, one of the aristocrats, had said to the people: "If he fails when sent out on this errand — as not infrequently happens in many contests, especially on the sea — what other man will you find to take his place for still more urgent tasks?" Thereupon the entire throng, as if by previous agreement, cried out and exclaimed: "You!" Thus Pompey secured command of the sea and of the islands and of the mainland for fifty miles inland from the sea.
§ 36.37.1 . . . and of Italy in place of consul for three years; and they assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and armaments that he might wish to take. The senate also, though quite reluctantly, ratified these measures and likewise passed such others from time to time as were necessary to their effectiveness. 2 Its action was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to allow the under-officers to hold enlistments in Gallia Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously enraged and would straightway have removed him from office, had not Pompey begged him off.
§ 36.37.3 So, after making preparations as the situation and as his judgment demanded, Pompey patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly by himself and partly through his lieutenants; and he subdued the greater part of it that very year. 4 For not alone was the force that he directed vast both in point of fleet and infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, but his leniency toward those who made terms with him was equally great, so that he won over large numbers by such a course;
§ 36.37.5 for those who were defeated by his troops and experienced his clemency went over to his side very readily. Besides other ways in which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant and cities that needed more inhabitants, in order that they might never again through poverty fall under the necessity of criminal deeds. 6 Among the other cities settled at this time was the one called Pompeiopolis. It is on the coast of Cilicia and had been sacked by Tigranes; its former name was Soli.
§ 36.38.1 Besides these events in the year of Acilius and Piso, a law directed at men convicted of bribery in seeking office was framed by the consuls themselves, to the effect that any such person should neither hold office nor be a senator, and should incur a fine besides. 2 For now that the power of the tribunes had been restored to its ancient status, and many of those whose names had been stricken off the list by the censors were aspiring to regain the rank of senator by one means or another, a great many factions and cliques were being formed aiming at all the offices.
§ 36.38.3 Now the consuls did not take this course because they were displeased at the practice; in fact they themselves were shown to have conducted a vigorous canvass, and Piso had actually been indicted on this charge, but had escaped being brought to trial by bribing one man after another; it was rather because they were forced to it by the senate. 4 The reason for this was that one Gaius Cornelius while tribune undertook to lay very severe penalties upon those guilty of bribery, and the populace adopted them. The senate, however, realizing that while excessive punishments have some deterrent force as threats, yet men are not then easily found to accuse or condemn those on trial, since the latter will be in desperate danger,
§ 36.38.5 whereas moderation encourages many to accusations and does not prevent condemnations, was desirous of modifying his proposition somehow, and bade the consuls frame it as a law.
§ 36.39.1 But since the elections had already been announced, and accordingly no law could be enacted till they were held, and the canvassers were doing much mischief in the meanwhile, to such an extent even that assassinations occurred, the senators voted that the law should be introduced before the elections and that a body-guard should be given to the consuls. 2 Cornelius, angry at this, proposed that the senators should not be allowed to grant office to any one seeking it in a way not prescribed by law, nor to usurp the people's right of decision in any other matter. This, indeed, had been the law from very early times, but it was not being observed in practice.
§ 36.39.3 When a great uproar arose at this, since Piso and a number of the senators opposed him, the crowd broke the consul's fasces to pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb. 4 Cornelius, accordingly, seeing their violence, dismissed the assembly for the time being before calling for any vote; later he added to the law a provision that the senate should invariably pass a preliminary decree concerning these matters and that it should be necessary for this decree to be ratified by the people. 40 1 So he secured the passage of both that law and another now to be explained.
§ 36.40.1 The praetors themselves had always compiled and published the principles of law according to which they intended to try cases; for the decrees regarding contracts had not all yet been laid down. 2 Now since they were not in the habit of doing this once for all and did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them, many of which were introduced out of favour or out of hatred of some one, he moved that they should at the very outset announce the principles they would follow, and not swerve from them at all.
§ 36.40.3 In fine, the Romans were so concerned at that time to prevent bribery, that in addition to punishing those convicted they even honoured the accusers. For instance, after Marcus Cotta had dismissed the quaestor Publius Oppius because of bribery and suspicion of conspiracy, though he himself had made great profit out of Bithynia, 4 they elevated Gaius Carbo, his accuser, to consular honours, although he had served only as tribune. But when Carbo himself later became governor of Bithynia and erred no less than Cotta, he was in turn accused by Cotta's son and convicted.
§ 36.40.5 Some persons, of course, can more easily censure others than admonish themselves, and when it comes to their own case do very readily the things for which they think their neighbours deserving of punishment. Hence they cannot, from the mere fact that they accuse others, inspire confidence in their own hatred of the acts in question.
§ 36.41.1 Lucius Lucullus, on the other hand, after finishing his term of office as praetor urbanus, and being chosen by lot thereafter to serve as governor of Sardinia, declined the province, detesting the business because of the many whose administration of affairs in foreign lands was anything but honest. That he was of a mild disposition he had given the fullest proof. 2 For when Acilius once commanded that the chair on which he sat while hearing cases should be broken in pieces because Lucullus, on seeing Acilius pass by, had not risen, the praetor not only did not give way to rage, but thereupon both he himself and his colleagues on his account gave their decision standing.
§ 36.42.1 Roscius likewise introduced a law, and so did Gaius Manilius, at the time when the latter was tribune. The former received some praise for this, which marked off sharply the seats of the knights in the theatres from the other locations; 2 but Manilius came near having to stand trial. He had granted the class of freedmen the right to vote with those who had freed them; this he did on the very last day of the year toward evening, after suborning some of the populace.
§ 36.42.3 The senate learned of it immediately on the following day, the first of the month, the day on which Lucius Tullus and Aemilius Lepidus entered upon their consulship, and it rejected his law. He, then, in fear because the plebs were terribly angry, at first ascribed the idea to Crassus and some others; 4 but as no one believed him, he paid court to Pompey even in the latter's absence, especially because he knew that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him. He went so far as to offer him command of the war against Tigranes and that against Mithridates, and the governorship of Bithynia and Cilicia at the same time.
§ 36.43.1 Now indignation and opposition were manifest even then on the part of the optimates, particularly because Marcius and Acilius were being removed before the period of their command had expired. 2 But the populace, although a little earlier it had sent the proper officials to establish a government over the conquered territory, regarding the war as at an end from the letters which Lucullus sent them, nevertheless voted to do as Manilius proposed. They were urged to this course very strongly by Caesar and Marcus Cicero.
§ 36.43.3 These men supported the measure, not because they thought it advantageous to the state or because they wished to do Pompey a favour; but inasmuch as things were certain to turn out that way, Caesar not only courted the good-will of the multitude, observing how much stronger they were than the senate, 4 but also at the same time paved the way for a similar vote to be passed some day in his own interest. Incidentally, also, he wished to render Pompey more envied and odious as a result of the honours conferred upon him, so that the people might get their fill of him more quickly. Cicero, on his part, was aspiring to leadership in the state, and was endeavouring to make it clear to both the plebs and the optimates that he was sure to make whichever side he should join preponderate.
§ 36.43.5 He was accustomed to play a double role and would espouse now the cause of one party and again that of the other, to the end that he might be courted by both. For example, a little while before he had said that he chose the side of the optimates and for that reason wished to be aedile rather than tribune; but now he went over to the side of the rabble.
§ 36.44.1 Soon after, when a suit was instituted by the optimates against Manilius and the latter was striving to gain some delay in the matter, Cicero tried in every way to thwart him, and only after obstinate objection did he put off his case till the following day, offering as an excuse that the year was drawing to a close. 2 He was enabled to do this by the fact that he was praetor and president of the court. Thereupon, when the crowd showed their displeasure, he entered their assembly, compelled to do so, as he claimed, but the tribunes, and after inveighing against the senate, promised to speak in support of Manilius. For this he fell into ill repute generally, and was called "turn-coat;" but a tumult that immediately arose prevented the court from being convened.
§ 36.44.3 Publius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla, a nephew of the great Sulla, who had been elected consuls and then convicted of bribery, had plotted to kill their accusers, Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus, especially after the latter had also been convicted. 4 Among others who had been suborned were Gnaeus Piso and also Lucius Catiline, a man of great audacity, who had sought the office himself and was angry on this account. They were unable, however, to accomplish anything because the plot was revealed beforehand and a body-guard given to Cotta and Torquatus by the senate.
§ 36.44.5 Indeed, a decree would have been passed against them, had not one of the tribunes opposed it. And when Piso even then continued to display his audacity, the senate, fearing he would cause some riot, sent him at once to Spain, ostensibly to hold some command or other; there he met his death at the hands of the natives whom he had wronged.
§ 36.45.1 Pompey was at first making ready to sail to Crete against Metellus, and when he learned of the decree that had been passed, pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of the opposite faction with always loading tasks upon him so that he might meet with some reverse. In reality he received the news with the greatest joy, 2 and no longer regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points where things had been left unsettled, he made preparations for the war with the barbarians. Meanwhile, wishing to test the disposition of Mithridates, he sent Metrophanes to him with friendly proposals.
§ 36.45.3 Now Mithridates at that time held him in contempt; for as Arsaces, king of the Parthians, had recently died, he expected to conciliate Phraates, his successor. But Pompey anticipated him by quickly establishing friendship with Phraates on the same terms and persuading the latter to invade promptly the part of Armenia belonging to Tigranes. When Mithridates ascertained this, he was alarmed and straightway sent an embassy and tried to arrange a truce. 4 But when Pompey demanded that he lay down his arms and deliver up the deserters, he had no opportunity to deliberate; for the large number of deserters who were in his camp, hearing of it and fearing they should be delivered up, and likewise the barbarians, fearing that they should be compelled to fight without them, raised an uproar.
§ 36.45.5 And they would have done some harm to the king, had he not by pretending that he had sent the envoys, not for a truce, but to spy out the Roman strength, with difficulty held them in check.
§ 36.46.1 Pompey, therefore, having decided that he must needs fight, was busy with his various preparations; among other things he reenlisted the Valerians. When he was now in Galatia, Lucullus met him and declared the whole conflict over, claiming there was no further need of an expedition, and that for this reason, in fact, the men sent by the senate to arrange for the government of the districts had arrived. Failing to persuade him to retire, Lucullus turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, greedy for war, greedy for office, and so on. Pompey, paying him but slight attention, forbade anybody longer to obey his commands and pressed on against Mithridates, being eager to join issue with him as quickly as possible.
§ 36.47.1 The king for a time kept fleeing, since his forces were inferior; he continually devastated the country before him, gave Pompey a long chase, and at the same time made him feel the want of provisions. But when his adversary invaded Armenia, both for this reason and because he expected to capture it while abandoned, 2 Mithridates, fearing it would be occupied before his arrival, also entered that country. He seized a strong hill opposite the Romans and there rested with his entire army, hoping to exhaust them by the failure of their provisions, while he could secure an abundance from many quarters, being among his own subjects. But he kept sending down some of his cavalry into the plain, which was bare, and attacking those who fell in with them, as a result of which he was receiving large numbers of deserters.
§ 36.47.3 Pompey did not dare to assail them in that position, but moved his camp to another spot where the surrounding country was wooded and where he would be troubled less by the foe's cavalry and archers, and there he set an ambuscade where an opportunity offered. 4 Then with a few troops he openly approached the camp of the barbarians, threw them into disorder, and luring them to the point he wished, killed a large number. Encouraged by this success, he also sent men out in various directions over the country after provisions.
§ 36.48.1 When Pompey continued to procure these in safety and through certain men's help had become master of the land of Anaitis, which belongs to Armenia and is dedicated to a certain goddess of the same name, a 2 and many others as a result of this kept revolting to him, while the soldiers of Marcius were added to his force, Mithridates became frightened and no longer kept his position, but immediately set out unobserved in the night, and thereafter by night marches advanced into the Armenia of Tigranes.
§ 36.48.3 Pompey followed after him, eager to engage in battle; yet he did not venture to do so either by day, for they would not come out of their camp, or by night, since he feared his ignorance of their country, until they got near the frontier. Then, knowing that they were about to escape, he was compelled to fight by night. 4 Having decided on this course, he eluded the barbarians while they were taking their noonday rest, and went on ahead by the road along which they were to march. And coming upon a defile between some hills, he stationed his army there on the higher ground and awaited the enemy.
§ 36.48.5 When the latter had entered the defile confidently and without any precaution, in view of the fact that they had suffered no injury previously and now at last were gaining safety, insomuch that they even expected the Romans would no longer follow them, he fell upon them in the darkness; for there was no illumination from the sky, and they had no kind of light with them.
§ 36.49.1 The course of the battle was as follows: First, all the trumpeters together at a signal sounded the attack, then the soldiers and all the multitude raised a shout, while some clashed their spears against their shields and others struck stones against the bronze implements. 2 The mountains surrounding the valley took up and gave back the din with most frightful effect, so that the barbarians, hearing them suddenly in the night and in the wilderness, were terribly alarmed, thinking they had encountered some supernatural phenomenon.
§ 36.49.3 Meanwhile the Romans from the heights were hurling stones, arrows, and javelins upon them from every side, inevitably wounding some by reason of their numbers; and they reduced them to the direst extremity. For the barbarians were not drawn up for battle, but for the march, and both men and women were moving about in the same place with horses and camels and all sorts of baggage; 4 some were riding on chargers, others in chariots or in the covered waggons and carriages, in indiscriminate confusion; and as some were being wounded already and others were expecting to be wounded they were thrown into confusion, and in consequence the more easily slain, since they kept huddling together.
