§ 1.1.1 Had previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since men have no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. 2 But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others.
§ 1.1.3 Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. 4 For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite everyone, young and old alike, to peruse my systematic history. 5 For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government — a thing unique in history?
§ 1.1.6 Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this knowledge?
§ 1.2.1 How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. 2 Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence.
§ 1.2.3 The Lacedemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. 4 The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic region to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. 5 Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest geographically and politically that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it.
§ 1.2.6 For they never even made a single attempt to dispute possession of Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown to them. 7 But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. 8 In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.
§ 1.3.1 The date from which I propose to begin my history is the 140th Olympiad [220-216 BCE], and the events are the following: in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aitolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus; in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, 2 in Italy, Libya, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sikyon.
§ 1.3.3 Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; 4 but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. 5 And this is my reason for beginning their systematic history from that date.
§ 1.3.6 For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and the continent of Asia. 7 Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. 8 But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us Greeks, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history,
§ 1.3.9 in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative proper may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over land and sea in our part of the world; 10 but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them, it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose.
§ 1.4.1 For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present age, is this. Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; 2 a historian should likewise bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand.
§ 1.4.3 As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. 4 I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. 5 For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times.
§ 1.4.6 We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each: a result by no means likely. 7 He indeed who believes that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eyewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. 8 For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream.
§ 1.4.9 For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. 10 Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. 11 It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.
§ 1.5.1 I shall adopt as the starting-point of this Book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus' History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264-261 BCE]. 2 Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot.
§ 1.5.3 The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. 4 The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. 5 For if there is any ignorance or indeed any dispute as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in our readers a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.
§ 1.6.1 It was, therefore, the nineteenth year after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans ratified the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, 2 that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol.
§ 1.6.3 The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. 4 After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war, they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East and North. 5 After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedition of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.)
§ 1.6.6 The Romans had ere this reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanquished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. 7 Their struggle with the Samnites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally expelling himself and his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. 8 When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots.
§ 1.7.1 For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. 2 Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery.
§ 1.7.3 After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens 4 and then took possession of the wives and families of the dispossessed victims, just as chance assigned them each at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. 5 Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit.
§ 1.7.6 For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. 7 The force which came, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, 8 but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased,
§ 1.7.9 yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have already mentioned. 10 But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, 11 most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to Rome
§ 1.7.12 the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation for good faith with the allies. 13 The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.
§ 1.8.1 The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene) as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans together with the Campanians who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. 2 When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes.
§ 1.8.3 Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young but because of his royal descent qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. 4 Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. 5 From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to military command.
§ 1.9.1 For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, 2 and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force.
§ 1.9.3 He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. 4 He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamosorus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. 5 During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens.
§ 1.9.6 Having thus efficiently accompanied his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. 7 Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, 8 and inflicted a severe defeat on them, capturing their leaders. This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.
§ 1.10.1 The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, 2 while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people.
§ 1.10.3 The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. 4 For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. 5 But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian Tyrrhenian seas.
§ 1.10.6 They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. 7 That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, 8 they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily.
§ 1.10.9 The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge for crossing over to Italy, debated the matter for long,
§ 1.11.1 and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. 2 The commons, however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the way of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of sending help;
§ 1.11.3 and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to cross to Messene. 4 The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. 5 The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning their citadel.
§ 1.11.6 Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Sunes. 7 Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army 8 marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well.
§ 1.11.9 Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. 10 Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, 11 as they commanded both land and sea, he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war.
§ 1.11.12 But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement 13 and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. 14 After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp.
§ 1.12.1 the following day Appius, learning of the result of this action and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. 2 He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day.
§ 1.12.3 Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to retreat in disorder to neighbouring cities. 4 Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before Syracuse and commenced to besiege it. 5 Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work.
§ 1.12.6 I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. 7 To follow out this previous history — how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise — seemed to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. 8 My readers need not therefore be surprised if, even in the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states;
§ 1.12.9 for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.
§ 1.13.1 Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. 2 To take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily.
§ 1.13.3 Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians under Hamilcar and after under Hasdrubal. 4 At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. 5 Contemporary with this the so called Cleomenic war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.
§ 1.13.6 Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; 7 for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. 8 I shall therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History.
§ 1.13.9 Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. 10 I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; 11 since it is not easy to name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations, more unintermittent activity, more battles, and greater changes of fortune.
§ 1.13.12 The two states were also at this period still uncorrupted in morals, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, 13 so that a better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of each can be formed by comparing their conduct in this war than in any subsequent one.
§ 1.14.1 An equally powerful motive with me for paying particular attention to this war is that, to my mind, the truth has not been adequately stated by those historians who are reputed to be the best authorities on it, Philinus and Fabius. 2 I do not indeed accuse them of intentional falsehood, in view of their character and principles, but they seem to me to have been much in the case of lovers;
§ 1.14.3 for owing to his convictions and constant partiality Philinus will have it that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely, well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. 4 In other relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all such favouritism; for a good man should love his friends and his country, he should share the hatreds and attachments of his friends; 5 but he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him.
§ 1.14.6 For just as a living creature which has lost its eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. 7 We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. 8 We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.
§ 1.14.9 The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows.
§ 1.15.1 Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that 2 the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners.
§ 1.15.3 After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. 4 The Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a decisive engagement, 5 and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege.
§ 1.15.6 This account is, it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. 7 For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, 8 while those whom he represented as defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally besieging Syracuse.
§ 1.15.9 It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. 10 But the latter is true; for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. 11 We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.
§ 1.15.12 We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when the occasion arises. 13 Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.
§ 1.16.1 When news of the successes of Appius and his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. 2 The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse.
§ 1.16.3 On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. 4 Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and the powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. 5 His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with proposals for peace and alliance.
§ 1.16.6 The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; 7 for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. 8 Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances.
§ 1.16.9 Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. 10 King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. 11 We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom in particular cases and in general policy.
§ 1.17.1 When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, 2 but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would be better off for supplies.
§ 1.17.3 The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. 4 They therefore enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, 5 and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.
§ 1.17.6 Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. 7 On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. 8 Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls.
§ 1.17.9 It was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was foreseen, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. 10 The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. 11 But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans; for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force.
§ 1.17.12 Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opposites who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. 13 Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.
§ 1.18.1 After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. 2 As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the Asclepieium outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards Heraclea.
§ 1.18.3 They fortified the ground between their camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. 4 On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. 5 Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required.
§ 1.18.6 So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; 7 but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city — fifty thousand at least in number — Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. 8 The Carthaginian government shipped the troops they had collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to Hanno their other general.
§ 1.18.9 Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy's camps from their provisions and necessary supplies. 10 The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and besiegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the necessities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, 11 and would in the end have done so, had not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies.
§ 1.19.1 In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own troops were in fit fighting condition, 2 took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him, and approaching the enemy's fortified camp to provoke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after which they were to give way and retire until they rejoined himself.
§ 1.19.3 The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked them. 4 The Libyans retreated as they had been ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. 5 After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy.
§ 1.19.6 For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day: 7 but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers from the city that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. 8 Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged.
§ 1.19.9 The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, 10 and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into disorder. 11 A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to Heraclea. The Romans captured most of the elephants and all the baggage.
§ 1.19.12 But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. 13 By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. 14 When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal's rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates.
§ 1.19.15 Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every description.
§ 1.20.1 When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, 2 but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose.
§ 1.20.3 As regards their land force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; 4 for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; 5 but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea, the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance.
§ 1.20.6 For in the period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. 7 Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reasons, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by naval forces, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. 8 And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of the war named above at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning — how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.
§ 1.20.9 When they saw that the war was dragging on, they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. 10 As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, 11 and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing.
§ 1.20.12 It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. 13 Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their forces across to Messene not only had they not any decked ships, but no long warships at all, not even a single boat, 14 and borrowing fifty-oared boats and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the people of Elea and Naples they took their troops across in these at great hazard.
§ 1.20.15 On this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing the straits, and one of their decked ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern; 16 so that it is evident that if this had not occurred they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge.
§ 1.21.1 Now, however, those to whom the construction of ships was committed were busy in getting them ready, and those who had collected the crews were teaching them to row on shore in the following fashion. 2 Making the men sit on rowers' benches on dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the ships themselves, they accustomed them to fall back all at once bringing their hands up to them, and again to come forward pushing out their hands, and to begin and finish these movements at the word of command of the bugle-man.
§ 1.21.3 When the crews had been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they were completed, and having practiced for a brief time actual rowing at sea, they sailed along the coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. 4 For the Consul appointed by the Romans to the command of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provide for all the urgent needs of the fleet. 5 While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town.
§ 1.21.6 The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boodes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. 7 Boodes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbor. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. 8 The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander of the enemy.
§ 1.21.9 But a few days later, though Gnaeus' disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. 10 For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. 11 As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.
§ 1.22.1 After this the Romans approached to coast of Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. 2 At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for sea-battle.
§ 1.22.3 As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called “ravens”. 4 They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. 5 This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length.
§ 1.22.6 In this gangway was an oblong hole, and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man's knee. 7 At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. 8 To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy's deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided broadsides.
§ 1.22.9 Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy's deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all directions but if they charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. 10 The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. 11 Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an opportunity for going into action.
§ 1.23.1 As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. 2 Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force.
§ 1.23.3 The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worthwhile to maintain order in the attack, but just as is they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. 4 They were commanded by Hannibal — the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army — in the seven-banked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus'. 5 On approaching and seeing the ravens nodding aloft on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly.
§ 1.23.6 But when the ships that came into collision were in every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. 7 So the first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander's galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. 8 The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines.
§ 1.23.9 Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, 10 but when the ravens swung round and plunged down in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.
§ 1.24.1 When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. 2 On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.
§ 1.24.3 After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered in the neighborhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, 4 and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. 5 After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers.
§ 1.24.6 Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbors of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. 7 The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia. 8 The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year;
§ 1.24.9 but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of next year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. 10 The Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. 11 This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation.
§ 1.24.12 They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Enna and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, 13 and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.
§ 1.25.1 Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. 2 The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under way, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them.
§ 1.25.3 Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral's ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. 4 The rest of the Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean. 5 The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves most thoroughly into the task of organizing naval forces
§ 1.25.6 and disputing the command of the sea, while in the meantime the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. 7 The Romans, therefore, after making preparations as I said, for the coming summer, set to sea with a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of war and put in to Messene. 8 Starting again from there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand, and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to be just in that neighborhood.
§ 1.26.1 The plan of the Romans was to sail to Libya and deflect the war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own territory in danger. 2 The Carthaginians were resolved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they were that Libya is easily accessible, and that all the people in the country would be easily subdued by anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk of a sea-battle.
§ 1.26.3 The object of the one side being to prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it was clear that their rival aims would result in the struggle which followed. 4 The Romans had made suitable preparations for both contingencies — for an action at sea and for a landing in the enemy's country. 5 For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from their land forces, they divided into four corps the total force they were about to embark.
§ 1.26.6 Each corps had two names; it was called either the First Legion or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly. The fourth had a third name in addition; they were called triarii after the usage in the land forces. 7 The whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty marines. 8 The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand.
§ 1.26.9 These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, if he estimates them from the number of men and ships. The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. 11 Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and side by side with each other.
§ 1.26.12 Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one galley, the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards. 13 Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. 14 Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-lines to the vessels of the third squadron.
§ 1.26.15 Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as triarii, making a single long line of ships so extended that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. 16 When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective and practical, while also difficult to break up.
§ 1.27.1 About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. 2 When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general's words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy's order adapted their own to it.
§ 1.27.3 Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at angle with the rest. 4 Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. 5 He had vessels for charging and also the swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement.
§ 1.27.6 The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the center of the line, used in the fray the following stratagem. 7 The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the center. 8 The Carthaginian center had received Hamilcar's orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously.
§ 1.27.9 While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, 10 and the triarii remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar's ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. 11 The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy's flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly, while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy,
§ 1.27.12 grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eyes of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. 13 Such then was the state of the battle in this quarter.
§ 1.28.1 At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the triarii, causing them great embarrassment and distress. 2 Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transports. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy.
§ 1.28.3 Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three sea-battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. 4 As the respective forces were in each case of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. 5 However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched.
§ 1.28.6 Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated, for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. 7 Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the triarii and horse-transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. 8 When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the triarii at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit.
§ 1.28.9 The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. 10 Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transports and triarii in safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; 11 for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging, apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters.
§ 1.28.12 The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. 13 The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favor of the Romans. 14 The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.
§ 1.29.1 After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Libya, 2 reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaion which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis.
§ 1.29.3 Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of which refused to surrender voluntarily. 4 Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. 5 But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district,
§ 1.29.6 sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. 7 As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. 8 Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome.
§ 1.29.9 Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, 10 while Lucius, taking with him the ship's crews and all the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.
§ 1.30.1 The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostar, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar, ordering him to return instantly. 2 Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken.
§ 1.30.3 They decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. 4 A few days later Regulus had begun to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the unwalled places and laying siege to those which had walls. 5 On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it.
§ 1.30.6 The Carthaginians, being anxious to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. 7 They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy, was not a favorable position for their own army; and there they encamped. 8 In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen.
§ 1.30.9 For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, 10 but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. 11 And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight;
§ 1.30.12 but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army were at once dislodged from their camp. 13 The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, 14 and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth over-ran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested.
§ 1.30.15 Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.
§ 1.31.1 The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, had now fallen into a thoroughly difficult position. 2 For, in addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter.
§ 1.31.3 The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former owing to the expectation of a siege. 4 Regulus, perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. 5 The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands.
§ 1.31.6 For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. 7 As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus's harshness. 8 The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.
§ 1.32.1 Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedemon, a man who had been brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. 2 On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals.
§ 1.32.3 Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before them and examine him. 4 He presented himself before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. 5 The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him.
§ 1.32.6 Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumor and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, 7 but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to maneuver some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could befall them. 8 Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces.
§ 1.32.9 These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.
§ 1.33.1 When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. 2 On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him.
§ 1.33.3 On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. 4 But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. 5 The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous.
§ 1.33.6 Acting on this authority, he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. 7 Some of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. 8 The Romans, seeing the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity.
