§ i  The Latin text of this philosophical dialogue survived as a palimpsest in the Vatican Library, discovered in 1819 and missing numerous pages. Parts can be filled from quotations and paraphrases by other ancient authors. The equivalent of about ten pages is lost at the beginning. Our manuscript commences in the midst of Cicero's preface to the dialogue: at this point he is evidently combating the Epicurean hostility to patriotism and the life of a statesman. https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?query=Cic.+Rep.+1&dbname=LatinAugust21

§ 1.1  [Without active patriotism ] .... could [never] have delivered [our native land] from attack, nor could Gaius Duelius, Aulus Atilius, or Lucius Metellus have freed [Rome] from her fear of Carthage, nor could the two Scipios have extinguished with their blood the rising flames of the Second Punic War, nor, when it broke forth again with greater fury, could Quintus Maximus have reduced it to impotence or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it, nor could Publius Africanus have torn it from the gates of this city and driven it within the enemy's walls.
Marcus Cato again, unknown and of obscure birth - by whom, as by a pattern for our emulation, all of us who are devoted to the same pursuits are drawn to diligence and valour - might surely have remained at Tusculum in the enjoyment of the leisurely life of that healthful spot so near to Rome. But he, a madman as our friends maintain, preferred, though no necessity constrained him, to be tossed by the billows and storms of our public life even to an extreme old age, rather than to live a life of complete happiness in the calm and ease of such retirement. I will not speak of the men, countless in number, who have each been the salvation of this republic; and as their lives do not much antedate the remembrance of the present generation, I will refrain from mentioning their names, lest someone complain of the omission of himself or some member of his family. I will content myself with asserting that Nature has implanted in the human race so great a need of virtue and so great a desire to defend the common safety that the strength thereof has conquered all the allurements of pleasure and ease.

§ 1.2  But it is not enough to possess virtue, as if it were an art of some sort, unless you make use of it. Though it is true that an art, even if you never use it, can still remain in your possession by the very fact of your knowledge of it, yet the existence of virtue depends entirely upon its use, and its noblest use is the government of the State, and the realisation in fact, not in words, of those very things that the philosophers, in their corners, are continually dinning in our ears. For there is no principle enunciated by the philosophers - at least none that is just and honourable - that has not been discovered and established by those who have drawn up codes of law for States. For whence comes our sense of duty? From whom do we obtain the principles of religion? Whence comes the law of nations, or even that law of ours which is called “civil”? Whence justice, honour, fair-dealing? Whence decency, self-restraint, fear of disgrace, eagerness for praise and honour? Whence comes endurance amid toils and dangers? I say, from those men who, when these things had been inculcated by a system of training, either confirmed them by custom or else enforced them by statutes.

§ 1.3  Indeed Xenocrates, one of the most eminent of philosophers, when asked what his disciples learned, is said to have replied, “To do of their own accord what they are compelled to do by the law.” Therefore the citizen who compels all men, by the authority of magistrates and the penalties imposed by law, to follow rules of whose validity philosophers find it hard to convince even a few by their admonitions, must be considered superior even to the teachers who enunciate these principles. For what speech of theirs is excellent enough to be preferred to a State well provided with law and custom? Indeed, just as I think that “cities great and dominant,” as Ennius calls them, are to be ranked above small villages and strongholds, so I believe that those who rule such cities by wise counsel and authority are to be deemed far superior, even in wisdom, to those who take no part at all in the business of government. And since we feel a mighty urge to increase the resources of mankind, since we desire to make human life safer and richer by our thought and effort, and are goaded on to the fulfilment of this desire by Nature herself, let us hold to the course which has ever been that of all excellent men, turning deaf ears to those who, in the hope of even recalling those who have already gone ahead, are sounding the retreat.

§ 1.4  As their first objection to these arguments, so well founded and so obviously sound, those who attack them plead the severity of the labour that must be performed in the defence of the State - surely a trifling obstacle to the watchful and diligent man, and one that merits only scorn, not merely with reference to matters of such moment, but even in the case of things of only moderate importance, such as a man's studies, or duties, or even his business affairs. Then too they allege the danger to which life is exposed, and confront brave men with a dishonourable fear of death, yet such men are wont to regard it a greater misfortune to be consumed by the processes of Nature and old age, than to be granted the opportunity of surrendering for their country's sake, in preference to all else, that life which in any event must be surrendered to Nature. On this point, however, the objectors wax wordy and, as they imagine, eloquent, going on to cite the misfortunes of eminent men and the wrongs they have suffered at the hands of their ungrateful fellow-citizens.

§ 1.5  For at this point they enumerate, first the famous illustrations taken from Greek history - the story of Miltiades, vanquisher and conqueror of the Persians, who, before the wounds had yet healed which he had received full in the front on the occasion of his glorious victory, was cast into chains by his own fellow-countrymen, and at their hands lost the life which the enemy's weapons had spared; and that of Themistocles, who, when driven in terror from his country, the land which he had set free, took refuge, not in the harbours of Greece, saved by his prowess, but in the recesses of the barbarian land which he had laid prostrate. Indeed there is no lack of instances of the fickleness and cruelty of Athens toward her most eminent citizens, and this vice, originating and spreading there, has, they say, overflowed even into our own powerful republic.

§ 1.6  For we are reminded of the exile of Camillus, the disgrace suffered by Ahala, the hatred directed against Nasica, the exile of Laenas, the condemnation of Opimius, the flight of Metellus, the bitter disaster to Gaius Marius, and, a little later, the slaughter and ruin of so many eminent men. In fact they now include my name also, and presumably because they think it was through my counsel and at my risk that their own peaceful life has been preserved to them, they complain even more bitterly and with greater kindness of the treatment I have received. But I find it difficult to say why, when these very men cross the seas merely to gain knowledge and to visit other countries, [they should expect us to be deterred by considerations of danger from the much more important task of defending our native land. For if the philosophers are repaid for the dangers of travel by the knowledge they gain thereby, statesmen surely win a much greater reward in the gratitude of their fellow-citizens.

§ 1.7  Few may have imagined, in view of all I had suffered, that when,] as I retired from the consulship, I took my oath before an assembly of the people, and the Roman people took the same oath, that the republic was safe [as a result of my efforts alone,] I was amply repaid thereby for all the anxiety and vexation that resulted from the injustice done to me. And yet my sufferings brought me more honour than trouble, more glory than vexation, and the joy I found in the affectionate longing felt for me by good citizens was greater than my grief at the exultation of the wicked. But, as I said before, if it had happened otherwise, how could I complain? For none of the misfortunes that fell to my lot in consequence of my great services was unexpected by me or more serious than I had foreseen. For such was my nature that, although, on account of the manifold pleasures I found in the studies which had engaged me from boyhood, it would have been possible for me, on the one hand, to reap greater profit from a quiet life than other men, or, on the other hand, if any disaster should happen to us all, to suffer no more than my fair share of the common misfortune, yet I could not hesitate to expose myself to the severest storms, and, I might almost say, even to thunderbolts, for the sake of the safety of my fellow-citizens, and to secure, at the cost of my own personal danger, a quiet life for all the rest.

§ 1.8  For, in truth, our country has not given us birth and education without expecting to receive some sustenance, as it were, from us in return; nor has it been merely to serve our convenience that she has granted to our leisure a safe refuge and for our moments of repose a calm retreat; on the contrary, she has given us these advantages so that she may appropriate to her own use the greater and more important part of our courage, our talents, and our wisdom, leaving to us for our own private uses only so much as may be left after her needs have been satisfied.

§ 1.9  Moreover we ought certainly not to listen to the other excuses to which these men resort, that they may be more free to enjoy the quiet life. They say, for example, that it is mostly worthless men who take part in politics, men with whom it is degrading to be compared, while to have conflict with them, especially when the mob is aroused, is a wretched and dangerous task. Therefore, they maintain, a wise man should not attempt to take the reins, as he cannot restrain the insane and untamed fury of the common herd, nor is it proper for a freeman, by contending with vile and wicked opponents, to submit to the scourgings of abuse or expose himself to wrongs which are intolerable to the wise - as if, in the view of good, brave, and high-minded men, there could be any nobler motive for entering public life than the resolution, not to be ruled by wicked men and not to allow the republic to be destroyed by them, seeing that the philosophers themselves, even if they should desire to help, would be impotent.

§ 1.10  And who in the world can approve of the single exception they make, when they say that no wise man will take any part in public affairs unless some emergency compels him to do so ? As if any greater emergency could come upon anyone than that with which I was confronted; and what could I have done in that crisis unless I had been consul at the time? And how could I have been consul unless I had held to a manner of life from my boyhood which led me to the highest office of State in spite of my equestrian birth? Hence it is clear that the opportunity of serving the State, however great be the dangers with which it is threatened, does not come suddenly, or when we wish it, unless we are in such a position that it is possible for us to take action.

§ 1.11  It has always seemed to me that the most amazing of the teachings of learned men is that they deny their own ability to steer when the sea is calm, having never learned the art nor cared to know it, while at the same time they assure us that, when the waves dash highest, they will take the helm. For it is their habit to proclaim openly, and even to make it their great boast, that they have neither learned nor do they teach anything about the principles of the State, either to establish it or to safeguard it, and that they consider the knowledge of such things unsuited to learned or wise men, but better to be left to those who have trained themselves in that business. How can it be reasonable, therefore, for them to promise to aid the State in case they are compelled by an emergency to do so, when they do not know how to rule the State when no emergency threatens it, though this is a much easier task than the other? Indeed, if it be true that the wise man does not, as a general thing, willingly descend from his lofty heights to statecraft, but does not decline the duty if conditions force him to assume it, yet I should think he ought by no means to neglect this science of politics, because it is his duty to acquire in advance all the knowledge that, for aught he knows, it may be necessary for him to use at some future time

§ 1.12  I have treated these matters at considerable length because I have planned and undertaken in this work a discussion of the State; hence, in order that this discussion might not be valueless, I had, in the first place, to remove all grounds for hesitation about taking part in public affairs. Yet if there be any who are influenced by the authority of philosophers, let them for a few moments listen and attend to those whose authority and reputation stand highest among learned men; for even if these have not governed the State themselves, nevertheless, since they have dealt with the State in many investigations and treatises, I consider that they have performed a certain function of their own in the State. And in fact I note that nearly every one of those Seven whom the Greeks called “wise” took an important part in the affairs of government. For there is really no other occupation in which human virtue approaches more closely the august function of the gods than that of founding new States or preserving those already in existence.

§ 1.13  Wherefore, since it is my good fortune to have accomplished, in the actual government of the republic, something worthy to live in men's memories, and also to have acquired some skill in setting forth political principles through practice and also by reason of my enthusiasm for learning and teaching, [I consider myself not unsuited to the task I have now undertaken; for, as a matter of fact, this combination of accomplishments is rare among those who are considered] authorities [on statecraft], since while certain men in former times have shown great skill in theoretical discussion, they are discovered to have accomplished nothing practical, and there have been others who have been efficient in action, but clumsy in exposition. Indeed the principles I am about to state are not at all new or original to myself, but it is my intention to recall a discussion carried on by men who were at a certain period the most eminent and wisest in our republic. This discussion was once reported to you, in your youth, and to me by Publius Rutilius Rufus, when we were spending several days together at Smyrna, in it, I believe, very little is omitted that would contribute greatly to a logical exposition of the whole subject.

§ 1.14  In the year when Tuditanus and Aquilius were consuls [129 BCE], Publius Africanus, the son of Paulus, decided to spend the Latin holidays at his country seat, and a considerable number of his most intimate friends stated their intention of visiting him during that period. Early in the morning of the holiday itself, his nephew, Quintus Tubero, arrived in advance of all the rest. Scipio greeted him cordially, for he was truly glad to see him, and then asked: Why are you here so early, Tubero? For these holidays would certainly have provided you with an excellent opportunity for pursuing your literary studies.
Tubero: My books are at home to me at any time, for they are never busy, but it is a very great privilege to find you at leisure, especially at this time of political unrest
Scipio: Yes, you have found me at leisure, but less so in mind than in occupation
Tubero: Yet it is your duty to relax your mind also. For a large number of us are prepared, as we have decided, to spend this time of leisure with you, if it suits your convenience.
Scipio: I shall be delighted, for at last we shall have an opportunity for the discussion of instructive topics

§ 1.15  Tubero: Well, then, Africanus, since you give me a sort of invitation, and encourage me in my hope regarding yourself, shall we not first inquire, before the others arrive, what the facts are in regard to that second sun that has been reported to the senate? For those who claim to have seen two suns are neither few nor untrustworthy, so that we must rather explain the fact than disbelieve it.
Scipio: How I wish our friend Panaetius were with us ! For it is his habit to make careful investigation of such celestial phenomena, as well as of other matters. But, Tubero, to give you my frank opinion, I do not entirely approve of our friend's habit in all matters of this kind: in dealing with things of whose nature we can hardly get an inkling by conjecture, he speaks with such assurance that one would think that he could see them with his own eyes or actually touch them with his hands. I always consider Socrates to have shown greater wisdom in refusing to take any interest in such matters and maintaining that the problems of natural phenomena were either too difficult for the human understanding to fathom or else were of no importance whatever to human life.

§ 1.16  Tubero: I cannot understand, Africanus, why the tradition has been handed down that Socrates refused to indulge in any discussions of that character, and confined himself to the study of human life and human morals. For what more trustworthy authority on Socrates can we cite than Plato? And in many passages of Plato's works Socrates, in the midst of his discussions of morals, of the virtues, and even of the State, makes it clear by what he says that he desires to combine with these subjects the consideration of arithmetic, geometry, and harmony, following the methods of Pythagoras.
Scipio: What you say is quite true, Tubero, but I suppose you have heard that, after Socrates' death, Plato went on journeys, first to Egypt for purposes of study, and later to Italy and Sicily in order to become acquainted with the discoveries of Pythagoras; and that he spent a great deal of time in the company of Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locri, and also got possession of Philolaus' notes. And, as Pythagoras' reputation was then great in that country, he devoted himself entirely to that teacher's disciples and doctrines. And so, as he loved Socrates with singular affection and wished to give him credit for everything, he interwove Socrates' charm and subtlety in argument with the obscurity and ponderous learning of Pythagoras in so many branches of knowledge.

§ 1.17  After this speech, Scipio noticed Lucius Furius Philus coming in unannounced, and after greeting him with the greatest cordiality, he took his hand and led him to a place on his own couch. Publius Rutilius, who later reported the conversation to us, came in at the same time, received Scipio's greeting, and was given a place beside Tubero.
Philus: What are you discussing? I hope our arrival has not interrupted your conversation.
Scipio: Certainly not, for the point which Tubero began to inquire into a short time ago belongs to the very class of subjects which you are always interested in investigating. As for our friend Rutilius, he used to discuss such topics with me occasionally, even under the very walls of Numantia.
Philus: What was this particular subject?
Scipio: Those two suns, Philus, and I am anxious to hear your opinion of them.

§ 1.18  No sooner had he said this than a servant announced that Laelius was coming, and had already left his house. Whereupon Scipio dressed and put on his shoes, and, leaving his bed-chamber, walked in the portico for a little while. On Laelius' arrival, he greeted him and those who had come with him - Spurius Mummius, of whom he was very fond, Gaius Fannius, and Quintus Scaevola, Laelius' sons-in-law, who were young men of excellent education, and had now reached the appropriate age for the quaestorship. After all these salutations he turned about in the portico, giving Laelius the place in the centre; for there was a kind of rule in their friendship, according to which Laelius honoured Scipio like a god in the field, on account of his unexcelled glory in war, while at home Scipio in his turn revered Laelius like a father, on account of his greater age. Then after they had conversed for a short time while walking up and down, Scipio, who had been greatly pleased and delighted at their arrival, thought it best that they should seat themselves in the sunniest part of the lawn, as it was winter. They were quite willing, and just then Manius Manilius came in, a man of good sense, who was agreeable to the whole company and beloved by them. After receiving a friendly greeting from Scipio and the rest, he sat down beside Laelius.

§ 1.19  Philus: I do not see why we should change the subject of our conversation because these friends have come in, but I think we must treat it more carefully, and be sure our remarks are worth their attention.
Laelius: What were you discussing? What sort of conversation was it that we have interrupted?
Philus: Scipio had just asked me what I thought of the generally admitted fact that two suns have been seen.
Laelius: Do you really think then, Philus, that we have already acquired a perfect knowledge of those matters that relate to our own homes and to the State, since we are now seeking to learn what is going on in the heavens?
Philus: Do you not think it important for our homes that we should know what is happening and being done in that home which is not shut in by the walls we build, but is the whole universe, a home and a fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of sharing with them? Surely it is important, especially since, if we are ignorant of these matters, we must remain ignorant of many other important things. Besides, the mere learning about the facts of nature and their investigation gives me at least the greatest pleasure, as it certainly must to you also, Laelius, and to all who are eager for wisdom.

§ 1.20  Laelius: I have no objection to the topic, especially as this is a holiday. But are we to hear some discussion of it, or have we come too late?
Philus: There has been no discussion as yet, and, since we have not begun, I should be pleased to yield to you, Laelius, so that you may give us your opinion on the subject.
Laelius: On the contrary, let us hear yours, unless perhaps Manilius thinks that a provisional edict ought to be issued embodying a compromise between the two suns, whereby “they shall have and hold the sky in such manner that they shall both in common have and hold it.”
Manilius: Laelius, are you still mocking at that art in which you are so proficient yourself, and without which no one can know what belongs to him and what does not? However, we can discuss that later, let us at present listen to Philus, who is already being consulted, I see, about matters of greater import than those on which Publius Mucius or I are asked for our opinions.

§ 1.21  Philus: I have nothing new to bring before you, nor anything that I have thought out or discovered by myself. For I remember an incident in the life of Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, a most learned man, as you know: at a time when a similar phenomenon was reported, and he happened to be at the house of Marcus Marcellus, his colleague in the consulship, he ordered the celestial globe to be brought out which the grandfather of Marcellus had carried off from Syracuse, when that very rich and beautiful city was taken, though he took home with him nothing else out of the great store of booty captured. Though I had heard this globe mentioned quite frequently on account of the fame of Archimedes, when I actually saw it I did not particularly admire it ; for that other celestial globe, also constructed by Archimedes, which the same Marcellus placed in the temple of Virtue, is more beautiful as well as more widely known among the people.

§ 1.22  But when Gallus began to give a very learned explanation of the device, I concluded that the famous Sicilian had been endowed with greater genius than one would imagine it possible for a human being to possess. For Gallus told us that the other kind of celestial globe, which was solid and contained no hollow space, was a very early invention, the first one of that kind having been constructed by Thales of Miletus, and later marked by Eudoxus of Cnidus (a disciple of Plato, it was claimed) with the constellations and stars which are fixed in the sky. He also said that many years later Aratus, borrowing this whole arrangement and plan from Eudoxus, had described it in verse, without any knowledge of astronomy, but with considerable poetic talent. But this newer kind of globe, he said, on which were delineated the motions of the sun and moon and of those five stars which are called wanderers, or, as we might say, rovers, contained more than could be shown on the solid globe, and the invention of Archimedes deserved special admiration because he had thought out a way to represent accurately by a single device for turning the globe those various and divergent movements with their different rates of speed. And when Gallus moved the globe, it was actually true that the moon was always as many revolutions behind the sun on the bronze contrivance as would agree with the number of days it was behind it in the sky. Thus the same eclipse of the sun happened on the globe as would actually happen, and the moon came to the point where the shadow of the earth was at the very time when the sun. . . out of the region. . .
[About two and a half pages appear to be lost. At the end of the gap, Scipio is speaking of Gaius Sulpicius Gallus. ]

§ 1.23  Scipio: . . . for I myself loved the man, and I was aware that he was also greatly esteemed and beloved by my father Paulus. For in my early youth, when my father, then consul, was in Macedonia, and I was in camp with him, I recollect that our army was on one occasion disturbed by superstitious fears because, on a cloudless night, a bright full moon was suddenly darkened. Gallus was at that time our legate (it being then about a year before his election to the consulship), and on the next day he unhesitatingly made a public statement in the camp that this was no miracle, but that it had happened at that time, and would always happen, at fixed times in the future, when the sun was in such a position that its light could not reach the moon.
Tubero: Do you really mean to say that he could convince men who were little more than simple peasants of such a thing, or that he dared even to state it before the ignorant?
Scipio: He certainly did, and with great. . .
[About fifteen lines appear to be lost. There is no change of subject. ]

§ 1.24  . . . for his speech showed no conceited desire to display his knowledge, nor was it unsuitable to the character of a man of the greatest dignity; in fact, he accomplished a very important result in relieving the troubled minds of the soldiers from foolish superstitious fear.