§ 36.49.5 This was what they endured while they were still being assailed from a distance. But when the Romans, after exhausting their long-distance missiles, charged down upon them, the outermost of the enemy were slaughtered, one blow sufficing for their death, since the majority were unarmed, and the centre was crushed together, as all by reason of the danger round about them moved thither. 6 So they perished, pushed about and trampled upon by one another without being able to defend themselves or show any daring against the enemy. For they were horsemen and bowmen for the most part, and were unable to see before them in the darkness and unable to carry out any manoeuvre in the narrow space. When the moon rose, the barbarians rejoiced, thinking that in the light they would certainly beat back some of the foe.
§ 36.49.7 And they would have been benefited somewhat, if the Romans had not had the moon behind them and as they assailed them, now on this side and now on that, caused much confusion both to the eyes and hands of the others. For the assailants, being very numerous, and all of them together casting the deepest shadow, baffled their opponents before they had yet come into conflict with them. 8 The barbarians, thinking them near, would strike vainly into the air, and when they did come to close quarters in the shadow, they would be wounded when not expecting it. Thus many of them were killed and fewer taken captives. A considerable number also escaped, among them Mithridates.
§ 36.50.1 The king then hastened toward Tigranes. But on sending courtiers to him he found no friendship awaiting him, because the young Tigranes had risen against his father, and the latter suspected that Mithridates, the youth's grandfather, had really been responsible for the quarrel. For this reason, far from receiving him, Tigranes even arrested and threw into prison the men sent ahead by him. Failing, therefore, of the expected refuge, he turned aside into Colchis, 2 and thence on foot reached Maeotis and the Bosporus, using persuasion with some and force with others. He also recovered that country, after so terrifying Machares, his son, who had espoused the cause of the Romans and was then ruling there, that he would not even come into his presence; and he likewise caused this son to be killed by his associates, to whom he promised to grant immunity and money.
§ 36.50.3 In the course of these events Pompey sent men to pursue him; but when he outstripped them by fleeing across the Phasis, the Roman leader colonized a city in the territory where he had been victorious, and gave it over to the wounded and superannuated soldiers. Many also of the neighbouring people voluntarily joined the settlement and later generations of them are in existence even now, being called Nicopolitans and belonging to the province of Cappadocia.
§ 36.51.1 While Pompey was thus engaged, Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, fled to Phraates, taking with him some of the foremost men, because his father was not ruling to suit them; and though Phraates, in view of the treaty made with Pompey, hesitated about what he ought to do, he was persuaded to invade Armenia. 2 So they came as far as Artaxata, subduing all the country before them, and even assailed that place too, for Tigranes the elder in fear of them had fled to the mountains. But when it appeared that time was required for the siege, Phraates left a part of the force with the young Tigranes and retired to his own land. Thereupon the father took the field against his son, who was now left alone, and conquered him.
§ 36.51.3 The latter, in his flight, set out at first to go to Mithridates, his grandfather; but when he learned that he had been defeated and was rather in need of aid than able so assist any one, he went over to the Romans. Pompey, employing him as a guide, made an expedition into Armenia against his father.
§ 36.52.1 Tigranes, learning of this, and becoming alarmed, immediately made overtures to him and delivered up the envoys of Mithridates. And when, on account of the opposition of his son, he could gain no moderate terms, but even as it was Pompey had crossed the Araxes and drawn near to Artaxata, 2 then at last Tigranes surrendered the city to him and came voluntarily into his camp. He had arrayed himself so far as possible in a manner midway between his former dignity and his present humbled state, in order that he might seem to him worthy both of respect and pity;
§ 36.52.3 for he had put off his tunic shot with white and the candys of pure purple, but wore his tiara and head-band. Pompey, however, sent a lictor and made him dismount from his horse, since the king was riding up as if to enter the very fortification on horseback according to the custom of his people. But when he saw him enter on foot, cast aside his head-dress and prostrate himself on the ground to do him obeisance, he felt an impulse of pity; 4 so springing up hastily, he raised him, bound on the head-band and seated him upon a chair close by, and spoke words of encouragement, telling him among other things that he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia, but had gained the friendship of the Romans. By these words Pompey restored his spirits, and then invited him to dinner.
§ 36.53.1 But the son, who sat on the other side of Pompey, did not rise at the approach of his father nor greet him in any other way, and furthermore, though invited to dinner, did not present himself, whence he incurred Pompey's most cordial hatred. 2 Now on the following day, when Pompey had heard the claims of both, he restored to the elder all his hereditary domain; but what he had acquired later (chiefly portions of Cappadocia and Syria, as well as Phoenicia and the large district of Sophene bordering on Armenia) he took away, and demanded money of him besides. To the younger he assigned Sophene only.
§ 36.53.3 And inasmuch as this was where the treasures were, the young man began a dispute about them, and not gaining his point, since Pompey had no other source from which to obtain the sums agreed upon, he became angry and planned to escape. Pompey, being informed of this in season, kept the youth in honourable confinement and sent to those who were guarding the money, bidding them give it all to his father. 4 But they would not obey, stating that it was necessary for the young man, to whom the country was now held to belong, to give them this command. Then Pompey sent him to the forts. He, finding them all locked up, came near and reluctantly ordered that they be opened. When the keepers obeyed no more than before, claiming that he issued the command not of his own free will, but under compulsion, Pompey was vexed and put Tigranes in chains.
§ 36.53.5 Thus the old king secured the treasures, and Pompey passed the winter in the land of Anaitis and near the river Cyrnus, after making three divisions of his army. From Tigranes he received plenty of everything and far more money than had been agreed upon. 6 It was for this reason particularly that he shortly afterwards enrolled the king among the friends and allies of the Roman people and brought his son to Rome under guard.
§ 36.54.1 The quiet of his winter quarters, however, was not unbroken. Oroeses, king of the Albanians dwelling beyond the Cyrnus, made an expedition against them just at the time of the Saturnalia. He was impelled partly by the desire to do a favour to Tigranes the younger, who was a friend of his, but chiefly by the fear that the Romans would invade Albania; and he cherished the idea that if he should fall upon them in the winter, when they were not expecting hostilities and were not encamped in one body, he would surely achieve some success. 2 Oroeses himself marched against Metellus Celer, in whose charge Tigranes was, and sent some against Pompey and others against Lucius Flaccus, the commander of a third of the army, in order that all might not assist one another.
§ 36.54.3 And yet, in spite of all, he accomplished nothing at any point. Celer vigorously repulsed Oroeses. Flaccus, being unable to save the whole circuit of his entrenchments by reason of their size, constructed another line inside. This fixed in his opponents' minds the impression that he was afraid, and so he was able to entice them inside of the outer trench, 4 where by making an unexpected charge upon them he slaughtered many in the conflict and many in flight. Meanwhile Pompey, having already learned of the attempt which the barbarians had made on the others, came, much to their surprise, to meet the detachment that was proceeding against him, conquered it, and at once hurried on just as he was against Oroeses. He did not overtake him, however, since Oroeses had fled after being repulsed by Celer and learning of the failures of the others;
§ 36.54.5 but he seized and destroyed many of the Albanians near the crossing of the Cyrnus. He then made a truce at their request; for although on other accounts he was extremely anxious to invade their country out of revenge, he was glad to postpone the war because of the winter.
§ 37.1.1 Book XXXVII (65 BC)
The year following these exploits, in the consulship of Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus, Pompey engaged in warfare with both the Albanians and the Iberians. Now it was with the Iberians that he was compelled to fight first and quite contrary to his purpose. They dwell on both sides of the Cyrnus, adjoining the Albanians on the one hand and the Armenians on the other; 2 and Artoces, their king, fearing that Pompey would direct his course against him, too, sent envoys to him on a pretence of peace, but prepared to attack him at a time when he should be feeling secure and therefore be off his guard.
§ 37.1.3 Pompey, learning of this also in good season, invaded the territory of Artoces before the other had made sufficient preparations or had secured the pass on the frontier, which was well-nigh impregnable. In fact he had advanced as far as the city called Acropolis before Artoces became aware that he was at hand. 4 This fortress was right at the narrowest point, where the Cyrnus flows on the one side and the Caucasus extends on the other, and had been built there in order to guard the pass. Thus Artoces, panic-stricken, had no chance to array his forces, but crossed the river, burning down the bridge;
§ 37.1.5 and those within the fortress, in view of his flight and also of a defeat they sustained in battle, surrendered. Pompey, after making himself master of the pass, left a garrison in charge of it, and advancing from that point, subjugated all the territory this side of the river.
§ 37.2.1 But when he was on the point of crossing the Cyrnus also, Artoces sent to him requesting peace and promising to yield the bridge to him voluntarily and to furnish him with provisions. 2 Both of these promises the king fulfilled as if he intended to come to terms, but becoming afraid when he saw his enemy already across, he fled away to the Pelorus, another river that flowed through his domain. Thus he first drew on, and then ran away from, the enemy whom he might have hindered from crossing.
§ 37.2.3 Upon perceiving this Pompey pursued, overtook, and conquered him. By a charge he came to close quarters with the enemy's bowmen before they could show their skill, and very promptly routed them. 4 Thereupon Artoces crossed the Pelorus and fled, burning the bridge over that stream too; of the rest some were killed in conflict, and some while fording the river.
§ 37.2.5 Many others scattered through the woods and survived for a few days, while they shot their arrows from the trees, which were exceedingly tall; but soon the trees were cut down under them and they also were slain. So Artoces again made overtures to Pompey, and sent gifts. 6 These the other accepted, in order that the king in the hope of securing a truce might not proceed any farther; but he would not agree to grant peace till the petitioner should first send to him his children as hostages.
§ 37.2.7 Artoces, however, delayed for a time, until in the course of the summer the Pelorus became fordable in places, and the Romans crossed over without any difficulty, particularly since no one hindered them; then at last he sent his children to Pompey and concluded a treaty.
§ 37.3.1 Pompey, learning now that the Phasis was not far distant, decided to descend along its course to Colchis and thence to march to Bosporus against Mithridates. 2 He advanced as he intended, traversing the territory of the Colchians and their neighbours, using persuasion in some quarters and fear in others. But, perceiving at this point that the route on land led through many unknown and hostile tribes, and that the voyage by sea was still more difficult on account of the lack of harbours in the country and on account of the people inhabiting the region,
§ 37.3.3 he ordered the fleet to blockade Mithridates so as to see that he did not sail away anywhere and to prevent his importing provisions, while he himself directed his course against the Albanians. He did not take the most direct route, but first turned back into Armenia, in order that by such a course, taken in connection with the truce, he might find them off their guard. 4 He forded the Cyrnus at a point where the summer had made it passable, ordering the cavalry to cross down stream, with the baggage animals next, and then the infantry. His object was that the horses should break the violence of the current with their bodies, and if even so any one of the pack-animals should be swept off its feet it might collide with the men crossing on the lower side and not be carried farther down.
§ 37.3.5 From there he marched to the Cambyses, without suffering any injury at the hands of the enemy; but as a result of the heat and consequent thirst both he and the whole army suffered severely, notwithstanding the greater part of the march was covered at night. For their guides, who were from among the captives, did not lead them by the most suitable route, 6 nor indeed was the river of any advantage to them; for the water, of which they drank great quantities, was very cold and proved injurious to many. When no resistance was offered to them at this place either, they marched on to the Abas river, carrying supplies of water only; for they received everything else by the free gift of the natives, and for this reason they committed no depredations.
§ 37.4.1 After they had already got across the river it was announced that Oroeses was coming up. Now Pompey was anxious to lead him into conflict before he should find out the number of the Romans, for fear that when he learned it he might retreat. 2 Accordingly he marshalled his cavalry in front, giving them notice beforehand what they should do; and he kept the rest behind them in a kneeling position and covered with their shields, causing them to remain motionless, so that Oroeses should not ascertain their presence until he came to close quarters.
§ 37.4.3 Thereupon the barbarian, in contempt for the cavalry, whom he supposed to be alone, joined battle with them, and when after a little they purposely turned to flight, he pursued them at full speed. Then the foot-soldiers suddenly rose and by extending their front not only afforded their own men a safe means of escape through the ranks but also received within their lines the enemy, who were heedlessly bent on pursuit, and surrounded a number of them. 4 So these troops cut down those caught inside the circle; and the cavalry, some of whom went around on the right and some on the other side of them, assailed are the rear those who were on the outside. Each force slaughtered many there, and burned to death others who had fled into the woods, crying out the while, "Aha, the Saturnalia!" with reference to the attack made on that occasion by the Albanians.
§ 37.5.1 After accomplishing this and overrunning the country, Pompey granted peace to the Albanians, and on the arrival of heralds concluded a truce with some of the other tribes that dwell along the Caucasus as far as the Caspian Sea, where the mountains, which begin at Pontus, come to an end. 2 Phraates likewise sent to him, desiring to renew the treaty with him. For the sight of Pompey's success, and the fact that his lieutenants were also subjugating the rest of Armenia and that part of Pontus, and that Gabinius had even advanced across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris, filled him with fear of them, and he was anxious to have the truce confirmed. He accomplished nothing, however;
§ 37.5.3 for Pompey, in view of the present situation and the hopes which it inspired, held him in contempt and replied haughtily to the ambassadors, among other things demanding back the territory of Corduene, concerning which Phraates was quarrelling with Tigranes. 4 When the envoys made no answer, inasmuch as they had received no instructions on this point, he wrote a few words to Phraates, but instead of waiting for a reply sent Afranius into the territory at once, and having occupied it without a battle, gave it to Tigranes.