§ 1.33.9 Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the velites in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. 10 In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. 11 When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favorable opportunity to attack.
§ 1.34.1 No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephant-drivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, 2 than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom and uttering their battle-cry, advanced against the foe.
§ 1.34.3 As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; 4 while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. 5 But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the melee, while the formation of the main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind, remained for a time unbroken.
§ 1.34.6 At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order 7 and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body of these tried to effect their escape, 8 and of these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy's hands and were made prisoners, himself included.
§ 1.34.9 It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. 10 All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together with him. 11 The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis.
§ 1.34.12 The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.
§ 1.35.1 In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to the better conduct of human life. 2 For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes.
§ 1.35.3 He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. 4 And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that “one wise counsel conquers many hands” were then confirmed by the actual facts. 5 For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers.
§ 1.35.6 This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. 7 For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter less hurtful. 8 Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt.
§ 1.35.9 Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; 10 for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.
§ 1.36.1 All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. 2 But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time sailed again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time,
§ 1.36.3 but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. 4 There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavor to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present. 5 The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Libya, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there.
§ 1.36.6 The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, 7 but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the defenders they at length abandoned the siege. 8 When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Libya, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones,
§ 1.36.9 and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained on the watch for an attack by the enemy. 10 In the early summer the Romans, having launched three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Libya. 11 Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaion they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews.
§ 1.37.1 They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. 2 For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage.
§ 1.37.3 History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. 4 The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius that they undertook the voyage). 5 The commanders, however, paid no attention to a single word they said, they took the outer course and there they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over.
§ 1.37.6 But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged to acknowledge their lack of judgment. 7 The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. 8 For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed.
§ 1.37.9 But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. 10 It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.
§ 1.38.1 The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. 2 They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants.
§ 1.38.3 After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition. 4 Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaion occupied himself in drilling unopposed his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended 5 to dispute the possession of the open country. The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships.
§ 1.38.6 In three months they were completed — a thing difficult to believe — and the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, 7 having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, 8 they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations
§ 1.38.9 brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, 10 its inhabitants soon surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.
§ 1.39.1 Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer 2 and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Libya, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally reached the isle of the Lotus-eaters, which is called Meninx and is not far distant from the Lesser Syrtis.
§ 1.39.3 Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating 4 and the ships grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. 5 Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily
§ 1.39.6 and rounded Cape Lilybaion they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships. 7 The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. 8 Relying now solely on their land forces, they dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions.
§ 1.39.9 The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; 10 for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. 11 These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Libya that the elephants had broken the Romans' ranks and killed most of their men,
§ 1.39.12 grew so afraid of the beasts that for the two years following this period, though often both in the district of Lilybaion and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never dared to begin a battle, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. 13 During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult country. 14 Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again.
§ 1.40.1 The Carthaginian commander-in chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies — it now being the height of the harvest — 2 removed his forces from Lilybaion and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus.
§ 1.40.3 Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal's aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. 4 Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. 5 Caecilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town.
§ 1.40.6 Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. 7 When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, 8 and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants which charged at them.
§ 1.40.9 Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, 10 he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy's left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. 11 When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench.
§ 1.40.12 When the elephants charged the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and spears fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, 13 they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops, trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. 14 Caecilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops caused a severe rout among them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight.
§ 1.40.15 He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. 16 By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.
§ 1.41.1 When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. 2 They were consequently encouraged to revert to their original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet of naval force; for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war.
§ 1.41.3 When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. 4 Anchoring off Lilybaion, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Libya. 5 On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more or less with the Romans,
§ 1.41.6 sharing their estimate of the place's value; so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily except Drepana. To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to.
§ 1.42.1 Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to Greece 2 and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea.
§ 1.42.3 Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. 4 The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, 5 that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias.
§ 1.42.6 The third looks towards Libya itself, and is favorably situated as a base for attacking the promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west, separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybaion. 7 On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbor requires great skill and practice. 8 The Romans encamped by this city on either side, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side,
§ 1.42.9 and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, 10 and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished 11 and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town.
§ 1.42.12 Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. 13 Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fell in a pitched battle.
§ 1.43.1 About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the matter over among themselves and in the full conviction that their subordinates would obey them, sallied from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. 2 But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general.
§ 1.43.3 Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favors if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. 4 On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who had died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. 5 They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements.
§ 1.43.6 So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. 7 The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very narrowly escaped a complete disaster 8 due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.
§ 1.44.1 The Carthaginian government knew nothing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. 2 Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaion and Carthage, and there awaited favorable weather.
§ 1.44.3 As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbor, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. 4 The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbor by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. 5 The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands.
§ 1.44.6 Hannibal, having entered the harbor in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. 7 All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the Carthaginians from sailing in.
§ 1.45.1 Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, 2 desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in both parties and make another attempt to fire the enemy's works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly,
§ 1.45.3 and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. 4 On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. 5 Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning watch,
§ 1.45.6 and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. 7 The Romans, who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. 8 Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous.
§ 1.45.9 Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single combat in the whole contest. 10 It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. 11 For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that
§ 1.45.12 at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pine-brands, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. 13 But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. 14 Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.
§ 1.46.1 As for Hannibal he sailed out with his ships after the affair while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. 2 Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbor, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection.
§ 1.46.3 The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaion. 4 The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaion, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaion and make a full report from personal observation. 5 They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port.
§ 1.46.6 But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaion, and next day finding the wind happily favorable, sailed in at about ten o'clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. 7 Next day he at once made preparations for departure, 8 but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbor waiting to see what would happen.
§ 1.46.9 The ships were waiting on either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. 10 But the “Rhodian,” getting under way in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, 11 but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy,
§ 1.46.12 and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. 13 After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness.
§ 1.47.1 What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. 2 For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Libya; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbor in entering.
§ 1.47.3 Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the “Rhodian's” audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbor. 4 For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. 5 However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.
§ 1.47.6 This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners 7 and especially for the “Rhodian.” It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. 8 At first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy.
§ 1.47.9 Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, 10 and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaion.
§ 1.48.1 The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, 2 when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting pent-houses from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force.
§ 1.48.3 During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. 4 The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. 5 The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succor and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult.
§ 1.48.6 The defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagration. 7 The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. 8 Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force.
§ 1.48.9 At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. 10 After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. 11 But the garrison of Lilybaion rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.
§ 1.49.1 On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, 2 they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily.
§ 1.49.3 These reinforcements were ferried over the Straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. 4 The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. 5 On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain.
§ 1.49.6 After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. 7 At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, 8 but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade.
§ 1.49.9 He himself at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. 10 On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. 11 Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eyes on his ship, to follow in his wake.
§ 1.49.12 Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under way and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbor from that on which the Romans were entering.
§ 1.50.1 Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, 2 but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbor, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter,
§ 1.50.3 he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbor fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. 4 The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbor into line, soon drew them up close to shore with their prows to the enemy. 5 Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left.
§ 1.50.6 At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy's left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of the open sea. 7 As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them 8 by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbor.
§ 1.50.9 This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement.
§ 1.51.1 When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. 2 At first the battle was equally balanced,
§ 1.51.3 as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it 4 as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, 5 as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water
§ 1.51.6 and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, 7 they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own line. 8 It was, however, just the opposite with the Romans. Those in distress could not retire backwards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern foremost or made for the shore and grounded.
§ 1.51.9 To sail on the one hand through the enemy's line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective maneuvers in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews' lack of skill. 10 Nor again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. 11 Such being their difficult position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him.
§ 1.51.12 The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.
§ 1.52.1 The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. 2 Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome.
§ 1.52.3 He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly escaped with his life. 4 Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. 5 The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus, with corn for the besiegers of Lilybaion and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him.
§ 1.52.6 Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaion and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse, having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. 7 There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. 8 He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.
§ 1.53.1 At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, 2 and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived,
§ 1.53.3 dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilybaion, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. 4 When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. 5 For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, on the watch at Lilybaion, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also.
§ 1.53.6 The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. 7 The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaion, and after coasting along for some distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept the ships that were on their way to join the army. 8 When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under way and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the Romans.
§ 1.53.9 The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. 10 Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbor, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. 11 Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy's attack.
§ 1.53.12 The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; 13 but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.
§ 1.54.1 The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaion in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. 2 The Carthaginian admiral, when his look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships.
§ 1.54.3 Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, 4 thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. 5 The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both.
§ 1.54.6 When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. 7 He very wisely consented, and with great labor they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. 8 But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets disabled.
§ 1.55.1 Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favor, 2 while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country.
§ 1.55.3 The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their position on land. 4 Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaion, continued to lament their whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, the besiegers thereby keeping up the investment as well as they could. 5 Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster.
§ 1.55.6 Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the sanctuary of Venus and of the town. 7 Eryx is a mountain on the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus, or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna. 8 On its summit, which is flat, stands the sanctuary of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places.
§ 1.55.9 The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. 10 He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.
§ 1.56.1 The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. 2 He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war)
§ 1.56.3 and after laying waste Locris and the Bruttii quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Hercte lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. 4 It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favorably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. 5 On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening.
§ 1.56.6 There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. 7 Besides this Hercte commands a harbor very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaion to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water. 8 The hill has only three approaches, all difficult, two on the land side and one from the sea.
§ 1.56.9 Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. 10 For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cumae, 11 and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here.
§ 1.57.1 For as in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, 2 but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals.
§ 1.57.3 The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. 4 It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts can be conveyed. 5 Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative.
§ 1.57.6 Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched; their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and the camps were at a quite small distance from each other, 7 this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. 8 The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.
§ 1.58.1 But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. 2 The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilcar now seized the town which lies between the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was.
§ 1.58.3 The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit — a thing they had never expected — remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed every device and effort that the siege demanded: 4 both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. 5 At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn.
§ 1.58.6 For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means. 7 Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. 8 For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or the other of the two will soon fall dead.
§ 1.58.9 So the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be despairing, their strength paralyzed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense.
§ 1.59.1 But, in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, 2 now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided for the third time to court the prospect of using sea-forces.
§ 1.59.3 They thought that this course, if they could but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favorable conclusion. 4 And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, 5 but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war.
§ 1.59.6 The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; 7 as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. 8 In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the model of the “Rhodian's” ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer.
§ 1.59.9 Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbor of Drepana and the road-steads near Lilybaion, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. 10 First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, 11 he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedition, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly,
§ 1.59.12 but every day was spent in exercising and practicing the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of good food and drink, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.
§ 1.60.1 When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, 2 and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need of necessary supplies.
§ 1.60.3 Hanno, whom they had appointed to command the naval force, set sail and reached the so called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. 4 Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaion. 5 There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day.
§ 1.60.6 In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favorable to the enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, 7 but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, 8 whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time.
§ 1.60.9 He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under way. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy.
§ 1.61.1 The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. 2 As the outfit of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each.
§ 1.61.3 The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. 4 With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. 5 The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their naval force.
§ 1.61.6 So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. 7 The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. 8 As for the Roman Consul, he sailed away to Lilybaion and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.
§ 1.62.1 Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. 2 For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war.
§ 1.62.3 They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. 4 As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. 5 But now that fortunes were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace.
§ 1.62.6 For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten. 7 Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows. 8 “There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans.
§ 1.63.1 But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. 2 On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage:
§ 1.63.3 for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy. Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. It had lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, 5 most unintermittent, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred.
§ 1.63.6 Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. 7 So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of operations. 8 Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea.
§ 1.63.9 This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose.
§ 1.64.1 Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets. 2 Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader.
§ 1.64.3 It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, 4 some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. 5 As regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy.
§ 1.64.6 In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior on the whole, but the general to whom the palm must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.
§ 1.65.1 Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. 2 For at Rome there followed civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favorable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days.
§ 1.65.3 But the war the Carthaginians had to face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. 4 In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. 5 For several reasons I think it worth my while to dwell on this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief narrative of it.
§ 1.65.6 In the first place one could not indicate a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, 7 and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians 8 and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from the events of that period one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war between the Romans and the Carthaginians.
§ 1.65.9 As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth.
§ 1.66.1 It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybaion he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Libya. 2 Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals
§ 1.66.3 in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. 4 Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, 5 but the Carthaginians partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city.
§ 1.66.6 As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. 7 The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. 8 The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city.
§ 1.66.9 In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. 10 The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. 11 At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians.
§ 1.66.12 The whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favor the account of the sum they had earned.
§ 1.67.1 The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicca, and when Hanno, who was then commander-in chief of Libya, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, 2 it produced at once a spirit of dissension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general.
§ 1.67.3 As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as τύρβη or turbulence. 4 For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, 5 but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumors or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to show the ignorant their error.
§ 1.67.6 Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. 7 Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. 8 It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could any general be expected to know all their languages?
§ 1.67.9 And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. 10 The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, 11 and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion.
§ 1.67.12 For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. 13 At length, then, refusing to treat with Hanno, thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.
§ 1.68.1 Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they had been. 2 For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force.
§ 1.68.3 Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages, giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favorable reception for their demands. 4 Still now, in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, 5 sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power.
§ 1.68.6 These increased daily, the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, 7 and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. 8 When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost.
§ 1.68.9 This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood at during the war. 10 In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. 11 However, on the Carthaginians promising to concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily.
§ 1.68.12 Now to Hamilcar Barcas, with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. 13 But being very favorably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him.
§ 1.69.1 Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. 2 He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset.
§ 1.69.3 Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. 4 There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. 5 He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavor both by speech and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians.
§ 1.69.6 He was supported by a Libyan called Mathos, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendius. 7 Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libyan subjects. 8 The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting.
§ 1.69.9 When Spendius and Mathos began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, 10 but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favor of Spendius or against him, but at once stoned him to death. 11 Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings,
§ 1.69.12 and in fact this phrase “Stone him” was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of the act. They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, 13 so that the moment anyone called out “Stone him,” the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape. 14 As for this reason no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Mathos and Spendius Generals.
§ 1.70.1 Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, 2 he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers,
§ 1.70.3 and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate nations. The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco, thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Mathos their “General” for it. This aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay 4 they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with him. 5 As for Mathos and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of setting war ablaze would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the money-chests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, gave them into custody.