§ 1.25  And a similar story is told of an event in that great war in which the Athenians and Lacedaemonians contended so fiercely. For when the sun was suddenly obscured and darkness reigned, and the Athenians were overwhelmed with the greatest terror, Pericles, who was then supreme among his countrymen in influence, eloquence, and wisdom, is said to have communicated to his fellow-citizens the information he had received from Anaxagoras, whose pupil he had been - that this phenomenon occurs at fixed periods and by inevitable law, whenever the moon passes entirely beneath the orb of the sun, and that therefore, though it does not happen at every new moon, it cannot happen except at certain periods of the new moon. When he had discussed the subject and given the explanation of the phenomenon, the people were freed of their fears. For at that time it was a strange and unfamiliar idea that the sun was regularly eclipsed by the interposition of the moon - a fact which Thales of Miletus is said to have been the first to observe. But later even our own Ennius was not ignorant of it, for he wrote that, in about the three hundred and fiftieth year after Rome was founded:
In the month of June - the day was then the fifth -
The moon and night obscured the shining sun.
And now so much exact knowledge in regard to this matter has been gained that, by the use of the date recorded by Ennius and in the Great Annals, the dates of previous eclipses of the sun have been reckoned, all the way back to that which occurred on July fifth in the reign of Romulus. For even though, during the darkness of that eclipse, Nature carried Romulus away to man's inevitable end, yet the story is that it was his merit that caused his translation to heaven.

§ 1.26  Tubero: Do you see, Africanus, that what you had a different opinion of a short time ago. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. ]
Scipio: . . . things which others may see. Furthermore how can any man regard anything in human affairs either as exalted, if he has examined into yonder realms of the gods, or as of long duration, if he has realized the meaning of eternity, or as glorious, if he has perceived how small is the earth - not only the earth as a whole, but especially that part of it which is inhabited by man - and has noticed how we Romans, though confined to a scanty portion of it and entirely unknown to many races of men, hope nevertheless that our name will be borne abroad on wings and will spread to the ends of the earth?

§ 1.27  But as far as our lands, houses, herds, and immense stores of silver and gold are concerned, the man who never thinks of these things or speaks of them as “goods,” because he sees that the enjoyment of them is slight, then usefulness scanty, their ownership uncertain, and has noticed that the vilest of men often possess them in unmeasured abundance - how fortunate is he to be esteemed! For only such a man can really claim all things as his own, by virtue of the decision, not of the Roman People, but of the wise, not by any obligation of the civil law, but by the common law of Nature, which forbids that anything shall belong to any man save to him that knows how to employ and to use it; only such a man will consider that our military commands and consulships are to be classed among things necessary rather than things desirable, and that they are to be undertaken from a sense of duty and not sought for profit or glory, only such a man, finally, can say of himself what my grandfather Africanus used to say, according to Cato's account - that he was never doing more than when he was doing nothing, and never less alone than when alone.

§ 1.28  For who can really believe that Dionysius, when by the greatest exertions he deprived his fellow-citizens of their liberty, was doing more than Archimedes, one of those citizens, when he made that very globe of which we have spoken, in making which he appeared to be doing nothing? And who does not believe that those are more alone who, though in the crowded forum, have no one with whom they care to talk, than those who, when no one else is present, either commune with themselves or, as we may say, participate in a gathering of most learned men, finding delight in their discoveries and writings? Who in truth would consider anyone richer than the man who lacks nothing that his nature requires, or more powerful than one who gams all he strives for, or happier than one who is set free from all perturbation of mind, or more secure in his wealth than one who possesses only what, as the saying goes, he can carry away with him out of a shipwreck? What power, moreover, what office, what kingdom can be preferable to the state of one who despises all human possessions, considers them inferior to wisdom, and never meditates on any subject that is not eternal and divine, who believes that, though others may be called men, only those are men who are perfected in the arts appropriate to humanity? In this connection the remark made by Plato, or perhaps someone else, seems to me particularly apt.

§ 1.29  For when a storm at sea had driven him to an unknown land and stranded him on a deserted shore, and his companions were frightened on account of their ignorance of the country, he, according to the story, noticed certain geometrical figures traced in the sand, and immediately cried out, “Be of good courage; I see the tracks of men.” He drew his inference, evidently, not from the cultivation of the soil, which he also observed, but from the indications of learning. For these reasons, Tubero, I have always delighted in learning, in men of erudition, and in such studies as those which you pursue.

§ 1.30  Laelius: In regard to these arguments, Scipio, I dare not say that either you or Philus or Manilius... to such an extent. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost, in which Laelius evidently says that, while he has no desire to disparage abstract learning, it ought not to interfere with the practical duties of a public man. ]
Laelius: . . . that friend of ours belonged to his father's family, and was worthy of his emulation.
Sagacious Aelius Sextus, a man most wise,
who was really most wise and sagacious, and was called so by Ennius, not because he sought what he could never find, but because he gave counsel which freed his clients from trouble and anxiety. And when he was arguing against the favourite studies of Gallus, he always had on his lips those famous words of Achilles in the Iphigenia,
The astral signs that are observed above,
When goat or scorpion of Jove arise,
Or other beasts; all gaze intent thereon,
Nor ever see what lies before their feet!
Yet this same man used to say (for I have often listened to him, and with pleasure) that the Zethus of Pacuvius was too hostile to culture; the Neoptolemus of Ennius was more to his taste in saying that he desired “to study philosophy, but in moderation; for he did not approve of doing so entirely.” But if the studies which occupied the Greeks attract you so powerfully, there are others, of a more free character and of wider range, which we can employ either for the conduct of our own lives or even for the service of the State. As for those arts of yours, if for anything at all, they are valuable only to sharpen somewhat and, we may say, stir up the faculties of the young, so that they find it easier to learn things of greater importance

§ 1.31  Tubero: I do not disagree with you, Laelius, but I should like to know what those things are which you consider of greater importance.
Laelius: I will tell you, to be sure, and perchance you may scorn my opinion, since it was you who inquired of Scipio about those celestial matters. Nevertheless, I should consider those things which are directly before our own eyes more worthy of investigation. For why is it that the grandson of Lucius Paulus, the nephew of our friend here, a scion of a most worthy family and of this most glorious republic, is asking how two suns could have been seen, instead of asking why, in one State, we have almost reached the point where there are two senates and two separate peoples? For, as you observe, the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and, even before his death, the whole character of his tribunate, divided one people into two factions. And in fact Scipio's slanderers and enemies, at first led by Publius Crassus and Appius Claudius, even now that those men are dead keep a part of the senate in opposition to you under the leadership of Metellus and Publius Mucius; and these men will not allow our friend here, who is the only man able to do so, to help us in our present dangerous emergency, though our allies and the Latins are roused against us, treaties have been broken, seditious triumvirs are plotting some new villainy daily, and our good citizens are in despair.

§ 1.32  For these reasons, young gentlemen, if you will listen to me, you will not be alarmed by the second sun (for either no such thing can really exist, or else let it exist, since it has been seen, provided it does us no harm; and we are either unable to learn anything at all about such matters, or else, even if we do learn all there is to know, we can never become better or happier through such knowledge), but as to our having a united senate and people, it is possible, and unless it is brought about, we shall have serious trouble, we know and observe that the situation is far from being as it should be, and that, if this can be brought about, our lives will be better and happier.

§ 1.33  Mucius: What knowledge then, Laelius, do you think we ought to acquire, in order to be able to accomplish the result you demand of us ?
Laelius: The knowledge of those arts which can make us useful to the State, for I consider this the noblest function of wisdom, and the highest duty of virtue as well as the best proof of its possession. Therefore, in order that these holidays may be devoted to discussions which, beyond any other object, are highly useful to the State, let us ask Scipio to tell us which form of government he considers the best. After that we will investigate other subjects, the knowledge of which will, I hope, lead us at the same time to the consideration of the present situation and to an understanding of what now lies before us.

§ 1.34  When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had expressed their enthusiastic approval of this suggestion. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. The following fragment is probably a part of the missing passage. ] . . therefore, if you please, bring your conversation down from the heavens to these things which lie nearer to us.
Laelius: . . . I desired this, not only because it was proper that an eminent statesman rather than anyone else should discuss the State, but also because I recollected that you used to converse very frequently with Panaetius on this subject in company with Polybius - two Greeks who were perhaps the best versed of them all in politics - and that you assembled many arguments to prove that the form of government handed down to us by our ancestors is by far the best of all. Now since you are better prepared than the rest of us to undertake this discussion, you will do us all a favour, if I may speak for the company, by presenting your ideas on the State.

§ 1.35  Scipio: I cannot, indeed, assert that any other subject claims more of my interest and careful thought, Laelius, than the one which you now assign to me. Furthermore, since I have noticed that the thoughts and efforts of every craftsman, if he is proficient, are directed to no other end than the improvement of his skill in his own craft, should not I, seeing that the guardianship and administration of the State have been handed down to me by my parents and ancestors as my sole task, have to confess that I am more slothful than any craftsman, if I have devoted less labour to the supreme craft than they to their humble tasks?

§ 1.36  But I am not satisfied with the works dealing with this subject which the greatest and wisest men of Greece have left us ; nor on the other hand am I bold enough to rate my opinion above theirs. Therefore I ask you to listen to me as to one who is neither entirely ignorant of the Greek authorities, nor, on the other hand, prefers their views, particularly on this subject, to our own, but rather as to a Roman who, though provided by a father's care with a liberal education and eager for knowledge from boyhood, yet has been trained by experience and the maxims learned at home much more than by books.

§ 1.37  Philus: By Hercules, I am confident, Scipio, that no one is your superior in innate ability, and that your experience in the highest spheres of government is absolutely unsurpassed; we are also aware to what studies you have always devoted yourself. Wherefore if, as you say, you have also devoted your attention to this science, or craft, as it may be called, I am very grateful to Laelius; for I hope that what you tell us will be far more profitable than anything contained in the treatises of the Greeks.
Scipio: You are setting very great expectations on what I shall say - a heavy burden to one who is about to discuss matters of such importance.
Philus: However great our expectations may be, you will still surpass them as usual; for there is no danger that you will lack eloquence in discussing such a topic as the State.

§ 1.38  Scipio: I will do as you wish, as well as I can, and shall at once begin my discussion, following the rule which, I think ought always to be observed in the exposition of a subject if one wishes to avoid confusion, that is, that if the name of a subject is agreed upon, the meaning of this name should first be explained. Not until this meaning is agreed upon should the actual discussion be begun, for the qualities of the thing to be discussed can never be understood unless one understands first exactly what the thing itself is. Therefore, since the commonwealth is the subject of our investigation, let us first consider exactly what it is that we are investigating.
As Laelius approved of this, Africanus continued as follows: But naturally, in taking up a topic so familiar and well known, I shall not go all the way back to its original elements, as learned men usually do in treating this subject, and begin with the first union of male and female, the birth of offspring, and the origin of kinship, nor shall I give repeated definitions of exactly what the subject of discussion is, how many forms of it exist, or what different names are given to it. For, as I am speaking to intelligent men who have taken a glorious part, both in the field and at home, in the administration of the greatest of all States, I will not allow the subject of my discussion to be clearer than my discussion itself. For I have not undertaken the task of making an absolutely complete examination of the topic, as a schoolmaster might, nor do I promise that no single point will be omitted in my discussion of it.
Laelius: For my part, I am looking forward to exactly the kind of discussion you promise.

§ 1.39  Scipio: Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man. For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men ] . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. The following fragment may be part of the missing passage. ]

§ 1.40  ... In a short time a scattered and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens by mutual agreement. . . .

§ 1.41  . . . certain seeds, as we may call them, for [otherwise] no source for the other virtues nor for the State itself could be discovered. Such an assemblage of men, therefore, originating for the reason I have mentioned, established itself in a definite place, at first in order to provide dwellings; and this place being fortified by its natural situation and by their labours, they called such a collection of dwellings a town or city, and provided it with shrines and gathering places which were common property. Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I have described, every city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is “the property of a people,” must be governed by some deliberative body if it is to be permanent. And this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its beginning to the same cause as that which produced the State itself.

§ 1.42  In the second place, this function must either be granted to one man, or to certain selected citizens, or must be assumed by the whole body of citizens And so when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this State a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the State is ruled by an aristocracy. But a popular government (for so it is called) exists when all the power is in the hands of the people. And any one of these three forms of government (if only the bond which originally joined the citizens together in the partnership of the State holds fast), though not perfect or in my opinion the best, is tolerable, though one of them may be superior to another. For either a just and wise king, or a select number of leading citizens, or even the people itself, though this is the least commendable type, can nevertheless, as it seems, form a government that is not unstable, provided that no elements of injustice or greed are mingled with it.

§ 1.43  But in kingships the subjects have too small a share in the administration of justice and in deliberation, and in aristocracies the masses can hardly have their share of liberty, since they are entirely excluded from deliberation for the common weal and from power; and when all the power is in the people's hands, even though they exercise it with justice and, moderation, yet the resulting equality itself is inequitable, since it allows no distinctions in rank. Therefore, even though the Persian Cyrus was the most just and wisest of kings, that form of government does not seem to me the most desirable, since “the property of the people ” (for that is what a commonwealth is, as I have said) is administered at the nod and caprice of one man; even though the Massilians, now under our protection, are ruled with the greatest justice by a select number of their leading citizens, such a situation is nevertheless to some extent like slavery for a people; and even though the Athenians at certain periods, after they had deprived the Areopagus of its power, succeeded in carrying on all their public business by the resolutions and decrees of the people, their State, because it had no definite distinctions in rank, could not maintain its fair renown.

§ 1.44  I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of popular government - when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. The first two lines of what follows ( to itemque ) appear to be corrupt, and cannot be translated. ]

§ 1.45  . . . and likewise some other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental forms. A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three which I mentioned at first.

§ 1.46  Laelius: I know that is your opinion, Africanus, for I have often heard you say so. Nevertheless, if it will not give you too much trouble, I should like to know which you consider the best of the three forms of government of which you have been speaking. For it might help us somewhat to understand. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. In what follows Scipio is evidently stating the common opinion that liberty is impossible in a monarchy or an aristocracy. ]

§ 1.47  Scipio: . . . and every State is such as its ruler's character and will make it. Hence liberty has no dwelling-place in any State except that in which the people's power is the greatest, and surely nothing can be sweeter than liberty; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty. And how can it be the same for all, I will not say in a kingdom, where there is no obscurity or doubt about the slavery of the subject, but even in States where everyone is ostensibly free? I mean States in which the people vote, elect commanders and officials, are canvassed for their votes, and have bills proposed to them, but really grant only what they would have to grant even if they were unwilling to do so, and are asked to give to others what they do not possess themselves. For they have no share in the governing power, in the deliberative function, or in the courts, over which selected judges preside, for those privileges are granted on the basis of birth or wealth. But in a free nation, such as the Rhodians or the Athenians, there is not one of the citizens who [may not hold the offices of State and take an active part in the government ] . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost In what follows Scipio evidently continues his summing up of the common arguments in favour of democratic government. ]

§ 1.48  . . . [Our authorities] say [that] when one person or a few stand out from the crowd as richer and more prosperous, then, as a result of the haughty and arrogant behaviour of these, there arises [a government of one or a few], the cowardly and weak giving way and bowing down to the pride of wealth. But if the people would maintain their rights, they say that no form of government would be superior, either in liberty or happiness, for they themselves would be masters of the laws and the courts, of war and peace, of international agreements, and of every citizen's life and property; this government alone, they believe, can rightly be called a commonwealth, that is, “the property of the people.” And it is for that reason, they say, that “the property of the people ” is often liberated from the domination of kings or senators, while free peoples do not seek kings or the power and wealth of aristocracies.

§ 1.49  And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of harmony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens. Therefore they maintain that when a senate has been supreme, the State has never had a stable government, and that such stability is less attainable by far in kingdoms, in which, as Ennius says,
No sacred partnership or honour is.
Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens? For if we cannot agree to equalise men's wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice? . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. There is no change of topic. ]

§ 1.50  . . . Indeed they think that States of the other kinds have no right at all to the names which they arrogate to themselves. For why should I give the name of king, the title of Jupiter the Best, to a man who is greedy for personal power and absolute authority, a man who lords it over an oppressed people? Should I not rather call him tyrant? For tyrants may be merciful as well as oppressive; so that the only difference between the nations governed by these rulers is that between the slaves of a kind and those of a cruel master; for in any case the subjects must be slaves And how could Sparta, at the time when the mode of life inculcated by her constitution was considered so excellent, be assured of always having good and just kings, when a person of any sort, if he was born of the royal family, had to be accepted as king? As to aristocrats, who could tolerate men that have claimed the title without the people's acquiescence, but merely by their own will? For how is a man adjudged to be “the best”? On the basis of knowledge, skill, learning, [and similar qualities surely, not because of his own desire to possess the title! ] . . ,
[About thirty lines are lost. At the end of the gap, Scipio is criticizing the arguments for democracy, and stating those for aristocracy. ]

§ 1.51  ... If [the State] leaves [the selection of its rulers] to chance, it will be as quickly overturned as a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men, especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger.
But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich, prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men, these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the “best.” For riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule over others, are full of dishonour and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State than that in which the richest are accounted the best.

§ 1.52  But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler, or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation, and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers.

§ 1.53  For that equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be maintained (for the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, give very many special powers to many individuals, and create great distinctions among men and the honours granted to them), and what is called equality is really most inequitable. For when equal honour is given to the highest and the lowest - for men of both types must exist in every nation - then this very “fairness” is most unfair; but this cannot happen in States ruled by their best citizens. These arguments and others like them, Laelius, are approximately those which are advanced by men who consider this form of government the best.

§ 1.54  Laelius: But what about yourself, Scipio? Which of these three forms do you consider the best?
Scipio: You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, [I might choose] the kingship. . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than . . .

§ 1.55  to be sustained by the care of one man who is the most virtuous and most eminent. But here are the aristocrats, with the claim that they can do this more effectively, and that there will be more wisdom in the counsels of several than in those of one man, and an equal amount of fairness and scrupulousness And here also are the people, shouting with a loud voice that they are willing to obey neither one nor a few, that nothing is sweeter than liberty even to wild beasts, and that all who are slaves, whether to a king or to an aristocracy, are deprived of liberty. Thus kings attract us by our affection for them, aristocracies by their wisdom, and popular governments by then freedom, so that in comparing them it is difficult to say which one prefers.
Laelius: No doubt; but it will be almost impossible to solve the problems that follow, if you abandon this one before reaching a solution.

