§ 1  I think, gentlemen of the jury, that I shall have no lack of witnesses, for I see many of you sitting on the jury who were present when Lysitheos was impeaching Theomnestus for speaking in the Assembly when it was illegal, as he had thrown away his shield. In that trial he said I had killed my father.

§ 2  Now if he had claimed I had killed his father, I should have overlooked his words, (for I thought him of no account and insignificant), (3) but now it seems a disgrace not to punish, a man who said this in relation to my father, who benefited you and the state so signally. And now I wish to know from you whether he shall pay the penalty, or whether he alone of the Athenians is allowed to act and speak illegally just as he pleases.

§ 4  This is my thirty-third year, gentlemen of the jury, and the twentieth since the restoration (of the Democracy). So I was clearly thirteen years old when my father died at the hands of the Thirty. At that age I neither understood what an oligarchy was, nor could I have helped my father under his unjust treatment.

§ 5  And I could not have had reason to plot against him for the sake of the money, for my elder brother Pantaleon took everything and as guardian took our patrimony, so that on many accounts, gentlemen of the jury, it was for my interest to desire my father's life. So it is necessary to call these facts to your minds, and I shall need but few words; you know well enough that I speak the truth. And nevertheless I will furnish evidence for these facts. EVIDENCE.

§ 6  Now probably, gentlemen of the jury, he will make no denial of these facts, but will say before you, as he dared to affirm before the arbiter, that one does not use a forbidden word in saying some one has "killed" his father, for the law does not forbid this, but forbids the use of the word "homicide."

§ 7  But I think that you should make your decision not about the letter of the law, but its intention. You all know that those who kill others are homicides, and those who are homicides kill others. For it would be a great task for a lawgiver to write all the words having the same signification, but in mentioning one term, his meaning covers all.

§ 8  This is the case then, is it not, Theomnestus, — if any one called you a beater of father or mother, you would think he should be punished, but if any one said you beat your father or mother, you would then think he should go unfined as saying no forbidden word!

§ 9  For I should like to hear from you (for in this you are skilled in practice and speech). If any one should say you "flung away" your shield, and in the law was written that a man was liable to punishment if any one declares he "threw it away," would you not have prosecuted him, and would it have been enough for you to say if some one declared you "flung it away," I do not care, for flinging and throwing are not the same thing.

§ 10  Now could you admit the charge as one of the Eleven, if some one brought in a man on the charge of having stripped off his cloak or shirt but you would have discharged him because he was not called a "clothesstealer." And if any one should be caught carrying off a boy, you would not say he was a kidnapper, if you quibble with terms, and will not pay attention to the facts to express which terms are invented.

§ 11  Consider this now, gentlemen of the jury. For this man seems never to have gone to the Areopagus through indolence and indifference. For you all know that there, whenever they are conducting a trial for murder, they do not make their depositions with this term, but with that by which I have been abused. For the prosecutor makes a deposition that "he killed," the defendant that "he did not kill."

§ 12  Accordingly it would be absurd to acquit the one who evidently committed murder because he pleads he is a murderer, when the prosecutor charges the defendant of "killing." For what is the difference of which this man speaks? And you yourself brought suit against Theon for saying you "flung away" your shield. Nothing is said in the law about "flinging," but if any one declared he has "thrown away" his shield, it decrees a fine of 500 drachmae.

§ 13  Would it not be terrible if whenever it were necessary for you to punish your enemies for slander, for you to interpret the laws as I do now, but whenever you speak illegally of another, to think you ought not to be punished? Are you so powerful as to be able to employ the laws as you wish, or have you such influence as to believe that those whom you wrong will not get a recompense?

§ 14  Are you not ashamed to have the thought that you should claim advantages, not from your services to the state, but from your unpunished deeds? But read me the law. LAW.

§ 15  I now, gentlemen of the jury, assume that you all know that I speak to the point, but he is so clumsy that he cannot understand what is said. So I wish to inform him also from other laws about these things, that even now while he is on the platform, he may be informed and may give you no further trouble. Now read me the old laws of Solon.