§ 1.70.6 From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind. 7 Such then was the origin and beginning of the war against the mercenaries, generally known as the Libyan war. 8 Mathos, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance.
§ 1.70.9 Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.
§ 1.71.1 The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. 2 At the present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected.
§ 1.71.3 For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquility, 4 and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. 5 In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now, with a civil war on their hands, they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city.
§ 1.71.6 Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. 7 So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea 8 and civil discord and disturbance.
§ 1.72.1 They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. 2 They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor.
§ 1.72.3 They had applauded and honored not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly — Hanno for example. 4 The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt — a mere messenger was sufficient — 5 while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund.
§ 1.72.6 Mathos and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. 7 This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.
§ 1.73.1 Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libya to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. 2 They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their skiffs.
§ 1.73.3 Meanwhile Mathos, when about seventy thousand Libyans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, 4 on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. 5 The isthmus which connects it with Libya is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake.
§ 1.73.6 So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day 7 and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.
§ 1.74.1 Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. 2 He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy.
§ 1.74.3 It was then that, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrifying the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. 4 For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy's entrenched camp. 5 When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants,
§ 1.74.6 but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. 7 Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. 8 Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person.
§ 1.74.9 The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in one day repeated retirements followed by fresh attacks. 10 At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, 11 they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates.
§ 1.74.12 They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy's hands. 13 This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, 14 he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgment.
§ 1.75.1 The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command 2 and dispatched him to the war on hand, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men.
§ 1.75.3 Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. 4 What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Mathos had posted guards in all those spots which were favorable for the passage of the hills. 5 In addition to this there is a river called Macaras which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Mathos had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head.
§ 1.75.6 So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. 7 Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. 8 He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur.
§ 1.75.9 When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. 10 Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge.
§ 1.76.1 Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. 2 When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and engaged the enemy.
§ 1.76.3 Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. In front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavy-armed. 4 When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force to face about. 5 He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy.
§ 1.76.6 The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and closed with them vigorously. 7 But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. 8 Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters.
§ 1.76.9 About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. 10 Hamilcar, successful in this fashion, followed closely on the retreating enemy and took by assault the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. 11 He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.
§ 1.77.1 Mathos for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, 2 keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground.
§ 1.77.3 While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. 4 Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men in all drawn from all the tribes, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. 5 He had also with him Autaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Eryx.
§ 1.77.6 Hamilcar had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. 7 The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.
§ 1.78.1 There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. 2 Thinking that this was a favorable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians.
§ 1.78.3 Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. 4 Hamilcar wondered what his object could be and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. 5 The Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and spears to his attendants,
§ 1.78.6 and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians looked on in mixed admiration and amazement at his daring, 7 but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. 8 Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage
§ 1.78.9 if he remained loyal to Carthage. The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, 10 and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle owing to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. 11 The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services.
§ 1.78.12 Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. 13 After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; 14 those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose,
§ 1.78.15 but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.
§ 1.79.1 About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Mathos and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the island. 2 They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostar, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots.
§ 1.79.3 Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him 4 and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power 5 continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarreled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy.
§ 1.79.6 Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. 7 Most authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes. 8 Mathos and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar's leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage.
§ 1.79.9 They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. 10 The letter advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians about their release. 11 Spendius, seizing on this pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners.
§ 1.79.12 “It is not,” he said, “with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him.” 13 Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. 14 He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia.
§ 1.80.1 Autaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. 2 Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own.
§ 1.80.3 Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. 4 Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to death not only Gesco and those arrested with him, but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. 5 He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him.
§ 1.80.6 He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. 7 His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. 8 Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness to them. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in his own language.
§ 1.80.9 But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out “Stone them,” and they instantly stoned all the speakers to death. 10 These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. 11 Spendius and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven hundred. Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands,
§ 1.80.12 beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. 13 After cutting off the hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs, threw them still alive into a trench.
§ 1.81.1 The Carthaginians, when news came of this unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. 2 To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up to them.
§ 1.81.3 Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as any who came would meet with the same punishment that had just befallen Gesco. 4 With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. 5 No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumors afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher degree of their souls.
§ 1.81.6 In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. 7 Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. 8 In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or deceive them, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors,
§ 1.81.9 but if, on the contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are displaying a fine courage. 10 Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in authority over them. 11 All these conditions were present in this mercenary force as a whole and especially in their chiefs.
§ 1.82.1 This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being convinced that if both armies united, an end would be put sooner to the whole war. 2 Meanwhile he continued to put to the sword those of the enemy who were conquered in the field, while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the enemy were utterly exterminated.
§ 1.82.3 The prospects of the Carthaginians in the war now seemed much brighter, but the tide of events suddenly turned completely against them. 4 For when the two generals met, they quarreled so seriously, that this difference caused them not only to neglect many opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but to afford many such to the latter. 5 The Carthaginians perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his post and the other to remain in sole command, leaving the choice to the troops.
§ 1.82.6 In addition to this they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporia, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. 7 And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. 8 The severest blow of all, however, was the defection of Hippacritae and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage.
§ 1.82.9 But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. 10 After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. 11 Mathos and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself.
§ 1.82.12 Barcas had now been joined in the command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the time the two generals had quarreled. 13 Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilcar scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Mathos and Spendius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas. Such were the positions of the field forces.
§ 1.83.1 The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. 2 Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests,
§ 1.83.3 and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, 4 for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. 5 But now the Romans as well as Hiero observed loyally the engagements the treaty imposed on them.
§ 1.83.6 At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. 7 The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Libya with supplies for the enemy, brought them into Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. 8 The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war
§ 1.83.9 and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. 10 They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, 11 and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.
§ 1.83.12 The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assistance from their friends continued to withstand the siege.
§ 1.84.1 But Mathos and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. 2 Hamilcar had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege.
§ 1.84.3 A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libyans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libyan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. 4 They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. 5 In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in terms of assault and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill.
§ 1.84.6 This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. 7 For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, 8 while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants.
§ 1.84.9 Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavorable for action on their part but favoring his own strong point — generalship — he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other — 10 a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbors. 11 They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience.
§ 1.84.12 Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit.
§ 1.85.1 But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, 2 and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the common soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar.
§ 1.85.3 They therefore dispatched a herald, and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. 4 The terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. 5 These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders.
§ 1.85.6 The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers' arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, 7 but Hamilcar, surrounding them (more than forty thousand) with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. This occurred near the place called the Saw; it got this name from its resemblance to the tool so called.
§ 1.86.1 By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. 2 The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, the Carthaginians reached Tunis and began to besiege Mathos.
§ 1.86.3 Hannibal encamped on the side of the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. 4 Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. 5 Mathos noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebels' hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner.
§ 1.86.6 Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. 7 Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruelest punishments. 8 Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamilcar heard of the sortie and attack, and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground.
§ 1.87.1 The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive so they at once fell again. 2 Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety.
§ 1.87.3 They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it, and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. 4 They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals' long-standing quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. 5 The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested.
§ 1.87.6 After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish, 7 so that Mathos, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around the place called Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. 8 Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue.
§ 1.87.9 When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. 10 The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Mathos himself was taken by the enemy.
§ 1.88.1 The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, 2 but Hippacritae and Utica still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled.
§ 1.88.3 This shows us that even in such offences it is most advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses willingly. 4 However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such conditions and terms as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose. 5 This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion.
§ 1.88.6 The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Mathos through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. 7 This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle. 8 The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island.
§ 1.88.9 When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome's, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, 10 the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. 11 The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome.
§ 1.88.12 Yielding therefore to circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present. Such then was the nature of these events.
§ 2.1.1 In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. 2 After relating when and how they first built naval forces, I pursued the history of the war on both sides until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except the parts which were Hiero's dominions.
§ 2.1.3 In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the so called Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. 4 I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following. 5 The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to the land of Spain entrusting him with an adequate force.
§ 2.1.6 Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians. 7 In this country he spent about nine years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, 8 dying bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to danger on the field.
§ 2.2.1 It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. 2 This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion.
§ 2.2.3 The circumstances which decided them to cross were as follows: 4 Agron, king of Illyria, was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. 5 Demetrius, the father of Philip V, had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aitolians were besieging.
§ 2.2.6 The Aitolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force. 7 Levying all their forces they encamped round the city and strictly besieged it, employing every forcible means and every device. 8 The date of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aitolians,
§ 2.2.9 maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. 10 Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. 11 The Aitolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.
§ 2.3.1 decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aitolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. 2 Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aitolian camp.
§ 2.3.3 The Aitolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. 4 Stationing the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favorable positions on the heights in front of the camp. 5 The Illyrians, charging their light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavy-armed troops.
§ 2.3.6 After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. 7 They killed many Aitolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. 8 The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home.
§ 2.4.1 Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. 2 They decided, in parody of the Aitolian decree, to inscribe them as won from and not by the present Aitolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office.
§ 2.4.3 It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. 4 For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. 5 The unlooked-for calamity of the Aitolians was a lesson to mankind never to discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected, this being especially true of war.
§ 2.4.6 King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aitolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. 7 He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. 8 As, with a woman's natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met,
§ 2.4.9 and next she collected a fleet and force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies.
§ 2.5.1 The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, 2 because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested.
§ 2.5.3 On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoinike in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. 4 There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred in number, at present in the employ of the Epirots. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. 5 When the Epirots learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoinike they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety.
§ 2.5.6 On news reaching them that Scerdilaidas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonia, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonia, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. 7 The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing planks on the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. 8 When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.
§ 2.6.1 The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aitolians and to the Achaean league imploring their succour. 2 Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum.
§ 2.6.3 The Illyrians holding Phoinike at first united with Scerdilaidas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans the Aitolians who had come to the rescue, and were anxious to give battle. 4 But the ground was very difficult and unfavorable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dardanians. 5 They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots.
§ 2.6.6 By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaidas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. 7 They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; 8 for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they all began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.
§ 2.6.9 The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, 10 engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Aitolians. 11 Their whole conduct showed them not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgment, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs.
§ 2.7.1 For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him; 2 but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgment and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves.
§ 2.7.3 It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them. 4 And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirots. 5 To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable?
§ 2.7.6 In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. 7 Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and the generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then above three thousand strong. 8 Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company,
§ 2.7.9 and when this plan fell through, they deserted to the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the sanctuary of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. 10 Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. 11 These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?
§ 2.7.12 I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians.
§ 2.8.1 To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, 2 and now while they were at Phoinike, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners.
§ 2.8.3 The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter. 4 Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoinike being then far the wealthiest city there), that she was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. 5 For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions; she had speedily put down the Illyrian revolt, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her,
§ 2.8.6 when the Roman ambassadors arrived by sea. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. 7 Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, 8 and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea.
§ 2.8.9 The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: 10 “O Teuta,” he said, the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. 11 Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings.”
§ 2.8.12 Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors were leaving in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. 13 On the news reaching Rome, the woman's outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.
§ 2.9.1 Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. 2 Some of them sailed through the strait to Corcyra, while a part put in to the harbor of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town.
§ 2.9.3 They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars, they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. 4 A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. 5 The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town.
§ 2.9.6 Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary lesson for the future. 7 The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under way and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Corcyra. 8 There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Corcyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaeans and Aitolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from their homes by the Illyrians.
§ 2.9.9 The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaeans. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Corcyra in the hope of raising the siege.
§ 2.10.1 The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island called Paxi. 2 The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew.
§ 2.10.3 The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favoring their charge, 4 but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, the marines leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. 5 In this way they captured four quadriremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margus of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaeans most loyally.
§ 2.10.6 The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. 7 The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their success, continued the siege with more security and confidence, 8 and the Corcyreans, whose hopes were crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos.
§ 2.11.1 At about the same time one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius, left with the land forces. 2 Gnaeus' first intention had been to make for Corcyra, as he supposed he would find the siege still undecided.
§ 2.11.3 On discovering that he was too late, he none the less sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand to find out accurately what had happened about the city, and on the other hand to put to a test the sincerity of communications made to him by Demetrius. 4 Accusations had been brought against the latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them the city and whatever else was under his charge. 5 The Corcyreans were much relieved to see the Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison to them with the consent of Demetrius. They unanimously accepted the Romans' invitation to place themselves under their protection, considering this the sole means of assuring for the future their safety from the violence of the Illyrians.
§ 2.11.6 The Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans to their friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. 7 Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. 8 On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged.
§ 2.11.9 The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. 10 The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaeans on their way. 11 Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians.
§ 2.11.12 On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. 13 The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. 14 They also captured twenty boats which were conveying the plunder from the country.
§ 2.11.15 Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius' influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. 16 Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to Rhizon, a place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. 17 After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army.
§ 2.12.1 Gnaeus Fulvius now sailed for Rome with the greater part of both forces, 2 and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighborhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome.
§ 2.12.3 In the early spring Teuta sent an embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two hundred vessels. 4 When this treaty had been concluded Postumius sent legates to the Aitolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. 5 After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned by sea to Corcyra,
§ 2.12.6 having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread; for the Illyrians were not then the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all. 7 Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. 8 But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent other envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.
§ 2.13.1 We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, 2 especially owing to its favorable position for action in Spain or Libya. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries.
§ 2.13.3 The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. 4 Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. 5 For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected from day today.
§ 2.13.6 They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thought that as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they never be masters of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. 7 Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.
§ 2.14.1 I think it will be of use to give some account of these peoples, which must be indeed but a summary one, in order not to depart from the original plan of this work as defined in the preface. 2 We must, however, go back to the time when they first occupied these districts. I think the story is not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who were the men and what was the country on which Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy the Roman dominion.
§ 2.14.3 I must first describe the nature of the country and its position as regards the rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities, regionally and as a whole land, will help us better to comprehend the more important of the events I have to relate. 4 Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of which the one or eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Strait and then continuously by the Adriatic Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas. 5 The apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea.
§ 2.14.6 The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. 7 At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of all Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. 8 The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles.