§ 1.56  Scipio: Then let us imitate Aratus, who, in beginning the treatment of lofty subjects, thought he must commence with Jupiter.
Laelius: With Jupiter? And what similarity has Aratus' poem with our present discussion?
Scipio: Only this, that is proper for us to begin our discussion with that god who alone is admitted by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be king of all gods and men.
Laelius: Why ?

§ 1.57  Scipio: Why do you imagine, except for the reason that lies before your eyes? It may be that the rulers of States have introduced, for its usefulness in practical life, the belief that there is one king in heaven, who moves all Olympus with a nod, as Homer says, and is both king and father of all; in that case we have an excellent precedent and the testimony of many witnesses - if all can be called “many” - to the fact that the nations have agreed (to wit, by the decisions of their rulers) that nothing is better than a king, since, as they believe, all the gods are ruled by the authority of one. But if, on the other hand, we have become convinced that these beliefs have their origin in the false ideas of the ignorant and are to be classed as fables, then let us listen to those who may be called the teachers of educated men, to those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears.
Laelius: What men are these?
Scipio: Those who by searching out the nature of all things have come to realize that the whole universe [is ruled] by [a single] mind. . .
[About thirty lines are lost At the end of the gap, Scipio is still presenting the arguments in favour of monarchy. ]

§ 1.58  Scipio: . . But, if you like, Laelius, I will bring before you witnesses who are neither so very ancient nor by any means barbarians.
Laelius: It is such witnesses that I desire.
Scipio: Are you aware that it is less than four hundred years since this city was ruled by kings?
Laelius: It is certainly less than that.
Scipio: Well, four hundred years is not very long, is it, in the life of a city or State?
Laelius: Hardly enough to bring it to maturity.
Scipio: Then there was a king at Rome less than four hundred years ago?
Laelius: Yes, and a proud one.
Scipio: And who preceded him?
Laelius: A very just king, and the line reaches all the way back to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years ago.
Scipio: Then even he is not very remote from us ?
Laelius: Not at all; for Greece was already approaching old age in his time
Scipio: Now tell me : was Romulus a king of barbarians?
Laelius: If, as the Greeks say, all men are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid be was, but if that name ought to be applied on the basis of men's manners rather than their language, I do not consider the Greeks less barbarous than the Romans.
Scipio: Yet for the purposes of our present subject we consider only character, not race. For if they were sensible men and lived at a period not very remote, who desired to be ruled by kings, then the witnesses I am bringing forward are neither of very ancient date nor uncivilized savages

§ 1.59  Laelius: I see that you are plentifully supplied with witnesses, Scipio, but to me, as to any good judge, demonstrations are more convincing than the testimony of witnesses.
Scipio: Then, Laelius, make use of an argument from your own feelings
Laelius: What feelings are those?
Scipio: Those which you have experienced in case, by any chance, you have ever been conscious of being angry with anyone
Laelius: I have been in that state, and oftener than I could wish.
Scipio: Well, when you are angry, do you allow your anger to rule your mind?
Laelius: Certainly not, but I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, who, when he found, upon arriving at his country place, that all his orders had been disobeyed, said to his superintendent: “You are at fault, wretched man, and I should have had you flogged to death ere this were I not angry!”

§ 1.60  Scipio: Excellent! Then Archytas clearly regarded anger, when it disagreed with calm judgment, as a sort of rebellion within the mind, which he desired should be put down by reason. Take as further examples avarice, greed for power and glory, and the passions; you see, if there is any kingly power in the minds of men, it must be the domination of a single element, and this is reason (for that is the best part of the mind), and, if reason holds dominion, there is no room for the passions, for anger, for rash action.
Laelius: That is true.
Scipio: Well then, does a mind so governed meet with your approval?
Laelius: Nothing could be better.
Scipio: In that case you would not approve if reason should be dethroned, and our innumerable passions, or our anger, should obtain complete domination?
Laelius: I can think of nothing more wretched than such a mind, or than the man that possesses it.
Scipio: Then you think that the mind should be a kingdom, all of whose parts are to be ruled reason?
Laelius: I certainly do .
Scipio: How then can you be doubtful as to your conclusion about the State? For if the management of a State is committed to more than one, you can see that there will be no authority at all to take command, for unless such authority is a unit, it can amount to nothing.

§ 1.61  Laelius: But let me ask what difference there is between one and many, if the many possess justice.
Scipio: As I realise that no great impression has been made upon you by my witnesses, I shall continue using you as my witness in order to prove what I say.
Laelius: Me ? In what way?
Scipio: A short time ago, when we were at your place at Formiae, I noticed that you gave your people emphatic orders to obey the directions of one person only.
Laelius: Certainly; my superintendent, of course.
Scipio: How about your residence in the city? Are several persons in charge there?
Laelius: Of course not; only one.
Scipio: And no one else but yourself rules your whole household?
Laelius: Certainly not
Scipio: Why then will you not admit that in the State likewise, the rule one man is best, if he be just?
Laelius: I am almost forced to agree with you.

§ 1.62  Scipio: You will be all the more inclined to agree, Laelius, if, omitting the analogies of the ship and the sick man, more advantageously entrusted to a single pilot and a single physician, if only they be proficient in their professions, I go on to examples of greater importance.
Laelius: What examples are these?
Scipio: Are you not aware that it was the insolence and pride of one man, Tarquinius, that made the title of king odious to our people?
Laelius: Certainly I am aware of it .
Scipio: Then you are also aware of a fact about which I expect to have more to say in the course of my discussion - that when Tarquinius was driven out, the people showed a strange way of rejoicing in their unwonted liberty; then it was that innocent men were driven into exile, then that the property of many citizens was pillaged, that the annual consulship was introduced, that the rods were lowered before the people, that appeals were allowed in cases of every sort, that secessions of the plebeians took place, and that, in a word, almost everything was done to give the people full power in all things.

§ 1.63  Laelius: What you say is quite true.
Scipio: Yes, and it is generally true in times of peace and security, for licence is possible as long as one has nothing to fear; as, for example, on board a ship, or frequently in the case of an illness that is trivial. But just as the sailor, when the sea suddenly grows rough, and the invalid when his illness becomes severe, both implore the assistance of one man, so our people, that in times of peace and while engaged at home wield authority, threaten even their magistrates, refuse to obey them, and appeal from one to another or to the people, yet in time of war yield obedience to their rulers as to a king, for safety prevails over caprice. Indeed, in wars of more serious import our people have preferred that all the power should be granted to one man without a colleague. And this man's title shows the character of his power, for though he is commonly called “dictator” from the fact that he is “named,” yet you know, Laelius, that in our books he is called “master of the people.”
Laelius: I do.
Scipio: Therefore the men of old time [acted] wisely. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. ]

§ 1.64  . . . indeed when a people is orphaned by the loss of a just king, as Ennius says,
For many a day doth sorrow fill their breasts,
Whenever a goodly king hath met his end;
In grief one to another thus they speak:
O Romulus, O Romulus divine,
A mighty bulwark of our native land
You were, - sent down from heaven to our need;
O sire, O father, blood from gods derived!
Neither “masters” nor “lords” did they call those men whom they lawfully obeyed, nay, not “kings” either, but “guardians of the fatherland,” “fathers,” “gods” ; and not without reason, for what is the next line?
To realms of light thy people hast thou led.
They thought that life, honour, and glory had been granted to them through the justice of their king. And the same goodwill toward kings would have abided in their descendants had the true image of kingship abided; but, as you know, it was through the injustice of one man alone that this whole form of government was overthrown
Laelius: I know it, and am eager to learn the course taken by such changes of government, not merely in our own State, but in all others as well.

§ 1.65  Scipio: When I have set forth my ideas in regard to the form of State which I consider the best, I shall have to take up in greater detail those changes to which States are liable, though I think it will not be at all easy for any such changes to take place in the State which I have in mind. But the first and most certain of these changes is the one that takes place in kingships: when the king begins to be unjust, that form of government is immediately at an end, and the king has become a tyrant. This is the worst sort of government, though closely related to the best. If the best men overthrow it, as usually happens, then the State is in the second of its three stages; for this form is similar to a kingship, being one in which a paternal council of leading men makes good provision for the people's welfare. But if the people themselves have killed or driven out the tyrant, they govern rather moderately, as long as they are wise and prudent, and, delighting in their exploit, they endeavour to maintain the government they have themselves set up. But if the people ever rebel against a just king and deprive him of his kingdom, or, as happens more frequently, taste the blood of the aristocracy and subject the whole State to their own caprices (and do not dream, Laelius, that any sea or any conflagration is so powerful that it cannot be more easily subdued than an unbridled multitude enjoying unwonted power), then we have a condition which is splendidly described by Plato, if only I can reproduce his description in Latin; it is difficult, but I will attempt it. {43.}

§ 1.66  He says: “When the insatiable throats of the people have become dry with the thirst for liberty, and, served by evil ministers, they have drained in their thirst a draught of liberty which, instead of being moderately tempered, is too strong for them, then, unless the magistrates and men of high rank are very mild and indulgent, serving them with liberty in generous quantities, the people persecute them, charge them with crime and impeach them, calling them despots, kings, and tyrants.” I think you are acquainted with this passage
Laelius: It is very familiar to me.

§ 1.67  Scipio: He continues thus: “Those who follow the lead of prominent citizens are persecuted by such a people and called willing slaves; but those who, though in office, try to act like private citizens, and those private citizens who try to destroy all distinction between a private citizen and a magistrate are praised to the skies and loaded with honours. It necessarily follows in such a State that liberty prevails everywhere, to such an extent that not only are homes one and all without a master, but the vice of anarchy extends even to the domestic animals, until finally the father fears his son, the son flouts his father, all sense of shame disappears, and all is so absolutely free that there is no distinction between citizen and alien, the schoolmaster fears and flatters his pupils, and pupils despise their masters; youths take on the gravity of age, and old men stoop to the games of youth, for fear they may be disliked by their juniors and seem to them too serious. Under such conditions even the slaves come to behave with unseemly freedom, wives have the same rights as their husbands, and in the abundance of liberty even the dogs, the horses, and the asses are so free in their running about that men must make way for them in the streets. Therefore,” he concludes, “the final result of this boundless licence is that the minds of the citizens become so squeamish and sensitive that, if the authority of government is exercised in the smallest degree, they become angry and cannot bear it. On this account they begin to neglect the laws as well, and so finally are utterly without a master of any kind.”

§ 1.68  Laelius: You have given us his description with great exactness.
Scipio: Well, to return now to my own style of discourse, he also says that from this exaggerated licence, which is the only thing such people call liberty, tyrants spring up as from a root, and are, as it were, engendered. For just as an excess of power in the hands of the aristocrats results in the overthrow of an aristocracy, so liberty itself reduces a people who possess it in too great degree to servitude. Thus everything which is in excess - when, for instance, either in the weather, or in the fields, or in men's bodies, conditions have been too favourable - is usually changed into its opposite; and this is especially true in States, where such excess of liberty either in nations or in individuals turns into an excess of servitude. This extreme liberty gives birth to a tyrant and the utterly unjust and cruel servitude of the tyranny. For out of such an ungoverned, or rather, untamed, populace someone is usually chosen as leader against those leading citizens who have already been subjected to persecution and cast down from their leadership - some bold and depraved man, who shamelessly harasses oftentimes even those who have deserved well of the State, and curries favour with the people by bestowing upon them the property of others as well as his own. To such a man, because he has much reason to be afraid if he remains a private citizen, official power is given and continually renewed, he is also surrounded by armed guards, as was Pisistratus at Athens; and finally he emerges as a tyrant over the very people who have raised him to power. If the better citizens overthrow such a tyrant, as often happens, then the State is re-established, but if it is the bolder sort who do so, then we have that oligarchy which is only a tyranny of another kind. This same form of government also arises from the excellent rule of an aristocracy, when some bad influence turns the leading citizens themselves from the right path. Thus the ruling power of the State, like a ball, is snatched from kings by tyrants, from tyrants by aristocrats or the people, and from them again by an oligarchical faction or a tyrant, so that no single form of government ever maintains itself very long.

§ 1.69  Since this is true, the kingship, in my opinion, is by far the best of the three primary forms, but a moderate and balanced form of government which is a combination of the three good simple forms is preferable even to the kingship. For there should be a supreme and royal element in the State, some power also ought to be granted to the leading citizens, and certain matters should be left to the judgment and desires of the masses. Such a constitution, in the first place, offers in a high degree a sort of equality, which is a thing free men can hardly do without for any considerable length of time, and, secondly, it has stability. For the primary forms already mentioned degenerate easily into the corresponding perverted forms, the king being replaced by a despot, the aristocracy by an oligarchical faction, and the people by a mob and anarchy, but whereas these forms are frequently changed into new ones, this does not usually happen in the case of the mixed and evenly balanced constitution, except through great faults in the governing class. For there is no reason for a change when every citizen is firmly established in his own station, and there underlies it no perverted form into which it can plunge and sink.

§ 1.70  But I am afraid that you, Laelius, and you, my very dear and learned friends, may think, if I spend more time upon this aspect of the subject, that my discourse is rather that of a master or teacher than of one who is merely considering these matters in company with yourselves. Therefore I will pass to a topic which is familiar to everyone, and which we ourselves discussed some time ago. For I am convinced, I believe, and I declare that no other form of government is comparable, either in its general character, in its distribution of powers, or in the training it gives, with that which our ancestors received from their own forefathers, and have handed down to us. Therefore, if you have no objection - since you have desired to hear me discourse upon matters with which you are already familiar - I will explain the character of this constitution and show why it is the best; and, using our own government as my pattern, I will fit to it, if I can, all I have to say about the ideal State. If I can keep to this intention and carry it through, the task that Laelius has imposed upon me will, in my opinion, have been abundantly accomplished.

§ 1.71  Laelius: The task is yours indeed, Scipio, and yours alone; for who is better qualified than yourself to speak of the institutions of our ancestors, since you yourself are descended from most famous forefathers? Or who is better able to speak of the ideal State? For if we are to have such a constitution (surely at present that is not the case), who would be more prominent in its administration than yourself? Or who is better qualified to speak of provisions for the future, when you have provided for all future time by freeing our city from the two dangers that threatened it ?

§ 1.72  FRAGMENTS OF BOOK I
[fr.1] . . . nor for very learned men
That Manius Persius read these words I care
No whit; let Junius Congus read them all.
[fr.2] Therefore, as our fatherland is the author of more benefits, and is an earlier parent than the father who begot us, surely greater gratitude is due to it than to a father.
[fr.3] Nor could Carthage have prospered so greatly for about six hundred years without good counsel and strict training.
[fr.4] . . . that I certainly am acquainted, he said, with this habit of yours, and with your eagerness for discussion. . .
[fr.5] Surely all the discussions of the men you mention, though they contain abundant springs of virtue and knowledge, nevertheless, if compared with what the others have actually performed and accomplished, would appear, I am afraid, to have provided men with more entertainment than stimulus to practical work.
[fr.6] . . . from which these friends of yours were summoning away. . .

§ 2.1  Book 2
All being on fire with eagerness to hear him, Scipio began as follows:
What I am about to say is derived from the aged Cato, for whom, as you know, I cherished a singular affection and had the highest admiration. Indeed, I spent all my time with him from my youth up, following my own inclination as well as the advice of both my fathers; and I never could get enough of his conversation, so remarkable was his experience of public affairs, with which he had dealt both in peace and war with the greatest success and for a very long period, his observance of due measure in speaking, his union of charm with dignity, his zeal for either learning or teaching, and the complete harmony between his life and his words.

§ 2.2  Cato: used to say that our constitution was superior to those of other States on account of the fact that almost every one of these other commonwealths had been established by one man, the author of their laws and institutions; for example, Minos in Crete, Lycurgus in Sparta, and in Athens, whose form of government had frequently changed, first Theseus, and later Dracon, Solon, Cleisthenes, and many others; and last of all, when the State lay bloodless and prostrate, that learned man of Phalerum, Demetrius, revived it again. On the other hand our own commonwealth was based upon the genius, not of one man, but of many, it was founded, not in one generation, but in a long period of several centuries and many ages of men For, said he, there never has lived a man possessed of so great genius that nothing could escape him, nor could the combined powers of all the men living at one time possibly make all necessary provisions for the future without the aid of actual experience and the test of time.

§ 2.3  Therefore, following Cato's precedent, my discourse will now go back to “the origin of the Roman People,” for I like to make use of his very words I shall, however, find my task easier if I place before you a description of our Roman State at its birth, during its growth, at its maturity, and finally in its strong and healthy state, than if I should follow the example of Socrates in Plato's work and myself invent an ideal State of my own.

§ 2.4  When all had signified their approval, he continued. What State's origin is so famous or so well known to all men as the foundation of this city by Romulus? He was the son of Mars (for we may grant that much to the popular tradition, especially as it is not only very ancient, but has been wisely handed down by our ancestors, who desired that those who have deserved well of the commonwealth should be deemed actual descendants of the gods, as well as endowed with godlike qualities), and after his birth they say that Amulius, the Alban king, fearing the overthrow of his own royal power, ordered him, with his brother Remus, to be exposed on the banks of the Tiber. There he was suckled by a wild beast from the forest, and was rescued by shepherds, who brought him up to the life and labours of the countryside. And when he grew up, we are told, he was so far superior to his companions in bodily strength and boldness of spirit that all who then lived in the rural district where our city now stands were willing and glad to be ruled by him. After becoming the leader of such forces as these (to turn now from fable to fact), we are informed that with their assistance he overthrew Alba Longa, a strong and powerful city for those times, and put King Amulius to death.

§ 2.5  After doing this glorious deed he conceived the plan, it is said, of founding a new city, if favourable auspices were obtained, and of establishing a commonwealth. As regards the site of his city - a matter which calls for the most careful foresight on the part of one who hopes to plant a commonwealth that will endure - he made an incredibly wise choice. For he did not build it down by the sea, though it would have been very easy for him, with the men and resources at his command, to invade the territory of the Rutuli and the Aborigines, or he might have founded his city on the mouth of the Tiber, where King Ancus planted a colony many years later. But with remarkable foresight our founder perceived that a site on the sea-coast is not the most desirable for cities founded in the hope of long life and extended dominion, primarily because maritime cities are exposed to dangers which are both manifold and impossible to foresee.

§ 2.6  For the mainland gives warning of the coming of the foeman, whether this be unexpected or expected, by means of many signs, and by what I may call a sort of rumbling din, the bare sound of moving men; nor can any enemy come upon us by land so swiftly that we are not able to learn not only that he is present, but also who he is and whence he comes. But a seafaring, ship-borne enemy can arrive before anyone is able to suspect that he is coming, and when he arrives he does not disclose who he is or whence he comes or even what his intentions are - in short, not even a single mark, showing whether he be friend or foe, can be made out and passed judgment upon.

§ 2.7  Maritime cities also suffer a certain corruption and degeneration of morals; for they receive a mixture of strange languages and customs, and import foreign ways as well as foreign merchandise, so that none of their ancestral institutions can possibly remain unchanged. Even their inhabitants do not cling to their dwelling places, but are constantly being tempted far from home by soaring hopes and dreams, and even when their bodies stay at home, their thoughts nevertheless fare abroad and go wandering. In fact, no other influence did more to bring about the final overthrow of Carthage and Corinth, though they had long been tottering, than this scattering and dispersion of their citizens, due to the fact that the lust for trafficking and sailing the seas had caused them to abandon agriculture and the pursuit of arms.