§ 37.5.5 Afranius, returning through Mesopotamia to Syria, contrary to the agreement made with the Parthian, wandered from the way and encountered many hardships by reason of the winter and the lack of supplies. Indeed, his troops would have perished, had not the Carrhaeans, Macedonian colonists who dwelt somewhere in that vicinity, received him and helped him forward.
§ 37.6.1 This was the treatment which Pompey in the fulness of his power accorded to Phraates, thereby indicating very clearly to those desiring to indulge their greed that everything depends on armed force, and that he who is victorious by its aid wins inevitably the right to lay down whatever laws he pleases. Furthermore, he showed contempt for the title of Phraates, in which that ruler delighted before all the world and before the Romans themselves, and by which the latter had always addressed him. 2 For whereas he was called "King of Kings," Pompey clipped off the phrase "of Kings" and addressed his demands merely "to the King" when writing; and yet he later, of his own accord and contrary to custom, gave this title to the captive Tigranes, when he celebrated his triumph over him in Rome.
§ 37.6.3 Phraates, consequently, although he feared and paid court to him, was vexed at this, feeling that he had actually been deprived of his kingdom; and he sent ambassadors, reproaching him with all the wrongs he had suffered, and forbidding him to cross the Euphrates.
§ 37.4.1 When Pompey gave him no conciliatory reply, Phraates immediately began a campaign in the spring against Tigranes, being accompanied by the latter's son, to whom he had given his daughter in marriage. This was in the consulship of Lucius Caesar and Gaius Figulus. In the first battle Phraates was beaten, but later was victorious.
§ 37.4.5 And when Tigranes invoked the assistance of Pompey, who was in Syria, Phraates again sent ambassadors to the Roman commander, bringing many charges against Tigranes, and making many insinuations against the Romans, so that Pompey was both ashamed and alarmed.
§ 37.7.1 As a result he lent no aid to Tigranes and no longer took any hostile measures against Phraates, offering the excuse that no such expedition had been assigned to him and that Mithridates was still in arms. He declared himself satisfied with what had been accomplished and did not wish to undertake further risks, lest in striving for additional results he might impair the successes already won by some reverse, as Lucullus had done. 2 Such was his philosophy, and he maintained that covetousness was a dangerous thing, and to aim at the possessions of others unjust, — now that he was no longer able to make use of them. For he feared the forces of the Parthian and dreaded the uncertain issue of events, and so did not undertake this war, although many urged him to do so. As for the barbarian's complaints, he made light of them,
§ 37.7.3 offering no answer, but asserting that the dispute which the prince had with Tigranes concerned some boundaries, and that three men should decide the case for them. These he actually sent, and they were enrolled as bona fide arbitrators by the two kings, who then settled all their mutual complaints. For Tigranes was angry at not having obtained the desired aid, 4 and Phraates wishes the Armenian ruler to survive, so that in case of need he might some day have him as an ally against the Romans. For they both well understood that whichever of them should conquer the other would simply help along matters for the Romans and would himself become easier for them to subdue. For these reasons, then, they were reconciled.
§ 37.7.5 Pompey passed this winter likewise in Aspis, winning over the districts that were still resisting, and taking also Symphorion, a fort which Stratonice betrayed to him. She was the wife of Mithridates, and in her anger against him because she had been left there she sent out the garrison, ostensibly to collect supplies, and then let the Romans in, although her child was with . . . 7a Returning from Armenia Pompey arbitrated disputes and managed other business for kings and potentates who came to him. He confirmed some in possession of their kingdoms, added to the principalities of others, and curtailed and humbled the excessive powers of a few. Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, which had lately rid themselves of their kings and had been ravaged by the Arabians and Tigranes, were united by him. Antiochus had dared to ask them back, but did not secure them; instead, they were combined into one province and received laws so that they were governed in the Roman fashion.
§ 37.8.1 . . . Not for this alone did Caesar receive praise during his aedileship, but also because he exhibited both the Ludi Romani and the Megalenses on the most expensive scale and furthermore arranged gladiatorial contests in his father's honour in the most magnificent manner. For, although the cost of these entertainments was in part shared jointly with his colleague Marcus Bibulus, and only in part borne by him individually, 2 yet he so far excelled in the funeral contests as to gain for himself the credit for the others too, and was thought to have borne the whole cost himself. Even Bibulus accordingly joked about it, saying that he had suffered the same fate as Pollux; for, although that hero possessed a temple in common with his brother Castor, it was named after the latter only.
§ 37.9.1 Over these successes the Romans naturally rejoiced, but the portents that occurred thoroughly disquieted them. On the Capitol many statues and images were melted by thunderbolts, among others one of Jupiter, set upon a pillar; and a likeness of the she-wolf with Romulus and Remus, mounted on a pedestal, fell down; 2 also the letters of the columns on which the laws were inscribed became blurred and indistinct. Accordingly, on the advice of the soothsayers they offered many expiatory sacrifices and voted that a larger statue of Jupiter should be set up, looking toward the east and the Forum, in order that the conspiracies by which they were disturbed might come to light.
§ 37.9.3 Such were the occurrences of that year. The censors also became involved in a dispute about the people living beyond the Po, one believing it wise to admit them to citizenship, while the other did not; so they did not even perform any of their other duties, but resigned their office. 4 And for the same reason their successors, too, did nothing in the following year, inasmuch as the tribunes hindered them in regard to the senatorial list, fearing that they themselves might be expelled from that body.
§ 37.9.5 Meanwhile all those who were resident aliens in Rome, except inhabitants of what is now Italy, were banished on the motion of one Gaius Papius, a tribune, because they were coming to be too numerous and were not thought fit persons to dwell with the citizens.
§ 37.10.1 In the following year, when Figulus and Lucius Caesar were in office, the events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions in human affairs. 2 For the man who had slain Lucretius at the instance of Sulla, and another who had slain many of the persons proscribed by him, were tried for the murders and punished, Julius Caesar being most instrumental in bringing this about.
§ 37.10.3 Thus changing circumstances often render very weak even those exceedingly powerful. This matter, then, turned out contrary to most people's expectation, as did also the case of Catiline, who, although charged with the same crimes as the others (for he, too, had killed many of the proscribed), was acquitted. And from this very circumstance he became far worse and even lost his life as a result. 4 For, when Marcus Cicero had become consul with Gaius Antonius, and Mithridates no longer caused any injury to the Romans, but had destroyed himself, Catiline undertook to set up a new government, and by banding together the allies against the state threw the people into fear of a mighty conflict. Now these two events came about as follows.
§ 37.11.1 Mithridates did not give way himself under his misfortunes, but relying more on his will than on his power, he planned, especially as Pompey was now tarrying in Syria, to reach the Ister through Scythia, and from there to invade Italy. 2 For, inasmuch as he was by nature given to great projects and had met with many successes as well as many failures, he felt there was nothing which might not be ventured or hoped for. And if he was to fail, he preferred to perish along with his kingdom, with pride undiminished, rather than live deprived of it in humility and disgrace.
§ 37.11.3 On this idea, then, he himself grew strong; for in proportion as he wasted away through weakness of body, the more steadfast did he grow in strength of mind, so that he even offset the infirmity of the former by the reasonings of the latter. 4 But his associates, on the other hand, became estranged, as the position of the Romans was ever growing more secure and that of Mithridates weaker. Among other things the greatest earthquake ever experienced destroyed many of their cities; the soldiery also mutinied, and some of Mithridates' sons were kidnapped and conveyed to Pompey.
§ 37.12.1 Thereupon he detected and chastised some, while others he punished on mere suspicion, before they could accomplish anything; he no longer trusted anybody, but even put to death some of his remaining children who incurred his suspicion. Seeing this, one of his sons, Pharnaces, impelled at once by fear of the king and the expectation of receiving the kingdom from the Romans, as he had now reached manhood, plotted against him. 2 He was detected, for many both openly and secretly were concerning themselves with all that he was doing; and if the bodyguard had had even the slightest good-will toward their aged sovereign, the son would have been punished immediately. But as it was, Mithridates, who had proved himself most wise in all matters pertaining to his royal office, did not recognize the fact that neither arms nor a multitude of subjects is of any real strength to any one without their friendship; on the contrary, the more subjects a ruler has, the greater burden they are to him, unless he holds them faithful.
§ 37.12.3 At any rate, Pharnaces, followed both by the men he had made ready and by those whom his father had sent to arrest him, — for he won these over very easily, — hastened directly against his father himself. The old king was in Panticapaion when he learned this, and sent ahead some soldiers against his son intimating that he himself would soon follow them. 4 These also Pharnaces quickly diverted from their purpose, inasmuch as they too did not love Mithridates, and after receiving the voluntary submission of the city, he put to death his father, who had fled for refuge into the palace.
§ 37.13.1 Mithridates had tried to make away with himself, and after first removing his wives and remaining children by poison, he had swallowed all that was left; yet neither by that means nor by the sword was he able to perish by his own hands. 2 For the poison, although deadly, did not prevail over him, since he had inured his constitution to it, taking precautionary antidotes in large doses every day; and the force of the sword blow was lessened on account of the weakness of his hand, caused by his age and present misfortunes, and as a result of taking the poison, whatever it was.
§ 37.13.3 When, therefore, he failed to take his life through his own efforts and seemed to linger beyond the proper time, those whom he had sent against his son fell upon him and hastened his end with their swords and spears. 4 Thus Mithridates, who had experienced the most varied and remarkable fortune, had not even an ordinary end to his life. For he desired to die, albeit unwillingly, and though eager to kill himself was unable to do so; but partly by poison and partly by the sword he was at once self-slain and murdered by his foes.
§ 37.14.1 Pharnaces embalmed his body and sent it to Pompey as a proof of what had been done, and surrendered himself and his dominions. The Roman showed Mithridates no indignity, but, on the contrary, commanded that he be buried among the tombs of his ancestors; for, feeling that his foe's enmity had been extinguished with his life, he now indulged in no vain rage against his dead body. 2 Nevertheless he granted the kingdom of Bosporus to Pharnaces as the wages of his bloody deed, and enrolled him as a friend and ally.
§ 37.14.3 After the death of Mithridates all portions of his dominion except a few were subjugated. A few garrisons which at that time were still holding forts outside of Bosporus, did not immediately come to terms, not so much because they were minded to resist Pompey as because they were afraid that others might seize the money which they were guarding and lay the blame upon them; hence they waited, wishing to show everything to Pompey himself.
§ 37.15.1 When, then, the regions in that quarter had been subdued, and Phraates remained quiet, while Syria and Phoenicia had become tranquil, Pompey turned against Aretas. The latter was king of the Arabians, now subjects of the Romans, as far as the Red Sea. Previously he had done the greatest injury to Syria and had on this account become involved in a battle with the Romans who were defending it; he was defeated by them, but nevertheless continued the war at that time. 2 Pompey accordingly marched against him and his neighbours, and, overcoming them without effort, left them in charge of a garrison. Thence he proceeded against Syria Palaestina, because its inhabitants had ravaged Phoenicia. Their rulers were two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, who were quarrelling themselves, as it chanced, and were creating factions in the cities on account of the priesthood (for so they called their kingdom) of their god, whoever he is.
§ 37.15.3 Pompey immediately won over Hyrcanus without a battle, since the latter had no force worthy of note; and by shutting up Aristobulus in a certain place he compelled him to come to terms, and when he would surrender neither the money nor the garrison, he threw him into chains. After this he more easily overcame the rest, but had trouble in besieging Jerusalem.
§ 37.16.1 Most of the city, to be sure, he took without any trouble, as he was received by the party of Hyrcanus; but the temple itself, which the other party had occupied, he captured only with difficulty. 2 For it was on high ground and was fortified by a wall of its own, and if they had continued defending it on all days alike, he could not have got possession of it. As it was, they made an excavation of what are called the days of Saturn, and by doing no work at all on those days afforded the Romans an opportunity in this interval to batter down the wall.
§ 37.16.3 The latter, on learning of this superstitious awe of theirs, made no serious attempts the rest of the time, but on those days, when they came round in succession, assaulted most vigorously. 4 Thus the defenders were captured on the day of Saturn, without making any defence, and all the wealth was plundered. The kingdom was given to Hyrcanus, and Aristobulus was carried away.
§ 37.16.5 This was the course of events at that time in Palestine; for this is the name that has been given from of old to the whole country extending from Phoenicia to Egypt along the inner sea. They have also another name that they have acquired: the country has been named Judaea, and the people themselves Jews.
§ 37.17.1 I do not know how this title came to be given to them, but it applies also to all the rest of mankind, although of alien race, who affect their customs. This class exists even among the Romans, and though often repressed has increased to a very great extent and has won its way to the right of freedom in its observances. 2 They are distinguished from the rest of mankind in practically every detail of life, and especially by the fact that they do not honour any of the usual gods, but show extreme reverence for one particular divinity. They never had any statue of him even in Jerusalem itself, but believing him to be unnamable and invisible, they worship him in the most extravagant fashion on earth.