§ 2.14.9 Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, 10 the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. 11 The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades;
§ 2.14.12 so that the whole circumference of this plain is not much less than ten thousand stades.
§ 2.15.1 Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. 2 Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can be estimated from the fact that,
§ 2.15.3 while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. 4 The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. 5 Travelers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person.
§ 2.15.6 The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an as per diem, i.e. the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. 7 As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak. 8 The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes.
§ 2.15.9 Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, meaning “beyond,” and those beyond the Alps being so called. 10 The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them.
§ 2.16.1 The Apennines, from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians 2 whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium.
§ 2.16.3 Next come the Etruscans and after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. 4 After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the center of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, 5 the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena.
§ 2.16.6 The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. 7 On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain, falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. 8 It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side,
§ 2.16.9 and is highest and finest at the time of the rising of the Dog-star, as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those mountains. 10 It is navigable for about two thousand stades from the mouth called Olana; 11 for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana.
§ 2.16.12 At the latter there is a harbor, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. 13 The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaethon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaethon, 14 and all matter for tragedy and the like, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work.
§ 2.16.15 I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make proper mention of all this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance concerning the district.
§ 2.17.1 The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also the Phlegraean plain in the neighborhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. 2 Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence.
§ 2.17.3 The Celts, being close neighbors of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. 4 The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. 5 The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language.
§ 2.17.6 About this people the tragic poets tell many marvelous stories. 7 On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones. 8 These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district.
§ 2.17.9 They lived in unwalled villages, without any superfluous furniture; 10 for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. 11 Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose.
§ 2.17.12 They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.
§ 2.18.1 On their first invasion they not only conquered this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. 2 Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol,
§ 2.18.3 but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. 4 After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. 5 Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium.
§ 2.18.6 Thirty years after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. 7 But when, twelve years later, the Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for nothing better than a decisive battle. 8 The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight.
§ 2.18.9 After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty years.
§ 2.19.1 But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. 2 They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory,
§ 2.19.3 but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. 4 This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and surfeiting. 5 Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss;
§ 2.19.6 meanwhile the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Sentinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. 7 Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in force and besieged Arretium. 8 The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Praetor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they nominated Manius Curius in his place.
§ 2.19.9 When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, 10 and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Gauls called Senones, 11 whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied.
§ 2.19.12 This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the Gauls who formerly inhabited it. 13 This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po.
§ 2.20.1 Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing a like fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and marched out in full force. 2 The united armies gave battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon,
§ 2.20.3 and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. 4 But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. 5 They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans.
§ 2.20.6 This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; 7 for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. 8 From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect any more terrible experience,
§ 2.20.9 and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, 10 so that they were able to daunt the courage of the Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.
§ 2.21.1 After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. 2 But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experience of suffering or peril,
§ 2.21.3 they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. 4 At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the multitude; 5 so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side.
§ 2.21.6 The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on hearing of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. 7 Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. 8 Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed.
§ 2.21.9 For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.
§ 2.22.1 The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. 2 They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroestus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future, pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious.
§ 2.22.3 They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loyal allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, 4 who had not only overcome the Romans in combat, but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, 5 possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed.
§ 2.22.6 When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. 7 All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, 8 that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country.
§ 2.22.9 This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; 10 for the Romans, as I said above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. 11 They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.
§ 2.23.1 The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth year after the partition of Picenum. 2 The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support;
§ 2.23.3 so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. 4 They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. 5 The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await here the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria,
§ 2.23.6 their other Consul, Gaius Atilius having already gone to Sardinia with his legions. 7 There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. 8 No one thought of anything else therefore, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness.
§ 2.23.9 All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of military age, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. 10 Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. 11 On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way;
§ 2.23.12 for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. 13 So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.
§ 2.24.1 But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, 2 I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time.
§ 2.24.3 Each of the Consuls was in command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. 4 The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. 5 The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand.
§ 2.24.6 The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. 7 The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinates inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. 8 These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition.
§ 2.24.9 These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force, ready for any war-contingency, consisting of twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. 10 The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, 11 Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse in all,
§ 2.24.12 Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. 13 In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of about four thousand two hundred foot and two hundred horse. 14 Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse;
§ 2.24.15 [a gloss has been bracketed here] 16 so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, 17 while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.
§ 2.25.1 The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country devastating it without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. 2 When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching.
§ 2.25.3 On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. 4 At sunset the two armies were in closed proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. 5 After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track,
§ 2.25.6 they themselves secretly retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's attack. 7 At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. 8 On their approaching the enemy, the Celts left their position and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place,
§ 2.25.9 in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. Most of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. 10 The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, 11 intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.
§ 2.26.1 At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. 2 He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the commander the plight they were in.
§ 2.26.3 On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, the latter ordered his Tribunes to march out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill mentioned above. 4 The leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council 5 at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous),
§ 2.26.6 they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. 7 It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. 8 Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favorable for inflicting damage on them or wresting some of the spoil from their hands.
§ 2.27.1 Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. 2 When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced foragers encountered the advance guard of Gaius and were made prisoners.
§ 2.27.3 On being examined by the Consul they narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. 4 The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in line. 5 He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share of credit for the result.
§ 2.27.6 The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. 7 But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, 8 since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front.
§ 2.28.1 Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. 2 Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced against the foe.
§ 2.28.3 The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, 4 and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the right bank of the Po. 5 Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it.
§ 2.28.6 This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. 7 The Insubres and Boii wore their trousers and light cloaks, 8 but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons.
§ 2.28.9 At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host combating there pell-mell. 10 In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the mellay fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. 11 The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports.
§ 2.29.1 For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. 2 Again, it must have been to all present, and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated,
§ 2.29.3 or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, 4 this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. 5 The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host
§ 2.29.6 and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable horn-blowers and trumpeters, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. 7 Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, 8 all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets.
§ 2.29.9 The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight.
§ 2.30.1 But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trousers and cloaks, 2 but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament.
§ 2.30.3 For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were the better chance had the missiles of going home. 4 At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. 5 Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javelineers;
§ 2.30.6 but the main body of the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci, once the javelineers had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a stubborn hand-to hand combat. 7 For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. 8 The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust.
§ 2.30.9 But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.
§ 2.31.1 About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. 2 The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends.
§ 2.31.3 The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. 4 With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Boii, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. 5 He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and necklaces (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls),
§ 2.31.6 but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph. 7 Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. 8 This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po and both the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force.
§ 2.31.9 They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome,10 but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.
§ 2.32.1 Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwelt not far from Marseilles. 2 Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda.
§ 2.32.3 Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. 4 After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. 5 The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle.
§ 2.32.6 Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called “immovable” from the sanctuary of Athena, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. 7 The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, 8 but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were wary of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance.
§ 2.32.9 Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, 10 firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. 11 After taking these measures they prepared for battle.
§ 2.33.1 The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their tribunes having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. 2 For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught,
§ 2.33.3 while still fresh, and that, from the way their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. 4 The tribunes therefore distributed among the front lines the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. 5 They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points.
§ 2.33.6 The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, the points being very effective. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, 7 the Consul Flaminius being thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to the Romans, as he left the lines no room to fall back gradually. 8 For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder.
§ 2.33.9 However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.
§ 2.34.1 Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. 2 On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy.
§ 2.34.3 The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. 4 Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. 5 The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anares, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium.
§ 2.34.6 On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. 7 The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy's arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. 8 When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided,
§ 2.34.9 many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. 10 The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. 11 Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum.
§ 2.34.12 The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, 13 until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. 14 After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants,
§ 2.34.15 and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the mountains. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault,
§ 2.35.1 upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans. 2 Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history,
§ 2.35.3 but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgment shown in executing it, not most steps but every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. 4 As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few regions close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion; 5 for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians,
§ 2.35.6 but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. 7 For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. 8 For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness.
§ 2.35.9 It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion; 10 and this especially was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings.
§ 2.36.1 This digression has led us away from the affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certainCelt owing to wrongs of a private nature. 2 He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs.
§ 2.36.3 The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their service. 4 From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. 5 The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction.
§ 2.36.6 The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. 7 It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.
§ 2.37.1 It was about this time that the Achaeans and King Philip with their allies began the war against the Aitolians known as the Social War. 2 I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary plan of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth, down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my general history,
§ 2.37.3 and, now bidding good-bye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. 4 For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world — my own times having, as I will more clearly explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose — 5 I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of principal and best known nations and countries of the world.
§ 2.37.6 As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. 7 But as regards the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, 8 and in the case of the Achaeans, as I said, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable.
§ 2.37.9 For while many have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, 10 this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only have they formed an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, 11 and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.
§ 2.38.1 In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. 2 For the people whose original and ancestral name this was are distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens.
§ 2.38.3 Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. 4 How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? 5 It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following.
§ 2.38.6 One could not find a political system and principle so favorable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean league. 7 Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. 8 For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity.
§ 2.38.9 We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnese. 10 These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achaea from an early date. 11 There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion.
§ 2.39.1 When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas, the club-houses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, 2 there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having then unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife.
§ 2.39.3 Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peacemakers, 4 but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. 5 And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League.
§ 2.39.6 The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common sanctuary of Zeus Amarius (Omarios) and site in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. 7 It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. 8 Again, subsequently, when the Lacedemonians were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, claimed the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory.
§ 2.39.9 They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, 10 not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all. 11 Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power,
§ 2.39.12 since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of those principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedemonian power or still more by that of Macedon.
§ 2.40.1 When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. 2 Aratus of Sikyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union.
§ 2.40.3 I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. 4 Aratus' government, however, will be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a truthful and clearly written memoir of his own career; 5 but the achievements of the two others will be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a view to its renewal.
§ 2.40.6 Henceforward the League continued to grow until it reached in my own time the state of completion I have just been describing.
§ 2.41.1 It was in the 124th Olympiad [284 BCE] that Patrae and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into a league, 2 just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad.
§ 2.41.3 The condition of the Achaean nation before this date had been more or less as follows. 4 Their first king was Tisamenus the son of Orestes, who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaea, and they continued to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogygus. 5 Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogygus' sons, which was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy.
§ 2.41.6 After this, down to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. 7 This consisted of twelve cities, which still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra. 8 These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene, Bura, and Caryneia.
§ 2.41.9 After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others' interests. 10 The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more monarchs in Greece than any other king. 11 But, as I said above, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh leagues. (This was about the date of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy.)
§ 2.41.12 The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. 13 About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. 14 Caryneia joined almost at the same time, for Iseas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the monarch of Bura killed by Margus and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round,
§ 2.41.15 abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.
§ 2.42.1 Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, 2 and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts.
§ 2.42.3 What I asserted was that the Achaeans always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. 4 For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. 5 Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success,
§ 2.42.6 but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty of all states and the union of the Peloponnesians. 7 This will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.
§ 2.43.1 For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. 2 After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margus of Caryneia.
§ 2.43.3 Four years later during Margus' term of office, Aratus of Sikyon, though only twenty years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his own city a member of the League. 4 Eight years after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he laid a plot to rule the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. 5 In the same term of office he obtained the adhesion of Megara to the Achaeans by the same means.
§ 2.43.6 These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. 7 Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, 8 the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state.
§ 2.43.9 During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aitolians, 10 although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League.
§ 2.44.1 But, on the death of Antigonus, the Achaeans even made an alliance with the Aitolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. 2 Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of events seemed to flow for a time in favor of the Achaeans' constant purpose;
§ 2.44.3 for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so, and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaeans. 4 They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, 5 and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government.
§ 2.45.1 The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aitolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, 2 went so far as to join hands with Antigonus Doson, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip, who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta.
§ 2.45.3 They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Acrocorinthus, 4 and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. 5 This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency.
§ 2.45.6 Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. 7 How he managed all this the following narrative will show.
§ 2.46.1 Aratus saw that the Aitolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, 2 but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aitolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but actually set their seal to his occupation.
§ 2.46.3 He saw too that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans. 4 Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. 5 This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes boldly began to fortify against them the so called Athenaion in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy,
§ 2.47.1 The Achaeans at first decided to face the Lacedemonian single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, 2 and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere.
§ 2.47.3 But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and daring in the conduct of the campaign, 4 Aratus, foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading the reckless audacity of the Aitolians, determined to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans. 5 He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a man of honour, but he knew that kings do not regard anyone as their natural foe or friend, but measure friendship and enmity by the sole standard of expediency.
§ 2.47.6 He therefore decided to approach that monarch and put himself on confidential terms with him, pointing out to him to what the present course of affairs would probably lead. 7 Now for several reasons he did not think it expedient to do this overtly. In the first place he would thus expect himself to being outbidden in his project by Cleomenes and the Aitolians, 8 and next he would damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus appealing to an enemy and appearing to have entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in them — this being the very last thing he wished them to think.
§ 2.47.9 Therefore, having formed his plan, he decided to carry it out by covert means. 10 He was consequently compelled in public both to do and to say many things quite contrary to his real intention, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exactly opposite impression. 11 For this reason there are some such matters that he does not even refer to in his Memoirs.
§ 2.48.1 He knew that the people of Megalopolis were suffering severely from the war, as owing to their being on the Lacedemonian border, they had to bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper assistance from the Achaeans, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. 2 As he also knew for a surety that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favors received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas,
§ 2.48.3 he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. 4 He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, 5 and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans begging them to appeal to Antigonus for help.
§ 2.48.6 Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaeans and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. 7 The Achaeans agreed to allow the Megalopolitans to send an embassy; 8 and with the other ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted.
§ 2.49.1 He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aitolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaeans were imperilled by it and next 2 and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaeans could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aitolians and Cleomenes were successful, they would surely not rest content and be satisfied with their advantage.
§ 2.49.3 The Aitolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnese or even those of Greece itself, 4 while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnese, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, 5 a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon.
§ 2.49.6 They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaeans and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of Macedonia with the Aitolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans all at once. 7 Should the Aitolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaeans in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaeans alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; 8 but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aitolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them.
§ 2.49.9 As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. 10 Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.
§ 2.50.1 Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, 2 promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too.
§ 2.50.3 Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter, assuring at the same time their people of his good-will towards them and readiness to be of service, 4 the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. 5 Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favorable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aitolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him.