§ 2.8  Many things too that cause ruin to states as being incitements to luxury are supplied by the sea, entering either by capture or import; and even the mere delightfulness of such a site brings in its train many an allurement to pleasure through either extravagance or indolence. And what I said of Corinth may perhaps be said with truth of the whole of Greece; for even the Peloponnese is almost in its entire extent close to the sea, and there is no people in it except the Phliasians whose territory does not touch the sea; and outside the Peloponnese the Aenianes, the inhabitants of Doris, and the Dolopes are the only peoples who lie at a distance from the sea. Why should I speak of the islands of Greece? For surrounded as they are by the billows, not only they themselves but also the customs and institutions of their cities can be said to be afloat.

§ 2.9  The situation of the Greek homeland is what I have described; of all the colonies, on the other hand, which have been sent out by the Greeks to Asia, Thrace, Italy, Sicily, and Africa, which, except Magnesia alone, is not washed by the waves? Indeed it seems as if the lands of the barbarians had been bordered round with a Greek sea-coast; for none of the barbarians themselves were originally seafaring peoples except the Etruscans and the Phoenicians, the latter for purposes of trade and the former as pirates. Clearly the cause of the evils and the revolutions to which Greece has been subject is to be traced to those disadvantages which I have just mentioned briefly as peculiar to maritime cities But nevertheless with all these disadvantages they possess one great advantage - all the products of the world can be brought by water to the city in which you live, and your people in turn can convey or send whatever their own fields produce to any country they like.

§ 2.10  How, then, could Romulus have acted with a wisdom more divine, both availing himself of all the advantages of the sea and avoiding its disadvantages, than by placing his city on the bank of a never-failing river whose broad stream flows with unvarying current into the sea? Such a river enables the city to use the sea both for importing what it lacks and for exporting what it produces in superfluity; and by means of it likewise the city can not only bring in by sea but also obtain from the land, carried on its waters, whatever is most essential for its life and civilization. Consequently it seems to me that Romulus must at the very beginning have had a divine intimation that the city would one day be the seat and hearthstone of a mighty empire; for scarcely could a city placed upon any other site in Italy have more easily maintained our present widespread dominion.

§ 2.11  As to the natural defences of the city itself, who is so unobserving as not to have a clear outline of them imprinted upon his mind? The line and course of its walls were wisely planned by Romulus and the kings who succeeded him, being so placed on the everywhere steep and precipitous hillsides that the single approach which lies between the Esquiline and the Quirinal hills was girt about by a huge rampart facing the foe and by a mighty trench, and our citadel was so well fortified by the sheer precipices which encompass it and the rock which appeals to be cut away on every side that it remained safe and impregnable even at the terrible time of the advent of the Gauls. In addition, the site which he chose abounds in springs and is healthful, though in the midst of a pestilential region; for there are hills, which not only enjoy the breezes but at the same time give shade to the valleys below.

§ 2.12  And Romulus accomplished all this very quickly; for after founding the city, which by his command was called Rome after his own name, in order to strengthen the new commonwealth he adopted a plan which, though original and somewhat savage in character, yet for securing the prosperity of his kingdom and people revealed a great man who even then saw far into the future. For when Sabine maidens of honourable lineage had come to Rome on the occasion of the Consualia, to witness the games whose annual celebration in the circus he had just instituted, he ordered their seizure and married them to young men of the most prominent families.

§ 2.13  When the Sabines, thus provoked, made war on the Romans, and the fortunes of the conflict were various and its issue doubtful, Romulus made a treaty with Titus Tatius, the Sabine king, the stolen women themselves petitioning that this be done. By this treaty he not only added the Sabines to the body of Roman citizens, giving them participation in the religious rites of the State, but also made their king a partner in his royal power.

§ 2.14  But after the death of Tatius, when all the powers of government reverted to Romulus, although Tatius had been associated with him when he chose a royal council consisting of the most eminent men (who were called “Fathers” on account of the affection felt for them), and when he divided the people into three tribes (named after himself, after Tatius, and after his ally Lucumo, who had been killed in the Sabine War), and also into thirty curiae (which he named after the stolen Sabine maidens who had pleaded for a treaty of peace) - although these arrangements had been made during the lifetime of Tatius, yet after this king's death Romulus had paid even greater deference in his conduct of the government to the influence and advice of the Fathers.

§ 2.15  It was after he had adopted this policy that Romulus first discovered and approved the principle which Lycurgus had discovered at Sparta a short time before - that a State can be better governed and guided by the authority of one man, that is by the power of a king, if the influence of the State's most eminent men is joined to the ruler's absolute power. Accordingly, supported and guarded by such a body of advisers, to which we may give the name of “Senate” he waged many wars against his neighbours with the greatest good fortune, and, though he brought none of the booty to his own home, he never ceased enriching his people.

§ 2.16  He also gave complete obedience to the auspices, a custom which we still observe to the great security of the State. For he not only took the auspices himself when he founded the city - an act that was the beginning of our commonwealth - but also, before the performance of any public act, he chose augurs, one from each tribe, to act with him in taking the auspices. He also divided the plebeians up among the prominent citizens, who were to be their patrons (the usefulness of which arrangement I shall consider later), and punished the guilty, not by doing violence to their persons, but by the infliction of fines consisting of sheep and cattle, for wealth at that time consisted of domestic animals [pecus ] and the ownership of places [loci ] and from these two kinds of property we get our words “wealthy” [pecunosus ] and “rich” [locuples ].

§ 2.17  And after Romulus had reigned thirty-seven years, and established those two excellent foundations of our commonwealth, the auspices and the senate, his great achievements led to the belief that, when he disappeared during a sudden darkening of the sun, he had been added to the number of the gods; indeed such an opinion could never have gotten abroad about any human being save a man pre-eminently renowned for virtue.

§ 2.18  And the case of Romulus is all the more remarkable because all other men who are said to have become gods lived in ruder ages when there was a great inclination to the invention of fabulous tales, and ignorant men were easily induced to believe them; but we know that Romulus lived less than six hundred years ago, at a period when writing and education had long been in existence, and all those mistaken primitive ideas which grew up under uncivilized conditions had been done away with. For if, as we learn from the annals of the Greeks, Rome was founded in the second year of the seventh Olympiad, the life of Romulus fell in a period when Greece already abounded in poets and musicians, and when small credence was given to fables, except in regard to events of a much earlier time. For the first Olympiad is placed one hundred and eight years after Lycurgus began to write his laws, though some, deceived by a name, think that the Olympiads were instituted by this same Lycurgus. But Homer, according to the least estimate, lived about thirty years before Lycurgus.

§ 2.19  Hence it is clear that Homer lived a great many years before Romulus, so that in the lifetime of the latter, when learned men already existed and the age itself was one of culture, there was very little opportunity for the invention of fables. For whereas antiquity would accept fabulous tales, sometimes even when they were crudely fabricated, the age of Romulus, which was already one of culture, was quick to mock at and reject with scorn that which could not possibly have happened.
[A few lines are lost. The following passage is fragmentary and its restoration is uncertain. It seems probable, however, that Scipio mentioned several Greek poets who lived in the period under consideration, ending the list with Simonides. ]

§ 2.20  . . . his grandson through his daughter, as some said in the very year of his death, in the fifty-sixth Olympiad, Simonides was born, so that it is easy to see that the period in which the story of Romulus' immortality gamed credence was one in which human life had become a matter of old experience, and men had already reflected upon it and ascertained its nature. And yet certainly there was in Romulus such conspicuous ability that men believed about him, on the authority of that untutored peasant Proculus Julius, that which for many ages before they had not believed about any human being. For we are told that this Proculus, at the instigation of the senators, who wanted to free themselves from all suspicion in regard to Romulus' death, stated before a public assembly that he had seen Romulus on the hill now called Quirinal; and that Romulus had charged him to ask the people to build him a shrine on that hill, as he was now a god and was called Quirinus.

§ 2.21  Do you not perceive, then, that by the wisdom of a single man a new people was not simply brought into being and then left like an infant crying in its cradle, but was left already full-grown and almost in the maturity of manhood?
Laelius: We do indeed perceive this, and also that you on your part have entered upon a new style of discussion, one that is nowhere employed in the writings of the Greeks. For that eminent Greek, whose works have never been surpassed, began with the assumption of an unoccupied tract of land, so that he might build a State upon it to suit himself. His State may perhaps be an excellent one, but it is quite unsuited to men's actual lives and habits.

§ 2.22  His successors have discussed the different types of State and their basic principles without presenting any definite example or model. But you, I infer, mean to combine these two methods, for you have approached your subject as if you preferred to give the credit for your own discoveries to others rather than, following the example of Socrates in Plato's work, to invent a new State yourself; and in what you have said about the site of your State you are referring to a definite principle the things done by Romulus either by chance or necessity; and, in the third place your discussion does not wander about, but confines itself to a single State. Therefore continue as you have begun, for I think I can foresee, as you follow the reigns of the succeeding kings, the State's progress toward perfection.

§ 2.23  Scipio: Well, then, when the senate of Romulus, which consisted of the most eminent men, and had been so much favoured by the king that he desired its members to be called “Fathers” and their children “patricians”, - when this senate attempted, after the death of Romulus, to rule the State by itself, dispensing with a king, the people would not tolerate it, but, in their affectionate longing for Romulus, continually thereafter demanded a king.
Then that body of leading men with great wisdom devised a plan which was entirely new and had never been heard of in any other State - the interregnum. Their purpose was that, until a permanent king was chosen, the State should neither be without a king nor yet subject to any one king who should hold office for a long time; and that the State should not be put into such a position that any man, growing accustomed to power, might become either too reluctant to lay aside the royal prerogative or too well entrenched for holding it.

§ 2.24  For even at that period the new nation perceived a fact that had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus; for it was his thought that the king should be, not one freely chosen (assuming that the power of Lycurgus could have extended as far as that), but one retained in power, whatever sort of man he might chance to be, if he were but the offspring of the stock of Hercules. Yet our ancestors, rustics though they even then were, saw that kingly virtue and wisdom, not royal ancestry, were the qualities to be sought.

§ 2.25  And since Numa Pompilius had the reputation of being pre-eminent in these qualities, the people themselves, by the advice of the Fathers, passed over their own citizens and chose a foreigner as their king, inviting this man, a Sabine of Cures, to come to Rome and rule over them. When he arrived, although the people had already chosen him king in the assembly of the curiae, he nevertheless of his own accord caused another curiate law, to be passed confirming him in his royal authority. And seeing that, as a result of their mode of life under Romulus, the Romans were filled with ardour for the pursuit of war, he thought it best to discourage that propensity to some slight extent.

§ 2.26  And first of all he divided up among the citizens the land which Romulus had won by conquest, giving each man a share, and showed them that by the cultivation of their farms they could have an abundance of all manner of possessions without resort to pillage or plunder. Thus he implanted in them a love for peace and tranquillity, which enable justice and good faith to flourish most easily, and under whose protection the cultivation of the land and the enjoyment of its products are most secure. Pompilius also instituted the “greater auspices,” added two augurs to the original number, and put five pontiffs, selected from the most eminent citizens, in charge of the religious rites, and by the introduction of religious ceremonial, through laws which still remain on our records, he quenched the people's ardour for the warlike life to which they had been accustomed. He also appointed flamens, Salii, and Vestal Virgins, and established all the branches of our religion with the most devout solicitude.

§ 2.27  He desired that the proper performance of the rites themselves should be difficult, but that the equipment necessary for them should be easily obtainable, for he provided that much should be learned by heart and scrupulously observed, but made the expenditure of money unnecessary. Thus he made the performance of religious duties laborious but not costly. He also established markets, games, and all sorts of other occasions for the gathering of large numbers. By the institution of such customs as these he turned toward benevolence and kindliness the thoughts of men who had become savage and brutish through their passion for war. Thus, when he had reigned for thirty-nine years in complete peace and harmony (to follow as our chief authority our friend Polybius, who is unsurpassed in chronological accuracy), he died, after having established the two elements which most conspicuously contribute to the stability of a State - religion and the spirit of tranquillity

§ 2.28  At this point in Scipio's discourse Manilius said: Is there really a tradition, Africanus, that this King Numa was a pupil, or at least a follower, of Pythagoras? For we have often heard this statement made by our elders and are aware that it is commonly believed, and yet we are quite certain that it cannot be definitely proved by reference to our official records.
Scipio: This story is entirely false, Manilius, and not merely an invention, but an ignorant and absurd one as well. For falsehoods are indeed intolerable which are not merely obvious inventions, but even relate what we know could not possibly have happened. For it has been ascertained that, in the fourth year of the reign of Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, Pythagoras visited Sybaris and Croton and the neighbouring parts of Italy; for the accession of Superbus and the arrival of Pythagoras are both recorded to have fallen in the same Olympiad, the sixty-second.

§ 2.29  From this fact, by adding up the reigns of all the kings, we can see that Pythagoras came to Italy for the first time about one hundred and forty years after Numa's death; and there never has been any doubt about this in the minds of those who have made a careful study of the chronological records.
Manilius: Ye immortal gods! What a blunder to pass current so long! Yet I am not sorry that we Romans got our culture, not from arts imported from overseas, but from the native excellence of our own people

§ 2.30  Scipio: Yet you will be able to realize this more easily if you watch our commonwealth as it advances, and, by a route which we may call Nature's road, finally reaches the ideal condition. Nay more, you will deem our ancestors' wisdom worthy of praise for the very reason that, as you will learn, even of those institutions that have been bon owed from abroad, many have been improved by us until they are much better than they were in the countries from which we obtained them and where they had their origin. And you will learn that the Roman People has grown great, not by chance, but by good counsel and discipline, though to be sure fortune has favoured us also.

§ 2.31  After the death of King Pompilius the people, in their curiate assembly presided over by an interrex, chose Tullus Hostilius as their king, and he followed the example of Pompilius by consulting the people, in the same curiate assembly, in regard to his possession of the royal power. This king excelled in military skill and mighty deeds of war; he built and walled in, from the proceeds of the sale of his spoils, a meeting-place for the popular assemblies and one for the senate; and he formulated rules for the declaration of war. He consecrated this eminently just code, which he himself had originated, by means of the fetial rites, so that any war which had not been declared and announced should be considered unjust and impious. And that you may take note how wisely even our early kings perceived that certain rights should be granted to the people (a subject on which I shall have a deal to say later), observe that Tullus did not venture to assume even the insignia of royalty without the permission of the people. For, that he might be allowed to be preceded by twelve lictors carrying the rods. . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. According to St Augustine ( De Civ Dei III, 15) the lost passage included the statement that, though Tullus Hostilius was killed by a stroke of lightning, it was not rumoured, as in the case of Romulus, that he had been taken up into heaven, perhaps because the Romans were unwilling that their first king should share this honour with another. ]

§ 2.33  . . . for the commonwealth, according to the account you have begun to give of it, is not creeping but flying toward the ideal condition.
Scipio: To succeed him Ancus Martius, grandson of Numa Pompilius through his daughter, was chosen king by the people, and he too caused a curiate law to be passed confirming his royal authority After conquering the Latins in war he incorporated them in the Roman State; he also added the Aventine and Caelian Hills to the city, divided among the citizens the territory he had conquered, made all the forests along the sea-coast, which he had obtained by conquest, public property, built a city at the mouth of the Tiber, and settled it with colonists. And so, after a reign of twenty-three years, he died.
Laelius: Truly a praiseworthy king! But the history of Rome is indeed obscure if we know who this king's mother was, but are ignorant of his father's name!
Scipio: That is true, but of that period very little more than the names of the kings has been handed down to us with any definiteness.

§ 2.34  Still it was at this time that the commonwealth appeals first to have become familiar with an alien system of education. For it was indeed no little rivulet that flowed from Greece into our city, but a mighty river of culture and learning. For we are told that a certain Demaratus of Corinth, easily pre-eminent in his own city in rank, influence, and wealth, fled with his great riches, not being able to endure the tyranny of Cypselus at Corinth, and came to Tarquinii, the most prosperous city of Etruria. And when he heard that the despotism of Cypselus was firmly established, this bold lover of liberty became a permanent exile from his country, and, being received as a citizen at Tarquinii, made his home there. When his Tarquinian wife had borne him two sons, he educated them in all the arts in accordance with the Greek system. . .
[About ten lines are lost. In what follows Lucius Tarquinius, the son of Demaratus, is referred to. ]

§ 2.35  . . . having easily obtained citizenship, [Lucius] became the friend of King Ancus on account of his geniality and great learning, and they were so intimate that he was believed to share all the king's counsels and to be almost a sharer in the throne In addition, he possessed gieat personal charm, and he showed the greatest kindness in granting help and assistance, protection, and even pecuniary aid, to all the citizens. Therefore, when Marcius died, the people by a unanimous vote elected Lucius Tarquinius king (for he had in this manner modified his Greek name, that he might appear to he adopting the customs of his new country in every respect). After having caused a law to be passed confirming his royal authority, he first of all doubled the original number of senators, and gave to those who had previously been called “Fathers” the title of “senators of the greater families” (these were always asked for their opinion first), and those whom he himself had added he designated “senators of the lesser families.”

§ 2.36  Then he established that organization of the knights which we still retain; but though he desired to change the names of the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, he was unable to do so, because the celebrated augur Attus Navius would not consent to it. I understand that the Corinthians also were given to the practice of supplying their knights with horses owned by the State, and feeding them, from contributions exacted from widows and orphan. At any rate Lucius added new cavalry organizations to the old ones, making a total of 1800 horse, thus doubling the original number. Later he conquered the Aequi, a powerful and warlike nation which threatened the welfare of the Roman people, and also drove the Sabines from the walls of the city, routed them with his cavalry, and finally conquered them completely. Tradition also informs us that he instituted those great games called “Roman”; that, in the war with the Sabines, he made a vow during a battle to build a temple to Jupiter the Greatest and Best on the Capitoline Hill; and that he died after a reign of thirty-eight years.

§ 2.37  Laelius: Now we have further proof of the accuracy of Cato's statement that the foundation of our State was the work neither of one period nor of one man; for it is quite clear that every king contributed many good and useful institutions But the one who comes next, in my opinion, had a better understanding of the government of a State than any of the rest.
Scipio: Quite true; for Servius Tullius followed Tarquinius; he, according to tradition, was the first to hold the royal power without being chosen by the people. They say that his mother was a slave in the household of Tarquinius, and his father one of the king's dependents. Though he was brought up as a slave, and served the king's table, yet the spark of genius, which shone even then in the boy, did not remain unnoticed, so capable was he in every duty and in every word he spoke. On this account Tarquinius, whose children were still very young, became so fond of Servius that the latter was popularly regarded as his son; and the king took the greatest care to have him educated in all the branches which he himself had studied, in accordance with the most careful practice of the Greeks.

§ 2.38  But when Tarquinius was killed by a plot formed by the sons of Ancus, Servius began to rule, as I have said, without being formally chosen by the people, but with their goodwill and consent. For the false report was given out that Tarquinius, though ill from his wound, was still alive; and Servius, assuming the royal garb, pronounced judgments, freed debtors at his own expense, and acting with great affability, convinced the people that he was administering justice by the orders of Tarquinius. He did not put himself in the senate's power, but, after the burial of Tarquinius, consulted the people himself in regard to his own power, and, when they had bidden him to be king, caused a curiate law to be passed confirming his royal authority. At the very beginning of his reign he made war on the Etruscans and avenged the wrongs of which they were guilty. From this [war] . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost After the gap we find Scipio describing the reforms of King Servius, particularly the institution of the centuriate assembly. ]

§ 2.39  . . . eighteen of the greatest wealth. Then after choosing a large number of knights out of the whole people, Servius divided the rest of the citizens into five classes, and separated the older from the younger. He made this division in such a way that the greatest number of votes belonged, not to the common people, but to the rich, and put into effect the principle which ought always to be adhered to in the commonwealth, that the greatest number should not have the greatest power. If his system were not well known to you, I should describe it, but you are already aware that the arrangement is such that the centuries of knights with their six votes, and the first class, with the addition of the century composed of the carpenters on account of their great usefulness to the city, make up a total of 89 centuries. Now if, out of a total of 104 centuries - for that is the number left - only eight centuries should adhere to the 89, the whole power of the people would be exerted. And the remaining 96 centuries, which contain a large majority of the citizens, would neither be deprived of the suffrage, for that would be tyrannical, nor be given too much power, for that would be dangerous.