§ 16  Law. Let him be bound, in the stocks by the feet, if the court decrees it in addition. The "stocks," Theomnestus, is the same thing which is now called the "pillory." If then a man who has been bound should on his release complain when the Eleven were undergoing their audit that he had not been bound in stocks but in the pillory, would they not think him crazy? Read another law.

§ 17  Law. Let him give security, having sworn by Apollo, fearing to escape on account of the penalty. The (old-fashioned) "swearing falsely" now means "swearing by," and "running off" is our "escape." And whoever shuts a door with a thief inside. The "close" is our "shut" and means the same.

§ 18  Money may be at interest at whatever rate the lender wishes. The "interest," my good friend, is not "weighed," but draws whatever percent is wished. Read now the last law.

§ 19  As many as go about in plain view, and He shall be responsible for injury to a domestic or female slave. Now attend. The "in plain view" is "openly," the "go about" is "walk the streets," the "domestic" is "servant." And there are many other such cases, gentlemen of the jury.

§ 20  And unless this man is stupid, I think he understands that these matters are the same now as in antiquity, but that we now employ different terms for them. And he will show (his consciousness), for he will withdraw from the platform in silence.

§ 21  And if he does not, I beg you, gentlemen of the jury, to vote what is just, bearing in mind that it is a much greater evil to hear that one has killed his father than to hear that he has thrown away his shield. I at least would rather have thrown away all my shields, rather than to have such a report (circulated) in relation to my father.

§ 22  So this man, being liable to that charge, for which the penalty would have been less (than mine for this), not only was acquitted by you, but brought disfranchisement upon a witness. And I have seen him doing that which you know of, and I myself rescued his shield and yet am charged with a deed so lawless and terrible. Now as I shall have the worst fate if he escapes, and his penalty if convicted of slander will not be what he deserves, shall I not obtain satisfaction from him? What charge have you against me?

§ 23  That there was justice in his accusation? But you yourselves would not say so. That the defendant is a nobler man and from nobler family than I? Not even he would claim that. That, having thrown away my shield, I am accused of libel by the one who rescued it? Such is not the story about town.

§ 24  But remember that you rendered him that great favor. In this matter who would not pity Dionysius that he met with such misfortune, a noble man who fell into danger, coming from the dicastery, saying (25) that we had made a most unfortunate expedition, where many lost their lives and others who saved their shields were convicted of perjury by those who threw theirs away? Were it not better for him to have died there rather than to come home to such a fate?

§ 26  So do not pity Theomnestus that he is ill-spoken of as he deserves, and do not give judgment in his favor while he insults (me) and speaks illegally. For what greater sorrow could befall me than this, to hear such base charges in relation to such a father?

§ 27  He often served as Strategus, and ran many other risks for you. And he was never made prisoner by the enemy, nor lost a suit to the state through his audit, and at sixty years of age he was put to death under the oligarchy through his devotion to the people.

§ 28  Am I not justified in my anger against the slanderer, and in coming to my father's rescue as if he were slandered by this charge? For what could be more distressing to him than this, to die at the hands of enemies and to have the reproach of having been put to death by his own children. His trophies of valor, gentlemen of the jury, even now hang on your shrines, but the trophies of the cowardice of this man (Theon) and his father are in an enemy's temple, so inborn is their baseness.

§ 29  And so, gentlemen of the jury, the more these are brave to all appearances, the more they deserve our anger, for they are evidently strong in body, but weak in spirit.

§ 30  I hear, gentlemen of the jury, that he will resort to the argument that he spoke in anger as I offered the same testimony as Dionysius. Bear in mind, gentlemen of the jury, that the law gives no pardon to anger, but fines one who cannot prove the truth of his words. And I twice gave evidence, not realizing that you punish witnesses and pardon those who throw away their shields.

§ 31  So about these things I do not know what more I ought to say. But I beg you to condemn Theon, bearing in mind that no trial could be more important to me. For I prosecute him for slander and by the same vote I am acquitted of the murder of my father, I, who by myself, as soon as I came of age, indicted the Thirty in the Areopagus. Recalling this, aid me and my father, and (stand by) the laws and the oaths which you have taken.