§ 2.50.6 He considered it a great advantage that the Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; 7 for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help also, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a whole. 8 For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened,
§ 2.50.9 as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in the case of the Acrocorinthus. 10 Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king's letter, assured them of his general friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once, 11 and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaeans also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course,
§ 2.50.12 but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid.
§ 2.51.1 The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. 2 But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the support of the Lacedemonians than with that of the Achaeans.
§ 2.51.3 Next the Achaeans were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lycaion and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoceia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaion in the territory of Dyme. 4 Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to appeal with one voice to Antigonus. 5 Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance.
§ 2.51.6 They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Acrocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. 7 This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.
§ 2.52.1 Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. 2 He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlious, Kleonai, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sikyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaeans;
§ 2.52.3 for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaeans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaeans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Acrocorinthus then held by them. 4 Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against the Lacedemonians. 5 Cleomenes, when he became aware of the understanding between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sikyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Acrocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back (Oneion), regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain.
§ 2.52.6 Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events, as Aratus had recommended, 7 but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing though Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, 8 the Aitolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaeans, forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.
§ 2.53.1 The Achaeans, although they had suffered such very serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, 2 but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there.
§ 2.53.3 We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. 4 Though his position was stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, 5 no sooner did the news reach him the Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat, fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy.
§ 2.53.6 Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.
§ 2.54.1 Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. 2 Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia.
§ 2.54.3 After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belminatis, and handed over the forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. 4 He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They thereupon appointed him commander-in chief of all the allied forces, 5 and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters near Sikyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army
§ 2.54.6 and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the siege of the city was opened. 7 The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of holding out and surrendered. 8 Antigonus, after securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia.
§ 2.54.9 He encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few skirmishes taking place; 10but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Orchomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily broke up his camp and hurried thither. 11 He surprised Orchomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea
§ 2.54.12 which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa 13 which the inhabitants surrendered to him of their own accord. The winter was now approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, 14 and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeans and making joint plans for the future.
§ 2.55.1 Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. 2 He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaion and at Ladoceia.
§ 2.55.3 He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. 4 On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, 5 who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaion.
§ 2.55.6 But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions, his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. 7 On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. 8 I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor.
§ 2.55.9 For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearces whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.
§ 2.56.1 Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, 2 it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority.
§ 2.56.3 In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; 4 but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war. 5 This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work.
§ 2.56.6 Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. 7 In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. 8 This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes.
§ 2.56.9 Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. 10 A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. 11 For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates,
§ 2.56.12 since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. 13 Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. 14 Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise.
§ 2.56.15 Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction. 16 So in every such case the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.
§ 2.57.1 Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aitolians and then of Cleomenes. 2 They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonus, their city was betrayed to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaeans.
§ 2.57.3 On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. 4 For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, 5 and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security.
§ 2.57.6 The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling. 7 The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. 8 This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaeans.
§ 2.58.1 Subsequently, as they foresaw discord among themselves and plots by the Aitolians and Lacedemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaeans asking for a garrison. 2 The Achaeans consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen.
§ 2.58.3 At the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. 4 Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaeans, and, inviting the Lacedemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaeans had sent them. It is not easy to name any greater or more atrocious act of treachery than this. 5 For in resolving to foreswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms.
§ 2.58.6 Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; 7 but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. 8 Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and lives — against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong?
§ 2.58.9 What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. 10 But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. 11 These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgment on them for their wickedness.
§ 2.58.12 Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, 13 and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. 14 For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time.
§ 2.58.15 If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.
§ 2.59.1 Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. 2 Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house.
§ 2.59.3 About Phylarchus' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it; 4 but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his treason to his own country rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. 5 Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he “not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants.”
§ 2.59.6 It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word “tyrant” alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. 7 Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings on one day; 8 I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaeans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir
§ 2.59.9 owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaeans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. 10 I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestors were guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story.
§ 2.60.1 We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. 2 Nor should we charge Antigonus and Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in the time of peace would have been applauded and honored by all right-thinking people.
§ 2.60.3 When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaeans, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? 4 Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaeans, 5 who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in chief.
§ 2.60.6 But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. 7 Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead. 8 Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officers in command at Cenchreae.
§ 2.61.1 To take another instance, Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, 2 does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions,
§ 2.61.3 or as if readers of his memoirs would be improved less by account of good conduct which we should emulate than by criminal conduct which we should shun. 4 He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand back their own native country to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, 5 and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers.
§ 2.61.6 So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. 7 And yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, 8 what should we feel for the Megalopolitans? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard.
§ 2.61.9 In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, 10 and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their sanctuaries, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. 11 What more noble conduct has there ever been or could there be?
§ 2.61.12 But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and those most worthy of an author's attention, has not said a single word on the subject.
§ 2.62.1 Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. 2 Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian.
§ 2.62.3 For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnese had been utterly ruined by the Macedonian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, 4 but in our own times, when all are in complete unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. 5 That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration.
§ 2.62.6 Who has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against the Lacedemonians, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, 7 they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. 8 This estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250, from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark.
§ 2.62.9 But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis,10 since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I have to say is the following: 11Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen,
§ 2.62.12 but yet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.
§ 2.63.1 What he tells us next is still more astounding; after this assertion about the booty, he states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. 2 He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources.
§ 2.63.3 But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; 4 and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. 5 But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection.
§ 2.63.6 Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.
§ 2.64.1 After the capture of Megalopolis, while Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. 2 Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it was really a safe and wise course.
§ 2.64.3 For as he saw that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. 4 If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favor of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; 5 but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened.
§ 2.64.6 For, when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, 7 and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.
§ 2.65.1 Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. 2 His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse.
§ 2.65.3 The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. 4 The allies consisted of two thousand Boeotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. 5 His total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse.
§ 2.65.6 Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, 7 and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men, as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. 8 At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus,
§ 2.65.9 the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oinous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleidas, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. 10 On the low ground beside the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. 11 Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his whole formation resembled a charge.
§ 2.65.12 For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action.
§ 2.66.1 Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, 2 while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his hand.
§ 2.66.3 But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, 4 he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had brought face to face. 5 To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos.
§ 2.66.6 Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. 7 His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oinous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. 8 He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians.
§ 2.66.9 Putting the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. 10 It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a flag of linen waved from the neighborhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. 11 The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a scarlet flag waved by the king.
§ 2.67.1 When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. 2 The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes' cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind,
§ 2.67.3 and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleidas' troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. 4 At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, 5 but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy.
§ 2.67.6 Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. 7 The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. 8 Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleidas was due to Philopoemen.
§ 2.68.1 Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonus asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to convict him of his shortcomings, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. 2 On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgment, the king said that this stripling in grasping the situation had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.
§ 2.68.3 To continue our narrative, Eucleidas' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave him. 4 They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. 5 Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favorable position.
§ 2.68.6 Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. 7 They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting their opponents as high up the hill as possible so that the enemy's flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous slope. 8 As might have been expected, the result was just the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit.
§ 2.68.9 From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step Eucleidas' men took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. 10 The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.
§ 2.69.1 At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. 2 Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs.
§ 2.69.3 Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. 4 These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and the armies. 5 Man therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage.
§ 2.69.6 Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. 7 Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. 8 A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx,
§ 2.69.9 until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedemonians from their stronghold. 10 The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. 11 At nightfall he went down to Gythion, where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.
§ 2.70.1 Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. 2 Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason.
§ 2.70.3 For on this occasion Cleomenes, had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown. 4 Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, 5 at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia,
§ 2.70.6 where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a blood-vessel or some such accident he fell sick and died shortly afterwards. 7 He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his support in the field as by his general high principles and excellence. 8 He was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.
§ 2.71.1 Now to explain why I have dealt with this at such length. 2 As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time.
§ 2.71.3 Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. 4 Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him in the kingdom of Syria. 5 The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus,
§ 2.71.6 who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings died in the 139th. 7 I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans, having mastered Italy, first entered on enterprises outside that land and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, 8 and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage as this existed then.
§ 2.71.9 So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, 10 I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.
§ 3.1.1 In my first Book, the third, that is, from this counting backwards, I explained that I fixed as the starting-points of my work, the Social war, the Hannibalic war, and the war for Coele-Syria. 2 I likewise set forth in the same place the reasons why I wrote the two preceding Books dealing with events of an earlier date.
§ 3.1.3 I will now attempt to give a well attested account of the above wars, their first causes and the reasons why they attained such magnitude; but in the first place I have a few words to say regarding my work as a whole. The subject I have undertaken to treat, the how, when, and wherefore of the subjection of the known parts of the world to the dominion of Rome, should be viewed as a single whole, 5 with a recognized beginning, a fixed duration, and an end which is not a matter of dispute; and I think it will be advantageous to give a brief prefatory survey of the chief parts of this whole from the beginning to the end.
§ 3.1.6 For I believe this will be the best means of giving students an adequate idea of my whole plan. 7 Since a previous general view is of great assistance to the mind in acquiring a knowledge of details, and at the same time a previous notion of the details helps us to knowledge of the whole, I regard a preliminary survey based on both as best and will draw up these prefatory remarks to my history on this principle. 8 I have already indicated the general scope and limits of this history.
§ 3.1.9 The particular events comprised in it begin with the above-mentioned wars and culminate and end in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Between the beginning and end lies a space of fifty-three years, 10 comprising a greater number of grave and momentous events than any period of equal length in the past. 11 Starting from the 140th Olympiad [220 BCE] I shall adopt the following order in my exposition of them.
§ 3.2.1 First I shall indicate the causes of the above war between Rome and Carthage, known as the Hannibalic war, and tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy, 2 broke up the dominion of Rome, and cast the Romans into great fear for their safety and even for their native soil, while great was their own hope, such as they had never dared to entertain, of capturing Rome itself.
§ 3.2.3 Next I shall attempt to describe how at the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aitolians and settling the affairs of Greece, conceived the project of an alliance with Carthage; 4 how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and at length went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria, 5 and how the Rhodians and Prusias, declaring war on the Byzantines, compelled them to stop levying toll on ships bound for the Euxine.
§ 3.2.6 Interrupting my narrative at this point, I shall draw up my account of the Roman Constitution, as a sequel to which I shall point out how the peculiar qualities of the Constitution conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire. 7 Simultaneously in a digression I shall narrate how the dominion of Hiero of Syracuse fell 8 and after this I shall deal with the troubles in Egypt, and tell how, on the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip, conspiring to partition the dominions of his son, a helpless infant, began to be guilty of acts of unjust aggression, Philip laying hands on the islands of the Aegean, and on Caria and Samos, while Antiochus seized on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.
§ 3.3.1 Next, after summing up the doings of the Romans and Carthaginians in Spain, Libya, and Sicily I shall shift the scene of my story definitely, as the scene of action shifted, to Greece and its neighborhood. 2 I shall describe the sea-battles in which Attalus and the Rhodians met Philip, and after this deal with the war between the Romans and Philip, its course, its reason, and its result.
§ 3.3.3 Following on this I shall make mention of the angry spirit of the Aitolians yielding to which they invited Antiochus over, and thus set ablaze the war from Asia against the Achaeans and Romans. 4 After narrating the causes of this war, and how Antiochus crossed to Europe, I shall describe in the first place how he fled from Greece; secondly how on his defeat after this he abandoned all Asia up to the Taurus; 5 and thirdly, how the Romans, suppressing the insolence of the Galatian Gauls, established their undisputed supremacy in Asia and freed its inhabitants on this side of the Taurus from the fear of barbarians and the lawless violence of these Gauls.
§ 3.3.6 Next I shall bring before the reader's eyes the misfortune that befel the Aitolians and Cephallenians, and then make mention of the war of Eumenes with Prusias and the Gauls and of that between Ariarathes and Pharnaces. 7 Subsequently, after some notice of the unification and pacification of the Peloponnese and of the growth of the Rhodian State, I shall bring the whole narrative of events to a conclusion, 8 narrating finally the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt, the war with Perseus, and the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy.
§ 3.3.9 All the above events will enable us to perceive how the Romans dealt with each contingency and thus subjected the whole world to their rule.
§ 3.4.1 Now if from their success or failure alone we could form an adequate judgment of how far states and individuals are worthy of praise or blame, I could here lay down my pen, bringing my narrative and this whole work to a close with the last-mentioned events, as was my original intention. 2 For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power was now complete.
§ 3.4.3 Besides which it was now universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders. 4 But since judgements regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final — 5 what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely —
§ 3.4.6 I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life. 7 For it is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see clearly whether the Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of blame. 8 And indeed it is just in this that the chief usefulness of this work for the present and the future will lie.
§ 3.4.9 For neither rulers themselves nor their critics should regard the end of action as being merely conquest and the subjection of all to their rule; 10 since no man of sound sense goes to war with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary, just as no one sails on the open sea just for the sake of crossing it. Indeed no one even takes up the study of arts and crafts merely for the sake of knowledge, 11 but all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility.
§ 3.4.12 So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued. 13 About this latter, owing to the importance of the actions and the unexpected character of the events, and chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some, I was induced to write as if starting on a fresh work.
§ 3.5.1 This period of disturbance comprises, firstly the war waged by Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei, that between Carthage and Massinissa the King of the Libyans 2 and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Next, Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia was expelled from his kingdom by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius and recovered his ancestral throne by the help of Attalus.
§ 3.5.3 Then Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after reigning in Syria for twelve years lost both his kingdom and his life, the other kings combining against him. 4 Next the Romans restored to their homes the Greeks who had been accused in consequence of the war with Perseus, acquitting them of the charges brought against them. A little later the Romans attacked Carthage, having resolved in the first place on changing its site and subsequently on its utter destruction for the reasons that I shall state in due course.
§ 3.5.6 Close upon this followed the withdrawal of the Macedonians from their alliance with Rome and that of the Lacedemonians from the Achaean League, and hereupon the beginning and the end of the general calamity that overtook Greece. Such is the plan I propose, but all depends on Fortune's granting me a life long enough to execute it. 8 However I am convinced that in the event of my death, the project will not fall to the ground for want of men competent to carry it on, since there are many others who will set their hands to the task and labor to complete it.