§ 2.40  In this arrangement Servius was careful even in his use of titles and names, for he called the rich “money-givers,” because they paid the expenses of the State, and named those who had less than 1500 denarii or nothing at all except their own persons, “child-givers,” to give the impression that offspring, that is to say, the progeny of the State, were to be expected from them. A number of individuals which was almost larger than that contained in the whole first class was placed in every one of the 96 centuries of this proletarian class. Thus, while no one was deprived of the suffrage, the majority of votes was in the hands of those to whom the highest welfare of the State was the most important. And indeed the official messengers, the auxiliary troops, the trumpeters and buglers, the proletarians. . ,
[About thirty lines are lost, of which the following fragment may be a part. At the end of the gap Carthage is referred to. ]

§ 2.41  . . . [I consider] the best constitution for a State to be that which is a balanced combination of the three forms mentioned, kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, and does not irritate by punishment a rude and savage heart. .

§ 2.42  . . . sixty-five years older, for it was founded in the thirty-ninth year before the first Olympiad. And Lycurgus, who lived in very ancient times, had almost the same idea. This equalized system, this combination of three constitutions, is in my opinion common to those nations and to ours. But the unique characteristic of our own commonwealth - the most splendid conceivable - I shall describe more completely and accurately, if I can, because nothing like it is to be found in any other State. For those elements which I have mentioned were combined in our State as it was then, and in those of the Spartans and Carthaginians, in such a way that there was no balance among them whatever.

§ 2.43  For in a State where there is one official who holds office for life, particularly if he be a king, even if there is a senate, such as existed at Rome under the monarchy and at Sparta under the code of Lycurgus, and even if the people possess some power, as they did under our kings - in spite of these facts the royal power is bound to be supreme, and such a government is inevitably a monarchy and will inevitably be so called. And this form of government is the most liable of all to change, because one man's vices can overthrow it and turn it easily toward utter destruction. For not only is the kingship in itself not at all reprehensible, but I am inclined to consider it by far the best of the simple forms of government - if I could approve any of the simple forms - but only so long as it retains its true character. But it does that only when the safety, equal lights, and tranquillity of the citizens are guarded by the life-long authority, the justice, and the perfect wisdom of a single ruler. To be sure a nation ruled by a king is deprived of many things, and particularly of liberty, which does not consist in serving a just master, but in [serving] no [master at all] . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. At the end of the gap the reign of Tarquinius Superbus is being cited as an example of the degeneration of monarchy. ]

§ 2.44  . . .They bore [the tyranny of Tarquinius nevertheless;] for even that unjust and cruel master occasionally enjoyed good fortune in his undertakings. Indeed, he conquered the whole of Latium and took the prosperous city of Suessa Pometia with its vast wealth, winning thereby an enormous store of gold and silver, with which he paid his father's vow by building the Capitol; he also planted colonies, and, following the example of his ancestors, sent magnificent gifts - an offering of the first-fruits, as it were, of his booty - to Apollo at Delphi

§ 2.45  At this point begins that orbit of development with whose natural motion and circular course you must become acquainted from its beginning. For the foundation of that political wisdom which is the aim of our whole discourse is an understanding of the regular curving path through which governments travel, in order that, when you know what direction any commonwealth tends to take, you may be able to hold it back or take measures to meet the change
Now this king of whom I am speaking, his hands being stained with the blood of a most excellent king, did not begin his reign with a clear conscience, and as he was himself in fear of suffering the extreme penalty for his crime, he wished to make himself feared by others. Later, relying upon his victories and his wealth, he became swollen with pride and was unable to control either his own conduct or the lustful desires of his family.

§ 2.46  Wherefore, when his elder son violated Lucretia, the daughter of Tricipitinus and wife of Collatinus, and this noble and virtuous woman inflicted the death penalty upon herself as a result of the outrage, Lucius Brutus, a man pre-eminent for wisdom and bravery, freed his fellow-citizens from the unjust yoke of cruel servitude.
And though Brutus was only a private citizen, he sustained the whole burden of the government, and was the first in our State demonstrate that no one is a mere private citizen when the liberty of his fellows needs protection. On his initiative and under his leadership the people, aroused not only by the bitter complaints, still fresh in their memories, of Lucretia's father and kinsmen, but also by their own recollection of the pride of Tarquinius and the many acts of injustice committed by him and his sons, banished the king himself, his children, and the whole race of the Tarquinii.

§ 2.47  Do you not see, therefore, how a king was transformed into a despot, and how a good form of government was changed into the worst possible form through the fault of one man? For here we have a master over the people, whom the Greeks call a tyrant; for they maintain that the title of king should be given only to a ruler who is as solicitous for the welfare of his people as is a father for his children, and maintains in the best possible conditions of life those over whom he is set. Such a government is truly a good one, as I have said, but nevertheless it inclines, and, I may almost say, naturally tends, toward the condition which is the most depraved of all.

§ 2.48  For as soon as this king turned to a mastery less just than before, he instantly became a tyrant, and no creature more vile or horrible than a tyrant, or more hateful to gods and men, can be imagined; for, though he bears a human form, yet he surpasses the most monstrous of the wild beasts in the cruelty of his nature. For how could the name of human being rightly be given to a creature who desires no community of justice, no partnership in human life with his fellow-citizens - aye, even with any part of the human race? But we shall find a more suitable point in our discourse for the consideration of this subject; when the very course of events constrains us to condemn those who, even after the liberation of the State, have sought despotic power.

§ 2.49  Here, then, you have the origin of the tyrant; for that is the title given by the Greeks to an unjust king, while we Romans have always given the name of king to all who exercise for life sole authority over a nation. Thus, for example, it has been said that Spurius Cassius, Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Maelius attempted to win the kingship, and recently [ Tiberius Gracchus ] . . .
[About fifteen lines are lost. Lycurgus is evidently the subject of the sentence which follows. ]

§ 2.50  [Lycurgus] called [this body gerontes ] at Sparta; but it was a very small number of men, twenty-eight in fact, who according to his plan were to have the supreme authority in counsel, while the king held the supreme executive power. And our ancestors, imitating his example and translating the title he used, gave the name of “senate” to the body which he had called “old men” ; this was done by Romulus himself, as we have said, after he had chosen the Fathers Yet the power, authority, and very title of the king stand out supreme in such a State. Grant some power to the people also, as did both Lycurgus and Romulus; you will not give them their fill of liberty, but merely excite their appetite for it, when you permit them to do no more than taste its flavour. And all the while there weighs heavily upon their hearts the fear that an unjust king may arise, as indeed often happens. The fortune of any people is therefore a fragile thing, as I have explained already, when it depends on the will or the character of one man.

§ 2.51  Therefore we may consider that the first form and variety of tyranny, and its way of coming into being, have come to light in this State of ours which Romulus founded after taking the auspices, and not in the commonwealth described by Socrates, as Plato tells us in his famous peripatetic discourse. For, just as happened in the case of Tarquinius, the tyrant overthrows the whole monarchical constitution, not by seizing any new powers, but by his misuse of the powers he already possesses. With him we may place in contrast that other type of ruler, the good, wise, and skilful guardian and protector, as one may say, of the practical interests and of the self-respect of the citizens of the State; for these are titles which will be granted to one who is truly the guide and pilot of a nation. See to it that you are able to recognize such a man, for he is one who can maintain the safety of the State both by counsel and by action. As, however, this subject has not been very fully treated so far in our conversation, and as this type of man will have to be considered rather often later in our discourse, [we shall say no more of him at the present time.]
[About four pages are lost. Plato is the subject of the sentence which follows. ]

§ 2.52  . . . has sought for. . . and has created a State of a kind that is to be desired rather than hoped for - one of the smallest size, not such as to be actually possible, but in which it might be possible to see the workings, of his theory of the State. As for me, however, I shall endeavour, if I am able to accomplish my purpose, employing the same principles which Plato discerned, yet taking no shadowy commonwealth of the imagination, but a real and very powerful State, to seem to you to be pointing out, as with a demonstrating rod, the causes of every political good and ill.
Now after these two hundred and forty years of monarchy (or a little longer, if one included the periods of interregnum), when Tarquinius had been banished, the title of king came to be as bitterly hated by the Romans as it had been longingly desired after the death, or rather the departure, of Romulus. Hence, just as then they could not bear to be without a king, so now, after the banishment of Tarquinius, they could not bear even to hear the title of king mentioned.
[About five pages are lost, of which the following fragment may be a part; a further clue to the contents of the lost passage may possibly be found in St Augustine, De Civ. Dei V, 12. According to this passage Cicero perhaps went on to say that the Romans substituted two supreme magistrates with annual tenure of office, and with an inoffensive title { consul, here derived from consulere, to consult ] for the king [rex, here connected with regno, to reign ]. }

§ 2.53  . . . Thus that excellent constitution of Romulus, after maintaining itself firmly for about two hundred and twenty years. . .
. . . that law was entirely abolished. It was on account of this feeling that our ancestors banished the unoffending Collatinus at that time, on account of the suspicion caused by his relationship, and all the other Tarquinii, on account of the hatred felt for the name. Another manifestation of the same spirit was the institution by Publius Valerius of the custom of ordering the rods to be lowered when he began to speak before the people; also the fact that he moved the site of his house to the foot of the Velian Hill when he noticed that popular suspicion was aroused because he had begun to build on the very spot on the top of that hill where King Tullius had resided. It was the same man who, by an act whereby he shows himself in the highest sense “the people's friend,” proposed to the citizens that first law passed by the centuriate assembly, which forbade any magistrate to execute or scourge a Roman citizen in the face of an appeal.

§ 2.54  The records of the pontiffs, however, state that the right of appeal, even against a king's sentence, had been previously recognized, and our augural books confirm the statement. Besides, many laws of the Twelve Tables show that an appeal from any judgment or sentence was allowed, and the tradition that the decemvirs who wrote the laws were elected with the provision that there should be no appeal from their decision shows clearly enough that other officials were subject to this right of appeal. And a law proposed by the consuls Lucius Valerius Potitus and Marcus Horatius Barbatus [449 BCE], men who wisely favoured popular measures to preserve peace, provides that no magistrate not subject to appeal shall be elected. Nor indeed did the Porcian laws, which, as you know, are three in number and were proposed by three different members of the Porcian family, add anything new to previous statutes except the provision of a penalty for violations.

§ 2.55  Thus Publicola, as soon as that law of his in regard to the right of appeal was passed, ordered the axes to be removed from the bundle of rods; and the next day he caused Spurius Lucretius to be elected as his colleague and ordered his own lictors to be transferred to Spurius as his senior in age. Publicola also introduced the rule that the lictors should precede each consul alternately for one month, so that the insignia of executive power might not be more numerous in the free State than they had been under the monarchy. In my opinion, it was a man of no ordinary talents who, by granting the people a moderate amount of liberty, the more easily maintained the power of the leaders of the State.
Now it is not without a definite purpose that I am reviewing events so ancient and remote, but I am taking my standards of character and action, to which the rest of my discourse must conform, from distinguished men and famous periods of om own history.

§ 2.56  Well then, at the period of which I have been speaking, the government was so administered by the senate that, though the people were free, few political acts were performed by them, practically everything being done by the authority of the senate and in accordance with its established customs, and that the consuls held a power which, though only of one year's duration, was truly regal in general character and in legal sanction. Another principle that was most important to the retention of the power by the aristocracy was also strictly maintained, namely, that no act of a popular assembly should be valid unless ratified by the Fathers. It was in the same period that the dictatorship was also instituted, Titus Larcius, the first dictator, being appointed about ten years after the election of the first consuls. This office was looked upon as embodying an entirely new sort of executive power which was very close to that of a king. Yet the whole government was kept, with the people's consent, in the strong hands of the aristocracy, and in those times mighty deeds of war were done by the brave men who held the supreme power either as dictators or as consuls.

§ 2.57  But after a short period, in about the sixteenth year of the republic, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius Cassius [493 BCE], an event occurred which in the nature of things was bound to happen: the people, freed from the domination of kings, claimed a somewhat greater measure of rights. Such a claim may have been unreasonable, but the essential nature of the commonwealth often defeats reason. For you must keep in mind a fact which I mentioned at the beginning: unless there is in the State an even balance of rights, duties, and functions, so that the magistrates have enough power, the counsels of the eminent citizens enough influence, and the people enough liberty, this kind of government cannot be safe from revolution.

§ 2.58  For at a time when the State was troubled by debt, the plebeians seized first the Sacred Mount, and then the Aventine Hill. And indeed not even the disciplinary system of Lycurgus was able to hold his subjects, though they were Greeks, under bridle and bit; for, in Sparta also, in the reign of Theopompus, the five officials called ephors, and in Crete the ten so-called kosmoi, were set up in opposition to the royal authority, just as at Rome the plebeian tribunes were chosen to counterbalance the power of the consuls.

§ 2.59  Perhaps our ancestors, to relieve the pressure of debt, might have used some such method as that which Solon the Athenian, who lived only a short time before, had not failed to discover, and which came to our own senate's notice some time later; for then, on account of one man's lust, all those citizens who had been enslaved for debt were released, and such enslavement was no longer permitted, and always, when the plebeians have been so weakened by the expenditures brought on by a public calamity that they give way under their burden, some relief or remedy has been sought for the difficulties of this class, for the sake of the safety of the whole body of citizens. But at the time of which I have been speaking such measures had not been taken, and thus the people were given an occasion, through the creation of two plebeian tribunes by means of an insurrection, for curtailing the power and influence of the senate. This power, however, remained great and respected, because the wisest and bravest still guided the State by arms and counsel, and their influence continued to be supreme because, while they surpassed the masses in preferment, they had a smaller share of the pleasures of life, and in property were not, as a rule, better off than their fellows. And the public services of every patrician were the more highly esteemed because they scrupulously made it their practice to aid individual citizens most liberally in their private difficulties by action, advice, and financial support.

§ 2.60  When the State was in this situation, Spurius Cassius, who enjoyed the greatest popularity, plotted to make himself king. The quaestor accused him of the crime (you have heard the story), and, when the father of Spurius testified that he knew him to be guilty, put him to death with the approval of the people. Later, about the fifty-fourth year after the election of the first consuls, the centuriate assembly passed that popular law regulating fines and amounts deposited in court, this law having been proposed by the consuls Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius [454 BCE]. Twenty years later, because the censors Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius had transferred, by the imposition of fines, a large number of cattle from private to public ownership, a method of appraising cattle that lightened the fines was introduced, in a law proposed by the consuls Gaius Julius and Publius Papirius.

§ 2.61  But several years before this, when the senate held supreme authority with the compliance and consent of the people, a plan was adopted whereby both the consuls and the plebeian tribunes should resign their offices, and a board of ten, possessing very great powers and not subject to the right of appeal, should be elected; and they were not only to exercise the supreme executive power but also to draw up a code of law. When these men had composed, with the greatest justice and wisdom, ten tables of the law, they caused another board of ten to be elected in their stead for the following year, but the honour and justice of these latter have not been praised so highly. One member of this college, however, Gaius Julius, deserves the highest praise, for, after stating that he himself had seen a corpse dug up in the chamber of Lucius Sestius, a man of high rank, although Julius himself held the supreme power, because no appeal was permitted from the sentence of any decemvir, he merely demanded that Lucius give bail for his appearance, explaining that he would not violate that excellent law which forbade a Roman citizen to be tried for his life except before the centuriate assembly.

§ 2.62  A third year of the decemvirate followed, the same decemvirs continuing in office, and being unwilling to have others elected in their stead. While the government was in this situation (which, as I have stated repeatedly, can never last long, because it is not fair to all classes in the State), the whole commonwealth was in the hands of the leading citizens, there being ten eminent men in command, with no plebeian tribunes to oppose them, no other magistrates whatever in office, and not even any right of appeal to the people against execution or scourging.

§ 2.63  Consequently, as a result of the injustice of these rulers, there was a great insurrection, followed by a complete change in the government. For the decemvirs had added two tables of unjust laws, among which was one that most cruelly prohibited intermarriage between plebeians and patricians, though this privilege is usually permitted even between citizens of different States; this was later repealed by the Canuleian Law, a decree of the plebeian assembly. These decemvirs also indulged in licence in all their governmental acts, and in cruelty and greed toward the people. The story of Decimus Verginius is of course well known, being recorded in many of the greatest works of our literature: how, after killing his virgin daughter with his own hand in the forum on account of the mad lust of one of these decemvirs, he fled weeping to the army, then encamped on Mount Algidus; whereupon the soldiers abandoned the war in which they were engaged and [occupied under arms] at first the Sacred Mount, as they had done before for a similar reason, and later the Aventine Hill . . .
[About three pages are lost, of which the following short fragment may be a part. ]
. . . Lucius Quinctius being appointed dictator . . .
. . . [which,] in my opinion, [our ancestors] approved most fully and retained most wisely.

§ 2.64  After Scipio had spoken thus, everyone was silent in expectation that he would continue. Finally Tubero said: Since my elders here make no further demands on you, Africanus, I will tell you what I should like you to add to your discourse.
Scipio: Certainly, I shall be glad to hear.
Tubero: It seems to me that you have praised our own commonwealth, though Laelius asked you to discuss, not our own State, but the State in general. And yet I have not learned from your discourse by what training, customs, or laws we shall be able to establish or to preserve the kind of commonwealth you yourself recommend.

§ 2.65  Scipio: I think, Tubero, we shall soon find a more suitable point in our conversation at which to consider the formation and preservation of States; but as far as the ideal State is concerned, I thought I had given an adequate response to the inquiry of Laelius. For in the first place I defined the three commendable types of States and the three bad types which are their opposites. Next I demonstrated that no single one of these types is the ideal, but that a form of government which is an equal mixture of the three good forms is superior to any of them by itself.

§ 2.66  As for my using our own State as a pattern, I did so, not to help me to define the ideal constitution (for that could be done without using any pattern at all), but in order to show, by illustrations from the actual history of the greatest State of all, what it was that reason and speech were striving to make clear. But if you inquire as to the nature of the ideal State in itself, without reference to a pattern furnished by any people, we must make use of a model supplied by nature, since you [are not satisfied with] our present model for a city and a people. . .
[A passage of considerable but uncertain length is lost. After the gap Scipio appears to be discussing the ideal statesman. ]

§ 2.67  Scipio: . . . whom I have long been seeking and am anxious to discover.
Laelius: Perhaps it is a man of good sense that you seek?
Scipio: Exactly.
Laelius: You have a goodly supply of such among those now present; you might begin with yourself, for example,
Scipio: And indeed I only wish there were as high an average of good sense in the senate as a whole! However, that is also a man of good sense who rides upon a huge and monstrous beast (a sight we have often met with in Africa) and guides this animal in whatever direction he wishes by gentle word or touch.
Laelius: I remember seeing this frequently when I was an officer under your command
Scipio: Well, that Indian or Carthaginian governs a single animal which is gentle and accustomed to the ways of man, but that power which is hidden in men's minds and forms a part of them, and is called reason, controls and subdues not merely one animal, or one which is easily mastered - that is, if it ever does accomplish that which is rarely possible; for that fierce [beast] also must be held in check. . . ?
[A page or more is lost, from which the short fragments in 41 may be quoted. Scipio continues his description of the ideal statesman in 42. ]

§ 2.68  . . . [a beast] which feeds on blood; which takes such delight in every sort of cruelty that it can hardly be sated even by the merciless slaughter of men. . .
. . . but to one who is greedy and acquisitive and lustful, and who wallows in sensual pleasure. . .
. . . and, in the fourth place, anxiety, prone to sorrow, ever grieving and torturing itself. . .
. . . to have been afflicted by anguish and suffering, or degraded by fear and cowardice. . .
. . . as an untrained charioteer is dragged from his chariot, trampled, lacerated, crushed. . .