§ 37.17.3 They built to him a temple that was extremely large and beautiful, except in so far as it was open and roofless, and likewise dedicated to him the day called the day of Saturn, on which, among many other most peculiar observances, they undertake no serious occupation. 4 Now as for him, who he is and why he has been so honoured, and how they got their superstitious awe of him, accounts have been given by many, and moreover these matters have naught to do with this history.
§ 37.18.1 The custom, however, of referring the days to the seven stars called planets was instituted by the Egyptians, but is now found among all mankind, though its adoption has been comparatively recent; at any rate the ancient Greeks never understood it, so far as I am aware. 2 But since it is now quite the fashion with mankind generally and even with the Romans themselves, I wish to write briefly of it, telling how and in what way it has been so arranged. I have heard two explanations, which are not difficult of comprehension, it is true, though they involve certain theories.
§ 37.18.3 For if you apply the so-called "principle of the tetrachord" (which is believed to constitute the basis of music) to these stars, by which the whole universe of heaven is divided into regular intervals, in the order in which each of them revolves, and beginning at the outer orbit assigned to Saturn, 4 then omitting the next two name the lord of the fourth, and after this passing over two others reach the seventh, and you then go back and repeat the process with the orbits and their presiding divinities in this same manner, assigning them to the several days, you will find all the days to be in a kind of musical connection with the arrangement of the heavens.
§ 37.19.1 This is one of the explanations given; the other is as follows. If you begin at the first hour to count the hours of the day and of the night, assigning the first to Saturn, the next to Jupiter, the third to Mars, the fourth to the Sun, the fifth to Venus, the sixth to Mercury, and the seventh to the Moon, 2 according to the order of the cycles which the Egyptians observe, and if you repeat the process, you will find that the first hour of the following day comes to the Sun.
§ 37.19.3 And if you carry on the operation throughout the next twenty-four hours in the same manner as with the others, you will dedicate the first hour of the third day to the Moon, and if you proceed similarly through the rest, each day will receive its appropriate god. This, then, is the tradition.
§ 37.20.1 Pompey, when he had accomplished what has been related, proceeded again to Pontus and after taking over the forts returned to Asia and thence to Greece and Italy. 2 Thus he had won many battles, had brought into subjection many potentates and kings, some by war and some by treaty, he had colonized eight cities, had opened up many lands and sources of revenue to the Romans, and had establish and organized most of the nations in the continent of Asia then belonging to them with their own laws and constitutions, so that even to this day they use the laws that he laid down.
§ 37.20.3 Yet, great as these achievements were and unrivalled by those of any earlier Roman, one might ascribe them both to his good fortune and to his troops; but the act for which credit particularly attaches to Pompey himself — a deed forever worthy of admiration — I will now relate. 4 He had enormous power both on sea and on land; he had supplied himself with vast wealth from the captives; he had made numerous potentates and kings his friends; and he had kept practically all the communities which he ruled well disposed through benefits conferred;
§ 37.20.5 and although by these means he might have occupied Italy and gained for himself the whole Roman power, since the majority would have accepted him voluntarily, and if any had resisted, they would certainly have capitulated through weakness, yet he did not choose to do this. 6 Instead, as soon as he had crossed to Brundisium, he dismissed all his forces on his own initiative, without waiting for any vote to be passed in the matter by the senate or the people, and without concerning himself at all even about their use in the triumph. For since he understood that men held the careers of Marius and Sulla in abomination, he did not wish to cause them any fear even for a few days that they should undergo any similar experiences.
§ 37.21.1 Consequently he did not so much as assume any additional name from his exploits, although he might have taken many. As for the triumph, — I refer to the one regarded as the great event, — although according to strict precedent it was not lawful for it to be held without the presence of those who aided in winning the victory, he nevertheless accepted it when voted to him. 2 He celebrated the triumph in honour of all his wars at once, including in it many trophies beautifully decked out to represent each of his achievements, even the smallest; and after them all came one huge one, decked out in costly fashion and bearing an inscription stating that it was a trophy of the inhabited world.
§ 37.21.3 He did not, however, add any other title to his name, but was satisfied with that of Magnus alone, which, of course, he had gained even before these achievements. Nor did he contrive to receive any other extravagant honour, or even accept such as had been voted him in his absence, except on a single occasion. 4 These consisted in the privilege of always wearing the laurel wreath at all public games, and arraying himself in the cloak of a general at all of them, as well as in the triumphal garb at the horse-races. They had been granted him chiefly through the cooperation of Caesar, and contrary to the advice of Marcus Cato.
§ 37.22.1 As regards the former, I have already stated who he was, and how, while paying court to the populace, and while generally striving to destroy Pompey's power, he nevertheless made a friend of him in cases where he would thereby please the populace and gain strength himself. But this Cato belonged to the family of the Porcii and emulated the great Cato, except that he had enjoyed a better Greek education than the former. 2 He diligently promoted the interests of the plebs, and admired no one man, but was thoroughly devoted to the common weal. Suspicious of unlimited power, he hated any one who had grown above his fellows, but loved any one of the common people through pity for his weakness.
§ 37.22.3 He was becoming the friend of the people such as no one else, and indulged in outspokenness in behalf of the right, even when it involved danger. Yet he did all this not with a view to power or glory or any honour, but solely for the sake of a life of independence, free from the dictation of tyrants. 4 Such was the nature of the man who now for the first time came forward and opposed the measures under consideration, not out of any hostility to Pompey, but because they were contrary to precedent.
§ 37.23.1 These honours, then, they granted Pompey in his absence, but none when he had come home, though they would certainly have added others, had he wished it. At any rate they had often bestowed many extravagant distinctions upon other men who had possessed less authority than he, but it is clear that they had done so unwillingly. 2 Now Pompey knew well that all the gifts granted by the multitude to the powerful who are in positions of authority contain the suggestion, no matter how willingly they are voted, of being forcibly granted at the instigation of the strong; and that they bring no glory to those who receive them, because it is believe that they have been obtained, not from willing donors, but under compulsion, and not from good will, but as a result of flattery. Hence he did not permit any one to propose any measure whatever.
§ 37.23.3 This course he declared to be far better than to reject what has once been voted you: the one course arouses hatred for the high position that led to such measures being passed, and argues arrogance and insolence in not accepting what is granted you by those who think themselves your superiors or at any rate your equals; whereas by the other course you are truly democratic both in name and in fact, not merely by way of display, but in very truth. 4 Thus Pompey, after having received practically all the offices and positions of command contrary to precedent, was now unwilling to accept any other such honours that were liable to bring him merely envy and hatred, even from the very givers, without enabling him to benefit any one or to be benefited.
§ 38.1.1 The following year Caesar wished to gain the favour of the whole multitude, that he might make them his own to an even greater degree. But since he was anxious to seem to be advancing the interests also of the optimates, in order to avoid incurring their enmity, he often told them that he would propose no measure which should not also be to their advantage. 2 And, indeed, he so framed a certain measure concerning the land, which he wished to assign to the whole populace, as not to incur the least censure for it; yet he pretended he would not introduce even this measure, unless it should be according to their wishes. So far as this law went, therefore, no one could find any fault with him. The swollen population of the city,
§ 38.1.3 which was chiefly responsible for the frequent rioting, would thus be turned toward labour and agriculture; and the great part of Italy, now desolate, would be colonized afresh, so that not only those who had toiled in the campaigns, but all the rest as well, would have ample subsistence. And this would be accomplished without any expense on the part of the city itself or any loss to the optimates; on the contrary, many of them would gain both rank and office. 4 He not only wished to distribute all the public land except Campania (which he advised them to keep distinct as the property of the state, because of its excellence), but he also bade them purchase the remainder from no one who was unwilling to sell nor yet for whatever price the land commissioners might wish, but, in the first place, from people who were willing to sell, and secondly, for the same price at which it had been assessed in the tax-lists.
§ 38.1.5 For they had a great deal of surplus money, he asserted, as a result of the booty which Pompey had captured, as well as from the new tributes and taxes just established, and they ought, inasmuch as it had been provided by the dangers that citizens had incurred, to expend it upon those same persons. 6 Furthermore, he proposed that the land commission should not consist of a few members only, so as to seem like an oligarchy, or of men who were under indictment, lest somebody might be displeased, but that there should be, in the first place, twenty of them, so that many might share the honour, and secondly, that they should be the most suitable men.
§ 38.1.7 But he excepted himself from consideration, a point on which he strenuously insisted at the outset, in order that he might not be thought to be proposing a measure in his own interest. As for himself, he was satisfied with originating and proposing the matter; at least he said so, but clearly he was doing a favour to Pompey and Crassus and the rest.
§ 38.2.1 So far as his measure went, then, he could not be censured, and, indeed, no one ventured to open his mouth in opposition; for he had read it beforehand in the senate, and calling upon each one of the senators by name, had inquired whether he had any criticism to offer; and he promised to alter or even to strike out entirely any clause which might displease anybody. 2 Nevertheless, practically all the optimates who were outside the league were greatly irritated; and they were grieved especially by the very fact that Caesar had drawn up such a measure as would admit of no censure, even while it embarrassed them all.
§ 38.2.3 For they suspected that by this measure he would attach the multitude to him and gain fame and power over all men; and this was, in fact, his very purpose. For this reason, even though no one spoke against him, no one expressed approval either. This sufficed for the majority, and while they kept promising him that they would pass the decree, they did nothing; on the contrary, fruitless delays and postponements kept arising.
§ 38.3.1 Marcus Cato, however, even though he had no fault to find with the measure, nevertheless urged them on general principles to abide by the existing system and to take no steps beyond it. He was a thoroughly upright man and disapproved of any innovation; yet he had no influence either as the result of natural gift or training. 2 At this Caesar was on the point of dragging Cato out of the very senate-house and casting him into prison. But the other offered himself with the greatest readiness to be led away, and not a few of the rest followed him; and one of them, Marcus Petreius, upon being rebuked by Caesar because he was taking his departure before the senate was yet dismissed, replied: "I prefer to be with Cato in prison rather than here with you."
§ 38.3.3 Abashed at this reply, Caesar let Cato go and adjourned the senate, merely remarking: "I have made you judges and masters of this law, so that if anything did not suit you, it should not be brought before the people; but since you are not willing to pass a preliminary decree, they shall decide for themselves."
§ 38.4.1 After that he communicated nothing further to the senate during his year of office, but brought directly before the people whatever he desired. 2 However, as he wished even under these circumstances to secure some of the foremost men as supporters in the assembly, hoping that they had now changed their minds and would have some fear of the plebs, he made a beginning with his colleague and asked him if he disapproved of the provisions of the law.
§ 38.4.3 When the other gave him no answer beyond saying that he would tolerate no innovations during his year of office, Caesar proceeded to entreat him and persuaded the multitude to join him in his request, saying: "You shall have the law, if only he wishes it." Bibulus in a loud voice replied: "You shall not have this law this year, not even if you all wish it." And having spoken thus he took his departure.
§ 38.4.4 Caesar did not address his inquiries to any other magistrates, fearing that some one of them also might oppose him; but he brought forward Pompey and Crassus, though they were private citizens, and bade them express their views concerning the measure.
§ 38.4.5 This was not because he was not acquainted with their view, for all their undertakings were in common; but he purposed both to honour these men, by calling them in as advisers about the law although they were holding no office, and also to frighten the others by securing the adherence of men who were admittedly the foremost in the city at that time and had the greatest influence with all. 6 By this very move, also, he would please the populace, by giving proof that they were not striving for any unnatural or unjust end, but for objects which those leaders were willing both to approve and to praise.
§ 38.5.1 Pompey, accordingly, very gladly addressed them as follows: "It is not I alone, Quirites, who approve this measure, but the whole senate as well, inasmuch as it has voted for land to be given not only to my soldiers but to those also who once fought with Metellus. 2 On the former occasion, to be sure, since the treasury had no great means, the granting of the land was naturally postponed; but at present, since it has become exceedingly rich through my efforts, it is but right that the promise made to the soldiers be fulfilled and that the rest also reap the fruit of the common toils."
§ 38.5.3 After this preamble he went over in detail every feature of the measure and approved them all, so that the crowd was mightily pleased. Seeing this, Caesar asked him if he would willingly assist him against those who were working in opposition, and he also urged the populace to join in asking his aid for this purpose. 4 When they had done so, Pompey felt elated over the fact that both the consul and the multitude had desired his help, although he was holding no position of command, and so, with an added opinion of his own worth, and assuming much dignity, he spoke at some length: "If any one dares to raise a sword, I also will snatch up my shield."
§ 38.5.5 These words of Pompey were approved by Crassus too. Consequently, even if some of the rest were not pleased, they nevertheless favoured the passage of the law when these men, who were not only accounted good citizens in general but were also, as they supposed, hostile to Caesar, (for their reconciliation was not yet manifest), joined in approving his measure.