§ 3.5.9 Now having given a summary of the most important events, with the object of conveying to my readers a notion of this work as a whole and its contents in detail, it is time for me to call to mind my original plan and return to the starting-point of my history.
§ 3.6.1 Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between Rome and Carthage, allege as its first cause the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians 2 and as its second their crossing, contrary to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber.
§ 3.6.3 I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, 4 unless we call Alexander's crossing to Asia the cause of his war against Persia and Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true. 5 For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against Rome by the Aitolians long before Antiochus arrived?
§ 3.6.6 These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last. 7 By the beginning of something I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects. 8 The nature of these is evident from the instances adduced above;
§ 3.6.9 it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and origin of the war against Persia. 10 The first was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians ventured to face them. 11 The second was the crossing of Agesilaus, King of Sparta, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything owing to the disturbances in Greece.
§ 3.6.12 From both of these facts Philip perceived and reckoned on the cowardice and indolence of the Persians as compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and further fixing his eyes on the splendour of the great prize which the war promised, 13 he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every preparation for this purpose. 14 We must therefore look on the first considerations I have mentioned as the causes of the war against Persia, the second as its pretext and Alexander's crossing to Asia as its beginning.
§ 3.7.1 Similarly it is evident that the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans was the anger of the Aitolians, 2 who (as I above stated) looking upon themselves as having been slighted in many ways by the Romans as regards their share in bringing the war with Philip to an end, not only invited Antiochus over, but were ready to do and suffer anything owing to the anger they conceived under the above circumstances.
§ 3.7.3 But the liberation of Greece, which they announced in defiance of reason and truth going round with Antiochus from city to city, we must consider to be a pretext of this war, and its beginning the landing of Antiochus at Demetrias. 4 In speaking at such length on this matter, my object has not been to censure previous writers, but to rectify the ideas of students. 5 For of what use to the sick is a physician who is ignorant of the causes of certain conditions of the body? And of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated?
§ 3.7.6 The former will scarcely be likely to recommend proper treatment for the body and it will be impossible for the latter without such knowledge to deal properly with circumstances. 7 Nothing, therefore, should be more carefully guarded against and more diligently sought out than the first causes of each event, since matters of the greatest moment often originate from trifles, and it is the initial impulses and conceptions in every matter which are most easily remedied.
§ 3.8.1 Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal's ambition and love of power. 2 He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Libya and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy.
§ 3.8.3 The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Libya and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. 4 Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal's principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal.
§ 3.8.6 Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, 7 not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. 8 After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war.
§ 3.8.9 Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer — how opportunity could have better favoured the Carthaginians' wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal's action from the outset) 10 than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offence, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution — 11 if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal's decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.
§ 3.9.1 One may ask why I make any mention of Fabius and his statement. 2 It is not from apprehension lest it may find acceptance from some owing to its plausibility; for its inherent unreasonableness, even without my comment, is self-evident to anyone who reads it.
§ 3.9.3 But what I wish is to warn those who consult his books not to pay attention to the title, but to facts. 4 For there are some people who pay regard not to what he writes but to the writer himself and, taking into consideration that he was a contemporary and a Roman senator, at once accept all he says as worthy of credit. 5 But my own opinion is that while not treating his authority as negligible we should not regard it as final, but that readers should in most cases test his statements by reference to the actual facts.
§ 3.9.6 To return to the war between Rome and Carthage, from which this digression has carried us away, we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barcas, the actual father of Hannibal. 7 Unvanquished in spirit by the war for Sicily, since he felt that he had kept the army of Eryx under his command combative and resolute until the end, and had only agreed to peace yielding to circumstances after the defeat of the Carthaginians in the naval battle, he maintained his resolve and waited for an opportunity to strike. 8 Had not the mutinous outbreak among the mercenaries occurred, he would very soon, as far as it lay in his power, have created some other means and other resources for resuming the contest,
§ 3.9.9 but he was hampered by these civil disturbances which occupied all his time and attention.
§ 3.10.1 When, on the suppression of this disturbance by the Carthaginians, the Romans announced their intention of making war on Carthage, the latter at first was ready to negotiate on all points, thinking that, justice being on her side, she would prevail 2 (about this I have spoken in the preceding Books, without a perusal of which it is impossible to follow properly what I am now saying and what I am about to say);
§ 3.10.3 but as the Romans refused to negotiate, the Carthaginians had to yield to circumstances, and though deeply aggrieved they were powerless, and evacuated Sardinia, agreeing also to pay twelve hundred talents in addition to the sum previously exacted, in order not to be forced to accept war at that time. 4 This, then, we must take to be the second and principal cause of the subsequent war; 5 for Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage added to his old indignation, as soon as he had finally crushed the mutiny of the mercenaries and secured the safety of his country, at once threw all his efforts into the conquest of Spain, with the object of using the resources thus obtained for the war against Rome.
§ 3.10.6 This success of the Carthaginian project in Spain must be held to be the third cause of the war, for relying on this increase of strength, they entered upon it with confidence. 7 Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this.
§ 3.11.1 At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aitolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king's purpose was. 2 The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aitolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing.
§ 3.11.3 For as time went on, the king's mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. 4 In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. 5 He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus.
§ 3.11.6 When, on the omens being favorable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. 7 On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. 8 He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter,
§ 3.11.9 but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans.
§ 3.12.1 Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust. 2 However, we should consider this as an unquestionable proof of Hamilcar's hostility and general purpose, and it is confirmed by the facts.
§ 3.12.3 For he made of his daughter's husband Hasdrubal and his own son Hannibal such enemies of Rome that none could be more bitter. 4 As Hasdrubal died before putting his purpose into execution, it was not in his case fully evident, but circumstance put it in the power of Hannibal to give only too manifest proof of his inherited hatred of Rome. 5 Therefore, statesmen should above all take care that the true motives of the reconciliation of enmities and the formation of friendships do not escape them. They should observe when it is that men come to terms under pressure of circumstances and when owing to their spirit being broken,
§ 3.12.6 so that in the former case they may regard them as reserving themselves for a favorable opportunity and be constantly on their guard, and in the latter they may trust them as true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command their services when required. We must consider, then, the causes of the Hannibalic War to have been those I have stated, while its beginnings were as follows.
§ 3.13.1 The Carthaginians could ill bear their defeat in the war for Sicily, and, as I said above, they were additionally exasperated by the matter of Sardinia and the exorbitancy of the sum they had been last obliged to agree to pay. 2 Therefore, when they had subjugated the greater part of Iberia, they were quite ready to adopt any measures against Rome which suggested themselves.
§ 3.13.3 On the death of Hasdrubal, to whom after that of Hamilcar they had entrusted the government of Iberia, they at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, 4 and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander, they hastened to summon a general assembly of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers. 5 Hannibal on assuming the command, at once set forth with the view of subduing a tribe called the Olcades, and arriving before their most powerful city Althaea,
§ 3.13.6 encamped there and soon made himself master of it by a series of vigorous and formidable assaults, upon which the rest of the tribe were overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians. 7 After exacting tribute from the towns and possessing himself of a considerable sum, he retired to winter quarters at New Carthage. 8 By the generosity he now displayed to the troops under his command, paying them in part and promising further payment, he inspired in them great good-will to himself and high hopes of the future.
§ 3.14.1 Next summer he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei, assaulted and took Hermandica at the first onset, but Arbacala being a very large city with a numerous and brave population, he had to lay siege to it and only took it by assault after much pains. 2 Subsequently on his return he unexpectedly found himself in great peril, the Carpetani, the strongest tribe in the district gathering to attack him and being joined by the neighbouring tribes,
§ 3.14.3 all incited to this by the fugitive Olcades, and also by those who had escaped from Hermandica. 4 Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; 5 but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front, and remained there to dispute the crossing, availing himself of the aid both of the river and of his elephants, of which he had about forty, so that everything went as he had calculated and as no one else would have dared to expect.
§ 3.14.6 For when the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, the greater mass of them perished in coming out of the river, the elephants following its bank and being upon them as soon as they landed. 7 Many also were cut down in the stream itself by the cavalry, as the horses could bear up better against the current, and the mounted men in fighting had the advantage of being higher than the unmounted enemy. 8 Finally, Hannibal in his turn crossed the river and attacked the barbarians, putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand.
§ 3.14.9 After their defeat none of the peoples on that side of the Ebro ventured lightly to face the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Saguntines. 10 Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war, until he had secured his possession of all the rest of the country, following in this his father Hamilcar's suggestions and advice.
§ 3.15.1 But the Saguntines sent repeated messages to Rome, as on the one hand they were alarmed for their own safety and foresaw what was coming, and at the same time they wished to keep the Romans informed how well things went with the Carthaginians in Spain. 2 The Romans, who had more than once paid little attention to them, sent on this occasion legates to report on the situation.
§ 3.15.3 Hannibal at the same time, having reduced the tribes he intended, arrived with his forces to winter at New Carthage, which was in a way the chief ornament and capital of the Carthaginian empire in Spain. 4 Here he found the Roman legates, to whom he gave audience and listened to their present communication. 5 The Romans protested against his attacking Saguntum, which they said was under their protection, or crossing the Ebro, contrary to the treaty engagements entered into in Hasdrubal's time.
§ 3.15.6 Hannibal, being young, full of martial ardour, encouraged by the success of his enterprises, and spurred on by his long-standing enmity to Rome, 7 in his answer to the legates affected to be guarding the interests of the Saguntines and accused the Romans of having a short time previously, when there was a party quarrel at Saguntum and they were called in to arbitrate, unjustly put to death some of the leading men. The Carthaginians, he said, would not overlook this violation of good faith for it was from of old the principle of Carthage never to neglect the cause of the victims of injustice. 8 To Carthage, however, he sent, asking for instructions, since the Saguntines, relying on their alliance with Rome, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage.
§ 3.15.9 Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. 10 How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in the event of refusal! 11 But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side.
§ 3.15.12 The Roman legates, seeing clearly that war was inevitable, took ship for Carthage to convey the same protest to the Government there. 13 They never thought, however, that the war would be in Italy, but supposed they would fight in Spain with Saguntum for a base.
§ 3.16.1 Consequently, the Senate, adapting their measures to this supposition, decided to secure their position in Illyria, as they foresaw that the war would be serious and long and the scene of it far away from home. 2 It so happened that at that time in Illyria Demetrius of Pharos, oblivious of the benefits that the Romans had conferred on him, contemptuous of Rome because of the peril to which she was exposed first from the Gauls and now from Carthage,
§ 3.16.3 and placing all his hopes in the Royal House of Macedon owing to his having fought by the side of Antigonus in the battles against Cleomenes, was sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities subject to Rome, and, sailing beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of the treaty, with fifty boats, had pillaged many of the Cyclades. 4 The Romans, in view of those proceedings and of the flourishing fortunes of the Macedonian kingdom, were anxious to secure their position in the lands lying east of Italy, feeling confident that they would have time to correct the errors of the Illyrians and rebuke and chastise Demetrius for his ingratitude and temerity. 5 But in this calculation they were deceived; for Hannibal forestalled them by taking Saguntum,
§ 3.16.6 and, as a consequence, the war was not waged in Spain but at the very gates of Rome and through the whole of Italy. 7 However, the Romans now moved by these considerations dispatched a force under Lucius Aemilius just before summer in the first year of the 140th Olympiad [220 BCE] to operate in Illyria.
§ 3.17.1 Hannibal at the same time quitted New Carthage with his army and advanced towards Saguntum. 2 This city lies on the seaward foot of the range of hills connecting Iberia and Celtiberia, at a distance of about seven stades from the sea.
§ 3.17.3 The territory of the Saguntines yields every kind of crop and is the most fertile in the whole of Iberia. 4 Hannibal, now encamping before the town, set himself to besiege it vigorously, foreseeing that many advantages would result from its capture. 5 First of all he thought that he would thus deprive the Romans of any prospect of a campaign in Iberia, and secondly he was convinced that by this blow he would inspire universal terror, and render the Iberian tribes who had already submitted more orderly and those who were still independent more cautious,
§ 3.17.6 while above all he would be enabled to advance safely with no enemy left in his rear. 7 Besides, he would then have abundant funds and supplies for his projected expedition, he would raise the spirit of his troops by the booty distributed among them and would conciliate the Carthaginians at home by the spoils he would send them. 8 From all these considerations he actively pursued the siege, now setting an example to the soldiers by sharing personally the fatigue of the battering operations, now cheering on the troops and exposing recklessly to danger.
§ 3.17.9 At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city by storm. 10 A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. 11 The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them, while he himself, by setting aside these funds, was able to accomplish many things of much service to him.
§ 3.18.1 While this was taking place Demetrius, getting wind of the Romans' purpose, at once sent a considerable garrison to Dimale with the supplies requisite for such a force. In the other cities he made away with those who opposed his policy and placed the government in the hands of his friends 2 while he himself, selecting six thousand of his bravest troops, quartered them at Pharos.
§ 3.18.3 The Roman Consul, on reaching Illyria with his army and observing that the enemy were very confident in the natural strength of Dimale and the measures they had taken for its defence, there being also a general belief that it was impregnable, decided to attack it first, wishing to strike terror into them. 4 Having given instructions to his officers and erected batteries in several places he began to besiege it. 5 By capturing it in seven days, he at one blow broke the spirit of all the enemy,
§ 3.18.6 so that from every city they at once flocked to surrender themselves unconditionally to Rome. 7 Having accepted their submission and imposed suitable conditions on each he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. 8 Learning that the city was very strong, that a large force of exceptionally fine troops was assembled within it and that it was excellently furnished with supplies and munitions of war, he was apprehensive that the siege might prove difficult and long.
§ 3.18.9 In view of this, therefore, he employed the following impromptu stratagem. 10 Sailing up to the island at night with his whole force he disembarked the greater part of it in certain well-wooded dells, 11 and at daybreak with twenty ships sailed openly against the harbor which lies nearest to the town.