§ 2.69  Scipio: . . . might be said.
Laelius: I now understand what duty and function you would entrust to the sort of man I was seeking.
Scipio: Of course he should be given almost no other duties than this one (for it comprises most of the others) - of improving and examining himself continually, urging others to imitate him, and furnishing in himself, as it were, a mirror to his fellow-citizens by reason of the supreme excellence of his life and character. For just as in the music of harps and flutes or in the voices of singers a certain harmony of the different tones must be preserved, the interruption or violation of which is intolerable to trained ears, and as this perfect agreement and harmony is produced by the proportionate blending of unlike tones, so also is a State made harmonious by agreement among dissimilar elements, brought about by a fair and reasonable blending together of the upper, middle, and lower classes, just as if they were musical tones. What the musicians call harmony in song is concord in a State, the strongest and best bond of permanent union in any commonwealth, and such concord can never be brought about without the aid of justice.
[A passage of uncertain length is lost. In it, according to St Augustine (De Civ. Dei II, 21), when Scipio had spoken further of the importance of justice in a State and the unfortunate results of its absence, Philus asked that this question be considered more fully, and that justice be taken up at greater length, because it was a common opinion that the government of a State cannot be carried on without injustice. ]

§ 2.70  . . . to be full of justice.
Scipio: I agree with you, and wish to assure you that we must consider all the statements we have made so far about the commonwealth as amounting to nothing, and must admit that we have no basis whatever for further progress, unless we cannot merely disprove the contention that a government cannot be earned on without injustice, but are also able to prove positively that it cannot be carried on without the strictest justice. However, with your permission, we shall go no further today, but shall put off what remains (for that is a considerable amount) until tomorrow.
This proposal being agreed to, they made an end of the conversation for that day.

§ 3.1  Book 3
[Cicero prefaces the second day's discussion with an introduction of considerable length, of which sections 3-7 form a part. St Augustine (De Civ. Dei II, 21) has given us a brief outline of the discussion itself. Philus is prevailed upon to undertake the defence of the thesis that the government cannot be carried on without injustice (sections 8-28). Laelius then takes up the defence of justice, maintaining that nothing is so harmful to a State as injustice, and that a State cannot be preserved without justice (sections 32-41). Scipio then resumes his discourse, and argues that his commonwealth as previously defined cannot be said to exist at all except where the government is just (sections 42-48). ]
[A page or more is lost at the beginning of the book. According to St Augustine (Contra Iulianum Pelag. IV, 12, 60), the book begins with some reflections on man's weakness at birth, and how it is overcome by the divine spirit planted within him. ]

§ 3.3  . . . and by vehicles [to remedy] his slowness of motion. . . and [reason] likewise, when it found men uttering unformed and confused sounds with unpractised voices, separated these sounds into distinct classes, imprinting names upon things just as distinguishing marks are sometimes placed upon them, thus uniting the race of men, solitary before, by the pleasant bond of communication by speech. Reason also marked and represented all the sounds of the voice, which seemed innumerable, by a few characters which it invented, so that conversation could be carried on with persons at a distance, and indications of our desires and records of past events could be set down. To this art was added that of numbers, which is not only necessary for human life but also unique in being unchangeable and eternal in itself. And acquaintance with this art first encouraged men to look up at the sky and to gaze, no longer idly, upon the motions of the stars, and by the numbering of nights and days. . .
[About three pages are lost. The account of the development of civilization is concluded in what follows, with the rise of philosophy and the art of statesmanship as its climax. ]

§ 3.4  . . . whose thoughts rose to an even higher plane, and they were able to achieve, by action or reflection, things worthy of the gift they had received, as I have said, from the gods. Wherefore let us admit that those who discuss the principles of living are great men, which is indeed the truth; let us recognize them as learned, and as teachers of truth and virtue, if only we do not forget that another science is by no means to be scorned, whether it was discovered by men who had had actual experience with various kinds of States, or was developed through the quiet study of these same learned men - I mean the art of government and the training of peoples, which, in men of ability and good character, calls into being, as it has very often done in the past, an almost incredible and divine virtue.

§ 3.5  But if anyone has believed, as these men do who are carrying on the discussion recorded in the present treatise, that learning and a richer knowledge should be added to those faculties which the mind possesses by nature and has acquired by experience in public affairs, then everyone ought to consider a man who combines these attainments superior to all others. For what can be more admirable than the union of experience in the management of great affairs with the study and mastery of those other arts? Or who can be considered closer to the ideal than Publius Scipio, Gaius Laelius, and Lucius Philus, who, for fear of omitting something that might be necessary to the complete excellence of eminent men, added the foreign learning which originated with Socrates to the traditional customs of their own country and their ancestors?

§ 3.6  Therefore those who have had the desire and ability to attain both these objects - who, that is, have perfected themselves by acquiring learning as well as by the observance of their ancestral customs, deserve from every point of view, in my opinion, the highest honour. But if only one of these two paths to wisdom can be chosen, even though a quiet life devoted to the study of the noblest arts will seem happier to some, surely the life of a statesman is more deserving of praise and more conducive to fame; by such a life the greatest men win honour; as for example, Manius Curius,
Whom none could overcome with sword or gold,
or . . .
[About two pages appear to be lost. ]

§ 3.7  [We must admit that both these types of learning] deserved the name of wisdom, yet the difference between these two classes of men has consisted in the fact that one nourished Nature's first gifts to man by admonition and instruction, while the other did so by institutions and laws. Indeed, our own country alone has produced many men, who, if they have not been “wise,” since that name is so carefully restricted, have surely deserved the highest praise, since they have fostered the precepts and the discoveries of the wise. And if we consider how many praiseworthy commonwealths exist now and have existed in the past, and remember that the establishment of a State which is stable enough to endure for ages requires by far the highest intellectual powers that nature can produce, what a multitude of great geniuses there must have been, even if we suppose that every such State possessed only one! But if we survey the nations of Italy; the Latins, Sabines, Volscians, Samnites, or Etruscans, if we examine Magna Graecia; and then if [we consider] the Assyrians, the Persians, the Punic peoples, if . . . these. . .
[About four pages are lost. At the end of the gap we find that the dialogue has been resumed, and that Philus has evidently just been asked to defend the cause of injustice. ]

§ 3.8  Philus: It is indeed an excellent cause that you are handing over to me, when you request me to undertake the defence of wickedness!
Laelius: I suppose you have great reason to fear that, if you repeat the usual arguments against justice, you may be thought also to approve them, when you are yourself an almost incomparable example of our old-fashioned probity and honour, and when we are quite familiar with your habit of arguing on the other side, because you think that it is the easiest means of reaching the truth!
Philus: Very well, then, I will humour you and cover myself with mud with a full realization of what I am doing. For just as those who seek gold do not hesitate to do this, so we who seek Justice, which is much more valuable than all the gold in the world, surely ought not to shrink from any hardship And I wish, just as I am going to present another's argument, that I could also make use of another's tongue! For Lucius Furius Philus must now report what the Greek Carneades, who was accustomed. . . whatever suited him... in words. . .
[About thirty lines appear to be lost, of which the three short fragments which follow are perhaps part. Lactantius (Inst. Div. V, 14, 3-5 ; Epitom. 55, 5-8 ) tells us that the disputation of Carneades, as quoted by Philus, began with a review of the arguments of Plato and Aristotle in favour of justice and then turned to a refutation of them. ]

§ 3.9  . . . [do not] reply [to me but] to Carneades, whose way it is frequently to make the best causes appear ridiculous by his talent for sophistry.

§ 3.11  . . . justice looks out of doors and is completely prominent and conspicuous. . .
. . . a virtue which, beyond all others, is entirely devoted and applied to the advantage of others. . .

§ 3.12  Philus: . . . should both discover and preserve. . . but the other filled four very large volumes with a treatise on justice itself. For I expected nothing great or remarkable from Chrysippus, who has his own peculiar method of discussion, examining everything on the basis of the meaning of words rather than by the weighing of facts. It was appropriate for those heroes to raise up this fallen virtue (which, where it really exists, is the most generous and liberal of them all, loving as it does all others more than itself, and existing for others' advantage rather than its own), and to seat it upon that divine throne not far from Wisdom herself.

§ 3.13  Nor indeed did they lack the desire to exalt it (for what other reason had they for writing? What was their purpose if not this? ), nor the ability, in which they surpassed all others; but the weakness of their case defeated both their enthusiasm and their eloquence. For the justice which we are investigating is a product of government, not of nature at all, for if it were natural, then, like heat and cold, or bitter and sweet, justice and injustice would be the same thing to all men.

§ 3.14  But in actual fact, if one could visit many diverse nations and cities and examine them, travelling about in Pacuvius' famous “chariot of winged snakes” he would see first of all that in Egypt, famed as ever changeless, which preserves written records of the events of countless ages, a bull, which the Egyptians call Apis, is deemed a god, and many other monsters and animals of every sort are held sacred as divine. Then, too, he would see in Greece, just as with us Romans, magnificent shrines, adorned with sacred statues in human form, a custom which the Persians considered wicked. And in fact Xerxes is said to have ordered the Athenian temples to be burned for the sole reason that he thought it sacrilege to keep the gods whose home is the whole universe shut up within walls.

§ 3.15  But later Philip, who planned an attack on the Persians, and Alexander, who actually made one, gave as their excuse for war the desire to avenge the temples of Greece, which the Greeks had thought it proper never to rebuild, so that posterity might have ever before its eyes a monument of Persian impiety. How many peoples, such as the Taurians on the shores of the Euxine, the Egyptian king Busiris, the Gauls, and the Carthaginians, have believed human sacrifice both pious and most pleasing to the immortal gods! Indeed, men's principles of life are so different that the Cretans and Aetolians consider piracy and brigandage honourable, and the Spartans used to claim as their own all the territory they could touch with their spears. The Athenians also used actually to take public oaths that all lands which produced olives or grain were then own. The Gauls think it disgraceful to grow grain by manual labour; and consequently they go forth armed and reap other men's fields.

§ 3.16  We ourselves, indeed, the most just of men, who forbid the races beyond the Alps to plant the olive or the vine, so that our own olive groves and vineyards may be the more valuable, are said to act with prudence in doing so, but not with justice, so that you can easily understand that wisdom and equity do not agree. Indeed, Lycurgus, famed as the author of excellent laws and a most equitable system of justice, provided that the lands of the rich should be cultivated by the poor as if the latter were slaves.

§ 3.17  But if I wished to describe the conceptions of justice, and the principles, customs, and habits which have existed, I could show you, not merely differences in all the different nations, but that there have been a thousand changes in a single city, even in our own, in regard to these things. For example, our friend Manilius here, being an interpreter of the law, would give you different advice about the rights of women in regard to legacies and inheritances from that which he used to give in his youth, before the passage of the Voconian law. In fact that law, passed for men's advantage, is full of injustice to women For why should a woman not have money of her own? Why may a Vestal Virgin have an heir, while her mother may not? Why, on the other hand, if it was necessary to limit the amount of property a woman could own, should the daughter of Publius Crassus, if she were her father's only child, be permitted by law to have a hundred million sesterces, while mine is not even allowed three million? . . .
[About fifteen lines appear to be lost. ]

§ 3.18  . . . [if the supreme God] had provided laws for us, then all men would obey the same laws, and the same men would not have different laws at different times. But, I ask, if it is the duty of a just and good man to obey the laws, what laws is he to obey? All the different laws that exist? But virtue does not allow inconsistency, nor does nature permit variation; and laws are imposed upon us by fear of punishment, not by our sense of justice. Therefore there is no such thing as natural justice, and from this it follows that neither are men just by nature. Or will they tell us that, though laws vary, good men naturally follow what is truly just, not what is thought to be so ? For, they say, it is the duty of a good and just man to give everyone that which is his due.

§ 3.19  Well then, first of all, what is it, if anything, that we are to grant to dumb animals as their due? For it is not men of mediocre talents, but those who are eminent and learned, such as Pythagoras and Empedocles, who declare that the same principles of justice apply to all living creatures, and insist that inevitable penalties threaten those who injure an animal. It is a crime, therefore, to harm a brute beast, and this crime. . . who wishes. . .
[A passage of considerable, but uncertain, length is lost Some information as to its contents is supplied by Lactantius (Inst. Div. V, 16, 2-4 , VI, 9, 2-4 , and VI. 6 19 and 23) and Tertullian ( Apolog. 25, p. 164 Oehl.). The outlines of the argument appear to have been as follows: The variety of laws in different States proves that these codes must be based on utility, which differs in different places, not on justice. Changes in the laws of a single State prove the same thing. There is no natural justice or law, but men as well as all other living creatures are governed naturally by utility. There is therefore no such thing as justice, or, if it exists, it is the height of folly, inasmuch as it leads us to injure ourselves to the advantage of others. The best proof of this is found in history, particularly in that of Rome. She has won her empire by injustice both to gods and men; a policy of justice would make her again what she was originally, a miserable poverty-stricken village. What is commonly called justice in States is nothing but an agreement for mutual self-restraint, which is a result of weakness, and is based on nothing whatever but utility. Rulers of all sorts rule for their own advantage solely, not in the interest of the governed. ]

§ 3.23  Philus: . . . for all who have the power of life and death over a people are tyrants, but they prefer to be called kings, the title given to Jupiter the Best. But when a certain number of men, by means of riches or noble birth or some other advantage, hold a commonwealth in their power, that is a ruling faction, but the rulers are called aristocrats. But if the people hold the supreme power and everything is administered according to their desires, that is called liberty, but is really licence. But when there is mutual fear, man fearing man and class fearing class, when, because no one is confident in his own strength, a sort of bargain is made between the common people and the powerful; this results in that mixed form of government which Scipio has been recommending; and thus, not nature or desire, but weakness, is the mother of justice. For we must choose one of three things - to do injustice and not to suffer it, or both to do it and to suffer it, or else neither to do it nor to suffer it. The happiest choice is to do it with impunity, if you can; the second best is neither to do it nor to suffer it; and the worst fate of all is to engage in the everlasting struggle of doing and suffering injustice. Thus he who first. . . to accomplish that. . .
[A passage of considerable length is lost, of which the following fragment may be a part. ]

§ 3.24  . . . for when he was asked what wickedness drove him to harass the sea with his one pirate galley, he replied, “The same wickedness that drives you to harass the whole world.”
Philus: . . . Wisdom urges us to increase our resources, to multiply our wealth, to extend our boundaries, for what is the meaning of those words of praise inscribed on the monuments of our greatest generals, “He extended the boundaries of the empire,” except that an addition was made out of the territory of others? Wisdom urges us also to rule over as many subjects as possible, to enjoy pleasures, to become rich, to be rulers and masters; justice, on the other hand, instructs us to spare all men, to consider the interests of the whole human race, to give everyone his due, and not to touch sacred or public property, or that which belongs to others. What, then, is the result if you obey wisdom? Wealth, power, riches, public office, military commands, and royal authority, whether we are speaking of individuals or of nations But, as we are discussing the State at present, what is done by a State is more important for our purpose, and, since the same facts in reference to justice are applicable in both cases, I think it better to discuss the wisdom of a people. Not to mention others, did our own people, whose record Africanus traced from the beginning in yesterday's discussion, and whose empire now embraces the whole world, [grow] from the smallest [to the greatest] through justice or through wisdom? . . .
[Thirty lines or more are lost. ]

§ 3.25  Philus: . . . except the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I suppose, feared that this provision dictated by justice might at some time be put into effect, and therefore invented the story that they had sprung from the earth, as field-mice come out of ploughed ground.

§ 3.26  To such arguments as these the following are usually the replies first given by those who are not unskilful in disputation, and whose discussions of this subject have all the greater weight because, in the search for the good man, whom we require to be open and frank, they do not themselves use crafty and rascally tricks of argument - these men say first of all that a wise man is not good because goodness and justice of or in themselves give him pleasure, but because the life of a good man is free from fear, anxiety, worry, and danger, while on the other hand the minds of the wicked are always troubled by one thing or another, and trial and punishment always stand before their eyes. They add, on the other hand, that no advantage or reward won by injustice is great enough to offset constant fear, or the ever-present thought that some punishment is near, or is threatening. . . losses. . .
[About one page appears to be lost. ]

§ 3.27  Philus: . . . Suppose there are two men, one a pattern of virtue, fairness, justice, and honour, and the other an example of extreme wickedness and audacity; and suppose a nation is so mistaken as to believe the good man a wicked, treacherous criminal, and the wicked man on the other hand a model of probity and honour. Then let us imagine that, in accordance with this opinion, held by all his fellow-citizens, the good man is harassed, attacked, and arrested, blinded, sentenced, bound, branded, banished, and reduced to beggary, and finally is also most justly deemed by all men to be most miserable. Then let the wicked man, on the contrary, be praised, courted, and universally loved; let him receive all sorts of public offices, military commands, wealth and riches from every source; and finally, let him have the universal reputation of being the best man in the world and most worthy of all the favours of fortune. Now I ask you, who could be so insane as to doubt which of the two he would prefer to be?

§ 3.28  The same thing is true of States as of persons; no people would be so foolish as not to prefer to be unjust masters rather than just slaves. I do not need to go far for an example: during my consulship, with you as my advisers, I had under consideration the treaty with Numantia. Who was not aware that Quintus Pompeius had made a treaty and that Mancinus was in the same situation? But the latter, an excellent man, went so far as to favour the bill which I proposed in accordance with a resolution of the senate, while the former defended himself with energy. If we are seeking modesty, probity, and honour, these qualities belong to Mancinus, but if we look for reason, wisdom, and prudence, then Pompeius is superior.
[The rest of Philus' report of the defence of injustice made by Carneades is lost, but we are given some idea of its contents by Lactantius (Inst. Div. V, 16,5-13) Toward the end he seems to have turned to men's personal relations for further proofs that justice is equivalent to folly, and to have given, among others, the following illustrations: If a man knows of serious faults in something he has for sale and reveals them to a prospective purchaser, he is a just man but a fool, if he conceals them, he is unjust, but wise! Similarly if there is a shipwreck, and two men are clutching a plank which can support only one, what is the stronger of the two to do ? If he lets go, he will be a just man and he will drown! If he is wise, he will be unjust and send the other man to his death. Only the following fragments (sections 32-41) of the reply of Laelius remain, but some further information about its contents can be obtained from Cicero's own references to it in other works. See De Fin. 18, 59 ; Ep. ad Att. X, 4, 4 ; VII, 2, 4. ]

§ 3.32  . . . I should not hesitate, Laelius, if I did not think that our friends here desired exactly what l am eager for myself, namely, that you should take some part in our discussion, especially since you told us yesterday that you would talk at even too great length. But that indeed is impossible; we all beg you not to fail us. . . .
Laelius: . . . But he certainly ought not to have our young men as his audience. For if he really believes what he says, he is a villain; but if not, as I prefer to think, what he says is at any rate pernicious. . .

§ 3.33  . . . True law is right reason in agreement with nature, it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment. . . .