§ 38.6.1 Bibulus, however, would not yield, but having gained the support of three tribunes, hindered the enactment of the law. Finally, when no other excuse for delay was any longer left him, he proclaimed a sacred period for all the remaining days of the year alike, during which the people could not legally even meet in their assembly. 2 Caesar paid but slight attention to him and appointed a fixed day for the passage of the law. And when the populace had already occupied the Forum by night, Bibulus came up with the following he had got together and succeeded in forcing his way through to the temple of Castor, from which Caesar was delivering his speech. The men fell back before him, partly out of respect
§ 38.6.3 and partly because they thought he would not actually oppose them. But when he appeared above and attempted to speak in opposition to Caesar he was thrust down the steps, his fasces were broken to pieces, and the tribunes as well as others received blows and wounds.
§ 38.6.4 Thus the law was passed. Bibulus was for the moment satisfied to escape with his life, but on the next day tried in the senate to annul the act; nevertheless, he accomplished nothing, since all were under the spell of the multitude's enthusiasm and would do nothing.
§ 38.6.5 Accordingly he retired to his home and did not appear in public again at all up to the last day of the year. Instead, he remained in his house, and whenever Caesar proposed any innovation, he sent formal notice to him through his attendants that it was a sacred period and that by the laws he could rightfully take no action during it. 6 Publius Vatinius, a tribune, undertook to place Bibulus in prison for this, but was prevented from doing so by the opposition of his colleagues. Bibulus, however, held aloof from all business of state in the manner related, and the tribunes belonging to his party likewise no longer performed any public duty.
§ 38.7.1 Now Metellus Celer and Cato, and through him one Marcus Favonius, who imitated him in everything, for a time did not take the oath of obedience to the law (a custom which began, as I have stated, on an earlier occasion, and was then continued in the case of other preposterous measures) and stoutly refused to approve it, Metellus, for instance, referring to Numidicus as an example. 2 When, however, the day came on which they were to incur the established penalties, they took the oath, perhaps because it is but human nature for many persons to utter promises and threats more easily than they actually carry them out, or else because they were going to be punished to no purpose, without helping the state at all by their obstinacy.
§ 38.7.3 So the law was passed, and in addition the land of Campania was given to those having three or more children. For this reason Capua was then for the first time considered a Roman colony. 4 By this means Caesar attached the plebs to his cause; and he won over the knights by releasing them from a third part of the taxes for which they had contracted. For all collecting of taxes was done by them, and though they had often asked the senate for some satisfaction, they had not obtained it, because Cato, among others, had opposed it.
§ 38.7.5 When, then, he had conciliated this class also without any one's protest, he first ratified all the acts of Pompey, meeting with no opposition either from Lucullus or any one else, and later he put through many other measures without encountering any resistance. 6 Even Cato did not object, although during his praetorship a little later, he would never mention the title of the other's laws, since they were called Julian laws; for although he followed their provisions in allotting the courts, he most absurdly suppressed their name.
As these laws, now, are very numerous and contribute nothing to this history, I will omit them; but one other I will mention.
§ 38.8.1 Quintus Fufius Calenus, finding that the votes of all were hopelessly confused, at least in party contests, since each of the orders attributed the good measures to itself and referred the preposterous ones to the others, proposed a law while praetor that each order should cast its vote separately. His purpose was that even if their individual opinions could not be revealed, by reason of their taking this vote secretly, yet it might become clear how the orders, at least, felt.
§ 38.8.2 In most matters Caesar himself proposed, advised, and arranged everything in the city once for all as if he were its sole ruler; hence some facetious persons totally suppressed the name of Bibulus, and in speaking or writing would name Caesar twice, stating that the consuls were Gaius Caesar and Julius Caesar. 3 But matters that concerned himself he managed through others, for he was extremely careful to offer nothing to himself; and thus he the more easily accomplished everything that he desired. On his own part, he would declare that he needed nothing more, and claimed to be thoroughly satisfied with what he had; 4 but others, believing him a necessary and useful factor in affairs, proposed whatever he wished and had it passed, not only by the populace but by the senate itself.
§ 38.8.5 Thus it was that the multitude granted him the government of Illyricum and of Cisalpine Gaul with three legions for five years, while the senate entrusted him in addition with Transalpine Gaul and another legion.
§ 38.9.1 But fearing even then that Pompey might make some change during his absence, inasmuch as Aulus Gabinus was to be consul, he attached to himself both Pompey and the other consul, Lucius Piso, by ties of kinship: upon the former he bestowed his daughter, in spite of having betrothed her to another man, while he himself married Piso's daughter. 2 Thus he strengthened himself on all sides. Cicero and Lucullus, however, little pleased at this, undertook to kill both Caesar and Pompey through the help of a certain Lucius Vettius; but they failed of their attempt and all but lost their own lives as well. For Vettius, upon being exposed and arrested before he had accomplished anything, denounced them;
§ 38.9.3 and had he not charged Bibulus also with being in the plot against the two, it would certainly have gone hard with them. But as it was, owing to the fact that in his defence he accused this man who had revealed the plan to Pompey, it was suspected that he was not speaking the truth in the case of the others either, but had been prompted in the matter as a result of a plot of the other side to calumniate their opponents. 4 Concerning these matters various reports were current, since nothing was definitely proven. Vettius was brought before the populace, and after naming only those whom I have mentioned, was thrown into prison, where he was treacherously murdered a little later.
§ 38.10.1 In consequence of this affair, Cicero became suspected by Caesar and Pompey, and he confirmed their suspicion in his defence of Antonius.
The latter, while governor of Macedonia, had inflicted many injuries upon the subject territory as well as upon that which was in alliance with Rome, and had suffered many disasters in return. 2 For after ravaging the possessions of the Dardanians and their neighbours, he did not dare to await their attack, but pretending to retire with his cavalry for some other purpose, took to flight; in this way the enemy surrounded his infantry and forcibly drove them out of the country, even taking away their plunder from them.
§ 38.10.3 When he tried the same tactics on the allies in Moesia, he was defeated near the city of the Istrians by the Bastarnian Scythians who came to their aid; and thereupon he ran away. It was not for this conduct, however, that he was accused, but he was indicted for complicity in Catiline's conspiracy; yet he was convicted on the former charge, so that it was his fate to be found not guilty of the crime for which he was being tried, but to be punished for something of which he was not accused. 4 That was the way he came off. But Cicero, who defended him at this time because Antonius had been his colleague, made a most bitter attack upon Caesar, whom he held responsible for the suit against him, and even went so far as to heap abuse upon him.
§ 38.11.1 Caesar was naturally indignant at this, but, although consul, refused to be the author of any insolent speech or act against him. He said that the multitude often purposely cast many idle slurs upon their superiors, in the effort to draw them into strife, so that they might seem to be their equals and of like importance with them, in case they should get anything similar said of themselves; and he did not see fit to make anybody his rival in this manner. 2 This, then, was his attitude toward others who insulted him in any way, and so now, when he saw that Cicero was not so anxious to abuse him as to receive similar abuse in return, he paid little heed to his traducer, ignoring all he said; indeed, he allowed him to indulge in abuse without stint, as if it were so much praise showered upon him.
§ 38.11.3 Still, he did not disregard him entirely. For, although Caesar possessed in reality a rather mild nature, and was not at all easily moved to anger, he nevertheless punished many, since his interests were so numerous, 4 yet in such wise that it was not done in anger nor always immediately. He did not indulge in wrath at all, but watched for his opportunity, and his vengeance pursued the majority of his foes without their knowing it. For he did not act in such a way as to seem to be defending himself against anybody, but so as to arrange everything to his own advantage while arousing the least hatred. Therefore he visited his retribution secretly and in places where one would least have expected it,
§ 38.11.5 both for the sake of his reputation, in order to avoid seeming to be of a wrathful disposition, and also to the end that no one should learn of it beforehand and so be on his guard, or try to inflict some serious injury upon him before being injured. For he was not so much concerned about what had already occurred as he was to prevent future attacks. 6 As a result he would pardon many of those, even, who had vexed him greatly, or pursue them only to a limited extent, because he believed they would do no further injury; whereas upon many others he took vengeance, even beyond what was fitting, with an eye to his own safety. What was once done, he said, he could never make undone by any penalty, but because of the severity of the punishment he would for the future at least suffer no harm.
§ 38.12.1 In view of these considerations he was inclined to do nothing on this occasion also; but when he ascertained that Clodius was willing to do him a favour in return for the fact that he had not accused him of adultery, he set this man secretly against Cicero. 2 In the first place, in order that he might be lawfully excluded from the patricians, he transferred him with Pompey's coöperation to the plebeian status once more, and then immediately had him appointed tribune.
§ 38.12.3 This Clodius, then, silenced Bibulus, when at the expiration of his office he entered the Forum and intended on connexion with taking the oath to deliver a speech about the existing state of affairs; and he attacked Cicero also. 4 But since he decided that it was not easy to overthrow a man who had very great influence in the state by reason of his skill in speaking, he proceeded to conciliate not only the populace, but also the knights and the senate, by whom Cicero was held in the highest regard. His hope was that if he could make these men his own, he might easily cause the downfall of the orator, whose strength lay rather in the fear than in the good-will which he inspired.
§ 38.12.5 For Cicero annoyed great numbers by his speeches, and those whom he aided were not so thoroughly won to his side as those whom he injured were alienated; for most men are more ready to feel irritation at what displeases them than to feel grateful to any one for kindnesses, and they think that they have paid their advocates in full with their fee, while their chief concern is to get even with their opponents in some way or other. 6 Cicero, moreover, made for himself very bitter enemies by always striving to get the better of even the most powerful men and by always employing an unbridled and excessive frankness of speech toward all alike; for he was in pursuit of a reputation for sagacity and eloquence such as no one else possessed, even in preference to being thought a good citizen.
§ 38.12.7 As a result of this and because he was the greatest boaster alive and regarded no one as equal to himself, but in his words and life alike looked down upon everybody and would not live as any one else did, he was wearisome and burdensome, and was consequently both disliked and hated even by those very persons whom he otherwise pleased.
§ 38.13.1 Clodius, therefore, hoped on this account that if he should first win over the senate and the knights and the populace he could quickly crush him. So he straightway went to distributing free corn; for when Gabinius and Piso had now become consuls, he had introduced his motion that it should be doled out to the needy; 2 and he revived the associations called collegia in the native language, which had existed of old but had been abolished for some time. He also forbade the censors to remove anybody from any order or to censure any one, except as he should be tried and convicted before them both.
§ 38.13.3 After offering them this lure he proposed another law, concerning which it is necessary to speak at some length, so that it may become clearer to the general public. Public divination was obtained from the sky and from certain other sources, as I have said, but that of the sky had the greatest authority — so much so, in fact, that while the other auguries were many in number and were taken for each action, this one was taken but once and for the whole day. 4 This was the most peculiar feature about it; but there was the further difference that whereas in reference to all other matters sky-divination either allowed things to be done, in which case they were carried out without consulting any individual augury further, or else would prevent and hinder something, yet it stopped the voting of the people altogether, serving always as a portent to check them, whether it was of a favourable or unfavourable nature.
§ 38.13.5 The cause of this custom I am unable to state, but I set down the common report. Accordingly, many persons who wished to obstruct the appointment of magistrates that came before the popular assembly were in the habit of announcing that they would look for omens from the sky that day, so that during it the people would have no power to pass any measure. 6 Clodius, now, was afraid that if he indicted Cicero some might adopt this means to secure the postponement or delay of the trial; and so he introduced a measure that none of the magistrates should observe the signs from heaven on the days when it was necessary for the people to vote on anything.
§ 38.14.1 Such were the measures which he then drew up with reference to Cicero. The latter understood what was afoot and induced Lucius Ninnius Quadratus, a tribune, to oppose every move; so Clodius, fearing that some disturbance and delay might arise as a result, outwitted him by deceit. 2 He first made an agreement with Cicero to bring no indictment against him, if the other would not interfere with any of the measures he proposed; thereupon, while Cicero and Ninnius remained quiet, he secured the passage of the laws, and then made his attack upon the orator.
§ 38.14.3 And thus the latter, who thought himself extremely shrewd, was deceived on that occasion by Clodius — if, indeed, it is proper to speak here of Clodius and not rather of Caesar and the others who were in league with the two. 4 Now the law that Clodius next proposed was not on its face enacted against Cicero, since it did not contain his name, but was directed against all, without exception, who should put to death or even had put to death any citizens without the condemnation of the people; yet in reality it was drawn up with especial reference to the orator.
§ 38.14.5 It brought within its scope, indeed, the entire senate, because that body had charged the consuls with the protection of the city, by which act it was permitted them to take such steps, and afterwards had condemned Lentulus and the others who were put to death at that time. 6 Nevertheless, Cicero received the whole blame, or at least the greater part of it, since he had laid information against the men and had on each occasion made the motion and put the vote and finally had exacted the penalty of them through those entrusted with such business.
§ 38.14.7 For this reason he vigorously opposed Clodius' measure in every way; in particular, he discarded his senatorial dress and went about in the garb of the knights, paying court meanwhile, as he went the rounds, day and night alike, to all who had any influence, not only of his friends but also of his opponents, and especially to Pompey and even Caesar, inasmuch as the latter concealed his enmity toward him.
§ 38.15.1 Now these men, indeed, did not wish to appear to have instigated Clodius themselves, or even to be pleased with his measures, and so they devised the following plan, involving no discredit to themselves but obscure to Cicero, for deceiving him. 2 Caesar, for his part, advised him to yield, for fear he might lose his life if he remained in the city; and in order to have it believed the more readily that he was doing this through good-will, he promised to employ him as his lieutenant, so that he might retire out of Clodius' way, not in disgrace, as if under investigation, but in a position of command and with honour.