§ 3.18.12 Demetrius, seeing the ships and contemptuous of their small number, sallied from the city down to the harbor to prevent the enemy from landing. On his encountering them
§ 3.19.1 the struggle was very violent, and more and more troops kept coming out of the town to help, until at length the whole garrison had poured out to take part in the battle. 2 The Roman force which had landed in the night now opportunely arrived, having marched by a concealed route,
§ 3.19.3 and occupying a steep hill between the city and the harbor, shut off from the town the troops who had sallied out. 4 Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, desisted from opposing the landing and collecting his forces and cheering them on started with the intention of fighting a pitched battle with those on the hill. 5 The Romans, seeing the Illyrians advancing resolutely and in good order, formed their ranks and delivered a terrible charge,
§ 3.19.6 while at the same time those who had landed from the ships, seeing what was going on, took the enemy in the rear, so that being attacked on all sides the Illyrians were thrown into much tumult and confusion. 7 At the end, being hard pressed both in front and in the rear, Demetrius' troops turned and fled, some escaping to the city, but the greater number dispersing themselves over the island across country. 8 Demetrius had some boats lying ready for such a contingency at a lonely spot, and retreating there and embarking sailed away at nightfall and managed to cross and reach King Philip, at whose court he spent the rest of his life.
§ 3.19.9 He was a man of a bold and venturesome spirit, but with an entire lack of reasoning power and judgment, 10 defects which brought him to an end of a piece with the rest of his life. 11 For having, with the approval of Philip, made a foolhardy and ill-managed attempt to seize Messene, he perished in the action, as I shall narrate in detail when we reach that date.
§ 3.19.12 Aemilius, the Roman Consul, took Pharos at once by assault and razed it to the ground, and after subduing the rest of Illyria and organizing it as he thought best, returned to Rome late in summer and entered the city in triumph, acclaimed by all, 13 for he seemed to have managed matters not only with ability, but with very high courage.
§ 3.20.1 The Romans, when the news of the fall of Saguntum reached them, did not assuredly hold a debate on the question of the war, as some authors allege, even setting down the speeches made on both sides — a most absurd proceeding. 2 For how could the Romans, who a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a casus belli, now when the city itself had been taken by assault, assemble to debate whether to go to war or not?
§ 3.20.3 How is it that on the one hand these authors draw a wonderful picture of the gloomy aspect of the Senate and on the other tell us that fathers brought their sons from the age of twelve upwards to the Senate House, and that these boys attended the debate but divulged not a syllable even to any of their near relatives? 4 Nothing in this is the least true or even probable, unless, indeed, Fortune has bestowed on the Romans among other gifts that of being wise from their cradles. 5 No further criticism, indeed, of such works as those of Chaereas and Sosylus is necessary; they rank in authority, it seems to me, not with history, but with the common gossip of a barber's shop.
§ 3.20.6 The Romans, on hearing of the calamity that had befallen Saguntum, at once appointed ambassadors and sent them post-haste to Carthage, giving the Carthaginians the option of two alternatives, 7 the one of which, if they accepted it, entailed disgrace and damage, while the other would give rise to extreme trouble and peril. 8 Either they must give up Hannibal and the members of his Council or war would be declared.
§ 3.20.9 On the Roman envoys arriving and appearing before the Senate and delivering their message the Carthaginians listened with indignation to this choice of alternatives, 10 but putting up their most able member to speak, they entered upon their justification.
§ 3.21.1 They said not a word of the treaty with Hasdrubal, considering it as not existent, or if existent, as not concerning them, since it was made without their approval. 2 Here they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, alleging that the treaty made in the war for Sicily under Lutatius, though agreed to by Lutatius, had been repudiated by the Romans as having been made without their approval.
§ 3.21.3 In all their plea of justification they founded and insisted on the treaty at the end of the war for Sicily, 4 in which they said there was no mention of Iberia, but it was expressly set down that the allies of each power should be secure from attack by the other. 5 They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several extracts from the treaty.
§ 3.21.6 The Romans refused definitely to discuss the matter of justification, saying that while Saguntum still stood unharmed matters admitted of a plea of justification and it was possible to reach a decision on the disputed points by argument, 7 but now that the treaty had been broken by the seizure of the city either they must give up the culprits, which would make it clear to all that they had no share in the wrong, but that it had been done without their approval, 8 or if they refused to do so and thus confessed that they were participators in the misdeed they must accept war. On this occasion the question was dealt with in more or less general terms,
§ 3.21.9 but I think it necessary for myself not to neglect it, so that neither those whose duty and interest it is to be accurately informed about this may deviate from the truth in critical debates, 10 nor students, led astray by the ignorance or partisanship of historians, acquire mistaken notions on the subject, but that there may be some survey generally recognized as accurate of the treaties between Rome and Carthage up to our own time.
§ 3.22.1 The first treaty between Rome and Carthage dates from the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls after the expulsion of the kings, and the founders of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. 2 This is twenty-eight years before the crossing of Xerxes to Greece.
§ 3.22.3 I give below as accurate a rendering as I can of this treaty, but the ancient Roman language differs so much from the modern that it can only be partially made out, and that after much application, by the most intelligent men. 4 The treaty is more or less as follows: “There is to be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies on these terms: 5 The Romans and their allies not to sail with long ships beyond the Fair Promontory
§ 3.22.6 unless forced by storm or by enemies: it is forbidden to anyone carried beyond it by force to buy or carry away anything beyond what is required for the repair of his ship or for sacrifice, 7 and he must depart within five days. 8 Men coming to trade may conclude no business except in the presence of a herald or town-clerk,
§ 3.22.9 and the price of whatever is sold in the presence of such shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale take place in Libya or Sardinia. 10 If any Roman come to the Carthaginian province in Sicily, he shall enjoy equal rights with the others. 11 The Carthaginians shall do no wrong to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Terracina, or any other city of the Latins who are subject to Rome.
§ 3.22.12 Touching the Latins who are not subjects, they shall keep their hands off their cities, and if they take any city shall deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. 13 They shall build no fort in the Latin territory. If they enter the land in arms, they shall not pass a night therein.”
§ 3.23.1 The “Fair Promontory” is that lying in front of Carthage to the North. 2 The Carthaginians forbid the Romans absolutely to sail south of this on its western side in long ships, the reason being, I think that they did not wish them to become acquainted either with the district round Byssatis or that near the lesser Syrtis, which they call Emporia, owing to their great fertility.
§ 3.23.3 If anyone, carried there by a storm or driven by his enemies, requires anything for the purpose of sacrificing to the gods or of repairing his ships, he may have this, but nothing beyond it, and those who touch there must leave within five days. 4 To Carthage itself and all parts of Libya on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of their just debts. 5 The phrasing of this treaty shows that they consider Sardinia and Libya as their own, whereas they distinctly express themselves otherwise about Sicily, mentioning only in the treaty those parts of it which are under Carthaginian rule.
§ 3.24.1 At a later date they made another treaty, in which the Carthaginians include Tyre and Utica, 2 and mention, in addition to the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseum as points beyond which the Romans may not either make marauding expeditions, or trade, or found cities. This treaty is more or less as follows:
§ 3.24.3 “There is to be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and the people of Utica and their respective allies. 4 The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the farther side of Fair Promontory, Mastia, and Tarseum. 5 If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to Rome, they shall keep the valuables and the men, but give up the city.
§ 3.24.6 If any Carthaginians take captive any of a people with whom the Romans have a treaty of peace, but who are not subject to Rome, they shall not bring them into Roman harbors, but if one be brought in and a Roman lay hold of him, he shall be set free. 7 The Romans shall not do likewise. 8 If a Roman gets water or provisions from any place over which the Carthaginians rule, he shall not use these provisions to wrong any member of a people with whom the Carthaginians have peace and friendship.
§ 3.24.9 The Carthaginians shall not do likewise. 10 If either do so, the aggrieved person shall not take private vengeance, and if he do, his wrongdoing shall be public. 11 No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor remain in a Sardinian or Libyan post longer than is required for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days.
§ 3.24.12 In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen. 13 A Carthaginian in Rome may do likewise.” 14 Again in this treaty they lay particular stress on Libya and Sardinia, asserting them to be their own private property and closing all landing-places to the Romans,
§ 3.24.15 but of Sicily they distinctly speak contrariwise, mentioning the part of it subject to them. 16 Similarly, the Romans in referring to Latium forbid the Carthaginians to wrong the people of Ardea, Antium, Circeii, and Terracina, the cities that stand on the coast of that Latin territory with which the treaty is concerned.
§ 3.25.1 A further and final treaty with Carthage was made by the Romans at the time of Pyrrhus' invasion before the Carthaginians had begun the war for Sicily. 2 In this they maintain all the previous agreements and add the following:
§ 3.25.3 “If they make an alliance with Pyrrhus, both shall make it an express condition that they may go to the help of each other in whichever country is attacked. 4 No matter which require help, the Carthaginians are to provide the ships for transport and hostilities, but each country shall provide the pay for its own men. 5 The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall come to the help of the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will.”
§ 3.25.6 The oaths they had to swear were as follows. In the case of the first treaty the Carthaginians swore by their ancestral gods and the Romans, following an old custom, by Jupiter Lapis, and in the case of this latter treaty by Mars and Quirinus. 7 The oath by Jupiter Lapis is as follows. The man who is swearing to the treaty takes in his hand a stone, and when he has sworn in the name of the state, he says, 8 “If I abide by this my oath may all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act, let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own substance, sanctuaries, and tombs, and may I alone be cast forth, even as this stone,”
§ 3.25.9 and so saying he throws the stone from his hand.
§ 3.26.1 The treaties being such, and preserved as they are on bronze tablets beside Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the Quaestors, 2 who can fail to be surprised at Philinus the historian, not indeed for his ignorance of them, for that is by no means surprising, since still in my time, the most aged among the Romans and Carthaginians and those best versed in public affairs were ignorant of them;
§ 3.26.3 but how did he venture and on what authority to state just the opposite, to wit that there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage by which the Romans were obliged to keep away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy, 4 and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath by their first crossing to Sicily? There is, as a fact, no such document at all, nor ever was there; 5 yet in his Second Book he states thus in so many words. I mentioned the subject in the introductory part of this work, but deferred until the present occasion the detailed treatment it deserves, in view of the fact that many people, relying on Philinus' work, have false notions on the subject.
§ 3.26.6 True, if as regards the crossing of the Romans to Sicily anyone chooses to blame them for having ever consented to receive into their friendship and afterwards to help those Mamertines who seized treacherously not only Messene but Rhegium, he would have good reason for his disapproval, 7 but if he supposes that they crossed contrary to treaty and to their oath he is obviously ignorant of the true facts.
§ 3.27.1 At the close of the war for Sicily, then, they made another treaty, the clauses of which run as follows: 2 “The Carthaginians are to evacuate the whole of Sicily and all the islands between Italy and Sicily.
§ 3.27.3 The allies of both parties are to be secure from attack by the other. 4 Neither party is entitled to impose any contribution to construct public buildings, or to enrol soldiers, in the dominions of the other, nor to form alliances with the allies of the other. 5 The Carthaginians are to pay twenty-two hundred talents within ten years, and a sum of a thousand talents at once.
§ 3.27.6 The Carthaginians are to give up to the Romans all prisoners free of ransom.” 7 Later, at the end of the Libyan War, after the Romans had actually passed a decree declaring war on Carthage, they added the following clauses, as I stated above: 8 “The Carthaginians are to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents.”
§ 3.27.9 The very last of this series of agreements that made with Hasdrubal in Spain, that “The Carthaginians are not to cross the Ebro in arms.” 10 Such is the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage up to the time of Hannibal.
§ 3.28.1 While therefore we find that the crossing of the Romans to Sicily was not contrary to treaty, for the second war, that in which they made the treaty about Sardinia, it is impossible to discover any reasonable pretext or cause. 2 In this case everyone would agree that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, and merely because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional sum I mentioned.
§ 3.28.3 For from the charge brought by the Romans against them in justification of this, that in the Libyan war they inflicted wrongs on the crews of ships sailing from Rome, they had freed them on the occasion when they had received back from them all their sailors who had been brought into Carthage and in return gave back all their own prisoners as an act of grace and without ransom. 4 Of this I have spoken at length in my previous Book. 5 Having established these facts it remains for us to consider, after thorough investigation, to which of the two states we should attribute the cause of the Hannibalic war.
§ 3.29.1 I have already stated what the Carthaginians alleged, and will now give the reply of the Romans — a reply indeed which they did not make at the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many occasions and by many different people at Rome. 2 In the first place they contend that the treaty with Hasdrubal should not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the audacity to say; for there was no conditioning clause at the end as in the treaty made by Lutatius:
§ 3.29.3 “This treaty shall be valid if the Roman people also agree to it,” but Hasdrubal finally and unconditionally made the agreement in which was the clause, “The Carthaginians shall not cross the Ebro in arms.” 4 Again, in the treaty about Sicily there was, as the Carthaginians admit, the clause: “The allies of either party are to be secure from attack by the other,” and this does not mean “those who were allies at that time,” as the Carthaginians interpret it; 5 for in that case there would have been a further clause to the effect that neither party should enter into other alliances than their existing ones or that those subsequently received into alliance should not be admitted to the benefits of the treaty.
§ 3.29.6 But since neither of these clauses was appended, it is evident that each party undertook that all allies of the other, both those then existing and those subsequently admitted to alliance, should be secure from attack. 7 This indeed seems a quite reasonable view; for surely they would never have made a treaty by which they deprived themselves of the freedom to admit into alliance from time to time any peoples whose friendship seemed to be of advantage to them, 8 nor, having taken such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would ignore injuries done to them by certain people.
§ 3.29.9 But the chief meaning of the treaty to both parties when they made it was, that they should each leave unmolested the existing allies of the other and in no way admit any of those into their own alliance, 10 whereas, regarding subsequent alliances, to which this clause particularly applies, they undertook not to enlist soldiers or levy contributions in the provinces of each or in countries allied to each, and that all allies of each in general should be secure from attack by the other.
§ 3.30.1 This being so, it is an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines, a good many years before the time of Hannibal, placed themselves under the protection of Rome. 2 The surest proof of this, and one accepted by the Carthaginians themselves, is that when a civil disturbance broke out at Saguntum they did not call in the mediation of the Carthaginians, although they were close at hand and already concerning themselves with Spanish matters, but that of the Romans, and with their help set right the affairs of the state.