§ 3.34  . .. a war is never undertaken by the ideal State, except in defence of its honour or its safety. . . .
. . . But private citizens often escape those punishments which even the most stupid can feel - poverty, exile, imprisonment and stripes - by taking refuge in a swift death. But in the case of a State, death itself is a punishment, though it seems to offer individuals an escape from punishment; for a State ought to be so firmly founded that it will live for ever. Hence death is not natural for a State as it is for a human being, for whom death is not only necessary, but frequently even desirable. On the other hand, there is some similarity, if we may compare small things with great, between the overthrow, destruction, and extinction of a State, and the decay and dissolution of the whole universe.

§ 3.35  . . . Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defence can actually be just. . . .
. . . No war is considered just unless it has been proclaimed and declared, or unless reparation has first been demanded. . . .
. . . But our people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole world. . .
[The following fragments, as St Augustine explains ( De Civ. Dei XIX , 21), are part of the argument for the justice of slavery and imperialism, in which it is maintained that certain nations and individuals are naturally fitted for and benefited by subjection to others. ]

§ 3.37  . . . Do we not observe that dominion has been granted by Nature to everything that is best, to the great advantage of what is weak? For why else does God rule over man, the mind over the body, and reason over lust and anger and the other evil elements of the mind? . . .
. . . But we must distinguish different kinds of domination and subjection. For the mind is said to rule over the body, and also over lust; but it rules over the body as a king governs his subjects, or a father his children, whereas it rules over lust as a master rules his slaves, restraining it and breaking its power. So kings, commanders, magistrates, senators, and popular assemblies govern citizens as the mind governs the body; but the master's restraint of his slaves is like the restraint exercised by the best part of the mind, the reason, over its own evil and weak elements, such as the lustful desires, anger, and the other disquieting emotions. . . .
. . . the parts of the body are ruled like sons on account of their ready obedience, but the evil parts of the mind are restrained with a stricter curb, like slaves. . .
. . . For there is a kind of unjust slavery, when those who are capable of governing themselves are under the domination of another; but when such men are slaves. . .

§ 3.39  . . . In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not appropriate to a wise man. . .

§ 3.40  . . . Virtue clearly desires honour, and has no other reward. . . yet though she receives it gladly, she does not exact it rigorously What riches, what power, what kingdoms can you offer such a man? For he thinks these things are human, but deems his own possessions divine. . . . But if universal ingratitude, or the envy of many, or the hostility of the powerful, deprive virtue of its proper rewards, yet it is soothed by many consolations, and firmly upheld by its own excellence. . . .
. . . Their bodies were not taken up to heaven, for Nature would not allow that which comes from the earth to be removed from earth. . . .
. . . The bravest men never. . . of bravery, energy, endurance. . . .
. . . Fabricius, I suppose, felt the lack of the wealth of Pyrrhus, and Curius of the riches of the Samnites! . . .
. . . Our glorious Cato, when he went out to his farm in the Sabine country, as we have heard him say, often visited the hearth of this man, sitting in whose home he had declined the gifts of the Samnites, once his enemies, but then under his protection. . .

§ 3.41  . . . Asia. . . Tiberius Gracchus. . .he kept faith with his fellow-citizens, but violated the treaty lights of our allies and the Latins. If this habit of lawlessness begins to spread and changes our rule from one of justice to one of force, so that those who up to the present have obeyed us willingly are held faithful by fear alone, then, though our own generation has perhaps been vigilant enough to be safe, yet I am anxious for our descendants, and for the permanent stability of our commonwealth, which might live on for ever if the principles and customs of our ancestors were maintained.

§ 3.42  After these words from Laelius, all expressed their great pleasure in his remarks; but Scipio, whose delight went beyond that of the rest, was almost carried away with enthusiasm.
Scipio: Laelius, you have often defended cases so eloquently that I believed that neither our colleague Servius Galba, whom you, during his lifetime, always considered unrivalled, nor even any of the Attic orators [could equal] you either in charm? . . .
[About four pages are lost, the two following fragments may perhaps be from this passage. ]
. . . that his lack of two qualities, self-confidence and vocal powers, prevented him from speaking to the people or in the forum. . .
. . . the bull roared with the groans of imprisoned men. . .

§ 3.43  Scipio: . . . to bring back. . . . Therefore how could that be called “the property of the people,” which is what “commonwealth” means? For all were oppressed by the cruelty of one, and there was no bond of justice whatever, nor any agreement of partnership amongst those gathered together, though that is part of the definition of a people. And the same was true of Syracuse: that famous city, which Timaeus calls both the largest of the Greek towns and the most beautiful city in the world, with its admirable citadel, its harbours, whose waters penetrated to the very heart of the town and to the foundations of its buildings, its broad streets, its porticoes, temples, and walls, could not be a commonwealth in spite of all these things while Dionysius was its ruler, for nothing belonged to the people, and the people itself was the property of one man. Therefore, wherever a tyrant rules, we ought not to say that we have a bad form of commonwealth, as I said yesterday, but, as logic now demonstrates, that we really have no commonwealth at all.

§ 3.44  Laelius: Excellently said, and now I understand the purport of your remarks.
Scipio: You understand, then, that not even a State which is entirely in the control of a faction can truly be called a commonwealth?
Laelius: That is indeed my opinion.
Scipio: And you are absolutely right, for where was there any “property of the Athenian people,” when, after the great Peloponnesian War, the notorious Thirty most unjustly governed their city? Did the ancient glory of that State, the transcendent beauty of its buildings, its theatre, its gymnasiums, its porticoes, its famous Propylaea, its citadel, the exquisite works of Phidias, or the splendid Piraeus, make it a commonwealth?
Laelius: By no means, since nothing was the “property of the people.”
Scipio: What of the period when the decemvirs ruled Rome without being subject to appeal, in that third year of their power, when liberty had lost all her legal bulwarks?
Laelius: There was no “property of the people” ; indeed the people rose in revolt to recover their property.

§ 3.45  Scipio: I come now to the third form of government, in regard to which we may appear to be in difficulty. For when everything is said to be administered by the people, and to be in the people's power; when the multitude inflicts punishment on whomsoever it will, when it seizes, plunders, retains, and wastes whatever it will, can you deny, Laelius, that we have a commonwealth then, when everything belongs to the people, and we have defined a commonwealth as the “property of a people” ?
Laelius: There is no government to which I should more quickly deny the title of commonwealth than one in which everything is subject to the power of the multitude. For as we have decided that there was no commonwealth at Syracuse or at Agrigentum or at Athens when those cities were ruled by tyrants, or here at Rome when the decemvirs were in power, I cannot see how the name of commonwealth would be any more applicable to the despotism of the multitude. For in the first place a people exists only when the individuals who form it are held together by a partnership in justice, according to your excellent definition, Scipio. But such a gathering as you have mentioned is just as surely a tyrant as if it were a single person, and an even more cruel tyrant, because there can be nothing more horrible than that monster which falsely assumes the name and appearance of a people. Nor indeed is it right, when the property of the insane is entrusted by law to their relatives in the male line, because [they are unable to manage it properly themselves, that an insane multitude should be left in uncontrolled possession of the “property of the people.” ] . . .
[About three pages are lost. ]

§ 3.46  . . . [And indeed many of the arguments] cited to prove that a kingdom is a commonwealth, “the property of a people,” could be applied [with equal justice to an aristocratic government.]
Mummius: And with even greater justice, for a king is more like a master, because he is a single individual, while nothing could be more advantageous for a State than to be ruled by a select number of good men. Nevertheless I prefer even a kingship to a free popular government, for that third possibility is the worst of all governments.

§ 3.47  Scipio: I am aware, Spurius, that you are always opposed to the power of the people; and, though that power might be borne with less resentment than you are accustomed to show, I agree with you that none of these three constitutions deserves less approbation But I cannot assent to your statement that aristocratic government is superior to kingship; for if wisdom rules the State, what difference does it make whether that wisdom is the possession of one person or of several? But we are being misled in our present argument by certain deceptive terms, for when we speak of “the best men” nothing can possibly seem preferable; for what can be deemed better than the best? But when we mention a king we immediately think of an unjust king, yet at present we are not referring to unjust kings at all in our consideration of the kingship itself. Therefore, if you will only imagine that the king we are referring to is Romulus or Pompilius or Tullus, perhaps you will not think so unfavourably of that form of government

§ 3.48  Mummius: What praise do you reserve, then, for popular government?
Scipio: What of Rhodes, Spurius, which we visited together? Does that seem to you no commonwealth at all?
Mummius: I certainly consider it a commonwealth, and one by no means deserving of our scorn.
Scipio: You are quite right. But, you may remember, all the people were senators and common citizens alternately, and they had a regular system of rotation in accordance with which they acted as senators for certain months of the year, and as private citizens during certain other months. They received payment for attending meetings in both capacities, and, both in the theatre and the senate-house, the same men decided capital cases and those of every other sort. The senate possessed as much power and influence as the multitude. . .
[The rest of the book is lost. The length of the missing passage is unknown. ]
FRAGMENTS OF BOOK III
[fr.1] There is therefore a certain restless element in individuals which is exalted by pleasure and broken by tribulation.
[fr.2] . . . they see what they think they will do.
[fr.3] The Phoenicians with their traffic in merchandise were the first to introduce into Greece greed, luxurious living, and insatiable desires of all sorts.
[fr.4] . . . the notorious Sardanapalus, far more ugly in his vices than in his name. . .
[fr.5] . . . unless someone wished to use the whole of Mount Athos as a monument. For what Athos or Olympus is so great. . . ?

§ 4.1  Book 4
[The Vatican manuscript contains only two short passages from this book, sections 2-3 and section 4. The order of the other fragments printed here is of course uncertain. The social classification of citizens, the maintenance of high moral standards in the State, the physical and mental training of the young, and the influence of drama, lyric poetry, and music, are evidently among the subjects discussed. ]
. . . and the same mind that foresees the future also remembers the past. . .
. . . And indeed, if there is no one who would not prefer death to transformation into an animal of any sort, even if he could retain the mind of a man, how much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast while retaining human form! As much more so, in my opinion, as the mind is superior to the body. . .
. . . he does not think the good of a ram and the good of Publius Africanus are the same. . . .
. . . and the same body, by its interposition, makes darkness and night, useful both for the reckoning of the days and for rest from labour. . .
. . . and when in the autumn the earth has opened to receive the seed of her produce, in winter has rested so that she may [transform] this seed, and in the maturity of summer has softened some and parched others. . .
. . . when they employ shepherds for the flocks. . .

§ 4.2  . . . How conveniently the orders are arranged, the ages, the classes, the knights, among whom the votes of the senators also are included! Too many foolishly desire to abolish this useful system in their search for a new distribution of money through some resolution of the plebs providing for the return of the horses.

§ 4.3  Now consider the other wise provisions for that association of the citizens in a happy and honourable life; for that is the original purpose of men's coming together, and it should be accomplished for them in their commonwealth partly by established customs and partly by laws. Now in the first place our people have never wished to have any system of education for the free-born youth which is either definitely fixed by law, or officially established, or uniform in all cases, though the Greeks have expended much vain labour on this problem, and it is the only point which our guest Polybius finds neglected in our institutions. For . . .
[At least thirty lines are lost between this passage and section 4. The following three fragments may be quoted from the lost passage. ]
. . . it is the custom to assign guardians to those who are entering upon military service, in order to direct them during their first year. . .
. . . not only as at Sparta, where the boys learn to steal and thieve . . .
. . . it was [considered] a disgrace to youths if they did not have lovers . . .

§ 4.4  Scipio: . . . that a young man should go naked. From such ancient sources are derived what we may call the foundation-stones of modesty! And how absurd their system of exercise for young men in gymnasiums! How far from rigorous is their system of military training for the ephebes! How free and easy are their contacts and love relations! To say nothing of the Eleans and Thebans, among whom lust is actually given free rein in the relations of free men, the Spartans themselves, who give every freedom to love relations with young men except that of actual defilement, protect only by a very thin wall this one exception, for, providing only that cloaks be interposed, they allow embraces and the sharing of the bed.
Laelius: I see clearly, Scipio, that in regard to the Greek systems of training which you criticize, you prefer to attack the most famous States rather than your beloved Plato, whom you do not even mention, especially as . . .

§ 4.5  And our beloved Plato went even further than Lycurgus, for he actually provided that all property should be owned in common, so that no citizen might be able to say of anything that it was his very own . . .
. . . But I . . . in the same way as [Plato] sends Homer out of the city which he invented, buying him off with wreaths and anointing him with perfumes . . .

§ 4.6  . . . The censor's judgment imposes almost no penalty except a blush, upon the man he condemns. Therefore, as his decision affects nothing but the reputation, his condemnation is called “ignominy” . . .
. . . The State is said at first to have been terrified by their severity. . .
. . . Nor indeed should there be a governor placed over women, as is usually done among the Greeks, but there should be a censor to teach men to rule their wives. . .
. . . Thus training in modesty has great effect; all women abstain from intoxicating drinks. . .
. . . And besides, if any woman had a bad reputation, her relatives refused to kiss her. . .
. . . Thus impudence is derived from seeking, and shamelessness from demanding . . .

§ 4.7  . . . For I do not approve of the same nation being the ruler of the world and also its tax-gatherer; on the other hand, I consider frugality the best revenue both for private families and for States. . .
Credit seems to me to get its very name from the fact that what is promised is performed . . .
. . . In a citizen of high rank or a man of high reputation, [I judge] flattery, ingratiation, and canvassing to be [indications] of shallowness. . .

§ 4.8  . . . I admire the excellence, not only of the subject matter, but also of the style. “If they disagree,” it says. A contest between friends, not a quarrel between enemies, is called a disagreement. . . Therefore the law considers that neighbours disagree rather than quarrel. . .
. . . the boundaries of men's care and men's life [to be] the same; thus by the pontifical law the sanctity of burial. . .
. . . because they had left unburied those whom they could not rescue from the sea on account of the severity of the storm, they put innocent men to death . . .
. . . and in this controversy I sided not with the people but with the good. . .
. . . It is not easy to resist the people in their might if you give them no legal rights or only a few. . .
. . . Would that I might prophesy honestly to him. . . .

§ 4.9  . . . When the applause and approval of the people, as of some great and wise master, have been granted to them, what darkness they produce! What fears they cause! What desires they inflame! . . .

§ 4.10  . . . Since they considered the dramatic art and the theatre in general disgraceful, they desired that all persons connected with such things should not only be deprived of the privileges of other citizens, but should even be removed from their tribes by sentence of the censors. . . .

§ 4.11  Scipio: . . . Nor would comedy, unless the customs of daily life had so permitted, ever have been able to make its disgraceful exhibitions acceptable to the spectators. Whom has [comedy] not attacked, or rather persecuted? Whom has it spared? It is true that it has wounded wicked demagogues and men who stirred up sedition in the State, like Cleon, Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. This we might allow, though it is preferable for such citizens to suffer disgrace from a censor rather than from a poet. But it was no more proper that Pericles, who by reason of his commanding influence had already governed his commonwealth for many years, both in peace and war, should be insulted in verse, and that such verses should be recited on the stage, than it would have been for our own Plautus or Naevius to have selected Publius and Gnaeus Scipio for abuse, or for Caecilius to have vilified Marcus Cato. . .

§ 4.12  On the other hand, our Twelve Tables, though they provided the death penalty for only a few crimes, did provide it for any person who sang or composed a song which contained a slander or insult to anyone else This was an excellent rule; for our mode of life ought to be liable to judgment by the magistrates and the courts of law, but not by clever poets; nor ought we to be subject to disgrace unless we have an opportunity to answer and defend ourselves in a court of law. . . . The early Romans did not desire that any living man should either be praised or blamed on the stage. . .

§ 4.13  . . . Aeschines of Athens, a most eloquent orator, took part in affairs of State though he had been a tragic actor in his youth, and the Athenians frequently sent Aristodemus, also a tragic actor, as ambassador to Philip in regard to the most important questions of peace and war. . .

§ 5.1  Book 5
[The Vatican manuscript contains only three short passages from this book: sections 3, 5, and 6-7. The order of the other fragments given is uncertain. St Augustine (De Civ. Dei II, 21) states that section 1 is quoted from Cicero's preface to the book, and not from the dialogue. The qualifications and functions of the ideal statesman are evidently the main subject of the book. ]
“The commonwealth of Rome is founded firm | On ancient customs and on men of might.”
Our poet seems to have obtained these words, so brief and true, from an oracle. For neither men alone, unless a State is supplied with customs too, nor customs alone, unless there have also been men to defend them, could ever have been sufficient to found or to preserve so long a commonwealth whose dominion extends so far and wide. Thus, before our own time, the customs of our ancestors produced excellent men, and eminent men preserved our ancient customs and the institutions of their forefathers.

§ 5.2  But though the republic, when it came to us, was like a beautiful painting, whose colours, however, were already fading with age, our own time not only has neglected to freshen it by renewing the original colours, but has not even taken the trouble to preserve its configuration and, so to speak, its general outlines. For what is now left of the “ancient customs” on which he said “the commonwealth of Rome” was “founded firm” ? They have been, as we see, so completely buried in oblivion that they are not only no longer practised, but are already unknown. And what shall I say of the men? For the loss of our customs is due to our lack of men, and for, this great evil we must not only give an account, but must even defend ourselves in every way possible, as if we were accused of capital crime. For it is through our own faults, not by any accident, that we retain only the form of the commonwealth, but have long since lost its substance.

§ 5.3  . . . [that nothing was so] kingly as the administration of justice, which included the interpretation of the law, for subjects used to seek legal decisions from their kings. And for these reasons, broad and rich lands and fields, suitable both for cultivation and pasturage, were set aside as the property of the king, and were cultivated for him without any labour or attention on his part, so that he might not be distracted from the people's business by any need of attention to his own private affairs. Nor did any private citizen act as judge or arbitrator in any suit, but every suit was decided by the king himself. And in my opinion our own king Numa followed most closely this ancient custom of the Greek kings. For our other kings, though they performed this duty also, spent a great deal of their time in waging war, and therefore paid attention to the laws of war, while the long period of peace under Numa was the mother of justice and religion in our city. This king even composed laws which are still in force, as you know. Such indeed are the proper concerns of this citizen of whom we are speaking. . . .

§ 5.4  . . . but nevertheless, as in the case of an efficient head of a family, some experience in the cultivation of the land, the construction of buildings, and the keeping of accounts is necessary. . .

§ 5.5  Scipio: . . . it would not displease you to know. . . of roots and seeds, would it ?
Mummius: Not at all, if any necessity for it should arise.
Scipio: Then you do not think that such knowledge is suitable only for the superintendent of a farm?
Mummius: By no means; since lack of careful attention is the most frequent fault in farming.
Scipio: The field-superintendent, then, knows the nature of the land, the household-superintendent knows how to read and write, and both are interested in the practical utility of their knowledge rather than in the pleasure they take in its possession. In the same way, then, this governing statesman of ours should surely have taken the pains to become familiar with justice and law, and should have examined their origins. But he should not allow his time constantly to be taken up with consultations or by reading and writing on these subjects, for he must be able, as we may say, to act as both field-superintendent and household-superintendent of the commonwealth; he must be fully conversant with justice in its highest aspects, for without that no one can be just; and he must not be ignorant of the civil law, but his knowledge of it should be like the pilot's knowledge of the stars, or a physician's knowledge of physics, for each uses his knowledge in his own art, but does not allow it to keep him from his own special duties. But this man will see to it . . .

§ 5.6  . . . states in which the best men seek praise and glory, and avoid disgrace and dishonour. Nor indeed are they deterred from crime so much by the fear of the penalties ordained by law as by the sense of shame which Nature has given to man in the form of a certain fear of justified censure. The governing statesman strengthens this feeling in commonwealths by the force of public opinion and perfects it by the inculcation of principles and by systematic training, so that shame deters the citizens from crime no less effectively than fear. And these remarks have to do with praise, and might have been stated more broadly and developed more fully.