§ 38.15.3 Pompey, however, tried to turn him aside from this course, calling the act outright desertion, and uttering insinuations against Caesar to the effect that through enmity he was not giving sound advice; as for himself, he advised him to remain and boldly defend both himself and the senate and thus avenge himself at once upon Clodius. 4 The latter, he declared, would not be able to accomplish anything with Cicero present and confronting him, and would furthermore meet his deserts, since he, Pompey, would also coöperate to this end. Now when these two expressed themselves thus, not because their views were opposed, but for the purpose of deceiving their victim without arousing his suspicion, Cicero attached himself to Pompey.
§ 38.15.5 Of him he had no previous suspicion and was absolutely confident of being saved by his assistance. For in the first place, many respected and honoured him as one who saved numerous persons in grave peril, some from the judges and others from their very accusers; 6 and Clodius, in particular, had formerly been a relative of Pompey's and had long served under him, so that it seemed likely that he would do nothing that failed to accord with his wishes. As for Gabinius, Cicero supposed he could count on him absolutely as an adherent, since he was a good friend of his, and equally on Piso, because of his amiability as well as his kinship with Caesar.
§ 38.16.1 On the basis of these calculations, then, he hoped to win, since he was now unreasonably confident, even as he had before been unduly terrified; and fearing that his withdrawal from the city would seem to have been occasioned by a bad conscience, he listened to Pompey, though he said that he was considerably obliged to Caesar. 2 And thus Cicero, deceived in this wise, was preparing as if for a great victory over his enemies. For, in addition to the grounds for hope already mentioned, the knights assembled on the Capitol and sent envoys in his behalf to the consuls and senate, some from their own number,
§ 38.16.3 and also the senators Quintus Hortensius and Gaius Curio. Ninnius, too, in addition to his assistance in other ways urged the populace to change their apparel, as if for a general calamity. And many of the senators also did this, and would not change back until the consuls rebuked them by an edict. 4 The forces of his adversaries were more powerful, however. Clodius would not allow Ninnius to take any action on his behalf, and Gabinius would not grant the knights access to the senate; on the contrary, he drove one of them, who was very insistent, out of the city, and rebuked Hortensius and Curio for having been present in the assembly of the knights and for having undertaken the mission.
§ 38.16.5 Moreover, Clodius brought them before the populace, where they were soundly belaboured for their mission by some appointed agents. After this Piso, though he seemed well-disposed towards Cicero and had advised him, on seeing that it was impossible for him to attain safety by any other means, to slip away in time, nevertheless, when the other took offence at this counsel, 6 came before the assembly at the first opportunity (he was too ill most of the time) and to the question of Clodius as to what opinion he held regarding the proposed measure said: "No deed of cruelty or sadness pleases me." Gabinius, too, on being asked the same question, not only failed to praise Cicero but even accused both the knights and the senate.
§ 38.17.1 Caesar, however, who had already taken the field, and whom Clodius could therefore make arbiter of the measure only by assembling the populace outside the walls, condemned the illegality of the action taken in regard to Lentulus, but still did not approve the punishment proposed for it. 2 Every one knew, he said, all that had been in his mind concerning the events of that time, as he had cast his vote in favour of sparing their lives, but it was not fitting for any such law to be drawn up with regard to events now past.
§ 38.17.3 This was Caesar's advice. Crassus showed some favour to Cicero through his son, but himself took the side of the multitude. Pompey kept promising him assistance, but by making various excuses at different times and purposely arranging many journeys out of town, failed to defend him. 4 Cicero, perceiving this, became afraid and again undertook to resort to arms, among other things even abusing Pompey openly; but he was stopped by Cato and Hortensius, for fear a civil war might result. Then at last he departed, against his will, and with the shame and ill-repute of having gone into exile voluntarily, as if conscience-stricken.
§ 38.17.5 But before leaving he ascended the Capitol and dedicated a little image of Minerva, whom he styled "Protectress." And he set out secretly for Sicily; for he had once been governor there, and entertained a lively hope that he should be honoured among its towns and private citizens and by their governor. 6 On his departure the law took effect; so far from meeting with any opposition, it was supported, as soon as he was once out of the way, by those very persons, among others, who had seemed to be the most active workers in Cicero's behalf. His property was confiscated, his house was razed to the ground, as though it had been an enemy's, and its site was dedicated for a temple of Liberty.
§ 38.17.7 Against Cicero himself a decree of exile was passed, and he was forbidden to tarry in Sicily; for he was banished five hundred miles from Rome, and it was further proclaimed that if he should ever appear within those limits, both he and those who harboured him might be slain with impunity.
§ 38.18.1 He accordingly went over to Macedonia and spent his time there in lamentations. But there met him a man named Philiscus, who had made his acquaintance in Athens and now by chance fell in with him again. "Are you not ashamed, Cicero," he said, "to be weeping and behaving like a woman? Really, I should never have expected that you, who have enjoyed such an excellent and varied education, and who have acted as advocate to many, would grow so faint-hearted." 2 "But," replied the other, "it is not at all the same thing, Philiscus, to speak for others as to advise one's self. The words spoken in others' behalf, proceeding from a mind that is firm and unshaken, are most opportune; but when some affliction overwhelms the spirit, it becomes turbid and darkened and cannot reason out anything that is opportune. For this reason, I suppose, it has been very well said that it is easier to counsel others than to be strong oneself under suffering."
§ 38.18.3 "That is but human nature," rejoined Philiscus. "I did not think, however, that you, who are gifted with so much sound sense and have practised so much wisdom, had failed to prepare yourself for all human possibilities, so that even if some unexpected accident should befall you, it would not find you unfortified at any point. 4 But since, now, you are in this plight, . . . for I might be of some little assistance to you by rehearsing a few appropriate arguments. And thus, just as men who put a hand to others' burdens relieve them, so I might lighten this misfortune of yours, and the more easily than they, inasmuch as I shall not take upon myself even the smallest part of it.
§ 38.18.5 Surely you will not deem it unbecoming, I trust, to receive some encouragement from another, since if you were sufficient for yourself, we should have no need of these words. As it is, you are in a like case to Hippocrates or Democedes or any of the other great physicians, if one of them had fallen ill of a disease hard to cure and had need of another's aid to bring about his own recovery."
§ 38.19.1 "Indeed," said Cicero, "if you have any arguments that will dispel this mist from my soul and restore me to the light of old, I am most ready to listen. For words, as drugs, are of many varieties, and divers potencies, so that it will not be surprising if you should be able to steep in some mixture of philosophy even me, for all my brilliant feats in the senate, the assemblies, and the law-courts." 2 "Come then," continued Philiscus, "since you are ready to listen, let us consider first whether these conditions that surround you are actually bad, and next in what way we may cure them. First of all, now, I see you are in excellent physical health and strength, which is surely man's chief natural blessing; and, next, that you have the necessities of life in sufficiency
§ 38.19.3 so as not to hunger or thirst or suffer cold or endure any other hardship through lack of means — which may appropriately be set down as the second natural blessing for man. For when one's physical condition is good and one can live without anxiety, all the factors essential to happiness are enjoyed."
§ 38.20.1 To this Cicero replied: "But not one of these things is of use when some grief is preying upon one's mind; for mental cares cause one far more distress than bodily comforts cause pleasure. Even so, I also at present set no value on my physical health, because I am suffering in mind, nor yet on the abundance of necessaries; for my loss is great indeed." 2 "And does this grieve you?" replied the other. "Now if you were going to be in want of things needful, there would be some reason for your being annoyed at your loss. But since you have all necessaries in full measure, why do you distress yourself because you do not possess more? For all that one has beyond one's needs is superfluous, and amounts to the same thing whether present or absent; since surely you did not make use formerly of what was not necessary.
§ 38.20.3 Consider, therefore, either that then what you did not need you did not have, or else that you now have what you do not need. Most of these things, indeed, were not yours by inheritance, that you should be particularly exercised about them, but were acquired by your own tongue and by your own words — the very things which caused you to lose them. 4 You should not, therefore, be vexed if things have been lost in the same manner in which they were won. Ship-masters, for example, do not take it greatly to heart when they suffer great losses; for they understand, I suspect, how to take the sensible view of it, namely, that the sea which gives them wealth takes it away again.
§ 38.21.1 "So much for the present point; for I think it should be enough for a man's happiness to have a sufficiency and to lack nothing that the body requires, and I hold that everything in excess involves anxiety, trouble, and jealousy. 2 As for your saying, now, that there is no enjoyment of physical blessings unless those of the spirit are also present, that is indeed true, since it is impossible, if the spirit is in a poor state, that the body should fail to share in its ailment; nevertheless, I think it much easier for one to look after his mental health than his physical.
§ 38.21.3 For the body, being of flesh, contains in itself many dangers and requires much assistance from the divine power; whereas the spirit, of a nature more divine, can easily be trained and prompted. Let us see here also, then, what spiritual blessing has abandoned you and what evil had come upon you that we may not shake off.
§ 38.22.1 "First, then, I see that you are a man of the greatest sagacity. The proof is that you so often persuaded both the senate and the people in cases where you gave them advice, and so often helped private citizens in cases where you acted as their advocate. And secondly, I see that you are a most just man. 2 Certainly you have always been found contending for your country and for your friends against those who plotted their ruin. Indeed, this very misfortune which you have now suffered has befallen you for no other reason than that you continued to say and do everything in behalf of the laws and of the constitution.
§ 38.22.3 Again, that you have attained the highest degree of self-mastery is shown by your very course of life, since it is not possible for a man who is a slave to sensual pleasures to appear constantly in public and to go to and fro in the Forum, making his deeds by day witnesses of those by night. 4 This being the case, I, for my part, supposed you were also very brave, enjoying, as you did, such force of intellect and such power of oratory.
§ 38.22.5 But it seems that, startled out of yourself through having failed contrary to your hopes and deserts, you have fallen a little short of true courage. But you will regain this immediately, and as you are thus equipped as I have pointed out, with a good physical endowment as well as mental, I cannot see what it is that is distressing you."
§ 38.23.1 At the end of this speech of his Cicero replied: "There seems to you, then, to be no great evil in disfranchisement and exile and in not living at home or being with your friends, but, instead, living in a foreign land, and wandering about with the name of exile, causing laughter to your enemies and disgrace to your friends?" 2 "Not in the least, so far as I can see," declared Philiscus. "There are two elements of which we are constituted, soul and body, and definite blessings and evils are given to each of the two by Nature herself. Now if there should be any defect in these two, it would properly be considered injurious and disgraceful; but if all should be right with them, it would be useful instead.
§ 38.23.3 This is your condition at the present moment. Those things which you mentioned, banishment and disfranchisement, and anything else of the sort, are disgraceful and evil only by convention and a certain popular opinion, and work no injury on either body or soul. What body could you cite that has fallen ill or perished and what spirit that has grow more unjust or even more ignorant through disfranchisement or exile or anything of that sort? I see none. 4 And the reason is that no one of these things is by nature evil, just as neither citizenship nor residence in one's country is itself excellent, but whatever opinion each one of us holds about them, such they seem to be.
§ 38.23.5 For instance, men do not universally apply the penalty of disfranchisement to the same acts, but certain deeds which are reprehensible in some places are praised in others, and various actions honoured by one people are punished by another. Indeed, some do not so much as know the name, nor the thing which it implies. 6 And naturally enough; for whatever does not touch that which belong to man's nature is thought to have no bearing upon him. Precisely in the same way, therefore, as it would be most ridiculous, surely, if some judgment or decree were to be rendered that So-and-so is sick or So-and-so is base, so does the case stand regarding disfranchisement.
§ 38.24.1 "The same thing I find to be true in regard to exile. It is a sojourn abroad involving disfranchisement; so that if disfranchisement in and of itself contains no evil, surely no evil can be attached to exile either. 2 In fact, many live abroad anyway for very long periods, some unwillingly, but others willingly; and some even spend their whole life travelling about, just as if they were expelled from every place in turn; and yet they do not regard themselves as being injured in doing so.
§ 38.24.3 Nor does it make any difference whether a man does it voluntarily or not; the man who trains his body unwillingly is no less strong than he who does it willingly, and one who goes on a voyage unwillingly obtains no less benefit than another. And as regards this unwillingness itself, I do not see how it can exist with a man of sense. 4 Accordingly, if the difference between being well and badly off is that we do some things readily and voluntarily, while we perform others unwillingly and grudgingly, the trouble can easily be remedied. For it we willingly endure all necessary things and allow none of them to conquer us, all those matters in which one might assume unwillingness have been done away with at a single stroke.
§ 38.24.5 There is, indeed, an old saying and a very good one, to the effect that we ought not to demand that whatever we wish should come to pass, but to wish for whatever does come to pass as the result of any necessity. For we neither have free choice in our manner of life nor are we our own masters; 6 but according as it may suit chance, and according to the character of the fortune granted each one of us for the fulfillment of what is ordained, we must also shape our life.