§ 3.30.3 Therefore, if we take the destruction of Saguntum to be the cause of the war we must allow that the Carthaginians were in the wrong in beginning the war, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, in which it was stipulated that the allies of each should be secure from attack by the other, and in view of the convention made with Hasdrubal, by which the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro in arms. 4 If, however, we take the cause of the war to have been the robbery of Sardinia and the tribute then exacted, we must certainly confess that they had good reason for entering on the Hannibalic war, since having yielded only to circumstances, they now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on those who had injured them.
§ 3.31.1 It might be said by some of these who look on such things without discernment, that these are matters which it was not necessary for me to treat in such detail. 2 My answer is, that if there were any man who considered that he had sufficient force in himself to face any circumstances, I should say perhaps that knowledge of the past was good for him, but not necessary;
§ 3.31.3 but if there is no one in this world at least who would venture to speak so of himself either as regards his private fortunes or those of his country — since, even if all is well with him now no man of sense could from his present circumstances have any reasonable confidence that he will be prosperous in the future — 4 I affirm for this reason that such knowledge is not only good but in the highest degree necessary. 5 For how can anyone when wronged himself or when his country is wronged find helpmates and allies; how can he, when desirous of acquiring some possession or initiating some project, stir to action those whose co-operation he wishes;
§ 3.31.6 how, finally, if he is content with present conditions, can he rightly stimulate others to establish his own convictions and maintain things as they are, if he knows nothing at all of the past history of those he would influence? 7 For all men are given to adapt themselves to the present and assume a character suited to the times, so that from their words and actions it is difficult to judge of the principles of each, and in many cases the truth is quite overcast. 8 But men's past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse.
§ 3.31.9 It is by this means that we shall often and in many circumstances find those who will compassionate our distresses, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies, 10 all which is most helpful to life both in public and in private. 11 Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each.
§ 3.31.12 For if we take from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, 13 what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future.
§ 3.32.1 For this reason I must pronounce those to be much mistaken who think that this my work is difficult to acquire and difficult to read owing to the number and length of the Books it contains. 2 How much easier it is to acquire and peruse forty Books, all as it were connected by one thread, and thus to follow clearly events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the capture of Carthage,
§ 3.32.3 and those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta on till the battle of the Romans and Achaeans at the Isthmus, than to read or procure the works of those who treat of particular transactions. 4 Apart from their being many times as long as my history, readers cannot gather anything with certainty from them, firstly because most of them give different accounts of the same matter, 5 and next because they omit those contemporary events by a comparative review and estimation of which we can assign its true value to everything much more surely than by judging from particulars; and, finally, because it is out of their power even to touch on what is most essential.
§ 3.32.6 For I maintain that far the most essential part of history is the consideration of the remote or immediate consequences of events and especially that of causes. 7 Thus I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter as resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily, the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose. 8 All this can be recognized and understood from a general history, but not at all from the historians of the wars themselves, such as the war with Perseus or that with Philip,
§ 3.32.9 unless indeed anyone reading their descriptions of the battles alone conceives that he has acquired an adequate knowledge of the management and nature of the whole war. 10 This, however, is not at all so, and I consider that my history differs to its advantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening.
§ 3.33.1 I interrupted my narrative to enter on this digression at the point where the Roman ambassadors were at Carthage. After listening to the Carthaginians' statement of their case, they made no other reply but the following. 2 The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the Senate that it held both war and peace for them: therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him.
§ 3.33.3 The Carthaginian Suffete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, 4 and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, “We accept it.” The ambassadors and the Senate parted on these terms. 5 Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future;
§ 3.33.6 next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; 7 in the third place he took precautions for the security of Libya, 8 adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Libya to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty.
§ 3.33.9 The troops who crossed to Libya were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, 10 and numbered twelve hundred horse 11 and thirteen thousand eight hundred and seventy Balearians, a popular appellation, derived from ballein, “to throw,” and meaning slingers, given to them owing to their skill with this weapon and extended to their nation and islands.
§ 3.33.12 He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. 13 From the so called Metagonian towns he sent four thousand foot to Carthage to serve both as a reinforcement and as hostages. 14 In Spain he left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes and all the triremes being fully manned.
§ 3.33.15 He also gave him as cavalry Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans to the number of four hundred and fifty, three hundred Ilergetes and eighteen hundred Numidians drawn from the Masylii, Masaesylii, Maccoei and Maurusi, who dwell by the ocean, 16 and as infantry eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearians, as well as twenty-one elephants. 17 No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible.
§ 3.33.18 The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document.
§ 3.34.1 Hannibal, after taking all precautions for the safety of Libya and Spain, was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the messengers he expected from the Celts. 2 He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war,
§ 3.34.3 and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans which I described in the preceding Book to enable my readers to follow all I am about to narrate. 4 He therefore cherished high hopes of them, and was careful to send messengers with unlimited promises to the Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves, 5 thinking that the only means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprise.
§ 3.34.6 When the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible, he drew out his troops from their winter quarters in the early spring. 7 As the news of what had happened in Carthage had just reached him, his spirits were now high, and trusting in the favorable disposition of the citizens, he now called openly on his men to join him in the war against Rome, 8 impressing upon them the demand of the Romans that he and all his principal officers should be given up to them, and pointing out at the same time the wealth of the country they were bound for and the friendly feelings of the Gauls who would be their allies.
§ 3.34.9 When he saw that the soldiers listened gladly and were as eager as himself to be off, he commended their alacrity and after ordering them to be ready on the day fixed for his departure, dismissed the meeting.
§ 3.35.1 Having completed the arrangements I mentioned above during the winter and thus assured the security of Libya and Spain, he advanced on the day he had fixed with an army of about ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. 2 Crossing the Ebro, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees,
§ 3.35.3 and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss, 4 he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river, placing the Bargusii under his absolute rule, as he mistrusted them most, owing to their friendly sentiments toward Rome. 5 He assigned to Hanno out of his own army ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, and he left with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force.
§ 3.35.6 He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a safe return in the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements, they might all readily respond. 7 With the rest of his force, thus lightened of its impedimenta and consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about nine thousand horse, he advanced throughout the Pyrenees towards the crossing of the Rhone, 8 having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain.
§ 3.36.1 That my narrative may not be altogether obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the topography I must explain whence Hannibal started, what countries he traversed, and into what part of Italy he descended. 2 Nor must I simply give the names of countries, rivers, and cities, as some authors do under the idea that this is amply sufficient for a clear knowledge.
§ 3.36.3 I am of opinion that as regards known countries the mention of names is of no small assistance in recalling them to our memory, but in the case of unknown lands such citation of names is just of as much value as if they were unintelligible and inarticulate sounds. 4 For the mind here has nothing to lean upon for support and cannot connect the words with anything known to it, so that the narrative is associated with nothing in the readers' mind, and therefore meaningless to him. 5 We must therefore make it possible when speaking of unknown places to convey to the reader a more or less real and familiar notion of them.
§ 3.36.6 Now the primary and most general conception and one common to all mankind is the division and ordering of the heavens by which all of us, even those of the meanest capacity, distinguish East, West, South, and North. 7 The next step in knowledge is to classify the parts of the earth under each of these divisions, ever mentally referring each statement to one of them until we arrived at a familiar conception of unknown and unseen regions.
§ 3.37.1 This once established as regards the whole earth, it remains for me to lay before my readers the division on the same principle of that portion of the world known to us. 2 This is divided into three parts, each with its name, the one part being called Asia, the second Libya, and the third Europe.
§ 3.37.3 Their respective boundaries are the river Tanais, the Nile, and the straits at the Pillars of Hercules. 4 Asia lies between the Nile and Tanais and falls under that portion of the heaven lying between the north-east and the south. 5 Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and it falls under the south to the south-west and west, as far as the point of the equinoctial sunset, in which latter quarter are the Pillars of Hercules.
§ 3.37.6 These two divisions of the earth, then, regarded from a general point of view, occupy the part of it which lies to the south of the Mediterranean, reaching from east to west. 7 Europe lies opposite to them on the north shore of this sea, extending continuously from east to west, 8 its most compact and deepest portion lying due north between the Tanais and the Narbo, the latter river being not far to the west of Marseilles and of the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea.
§ 3.37.9 The Celts inhabit the country near the Narbo and beyond it as far as the chain of the Pyrenees which stretches in an unbroken line from the Mediterranean to the Outer Sea. 10 The remaining part of Europe beyond the Pyrenees reaching to its western end and to the Pillars of Hercules is bounded on the one side by the Mediterranean and on the other by the Outer Sea, that portion of which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules being called Iberia, 11 while that part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, as it has only recently come under notice, but is all densely inhabited by barbarous tribes of whom I shall speak more particularly on a subsequent occasion.
§ 3.38.1 Just as with regard to Asia and Libya where they meet in Aethiopia no one up to the present has been able to say with certainty whether the southern extension of them is continuous land or is bounded by a sea, so that part of Europe which extends to the north between the Tanais and Narbo is up to now unknown to us, and will remain so unless the curiosity of explorers lead to some discoveries in the future.
§ 3.38.3 We must pronounce that those who either by word of mouth or in writing make rash statements about these regions have no knowledge of them, and invent mere fables. 4 I have said so much in order that my narrative should not be without something to range itself under in the minds of those who are ignorant of the localities, but that they should have some notion at least of the main geographical distinctions, with which they can connect in thought and to which they can refer my statements, calculating the position of places from the quarter of the heaven under which they lie. 5 For as in the case of physical sight we are in the habit of turning our faces in the direction of any object pointed out to us, so should we mentally ever turn and shift our glance to each place to which the story calls our attention.
§ 3.39.1 Dismissing this matter I will now continue my narrative. 2 At the time of which we are speaking the Carthaginians were masters of all that part of Libya which looks towards the Mediterranean from the Altars of Philaenus on the Greater Syrtis as far as the Pillars of Hercules.
§ 3.39.3 The length of this coast-line is more than sixteen thousand stades. 4 Crossing the straits at the Pillars of Hercules they had similarly subdued all Iberia as far as the point on the coast of the Mediterranean where the Pyrenees, which separate the Celts from the Iberians, end. 5 This spot is about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth of this sea at the Pillars of Hercules,
§ 3.39.6 the distance being three thousand stades from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which place Hannibal started for Italy, two thousand six hundred stades from hence to the Ebro, 7 and from the Ebro to Emporium one thousand six hundred stades. 8 From Emporium to Narbo it is about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhone about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade.
§ 3.39.9 From the passage of the Rhone, following the bank of the river in the direction of its source as far as the foot of the pass across the Alps to Italy, the distance is fourteen hundred stades, 10 and the length of the actual pass which would bring Hannibal down into the plain of the Po, about twelve hundred. 11 So that to arrive there he had, starting from New Carthage, to march about nine thousand stades.
§ 3.39.12 Of this, as far as distance goes, he had nearly traversed the half, but if we look to difficulty far the largest part lay before him.
§ 3.40.1 While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross the Pyrenees, in great fear of the Celts owing to the natural strength of the passes, 2 the Romans, having received from the envoys they had sent to Carthage an account of the decision arrived at, and the speeches made there, and on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Libya.
§ 3.40.3 While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. 4 They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about six thousand in number for either city, to be on the spot within thirty days. 5 The one city they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, on the far side.
§ 3.40.6 Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no opportunity, 7 elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at end of the former war which I described in my last Book. 8 Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them.
§ 3.40.9 Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former Consul, and two former Praetors. 10 On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. 11 When the Praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighborhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help.
§ 3.40.12 The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. 13 The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis. 14 When the news reached Rome that the fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a Praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enrol other legions from the allies.
§ 3.41.1 The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book. 2 The two Roman Consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with sixty ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Libya with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes.
§ 3.41.3 With these he threatened such a redoubtable expedition and made such vast preparations at Lilybaion, collecting all kinds of forces from everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege to it. 4 Publius, coasting along Liguria, reached the neighborhood of Marseilles from Pisa in five days, 5 and coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rhone, known as the Massaliotic mouth,
§ 3.41.6 disembarked his forces there, having heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but convinced that he was still at a distance of many days' march owing to the difficulty of the country and the numbers of Celtic tribes between them. 7 Hannibal, however, who had bribed some of the Celts and forced others to give him passage, unexpectedly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhone, having marched with the Sardinian Sea on his right. 8 Publius, when the arrival of the enemy was reported to him, being partly incredulous owing to the cupidity of their advance and partly desirous of ascertaining the exact truth — while he himself was refreshing his troops after their voyage and consulting with his Tribunes in what place it would be wisest to offer battle to the enemy —
§ 3.42.1 Hannibal, on reaching the neighborhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea. 2 Doing his best to make friends with the inhabitants of the bank, he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic.
§ 3.42.3 He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across. 4 In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing. 5 Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides,
§ 3.42.6 sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete. 7 Advancing up the bank of the river for two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped. 8 Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition.
§ 3.42.9 Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute. 10 Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied. 11 The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.
§ 3.43.1 On the fifth night, however, the force which had already crossed began a little before dawn to advance along the opposite bank against the barbarians there, 2 while Hannibal had got his soldiers ready and was waiting till the time for crossing came. He had filled the boats with his light horse and the canoes with his lightest infantry.
§ 3.43.3 The large boats were placed highest up stream and the lighter ferry-boats farther down, so that the heavier vessels receiving the chief force of the current the canoes should be less exposed to risk in crossing. 4 They hit on the plan of towing the horses astern of the boats swimming, one man at each side of the stern guiding three or four horses by their leading reins, so that a considerable number were got across at once in the first batch. 5 The barbarians seeing the enemy's project poured out of their camp, scattered and in no order, feeling sure that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing.
§ 3.43.6 Hannibal, as soon as he saw that the force he had previously sent across was near at hand on the opposite bank, they having announced their approach by a smoke-signal as arranged, ordered all in charge of the ferry-boats to embark and push up against the current. 7 He was at once obeyed, and now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, 8 with the two armies standing on either b