§ 5.7  But, as regards the practical conduct of life, this system provides for legal marriage, legitimate children, and the consecration of homes to the Lares and Penates of families, so that all may make use of the common property and of their own personal possessions. It is impossible to live well except in a good commonwealth, and nothing can produce greater happiness than a well-constituted State. Therefore it always seems very remarkable to me, [that] what is so important. . .

§ 5.8  Scipio: . . . For just as the aim of the pilot is a successful voyage, of the physician, health, and of the general, victory, so this director of the commonwealth has as his aim for his fellow-citizens a happy life, fortified by wealth, rich in material resources, great in glory and honoured for virtue. I want him to bring to perfection this achievement, which is the greatest and best possible among men. . . .
. . . And where does your literature as well praise that ruler of his native land who considers the good of his people rather than their desires? . . .

§ 5.9  . . . [our] ancestors were inspired to many wonderful and admirable deeds by their eagerness for glory. . .
. . the leading man of a State must be fed on glory, and the State can stand firm only so long as honour is given by all to their leader. . . .
. . . then by virtue, labour, and industry. . . should preserve the native talents of the most eminent man, unless a fierce spirit in a too headstrong manner. . . him. . . in some [way] . . .
. . . this virtue is called bravery, which is made up of nobility of spirit and an entire contempt for pain and death. . .

§ 5.10  . . . As Marcellus was spirited and pugnacious, and Maximus thoughtful and cautious. . .
. . . included in the world. . .
. . . because he could make your families share some of the annoyances of his old age. . .

§ 5.11  . . . as Menelaus of Sparta possessed a certain pleasing and charming eloquence . . . let him cultivate brevity in speech. . .
. . and since nothing ought to be so free from corruption in a State as the vote and the expression of opinion, I cannot understand why the man who corrupts them by the use of money deserves punishment, if the one who does so by eloquence is praised for it. In fact, it seems to me that the man who corrupts a judge by a speech commits a worse crime than the one who does so by a bribe, for even a virtuous man can be corrupted by oratory, though not by a bribe. . .
. . . After Scipio had spoken thus, Mummius gave his full approval, for he was filled with a kind of hatred for the rhetoricians. . .
. . . then excellent seeds would have been sown in a most fertile field. . .

§ 6.1  Book 6
[The Vatican manuscript has preserved no part of this book. But in addition to the scattered fragments printed below, the famous Dream of Scipio has been handed down to us by Macrobius, in connection with his commentary upon it. The lost portion of the book was evidently devoted to further discussion of the qualities and duties of the statesman, and of the value and reward of his labours. ]
. . . What you look for, then, is an account of this ruling statesman's prudence in its entirety, a quality which derives its name from foreseeing. . .
. . . Therefore this citizen must see to it that he is always armed against those influences which disturb the stability of the State. . .
. . . and such a dissension among the citizens, in which one party separates from the rest, is called sedition. . .
. . . And indeed in civil strife, when virtue is of greater importance than numbers, I think the citizens ought to be weighed rather than counted. . .
. . . For our desires are hard masters over our thoughts, compelling and commanding us to do an infinite number of things; and as these desires can never be appeased or satisfied in any way, they urge to every soit of crime those whom they have inflamed by their allurements.
. . . who has restrained its power and that unbridled ferocity. . .

§ 6.2  . . . This indeed was so much the greater because, though the colleagues were in agreement, they were not only not equally hated, but the affection felt for Gracchus even lessened the unpopularity of Claudius. . .
. . . who continually attacked the forces of the aristocrats and the eminent men in these words, and left behind him that sad, resounding echo of his dignity. . .
. . . so that, according to this author, every day a thousand men came down into the forum in robes dyed with purple. . .
. . . in those cases, as you remember, the funeral was unexpectedly honoured by the gathering of the fickle crowd and the heaping up of bronze. . .
. . . for our ancestors desired that marriages should be stable and permanent. . .
. . . the speech of Laelius, which we all have in our hands, tells us how pleasing to the gods are the pontiffs' ladles, and, to quote his words, the Samian bowls. . .

§ 6.3  . . . [ Er the Pamphylian ], who, after being laid on the pyre, came to life again and told many secrets of the world below. . . The things that are told of the immortality of the soul and of the heavens [are not] the fictions of dreaming philosophers, or such incredible tales as the Epicureans mock at, but the conjectures of sensible men. . .

§ 6.4  . . . [ that Plato ] was rather jesting than intending to claim that this was true. . .

§ 6.8  Scipio: . . . But though the consciousness of the worth of his deeds is the noblest reward of virtue for a wise man, yet that godlike virtue longs, not indeed for statues fixed in lead, or triumphs with their fading laurels, but for rewards of a more stable and lasting nature.
Laelius: What are they, then?
Scipio: Allow me, since this is the third day of our holiday celebration. . .
SCIPIO'S DREAM

§ 6.9  Scipio: I was military tribune in the Fourth Legion in Africa under the consul Manius Manilius, as you know. When I arrived in that country my greatest desire was to meet King Masinissa, who for excellent reasons was a very close friend of my family. When I came into his presence the aged man embraced me and wept copiously; after a short interval, turning his eyes up to heaven, he uttered these words: “I thank you, O supreme Sun, and you other heavenly beings, that, before I depart this life, I see within my kingdom and under my roof Publius Cornelius Scipio, by the mere sound of whose name I am refreshed, so little has the memory of that noble and invincible hero faded from my memory!” Then I questioned him about his kingdom, while he inquired of me about our commonwealth, and we spent the whole day in an extended discussion of both.

§ 6.10  Later, after I had been entertained with royal hospitality, we continued our conversation far into the night, the aged king talking of nothing but Africanus, and recollecting all his sayings as well as his deeds. When we separated to take our rest, I fell immediately into a deeper sleep than usual, as I was weary from my journey and the hour was late. The following dream came to me, prompted, I suppose, by the subject of our conversation; for it often happens that our thoughts and words have some such effect in our sleep as Ennius describes with reference to Homer, about whom, of course, he frequently used to talk and think in his waking hours. I thought that Africanus stood before me, taking that shape which was familiar to me from his bust rather than from his person. Upon recognising him I shuddered in terror, but he said:
“Courage, Scipio, have no fear, but imprint my words upon your memory.

§ 6.11  ”Do you see yonder city, which, though forced by me into obedience to the Roman people, is renewing its former conflicts and cannot be at rest " ( and from a lofty place which was bathed in clear starlight, he pointed out Carthage ), “that city to which you now come to lay siege, with a rank little above that of a common soldier? Within two years you as consul shall overthrow it, thus winning by your own efforts the surname which till now you have as an inheritance from me. But after destroying Carthage and celebrating your triumph, you shall hold the censorship, you shall go on missions to Egypt, Syria, Asia and Greece; you shall be chosen consul a second time in your absence, you shall bring a great war to a successful close; and you shall destroy Numantia. But, after driving in state to the Capitol, you shall find the commonwealth disturbed by the designs of my grandson. [Tiberius Gracchus]

§ 6.12  ”Then, Africanus, it will be your duty to hold up before the fatherland the light of your character, your ability, and your wisdom. But at that time I see two paths of destiny, as it were, opening before you For when your age has fulfilled seven times eight returning circuits of the sun, and those two numbers, each of which for a different reason is considered perfect, in Nature?s evolving course have reached their destined sum in your life, then the whole State will turn to you and your name alone. The senate, all good citizens, the allies, the Latins, will look to you; you shall be the sole support of the State's security, and, in brief, it will be your duty as dictator to restore order in the commonwealth, if only you escape the wicked hands of your kinsmen."
Laelius: cried aloud at this, and the rest groaned deeply, but Scipio said with a gentle smile: Quiet, please; do not wake me from my sleep, listen for a few moments, and hear what followed.

§ 6.13  “But, Africanus, be assured of this, so that you may be even more eager to defend the commonwealth all those who have preserved, aided, or enlarged their fatherland have a special place prepared for them in the heavens, where they may enjoy an eternal life of happiness. For nothing of all that is done on earth is more pleasing to that supreme God who rules the whole universe than the assemblies and gatherings of men associated in justice, which are called States. Their rulers and preservers come from that place, and to that place they return. ”

§ 6.14  Though I was then thoroughly terrified, more by the thought of treachery among my own kinsmen than by the fear of death, nevertheless I asked him whether he and my father Paulus and the others whom we think of as dead, were really still alive.
“Surely all those are alive,” he said, “who have escaped from the bondage of the body as from a prison; but that life of yours, which men so call, is really death. Do you not see your father Paulus approaching you?”
When I saw him I poured forth a flood of tears, but he embraced and kissed me, and forbade me to weep. {15.}

§ 6.15  As soon as I had restrained my grief and was able to speak, I cried out: “O best and most blameless of fathers, since that is life, as I learn from Africanus, why should I remain longer on earth? Why not hasten thither to you?”
“Not so,” he replied, “for unless that God, whose temple is everything that you see, has freed you from the prison of the body, you cannot gain entrance there. For man was given life that he might inhabit that sphere called Earth, which you see in the centre of this temple, and he has been given a soul out of those eternal fires which you call stars and planets, which, being round and globular bodies animated by divine intelligences, circle about in their fixed orbits with marvellous speed. Therefore you, Publius, and all good men, must leave that soul in the custody of the body, and must not abandon human life except at the behest of him by whom it was given you, lest you appear to have shirked the duty imposed upon man by God. {16.}

§ 6.16  But, Scipio, imitate your grandfather here, imitate me, your father; love justice and duty, which are indeed strictly due to parents and kinsmen, but most of all to the fatherland. Such a life is the road to the skies, to that gathering of those who have completed their earthly lives and been relieved of the body, and who lie in yonder place which you now see ” (it was the circle of light which blazed most brightly among the other fires), " and which you on earth, borrowing a Greek term, call the Milky Circle. "
When I gazed in every direction from that point, all else appeared wonderfully beautiful. There were stars which we never see from the earth, and they were all larger than we have ever imagined. The smallest of them was that farthest from heaven and nearest the earth which shone with a borrowed light [the moon]. The starry spheres were much larger than the earth; indeed the earth itself seemed to me so small that I was scornful of our empire, which covers only a single point, as it were, upon its surface.

§ 6.17  As I gazed still more fixedly at the earth, Africanus said: “How long will your thoughts be fixed upon the lowly earth? Do you not see what lofty regions you have entered? These are the nine circles, or rather spheres, by which the whole is joined. One of them, the outermost, is that of heaven; it contains all the rest, and is itself the supreme God, holding and embracing within itself all the other spheres; in it are fixed the eternal revolving courses of the stars. Beneath it are seven other spheres which revolve in the opposite direction to that of heaven. One of these globes is that light which on earth is called Saturn's. Next comes the star called Jupiter's, which brings fortune and health to mankind. Beneath it that star, red and terrible to the dwellings of man, which you assign to Mars. Below it and almost midway of the distance is the Sun, the lord, chief, and ruler of the other lights, the mind and guiding principle of the universe, of such magnitude that he reveals and fills all things with his light. He is accompanied by his companions, as it were - Venus and Mercury in their orbits, and in the lowest sphere revolves the Moon, set on fire by the rays of the Sun. But below the Moon there is nothing except what is mortal and doomed to decay, save only the souls given to the human race by the bounty of the gods, while above the Moon all things are eternal. For the ninth and central sphere, which is the earth, is immovable and the lowest of all, and toward it all ponderable bodies are drawn by their own natural tendency downward. ”

§ 6.18  After recovering from the astonishment with which I viewed these wonders, I said: “What is this loud and agreeable sound that fills my ears?”
“That is produced,” he replied, “by the onward rush and motion of the spheres themselves; the intervals between them, though unequal, being exactly arranged in a fixed proportion, by an agreeable blending of high and low tones various harmonies are produced; for such mighty motions cannot be carried on so swiftly in silence; and Nature has provided that one extreme shall produce low tones while the other gives forth high. Therefore this uppermost sphere of heaven, which bears the stars, as it revolves more rapidly, produces a high, shrill tone, whereas the lowest revolving sphere, that of the Moon, gives forth the lowest tone; for the earthly sphere, the ninth, remains ever motionless and stationary in its position in the centre of the universe. But the other eight spheres, two of which move with the same velocity, produce seven different sounds, - a number which is the key of almost everything. Learned men, by imitating this harmony on stringed instruments and in song, have gained for themselves a return to this region, as others have obtained the same reward by devoting their brilliant intellects to divine pursuits during their earthly lives.

§ 6.19  Men: s ears, ever filled with this sound, have become deaf to it , for you have no duller sense than that of hearing. We find a similar phenomenon where the Nile rushes down from those lofty mountains at the place called Catadupa; the people who live nearby have lost their sense of hearing on account of the loudness of the sound. But this mighty music, produced by the revolution of the whole universe at the highest speed, cannot be perceived by human ears, any more than you can look straight at the Sun, your sense of sight being overpowered by its radiance. ”
While gazing at these wonders, I was repeatedly turning my eyes back to earth. {19.}

§ 6.20  Then Africanus resumed: "I see that you are still directing your gaze upon the habitation and abode of men. If it seems small to you, as it actually is, keep your gaze fixed upon these heavenly things, and scorn the earthly. For what fame can you gain from the speech of men, or what glory that is worth the seeking? You see that the earth is inhabited in only a few portions, and those very small, while vast deserts lie between those inhabited patches, as we may call them; you see that the inhabitants are so widely separated that there can be no communication whatever among the different areas; and that some of the inhabitants live in parts of the earth that are oblique, transverse, and sometimes directly opposite your own; from such you can expect nothing surely that is glory.

§ 6.21  “Besides, you will notice that the earth is surrounded and encircled by certain zones, of which the two that are most widely separated, and are supported by the opposite poles of heaven, are held in icy bonds, while the central and broadest zone is scorched by the heat of the sun. Two zones are habitable, of these the southern (the footsteps of whose inhabitants are opposite to yours ) has no connection whatever with your zone. Examine this northern zone which you inhabit, and you will see what a small portion of it belongs to you Romans. For that whole territory which you hold, being narrow from North to South, and broader from East to West, is really only a small island surrounded by that sea which you on the earth call the Atlantic, the Great Sea, or the Ocean. Now you see how small it is in spite of its proud name!

§ 6.22  Do you suppose that your fame or that of any of us could ever go beyond those settled and explored regions by climbing the Caucasus, which you see there, or by swimming the Ganges? What inhabitants of those distant lands of the rising or setting sun, or the extreme North or South, will ever hear your name? Leave out all these and you cannot fail to see what a narrow territory it is over which your glory is so eager to spread. And how long will even those who do talk of us now continue so to do ?

§ 6.23  ”But even if future generations should wish to hand down to those yet unborn the eulogies of every one of us which they received from their fathers, nevertheless the floods and conflagrations which necessarily happen on the earth at stated intervals would prevent us from gaining a glory which could even be long-enduring, much less eternal. But of what importance is it to you to be talked of by those who are born after you, when you were never mentioned by those who lived before you,

§ 6.24  who were no less numerous and were certainly better men; especially as not one of those who may hear our names can retain any recollection for the space of a single year? For people commonly measure the year by the circuit of the sun, that is, of a single star alone; but when all the stars return to the place from which they at first set forth, and, at long intervals, restore the original configuration of the whole heaven, then that can truly be called a revolving year. I hardly dare to say how many generations of men are contained within such a year; for as once the sun appeared to men to be eclipsed and blotted out, at the time when the soul of Romulus entered these regions, so when the sun shall again be eclipsed at the same point and in the same season, you may believe that all the planets and stars have returned to their original positions, and that a year has actually elapsed. But be sure that a twentieth part of such a year has not yet passed.

§ 6.25  “Consequently, if you despair of ever returning to this place, where eminent and excellent men find their true reward, of how little value, indeed, is your fame among men, which can hardly endure for the small part of a single year? Therefore, if you will only look on high and contemplate this eternal home and resting place, you will no longer attend to the gossip of the vulgar herd or put your trust in human rewards for your exploits. Virtue herself, by her own charms, should lead you on to true glory. Let what others say of you be their own concern, whatever it is, they will say it in any ease. But all their talk is limited to those narrow regions which you look upon, nor will any man's reputation endure very long, for what men say dies with them and is blotted out with the forgetfulness of posterity. ”

§ 6.26  When he had spoken thus, I said: “If indeed a path to heaven, as it were, is open to those who have served their country well, henceforth I will redouble my efforts, spurred on by so splendid a reward, though even from my boyhood I have followed in the footsteps of my father and yourself, and have not failed to emulate your glory. ”
He answered: “Strive on indeed, and be sure that it is not you that is mortal, but only your body. For that man whom your outward form reveals is not yourself; the spirit is the true self, not that physical figure which can be pointed out by the finger. Know, then, that you are a god, if a god is that which lives, feels, remembers, and foresees, and which rules, governs, and moves the body over which it is set, just as the supreme God above us rules this universe. And just as the eternal God moves the universe, which is partly mortal, so an immortal spirit moves the frail body.

§ 6.27  ”For that which is always in motion is eternal, but that which communicates motion to something else, but is itself moved by another force, necessarily ceases to live when this motion ends. Therefore only that which moves itself never ceases its motion, because it never abandons itself - nay, it is the source and first cause of motion in all other things that are moved. But this first cause has itself no beginning, for everything originates from the first cause, while it can never originate from anything else; for that would not be a first cause which owed its origin to anything else And since it never had a beginning, it will never have an end. For if a first cause were destroyed, it could never be reborn from anything else, nor could it bring anything else into being; since everything must originate from a first cause. Thus it follows that motion begins with that which is moved of itself, but this can neither be born nor die, or else all the heavens must fall and all nature perish, possessing no force from which they can receive the first impulse to motion

§ 6.28  “Therefore, now that it is clear that what moves of itself is eternal, who can deny that this is the nature of spirits? For whatever is moved by an external impulse is spiritless, but whatever possesses a spirit is moved by an inner impulse of its own, for that is the peculiar nature and property of a spirit. And as a spirit is the only force that moves itself, it surely has no beginning and is immortal.

§ 6.29  Use it, therefore, in the best pursuits! And the best tasks are those undertaken in defence of your native land; a spirit occupied and trained in such activities will have a swifter flight to this, its proper home and permanent abode. And this flight will be still more rapid if, while still confined in the body, it looks abroad, and, by contemplating what lies outside itself, detaches itself as much as may be from the body. For the spirits of those who are given over to sensual pleasures and have become their slaves, as it were, and who violate the laws of gods and men at the instigation of those desires which are subservient to pleasure - their spirits, after leaving their bodies, fly about close to the earth, and do not return to this place except after many ages of torture.”
He departed, and I awoke from my sleep.
UNPLACED FRAGMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC
[fr.1] . . . and Nature herself would not only invite, but even compel this.
[fr.2] Fannius, it is a difficult matter to praise a boy; for praise must then be given to hope, not to achievement
[fr.3]
If fate let man ascend to heavenly heights
To me alone the great gates open wide.
. . . Quite true, Africanus, for that same gate stood open to Hercules.
[fr.4] Since we have been recalled from the very goal itself by his interruption. . .
A man to whom nor friend nor foe could give
A just repayment for his deeds of might.
[fr.5] All who attempt to win men's favour by banquets or dinners or extravagant entertainments show clearly that they lack true honour, which comes from virtue and merit.
[fr.6] Confidence ought to be won gradually and quietly, not by force or sudden attack.
[fr.7] There is no pattern to which we should prefer to make the State conform.
[fr.8] . . . treaty-breaking Africans. . .