§ 38.25.1 "Such is the nature of the case whether we like it or not. If, now, it is not disfranchisement in itself or exile in itself that troubles you, but the fact that you have not only done your country no injury but have actually benefited her greatly, and yet you have been disenfranchised and expelled, look at it in this way — that, when once it was destined for you to have such an experience, it has surely been the noblest and the best fortune that could befall you to be despitefully used without having committed any wrong. 2 For you advised and carried out all that was proper for the citizens, not as an individual but as consul, not meddling officiously in a private capacity but obeying the decrees of the senate, which were not passed as party measures but for the best ends.
§ 38.25.3 This and that person, on the contrary, out of their superior power and insolence devised everything against you; hence they ought to have trouble and sorrow for their injustice, but for you it is noble as well as necessary to bear bravely what Heaven has determined. 4 Surely you would not prefer to have joined with Catiline and conspired with Lentulus, to have given your country the exact opposite of useful counsel, to have performed none of the duties laid upon you by her, and thus remain at home as the reward of wickedness, instead of saving your country and being exiled.
§ 38.25.5 Accordingly, if you care at all about your reputation, it is far preferable, I am sure, for you to have been driven out, after doing no wrong, than to have remained at home by performing some base act; for, apart from other considerations, the shame attaches to those who have unjustly cast a man forth, rather than to the man who has been wantonly expelled.
§ 38.26.1 "Moreover, the story, as I heard it, was that you did not depart unwillingly, nor after conviction, but of your own accord; that you hated to live with them, seeing that you could not make them better and would not endure to perish with them, and that you fled, not from your country, but from those who were plotting against her. Consequently it would be they who are dishonoured and banished, having cast out all that is good from their souls, 2 and it would be you who are honoured and fortunate, as being nobody's slave in unseemly fashion but possessing all that is needful, whether you choose to live in Sicily, or in Macedonia, or anywhere else in the world. For surely it is not places that give either success or misfortune of any sort, but each man creates his own country and his own happiness always and everywhere.
§ 38.26.3 This was the feeling of Camillus when he was fain to dwell in Ardea; this was the way Scipio reasoned when he spent his last days in Liternum without grieving. But why mention Aristides or Themistocles, men whom exile rendered more famous, or . . . or Solon, who of his own accord left home for ten years? 4 "Therefore, do you likewise cease to consider irksome any such thing as pertains neither to our physical nor to our spiritual nature, and do not vex yourself at what has happened. For to us belongs no choice, as I told you, of living as we please, but it is absolutely necessary for us to endure what Heaven determines.
§ 38.26.5 If we do this voluntarily, we shall not be grieved; but if involuntarily, we shall not escape at all what is fated, and we shall at the same time acquire the greatest of ills — the distressing of our hearts to no purpose. 6 The proof of this is that men who bear good-naturedly the most outrageous fortunes do not regard themselves as being in any very dreadful plight, while those who are disturbed at the lightest disappointments imagine that all human ills are theirs. And people in general, both those who manage favourable conditions badly and those who manage unfavourable conditions well, make their good or ill fortune appear to others to be just what they make it for themselves.
§ 38.27.1 Bear this in mind, then, and be not cast down by your present state, nor grieve if you learn that the men who exiled you are flourishing. For the successes of men are vain and ephemeral at best, and the higher a man climbs as a result of them, the more easily, like a breath, does he fall, especially in partisan strife. 2 Borne along in the midst of troubled and unstable conditions they differ little, if at all, from sailors in a storm, but are tossed up and down, now hither, now thither; and if they make the slightest mistake, they are sure to sink.
§ 38.27.3 Not to mention Drusus, or Scipio, or the Gracchi, or certain others, remember how Camillus, the exile, later came off better than Capitolinus, and remember how greatly Aristides afterwards surpassed Themistocles. 4 "Do you also, then, hope, first and foremost, for your restoration; for you have not been expelled on account of wrong-doing, and the very ones who drove you forth will, as I learn, seek for you, while all will miss you. But even if you continue in your present state, do not distress yourself at all about it.
§ 38.28.1 For if you will take my advice, you will be quite satisfied to pick out a little estate in some retired spot on the coast and there carry on at the same time farming and some historical writing, like Xenophon and like Thucydides. 2 This form of learning is most enduring and best adapted to every man and to every state; and exile brings with it a kind of leisure that is more fruitful. If, then, you wish to become really immortal, like those historians, emulate them.
§ 38.28.3 You have the necessary means in sufficiency and you lack no distinction. For if there is any virtue in such honours, you have been consul; nothing more belongs to those who have held office a second, a third, or a fourth time, except an array of idle letters which benefit no man, living or dead. 4 Hence you would not choose to be Corvinus, or Marius, the man seven times consul, rather than Cicero. Nor, again, are you anxious for any position of command, seeing that you withdrew from the one bestowed upon you, because you scorned the gains to be had from it, scorned a brief authority that was object to the scrutiny of all who chose to practise blackmail.
§ 38.28.5 These matters I have mentioned, not because any one of them is requisite for happiness, but because, since it was necessary, you have occupied yourself sufficiently with public affairs to learn therefrom the difference in lives and to choose the one course and reject the other, to pursue the one and avoid the other. Our life is but short, and you ought not to live all yours for others, but by this time to grant a little to yourself. 6 Consider how much better quiet is than turmoil, and tranquillity than tumults, freedom than slavery, and safety than dangers, that you may feel a desire to live as I am urging you to do. In this way you will be happy, and your name shall be great because of it — and that for evermore, whether you are living or dead.
§ 38.29.1 "If, however, you are eager for your restoration and aim at a brilliant political career, I do not wish to say anything unpleasant, but I fear, as I cast my eyes over the situation and call to mind your frankness of speech, and behold the power and numbers of your adversaries, that you may meet defeat once more. 2 If then you should encounter exile, you will have merely to experience a change of heart; but if you should incur some fatal punishment, you will not be able even to repent. And yet is it not a dreadful and disgraceful thing to have one's head cut off and set up in the Forum, for any man or woman, it may be, to insult?
§ 38.29.3 Do not hate me as one who prophesies evil to you, but pay heed to me as to one announcing a warning from Heaven. Do not let the fact that you have certain friends among the powerful deceive you. You will get no help against those who hate you from the men who seem to love you, as, indeed, you have learned by experience. 4 For those who have a passion for power regard everything else as nothing in comparison with obtaining what they desire, and often give up their dearest friends and closest kin in exchange for their bitterest foes."
§ 38.30.1 On hearing this Cicero grew somewhat easier in mind. His exile, however, did not last long, but he was recalled by Pompey himself, who had been chiefly responsible for his expulsion. The reason was this. Clodius had taken a bribe to deliver Tigranes the younger, who was still at that time in confinement at the house of Lucius Flavius, and had let him go; 2 and when Pompey and Gabinius became indignant at this, he wantonly insulted them, inflicted blows and wounds upon their followers, broke to pieces the consul's fasces, and devoted his property to the gods.
§ 38.30.3 Pompey, enraged at this, particularly because the authority which he himself had restored to the tribunes had been used against him by Clodius, desired to recall Cicero, and immediately began through Ninnius to work for his restoration. 4 The latter waited for Clodius to be absent, and then introduced in the senate the motion in Cicero's behalf. When another one of the tribunes opposed him, he not only posted up his measure, indicating that he would communicate it also to the people, but he furthermore set himself in unqualified opposition to Clodius at every point. From this there arose contentions and many wounds in consequence for both sides.
§ 38.30.5 But before matters reached that point Clodius wished to get Cato out of the way, so that he might more easily succeed with his schemes, and likewise to avenge himself upon Ptolemy, who then held Cyprus, because the latter had failed to ransom him from the pirates. Hence he declared the island the property of the state and despatched Cato, very much against the latter's will, to attend to its administration.
§ 38.31.1 While this was going on in the city, Caesar found no hostility in Gaul, but everything was absolutely quiet. The state of peace, however, did not continue, but first one war broke out against him of its own accord, and then another was added, so that his greatest wish was fulfilled of waging war and winning success for the whole period of his command (?). 2 The Helvetii, who were strong in numbers and had not sufficient land for their large population, were unwilling to send out a part to form a colony for fear that if separated they might be more exposed to plots on the part of the tribes whom they had once injured; instead, they decided to migrate all together, with the intention of settling in some larger and better country, and they burned all their villages and cities, so that none should regret the migration.
§ 38.31.3 After adding to their numbers some others who felt the same needs, they set out with Orgetorix as their leader, intending to cross the Rhone and settle somewhere near the Alps. When Caesar destroyed the bridge and made other preparations to hinder them from crossing, they sent to him asking permission to cross and also promising to do no injury to the Roman territory. 4 And though he had the greatest distrust of them and had not the slightest idea of allowing them to proceed, nevertheless, because he was not yet well prepared he answered that he wished to consult his lieutenants about their requests and would give them their reply on a stated day; in fact he held out some little hope that he would grant them the passage. Meanwhile he dug ditches and erected walls in the most commanding positions, so as to make the road impassable for them.
§ 38.32.1 Accordingly the barbarians waited for a time, and then, when they heard nothing as agreed, they set out and proceeded first through the country of the Allobroges, as they had begun. Then, encountering the obstacles, they turned aside into the territory of the Sequani 2 and passed through their land as well as that of the Aedui, who gave them a free passage on condition that they should do no harm; but instead of abiding by the agreement, they went to plundering their country. Then the Sequani and Aedui sent to Caesar asking for assistance and begging him not to let them be ruined.
§ 38.32.3 Although their statements did not correspond at all with their past deeds, they nevertheless obtained their request. For Caesar was afraid the Helvetii might turn also against Tolosa, and chose to drive them back with the help of the other tribes, rather than to fight them all after they had come to an understanding, which it was clear they would otherwise do. 4 Consequently he fell upon the Helvetii as they were crossing the Arar, annihilating at the very ford those who were bringing up the rear, and so alarming those who had gone ahead by the suddenness and swiftness of his pursuit and the report of their losses, that they desired to come to terms, on condition of receiving some land.
§ 38.33.1 They did not, however, reach any agreement; for when they were asked for hostages, they became offended, not because they were distrusted, but because they thought it unworthy of them to give hostages to anyone. So they disdained a truce and went forward again.
When Caesar's cavalry galloped far ahead of the infantry and proceeded to harass their rear-guard, the enemy withstood them with their own cavalry and conquered them. 2 Filled with pride in consequence, and thinking that he, too, had fled, both because of the defeat and because, owing to lack of provisions, he turned aside to a city that was off the road, they abandoned further progress and pursued after him.
§ 38.33.3 Caesar, seeing this and fearing the violence of their attack as well as their numbers, hurried with his infantry to some higher ground, but first threw forward his horsemen to bear the brunt of the fighting until he could marshal his forces in a suitable place. The barbarians routed them a second time and were making a spirited charge straight up the hill, when Caesar with his forces in battle-array dashed down upon them suddenly from his superior position, while they were scattered, and so repulsed them without difficulty. 4 After these had been routed, some others who had not joined in the conflict — for owing to their multitude and their haste not all had arrived at the same time — attacked the pursuers in the rear and threw them into some confusion, but gained no advantage.
§ 38.33.5 For Caesar, leaving the fugitives to his cavalry, and turning himself with his heavy-armed troops to the others, defeated them and followed both bodies as they fled together to the waggons; and there, though from these vehicles they made a vigorous defence, he vanquished them again. After this reverse the barbarians divided into two parties. 6 The one came to terms with him, and going back again to their native land, whence they had set out, they rebuilt and occupied their cities there. The others refused to surrender their arms, and, with the idea that they could get back again to their old home, set out for the Rhine; but being few in numbers and labouring under a defeat, they were easily annihilated by the allies of the Romans through whose territory they passed.
§ 38.34.1 Such was the first war that Caesar fought, and he did not remain quiet after this beginning; instead, he at the same time satisfied his own desire and did the allies a favour. For the Sequani and Aedui, who had marked his desire and had noticed that his deeds corresponded with his hopes, were willing at one stroke to bestow a benefit upon him and to take vengeance upon the Germans, who were their neighbours. 2 The latter had at some time in the remote past crossed the Rhine, cut off portions of their territory, and rendered them tributaries, taking hostages from them. And because they happened to be asking what Caesar was anxious for, they easily persuaded him to assist them.
§ 38.34.3 Now Ariovistus was the ruler of those Germans; his authority had been confirmed by the Romans and he had been enrolled among their friends and allies by Caesar himself during his consulship. In comparison, however, with the glory to be derived from the war and the power which that glory would bring, the Roman general heeded none of these considerations, except in so far as he wished to get some excuse for the quarrel from the barbarian, so that he should not appear to be in any way the aggressor against Ariovistus. 4 Therefore he sent for him, pretending that he wished to have a conference with him. Ariovistus, instead of obeying, replied: "If Caesar wishes to say anything to me, let him come to me himself. I am not inferior to him, anyway, and the man who has need of another should himself go to that person."
§ 38.34.5 Thereupon Caesar became angry on the ground that he had thereby insulted all the Romans, and he immediately demanded of him the hostages of the allies and forbade him either to set foot on their land or to bring any reinforcements from home. 6 This he did, not with the idea of scaring him, but because he hoped to enrage him and by that means to gain a good and plausible pretext for the war. And this was what happened. The barbarian, angered by these demands, made a long and harsh reply, so that Caesar no longer bandied words with him, but straightway, before any one was aware of his intentions, seized on Vesontio, the city of the Sequani.
§ 38.35.1 Meanwhile reports reached the soldiers that Ariovistus was making vigorous preparations, and also that many other Germans had either already crossed the Rhine to assist him or had collected on the very bank of the river to attack the Romans suddenly; hence they fell into deep dejection. 2 Alarmed by the stature of their enemies, by their numbers, their boldness, and consequent ready threats, they were in such a mood as to feel that they were going to contend not against men, but against uncanny ferocious wild beasts. And the talk was that they were undertaking a war which was none of their business and had not been decreed, merely on account of Caesar's personal ambition; and they threatened also to desert him if he did not change his course.
§ 38.35.3 So he, when he heard of it, did not make any address to the common soldiers, since he thought it was not a good plan to discuss such matters before a crowd, and that if he did, these things would get out and reach the enemy, and since he feared his soldiers might perchance refuse obedience, raise a tumult, and do some harm, but he assembled his lieutenants and subalterns and spoke before them as follows:
§ 38.36.1 "My friends, we ought not, I think, to deliberate about public interests in the same way as about private. In fact, I do not see that the same goal is set for each men privately as for all together publicly. For though we may for ourselves take the course that is most expedient and safe, yet for the people we should both adopt and carry out only the measures that are best. 2 Even in private matters it is necessary to be energetic; so only can a respectable position be maintained. Still, a man who is least occupied with affairs is thought to be also safest.
§ 38.36.3 But a state, especially if it holds sway over others, would be very quickly overthrown by such a course. These laws, not drawn up by man but exacted by Nature herself, always have existed, do exist, and will exist so long as the race of mortals endures.
"This being the case, no one of you at this juncture should have an eye to what is privately agreeable and safe so much as to what is creditable and advantageous to all the Romans. 4 For, apart from the other considerations that may naturally arise, reflect in particular that we who are so many and of such rank — members of the senate and knights — have come here accompanied by a great multitude of soldiers and with money in abundance,
§ 38.36.5 not that we may take our ease or neglect our duties, but for the purpose of managing rightly the affairs of our subjects, preserving in safety the property of those bound to us by treaty, repelling any who undertake to do them wrong, and increasing our own possessions. 6 For if it was not in this spirit that we came, why in the world did we take the field at all instead of contriving in some manner or other to stay at home attending to our own affairs? Surely it were better not to have undertaken the campaign than to give it up after being assigned to it.
§ 38.36.7 If, however, some of use are here because compelled by the laws to do what our country ordains, and the majority of us voluntarily, on account of the honours and rewards that come from the wars we wage, how could we either honourably or rightly cheat not only the hopes of the men who sent us forth but also our own? 8 For no one can fare so well individually as not to be ruined with the republic, if it should fall; but if the state prospers, it sustains all the misfortunes of each individual citizen.
§ 38.37.1 "I do not say this with reference to you who are here, my comrades and friends; for you are not ignorant of these things, that you need to be instructed in them, nor are you indifferent toward them, that you require exhortation. I say it because I have ascertained that some of the soldiers are themselves noisily talking to the effect that this war we have undertaken is none of our business, and are stirring up the rest to sedition. 2 My purpose is that you yourselves may as a result of my words make more unswerving the zeal you have for your country and may also teach the others their whole duty. For they will be benefited more by hearing it from you individually and repeatedly than they would from learning it but once from my lips.
§ 38.37.3 Tell them, then, that it was not by staying at home or shirking their campaigns or avoiding their wars or pursuing their ease that our ancestors made the city so great, but it was by bringing their minds to venture readily all that they ought to do and their bodies to work out eagerly all the plans they had determined upon; 4 by risking their own possessions as if they belonged to others, but acquiring readily the possessions of their neighbours as their own, while they thought that happiness was nothing else than doing their duty, and held that misfortune was nothing else than resting inactive.
§ 38.37.5 "It was in consequence of these principles, therefore, that those men, who were in the beginning very few and dwelt in a city as small as any at first, conquered the Latins, subdued the Sabines, mastered the Etruscans, Volscians, Oscans, Lucanians and Samnites, in a word, subjugated the whole land south of the Alps, and repulsed all the foreign tribes that came against them.
§ 38.38.1 The later Romans, likewise, and our own fathers imitated them, not being satisfied with what they had inherited, but regarding sloth as their sure destruction and hardship as their certain safety. They feared that if their treasures remained unaugmented they would waste away of themselves and wear out with age, and were ashamed after receiving so rich a heritage to add nothing to it; accordingly they effected much greater and more numerous conquests. 2 But why mention individually Sardinia, Sicily, Macedonia, Illyria, Greece, Ionian Asia, Bithynia, Spain, and Africa? And yet the Carthaginians would have given them much money not to extend their voyages thither, and much would Philip and Perseus have given to keep them from making campaigns against them; Antiochus would have given much, his sons and grandsons would have given much, to have them remain in Europe.
§ 38.38.3 But those men in view of the glory and the greatness of the empire did not choose to be ignobly idle or to enjoy their wealth in security, nor did the older men of our generation who even now are still alive; nay, as men who well knew that advantages are preserved by the same methods by which they are acquired, they made sure of many of their original possessions and also acquired many new ones. 4 But here again, why catalogue in detail Crete, Pontus, Cyprus, Asiatic Iberia, Farther Albania, both Syrias, the two Armenias, Arabia, and Palestine? Countries whose very names we did not know precisely in former times we now rule, lording it over some ourselves and having bestowed others upon various persons, so that we have gained from them revenues and troops and honour and alliances.
§ 38.39.1 "With such examples before you, now, do not bring shame upon the deeds of the fathers nor let slip the empire which is already the greatest. We cannot even deliberate in like manner with the rest of mankind who have no possessions like ours. 2 For them it suffices to live in ease and, with safety guaranteed, to be subject to others, but for us it is necessary to toil, to make campaigns, and to incur danger in guarding our existing property. Against this prosperity many are plotting, since everything that lifts people above their fellows arouses both emulation and jealousy; and consequently an eternal warfare is waged by all inferiors against those who excel them in any way.
§ 38.39.3 Hence either we ought not in the first place to have grown powerful beyond other men, or else, since we have become so great and have gained so many possessions, it is fated for us either to rule our subjects firmly or to perish utterly ourselves. For it is impossible for men who have advanced to such distinction and to power so vast to live to themselves without danger. Let us therefore obey Fortune and not repel her, seeing that she voluntarily and at her own behest was present with our fathers and now abides with us. 4 But this result will not be attained if we cast away our arms or desert or sit idly at home or even wander about visiting our allies; it will be attained if we keep our arms constantly in hand (this is the only way to preserve peace), practise the deeds of war by actual fighting (this is the only way we shall not be forever having war),
§ 38.39.5 aid unhesitatingly those of our allies who ask for aid (in this way we shall get many more), and do not indulge those of our enemies who are always turbulent (in this way no one will any longer care to wrong us).
§ 38.40.1 "What though some god had become our surety that even if we should fail to do all this, no one would plot against us and we should forever enjoy in safety all that we have won, it would still be disgraceful to say that we ought to keep quiet; yet those who are willing to do nothing that is requisite would then have some show of excuse. 2 But if, as a matter of fact, it is inevitable that men who possess anything should be plotted against by many, and if it behooves them to anticipate their attacks; if those who hold quietly to their own possessions risk losing even these, while those who without any compulsion employ war to acquire the possessions also of others are protecting their own as well, —
§ 38.40.3 for no one who fears for his own goods covets those of his neighbour, since his fear concerning what he already has effectually deters him from meddling in what does not belong to him, — if all this be true, why, then, does any one say that we ought not always to be acquiring something more? 4 "Do you not recall, partly from hearsay and partly from observation, that none of the Italian races stopped plotting against our country until our ancestors carried the wars into their territory, nor yet the Epirots until our fathers crossed over into Greece?
§ 38.40.5 Nor Philip, who intended to make a campaign even against Italy, until they harried his land first; nor Perseus, or Antiochus, or Mithridates, until they treated them in the same way? And why mention the other instances? 6 But take the Carthaginians; so long as they suffered no disaster at our hands in Africa, they kept crossing into Italy, overrunning the country, sacking the towns, and almost captured the city itself; but when they began to have war made upon them, they fled altogether from our land.
§ 38.40.7 One might instance the same results in the case of the Gauls and Germans. For these peoples, while we remained on our side of the Alps, often crossed them and ravaged a large part of Italy; but when we ventured at last to make a campaign beyond our own borders and to bring the war home to them, and also took away a part of their territory, we never again saw any war begun by them in Italy, except once. 8 When, accordingly, in the face of these facts, anybody declares that we ought not to make war, he simply says that we ought not to be rich, ought not to rule others, ought not to be free, ought not to be Romans.
§ 38.40.9 Therefore, just as you would not endure it if a man should say any of these things, but would kill him even as he stood before you, so now also, comrades, you must feel the same way toward those who make these other statements, judging their disposition not by their words but by their deeds.
"Therefore none of you will contend, I think, that this is not the right point of view to take.
§ 38.41.1 If, however, any one thinks that because no investigation has been made of this war in the senate and no vote has been passed in the assembly we need be less eager, let him reflect that while some, to be sure, of the many wars which have fallen to our lot, have come about as a result of preparation and previous announcement, yet others have occurred on the spur of the moment. 2 For this reason all uprisings that are made while we are staying at home and keeping quiet, in which the beginning of the complaints arises from some embassy, both call for and demand an inquiry into their nature and the taking of a vote, after which the consuls and praetors must be assigned to them and the forces sent out;
§ 38.41.3 but all that come to light after commanders have already gone forth and taken the field are no longer to be brought up for decision, but to be taken in hand promptly, before they increase, as matters decreed ratified by the very urgency of the crisis.
§ 38.41.4 "Else for what reason did the people send you hither, for what reason did they send me immediately after my consulship? Why did they, on the one hand, elect me to hold command for five years at one time, as had never been done before, and on the other hand equip me with four legions, unless they believed that we should certainly be required to fight?
§ 38.41.5 Surely it was not that we might be supported in idleness, or that making visits to the allied cities and our subject territory, we should prove a worse bane to them even than their enemies. Nobody would make this assertion. It was rather that we might protect our own land, ravage that of the enemy, and accomplish something worthy both of our numbers and our expenditures. 6 With this understanding, therefore, both this war and every other whatsoever have been assigned and entrusted to us. They acted very sensibly in leaving in our hands the decision as to whom we should fight, instead of voting for the war themselves. For they would not have been able to understand thoroughly the affairs of our allies, being at such a distance from them, and would not have taken measures with equal opportuneness against enemies who were already informed and prepared.
§ 38.41.7 So we, on whom has devolved at once the decision and the carrying out of the war, and who are turning our weapons promptly against foes actually in the field, shall not be waging the war without investigation or unjustly or incautiously.
§ 38.42.1 "But suppose, now, some one of you should answer me with this objection: 'What wrong has Ariovistus done so great that he should have become an enemy of ours in place of a friend and ally?' Let any such man consider the fact that one has to defend one's self against those who are undertaking to do a wrong not merely on the basis of what they do, but also on the basis of what they intend, and has to check their growth promptly, before suffering any injury, instead of waiting until the wrong is actually done and then taking vengeance. 2 Now how could it better be proved that he is hostile, nay, most hostile toward us than by what he has done? I sent to him in a friendly way to bid him come to us and consult with us about present conditions, and he neither came nor promised that he would appear.
§ 38.42.3 And yet what did I do that was unfair or unseemly or arrogant in summoning him as a friend or ally? What insolence and wantonness, on the other hand, has he failed to show in refusing to come! Is it not inevitable that he did this for one of two reasons — either that he suspected he should suffer some harm or that he felt contempt for us? 4 Now if he felt any suspicion, he convicts himself most clearly of conspiring against us; for no one, when he has suffered no injury, is suspicious towards us, nor does one become so with an upright and guileless mind; rather, it is those who have prepared themselves to wrong others because of their own conscience that harbour suspicion against them.
§ 38.42.5 If, on the other hand, nothing of this sort was at the bottom of his action, but he merely looked down on us and insulted us with overweening words, what must we expect him to do when he lays hold of some real project? For when a man has shown such disdain in matters where he was not going to gain anything, does he not stand convicted from afar off of utter injustice both in thought and in deed?
"Not content, now, with this, he further bade me come to him, if I wanted anything of him.
§ 38.43.1 Do not, I beg of you, regard this addition as any light matter; for it is weighty as an indication of his disposition. As for his refusing to come to us, one speaking in his defence might ascribe this to hesitation, or infirmity, or fear; 2 but his summoning me admits of no excuse, and furthermore proves that he acted in the first instance from no other motive than a determination to yield us obedience in nothing and furthermore to make corresponding demands in every case.
§ 38.43.3 And yet with what insolence and contumely does this very course of his teem! The proconsul of the Romans summons a man and he does not come; then some one summons the proconsul of the Romans — an Allobrogian! Do not regard it as a slight matter and of little moment that he failed to obey me, Caesar, or that he summoned me, Caesar. 4 For it was not I who summoned him, but the Roman, the proconsul, the fasces, the authority, the legions; it was not I who was summoned by him, but all these. Privately I have no relations with him, but in common we have all spoken and acted, received his retort and suffered his scorn.